Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 October 2019
This chapter examines the awareness of modern philosophy and its methods that Scottish thinkers brought to bear on the workings of the human mind. Both George Turnbull and Thomas Reid extend elements of Newton’s regulae, while they and others also deploy methods from Bacon, natural history, and the experimental philosophy more generally. Locke figures also as an important source of explanation for perception, and the Scots, principally Francis Hutcheson, extend this perceptual model to account for the sense of beauty and the moral sense. Both Turnbull and David Hume are notable for their constructive development of associationism, while Reid, emphasizing the objects of the mind s conscious awareness, introduces a new realism into Scottish philosophy.
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