

happiness and the related belief in the unlimited possibilities of scientific progress. The last part of the book shows that although in essentials the period under review may be regarded as the overture to the age of rationalist enlightenment (an overture in which all the *leitmotifs* are anticipated), it was by no means utterly devoid of pre-Romantic trends. Thus the conclusion is reached: 'In this era, so turbid, so crowded with events, that it seems at first sight a mere welter of confusion, there took their rise two great streams which were to flow on through the whole of the century'.

Can the rationalist stream not be traced still further back? Indeed, it has been argued, most recently again by Andreas Flitner in his learned study on *Erasmus im Urteil seiner Nachwelt* (Tübingen, 1952), that Hazard, in his analysis of the secularisation of European culture, did not sufficiently stress the indebtedness of this initial period of the *Aufklärung* to the more remote era of the Renaissance. In view of what the author himself remarks on this problem (pp. 252, 442), it would seem that the criticism is not quite justified. Surely it lies in the nature of things that a study in which the attention is focused on a chosen period cannot give a detailed account of all the roots of that period.

Two points, however, suggest themselves to the present reviewer. First, as regards the construction of the work itself, so important a feature as the advent of tolerance should perhaps have been treated in a special chapter, rather than be included, almost as an afterthought, in the chapter 'Happiness on Earth'. Second, and more important: the French edition included a slim volume of *Notes et Références* (160 pp.), full of useful and stimulating bibliographical suggestions. If for some reason or other it has proved impracticable to include the extra material in the English edition, this deviation from the French edition ought to have been pointed out in the preface to the present volume.

Before he died, Paul Hazard completed the manuscript of a sequel to this work; it was published in Paris in 1946 under the title *La Pensée Européenne au XVIIIe Siècle. De Montesquieu à Lessing*. It is most gratifying to learn that the posthumous publication too will appear in an English edition.

H. G. SCHENK

BORN TO BELIEVE. By Lord Pakenham. (Cape; 18s.)

Future historians of the first half of the twentieth century will be fortunate in the social documentation provided by the spate of autobiographies so characteristic of that period. Yet for the most part they will be able to learn very little of the character of the men and women who wrote them. So far this has been particularly true of the autobiographies that have come from a university milieu. Thus among them Mr

A. L. Rowse's *Cornish Childhood* seems sure to survive to become a classic, and the memories of Sir Charles Oman will remain a major quarry for the historians of Oxford. Yet no one could ever learn from them the true personalities of their authors. It has become almost a platitude that the historic value of modern autobiographies consists in the representation of the writers' social context—not of the writer. With *Born to Believe* this has been reversed.

It is one of the most readable of all autobiographies. It contains a number of admirable stories admirably told; perhaps the most entrancing is the anecdote about Earl Baldwin and Sir Henry Maine. But as an exact contemporary of Lord Pakenham, who has known the great majority of the personalities to whom he refers, I have read and re-read it and enjoyed and re-enjoyed it, yet feel convinced that as a social record it is so incomplete as to be unintentionally misleading. In the first place the over-all impression is that of niceness and cleanness; so much could be written in praise of the twenties and thirties, but they were surely no more nice or clean than the last decades of the Roman empire. Secondly, the great historic figures of that period seem treated with deliberate reticence; this would seem to be particularly true, though surely for quite different reasons, of both the first Lord Birkenhead and Mr Ernest Bevin. Thirdly, the terms of generous praise selected by Lord Pakenham so often fail to fit; it is not that he overpraises but he seems so frequently to suggest some rather unsuitable pigeon-hole. Thus Dom Paul Nevill should be remembered not only as the virtual creator of a great public school but as the heir, perhaps the last heir, to a great tradition in nineteenth-century English education. Very little of the character of his achievement is conveyed by the statement that he is in close touch with 'the fierce intellectual life of the century'. The late Lord Lindsay of Birker was a most complex personality. No one who has worked with him could doubt the post-Puritan fervour of his convictions and the blinding sincerity with which he subordinated means to ends. Lord Pakenham primarily commemorates him as the most upright and morally sensitive of politicians. It would be very difficult to overpraise the fastidious distinction both in sensibility and in thought that marks Lord David Cecil. But can it really be true that he 'improves the self-esteem of all who are with him'? It is only right that Mr Dundas should be commemorated among famous bachelor dons, but is it correct to imply that all Christ Church men ask after him eagerly? Is the giving of 'security' the exact note of the rule of the present President of Magdalen? Something of Basil Dufferin is conveyed completely—but that is through a citation from John Betjeman. Besides the author, only two characters in *Born to Believe* come completely, intrinsically, convincingly, alive: they are those of his father and of his wife; perhaps because he cares for both so deeply that they have become part of himself.

For though *Born to Believe* may be inadequate as a contribution to the history of the last thirty years it is completely successful as an unconscious self-portrayal. Perhaps it is precisely because it was never intended as self-revelation that it is so self-revealing. Studying it in the year 2000 an historian could at least learn from it who and what Frank Pakenham was—the Lord Edward Fitzgerald of our time.

GERVASE MATHEW, O.P.

SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNISM. By Jules Monnerot. Translated by Jane Degras and Richard Rees. (George Allen and Unwin; 30s.)

The other day the editor of one of the left-wing weeklies, wise after the event, was able to write with all solemnity of 'Stalin's perversion of Communism'. This is a typical result of the polyvalent nature of Communism, for despite the spate of books which pour from the presses on Communism, Marxism, Stalinism, written by Communists, ex-Communists and anti-Communists, there is no agreement about the definition of Communism itself. For some it is more of a method of discovery than a complete system of beliefs, while for others it provides an order which they cannot find elsewhere in their scientific work. For M. Monnerot these sympathisers, whose numbers are far greater than those of believers, are 'men of the threshold', all of them blinding themselves to some aspects of the complete system. Hence M. Monnerot's approach, writing as a historical and psychological sociologist with a fine objective strain, is valuable. He treats Communism as a broad sociological fact and a total social phenomenon, showing how Marx (in his later stage) was the prophet, and the decisive influence of Lenin in his *What is to be done?* which turned the party into a para-military organisation. 'During the nineteenth century world history seemed to be at the mercy of economic forces: but the twentieth century has been remarkable for a determined effort to control history by ideology, and the bolsheviks have undertaken, in the name of historical materialism, to impose the will of a few individuals upon the entire human world. Lenin inaugurated *the era of staff campaigns*.' M. Monnerot emphasises the mobile and dynamic character of Communism by frequent references to 'the campaign': the Party is the means of permanent revolution.

Russian Communism is a military organisation with outposts of its army in most countries of the world, and it uses domestic policy as infantry and foreign policy as artillery. But more important than this, it is a religion; and although *sui generis* as a secular religion, M. Monnerot finds many points of similarity with Islam. The sharp distinction made in liberal thought between religion and politics is no longer recognised, the search for a middle term between the desirable and the possible has been abandoned in favour of pursuing historical necessity. Although it is stiff reading,