

CLEARCHUS OF SOLI

MAYHEW (R.), MIRHADY (D.C.), DORANDI (T.), WHITE (S.) (edd., trans.) *Clearchus of Soli. Text, Translation, and Discussion*. Pp. x + 612. London and New York: Routledge, 2022. Cased, £120, US \$160. ISBN: 978-0-367-70681-4.

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The volume under review is the latest instalment in the series *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities (RUSCH)*. The series, created in conjunction with Project Theophrastus, was originally conceived as a vehicle for publishing the interim results of Project Theophrastus. The aims of *RUSCH* were subsequently broadened to include the publication of editions, with facing translation and interpretative essays, of the extant evidence for the early Peripatetic philosophers besides Aristotle and Theophrastus. The idea was to provide scholars and advanced students with an alternative to the collections of fragments produced by F. Wehrli and published under the collective title *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (the second, expanded and corrected, edition of this commendable project was published in 1969). One obvious improvement is this: Wehrli did not provide a translation of the texts he edited, whereas all the volumes published in *RUSCH* have a facing translation. To date, the following volumes have appeared in the series: Demetrius of Phalerum (2000), Dicaearchus of Messana (2001), Lycos of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes (2004), Aristo of Ceos (2006), Heraclides of Pontus (2008), Strato of Lampsacus (2011), Paxiphanes of Mytilene and Chamaeleon of Heraclea (2012), Phaenias of Eresus (2015).

We have no precise dates for the activity of Clearchus of Soli, but a few of our ancient sources tell us that he was not only a Peripatetic philosopher but also a direct student and an associate of Aristotle. We have no reason to doubt his affiliation to the early Peripatos and close acquaintance with Aristotle. Hence, his activity can be safely dated to the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the third century BCE. Plutarch of Chaeronea tells us that Clearchus distorted many views of his teacher (*On the Face of the Moon* 920 F; Text 116 in the volume under review). But since the early Peripatos was hospitable to different positions, we can take this testimony to be evidence of how his views were received in the later philosophical tradition, rather than evidence of how Clearchus considered his philosophical contribution with respect to Aristotle. In fact, this contribution remains elusive even after the publication of this volume due to the sparse and fragmentary nature of the extant evidence.

A first goal of any collection of sources (where ‘sources’ is to be understood in the broad sense of testimonies rather than in the strict sense of fragments) is to offer a collection as complete and reliable as possible. The list of concordances on pp. 286–306 helps us establish that the collection is fuller than the ones published by Wehrli (1969²) and I. Taifakos (2008). The sources have been selected and edited by Dorandi, organised as follows: Writings (T 1); Plato and the Academy (2–11); Ethics (12–66); Literary Studies (67–104); Natural History (105–15); Unassigned Texts (116–23); Doubtful (124–9); Spurious (130).

The editorial criteria adopted are not different from those followed in other volumes on early Peripatetic philosophers published under the aegis of Project Theophrastus. What is new in this edition, compared with the previous ones, is the addition of a *Subsidium interpretationis*, which consists of a set of critical and exegetical notes to supply additional textual or exegetical information. The *Subsidium*, written in Latin, combined with the bridge texts that White presents in the facing translation provide readers with much-needed

context. They jointly offer a first orientation for the information collected in the first part of the volume.

While the first part of the volume consists of the collection of sources, the second is best described as a selective discussion of the evidence gathered in the first part. This discussion takes initially the form of an in-depth study of the putative evidence that Clearchus was influenced by Plato in his views on the soul (R. Schorlemmer) with a focus on his dualistic account of the soul in the treatment of sleep (F. Verde). This is a *locus classicus* of scholarship: interpreters have often tried to establish whether Clearchus was a free thinker or a rebellious student and whether he was drawn more to Plato than to Aristotle. In light of this, it makes sense to start the reassessment of Clearchus' contribution to ancient thought from there. We cannot rule out a Platonic, or even an Orphic and Pythagorean, influence on Clearchus, as suggested by Schorlemmer, but the overall impression is that we cannot make significant progress on this front due to the lack of clear and complete evidence.

The extant evidence for the following lost works is discussed: *On education* (W. Ax), *On love* (White) and *On the ways of life* (W. Fortenbaugh). While it is true that Clearchus comes across as a multifaceted author whose interests fit well with what we know about the cultural horizon of the early Peripatos (p. 9), we would like to be able to establish connections among those interests so as to delineate a coherent intellectual, or even philosophical, profile for Clearchus. Unfortunately, the evidence makes it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve this goal. We can only say that Clearchus concerned himself with the topics of *paideia* and *eros* as well as with a certain number of kinds of *bioi* (most likely with the intention of establishing the best mode of life for an ethical agent).

The extant evidence for Clearchus betrays a keen interest in popular and ancient wisdom transmitted in the form of sayings (*paroimiai*). This interest fits well with the testimonies on the activity of the early Peripatos since not only Aristotle but also Theophrastus and Dicaearchus are credited by our ancient sources with collections of maxims. The evidence is discussed in separate but well-coordinated essays by A. Zucker and G. Verhasselt. They offer a convincing analysis of what remains of this interest.

The final two essays deal with topics that fall within the scope of Peripatetic natural philosophy. The first is concerned with the interest on the part of Clearchus for the study of animals (O. Hellmann). We must evaluate this evidence in the context of what we know not only for Aristotle and Theophrastus but also for Eudemus and Phaenias. At the very least we can say that there was a sustained and coordinated effort to study animals and plants from within the theoretical framework that Aristotle provided in his extant biological works. The second essay (Mayhew) focuses on Clearchus' putative explanation of the so-called face of the moon preserved by Plutarch. The problem for any Peripatetic philosopher is how to account for what we see on the surface of the moon vis-à-vis the Aristotelian claim that the moon is made of a special simple body different from earth, water, air and fire. A solution in line with the Aristotelian doctrine would consist of claiming that the moon is not only made of this special simple body but rather, due to its proximity to the sublunary world, a mixture of this special celestial body and the sublunary bodies. Instead, according to Plutarch, Clearchus argued that the so-called face of the moon is an image of the ocean reflected on the moon. This testimony enjoyed great fortune well beyond the narrow boundaries of antiquity. What matters to us is that Plutarch used this evidence to claim that Clearchus was not a loyal student of Aristotle. But Plutarch is projecting his own expectations on loyalty and philosophical allegiance back onto Clearchus.

We should be grateful to the contributors to this volume for reassessing the sparse and meagre evidence on Clearchus, which is far from being an easy, or for that matter

rewarding, task. In fact, it is at times a frustrating experience due to the almost complete lack of evidence. In the process, however, they have produced a solid piece of scholarship, which goes beyond what has been accomplished by previous scholars (most notably, S. Tsitsiridis [2013]). The volume will remain the reference book on Clearchus for quite some time.

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FORMATS OF CITATION IN CHRYSIPPUS

RIEDL (T.) *Argument und Dichtung. Dichterzitate bei Chrysipp von Soloi*. (Philosophie und Literatur 2.) Pp. 406. Baden-Baden: Academia, 2023. Paper, €84. ISBN: 978-3-98572-042-2.

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On the one hand, a study of poetic quotations in Chrysippus seems a worthwhile endeavour; for after all, according to several testimonies, the use and interpretation of poetry plays a central role in this Stoic's discourse. On the other hand, it seems a nearly impossible endeavour, as Chrysippus is only preserved via the indirect tradition – so one has to handle the fact that the excerptors have obliterated the original citation technique. Nevertheless, in the present book, which emerged from a dissertation at Vienna, R. attempts to undertake this worthwhile and almost impossible endeavour – and, let it be said in advance, he succeeds with this careful study. R. sets out the dilemma just indicated in the introduction: those fragments in which poetry quotations are found come from three sources, and each brings with it certain difficulties (especially, in startling density, p. 42): Galenus is the most important source for quotations on Chrysippus' doctrine of the soul and affects, but he places them in his own context and selects them accordingly. The situation is even more complex in the case of the Epicurean Diogenianus, who is only preserved in excerpts from the Christian Eusebius in his *Praeparatio Evangelica* – thus Chrysippus can only be glimpsed in double refraction. Finally, in Plutarch's *De Stoicorum repugnantis* (pp. 45–6) the quotations from Chrysippus are obviously based on the premise of proving logical breaks in his argument, i.e. they are a priori tendentious.

R. aims to do justice to this situation with a clear methodology. This refers in particular to the concept and terminology of the quotation: R. speaks of the four elements of the quotation ('Die vier Elemente des Zitats'), referring to the pre-text ('Prätexit'), the subsequent text ('Folgetext'), the quotation segment ('Zitatsegment') and the marking ('Markierung'). This creates a clear operational model and integrates the study into a series of other recent works on the morphology and function of quotations in philosophical discourse, although the designation of the marking as an element ('Element') or constituent ('Bestandteil') of the quotation is perhaps somewhat unfortunate: the follow-up text, the pre-text and the quotation segment are textual in character, whereas the marking is rather a metatextual descriptive criterion: it can be textually reflected in a constituent (e.g. 'Homer says: ...'), but it can also consist in the conscious absence of any textual marker