

BRAZILIAN REGIONALISM

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RIO GRANDE DO SUL AND BRAZILIAN REGIONALISM. by JOSEPH L. LOVE.
(Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1971. \$12.50.)

MINAS GERAIS IN THE BRAZILIAN FEDERATION, 1889–1937. By JOHN D. WIRTH. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1977. Pp. 322. \$17.50.)

PERNAMBUCO IN THE BRAZILIAN FEDERATION, 1889–1937. By ROBERT M. LEVINE. (Stanford Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1978. Pp. 236. \$17.50.)

SÃO PAULO IN THE BRAZILIAN FEDERATION, 1889–1937. By JOSEPH L. LOVE. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1980. \$17.50.)

The founding of the First Brazilian Republic in 1889 initiated a process of political and administrative decentralization that seems peculiarly out of step with the dominant historical trend of the period. Indeed, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed greater centralization of government throughout Latin America, as well as the rise of strong nation-states in the wake of unification movements in Europe, Asia, and the United States. Thus, at a time when countries in both the New and Old Worlds were forging new national identities and cross-regional alliances, the Brazilian elites were inaugurating a political system that left the formation of political parties and bureaucracies, and the collection of most revenues, to the individual states. Presumably, decentralization on such a broad scale could only reinforce regionalist sentiment, and place Brazil outside the mainstream of history.

However, if we take a closer look at the process of unification and centralization in countries like Italy and the United States, or the rise of national elites in Latin America itself, we can discern patterns of change that, curiously enough, have several elements in common with Brazilian decentralization. In virtually every case, the emerging capitalist class gained control over certain powers of the state through an alliance with agrarian elites in less developed regions. The political power of these rising bourgeoisies varied considerably, depending upon the degree and scope of capitalist development, and the attendant development of communication and transport facilities that would allow both the widespread penetration of commodity relations and the effective use of force, if necessary, by the central government. Consequently, in countries

where the physical obstacles were particularly acute, or where the shift to the capitalist mode of production was only partial, the emergence of a capitalist class seeking power at the national level could actually strengthen the power of traditional elites at the regional level. That is, in order for the “progressive” economic classes in these nations to gain control over key governmental functions and revenues essential to their continued prosperity, they needed to secure the cooperation of noncapitalist elites. In doing so, they ceded certain political powers and patronage rights to the ruling groups in the less-developed regions, thereby increasing the capacity of these groups to dominate economic and political life in their traditional bailiwicks.¹

Viewed from this perspective, the political history of Brazil’s Old Republic seems much less anomalous. The fall of the monarchy, and the subsequent fiscal and administrative decentralization, provided the elite of São Paulo with sufficient revenues to facilitate that state’s incipient transition to the capitalist mode of production in both the rural and urban sectors. As for control over the state, or at least over areas of decision-making that might impinge upon the state economy, the Paulistas assured themselves of a preeminent position in the federal government through an alliance with the elite of Minas Gerais, a populous but less-developed neighboring state which stood to gain both political power and a substantial portion of federal patronage as São Paulo’s ally. Together, the Paulistas and Mineiros created the machinery for the *política dos governadores*: according to this unwritten arrangement, the various governors or state bosses were granted near-complete autonomy in their particular domains. In return, they were expected to cede control over the presidency and other strategic federal posts to the Paulista and Mineiro elites. In short, decentralization vastly increased the revenues at São Paulo’s disposal, and allowed the Paulistas to gain direct influence over key functions of the federal administration, thereby accelerating their state’s emergence as Brazil’s leading center of capitalist development. At the same time, the *política dos governadores* extended the power and prerogatives of the regional elites in the less-developed states beyond the bounds established under the previous regime.

As a result of this new arrangement, regionalism became a fundamental fact of political life for the Brazilian elites. The Center-South states, which controlled the federal government, did try to keep as tight a rein as possible on the regional political machines, but meager federal resources and the sheer size of the nation made discipline difficult to enforce. Consequently, not a single stable political party of national scope arose during the Old Republic; moreover, everything from tax collection to the administration of public lands remained highly decentralized.² Clearly, this means that any study of republican politics that focuses solely on events and developments in Rio, or on the policies

of the various presidents, will be telling us less than half the story. Only by examining the way in which politics operated in the different regions, and how the state political elites interacted with the central administration, can we begin to understand the dynamics of the Old Republic.

Despite the obvious need for a regional approach, only in the past decade did a series of studies begin to appear that emphasized politics in the individual states.³ One of the first was Joseph L. Love's *Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism*, published in 1971. Love's account of *gaúcho* politics detailed the impact of republicanism and decentralization on Brazil's southernmost state. And Rio Grande do Sul was a particularly appropriate starting point since, as Love carefully shows, it produced one of the strongest and most durable state political machines. Indeed, during the republican years, the *gaúchos* could probably be credited with the fiercest sense of regional loyalty in all of Brazil. The Riograndenses also had an extremely complex relationship with the federal government. Save for São Paulo, their state was the leading area of economic growth and capitalist development; this relative prosperity, combined with an unusually effective system of revenue collection, allowed the *gaúcho* political machine to create a civil guard rivalled only by São Paulo's *força pública*, making the state all but invulnerable to unwanted federal intervention.

Due to its disciplined state machine and impressive militia, Rio Grande do Sul was able to wield considerable influence in the Brazilian parliament. Love traces in fascinating detail the role of the Riograndenses at the federal level, and especially the congressional career of *gaúcho* strongman José Pinheiro Machado. This self-styled "kingmaker" was for many years one of the most powerful men in the Brazilian senate; he also masterminded the Partido Republicano Conservador, a short-lived attempt to form a national party which, conceivably, could have replaced the *café com leite* alliance (that is, São Paulo and Minas) as the chief locus of decision making at the federal level. Yet even when Pinheiro Machado reached the height of his power, the Paulistas and Mineiros resisted the *gaúchos'* attempts to join the center-south coalition as a full partner, and Rio Grande's adversary relationship with São Paulo intensified during the final years of the Old Republic as the Paulistas sought to arrogate ever greater political powers. Thus, it is little wonder that the well-armed *gaúchos*, under the leadership of Getúlio Vargas (whose campaign for the presidency had just been foiled by the Paulistas), formed the driving wedge of the 1930 revolution signalling the end of the Old Republic and the final collapse of the *café com leite* alliance. It is ironic, however, that *gaúcho* society, with its markedly regionalist orientation, should have produced Getúlio Vargas, the architect of national integration and recentralization.

Rio Grande do Sul certainly played a crucial role in the political

system of the Old Republic, but the state was rather atypical in terms of its economic structure and historical background. Consequently, Love's study tells us much about the basic mechanisms of republican politics, and certain aspects of the First Republic directly involving Rio Grande do Sul, but much of what he has to say about gaúcho politics could hardly be applied to other key states in the Brazilian federation. Due to the sharp regional differences that characterized Brazil during the Old Republic, a single state study, on its own, reveals only one facet of the national political process. Further state-based research was needed to help bring the subject into focus, and to allow for cross-regional comparisons and generalizations.

Fortunately, other studies of regional politics under the Old Republic soon began to appear. Indeed, Love himself continued with the topic, joining forces with John Wirth and Robert Levine to undertake an ambitious and extensive examination of republican politics in three different states.⁴ The fruit of this extraordinary collaborative effort is a trio of independent but coordinated studies, beginning with Wirth's *Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation*, published in 1977. This first volume deals with a state which, despite substantial political power at the federal level, experienced only limited economic growth during the republican period. Next, Levine's *Pernambuco in the Brazilian Federation* provided an account of a state which suffered both political and economic decline during the years under consideration. Finally, in 1980, Love rounded out the three-volume series with his *São Paulo in the Brazilian Federation*, the first detailed account of that state's role in the politics of the Old Republic.

Archival research has, traditionally, been regarded as a rather solitary activity, but these studies demonstrate admirably that the historian need not labor in complete isolation. Each volume is individually authored, but a number of research tasks were carried out on a joint basis. More important, the authors coordinated their respective research projects so that each examined similar documents and statistical data, thereby maximizing the possibilities for cross-regional comparisons. Perhaps the most ambitious example of coordinated data collection is their profile of the political elites in the three states. Using a set definition of political elite, each author compiled a list of his state's leading officeholders, party bosses, magistrates, etc., reconstructing hundreds of biographies, which include information on everything from occupation and education to political experience and foreign ties. As a result of this cooperative effort, we have more statistically comparable data on the republican elite than we could expect from a lone endeavor. In addition, the authors compiled data on regional revenues and expenditures, patterns of officeholding, and generational divisions in all three states that allow for further cross-regional analysis.

Aside from the collection of comparable data, the authors also utilized a common format for all three volumes. Each study opens with the same introduction, the only portion of the series coauthored by the three historians. Subsequent chapters deal with regional geography, economy, and culture, providing the "background" for the meat of the series: sections on state political structures, elite profiles, state-federal relations, integrative mechanisms, and "fiscal federalism." Of course, the nature of the material covered under these headings varies from volume to volume, but the authors generally manage to maintain a certain uniformity in scope and emphasis. Accordingly, each examines the political cleavages within his particular state, and the extent to which the local political elite succeeded in forming a smoothly functioning state machine, and in gaining access to federal patronage. And they each close with a careful consideration of the impact of increasing centralization on the individual states.

The ultimate objective of the three studies, however, goes beyond the merely political. Regionalism is still a very lively issue in Brazil not simply because of lingering emotional loyalties, or residual administrative decentralization, but because of the nation's glaring and seemingly ineradicable regional economic inequalities.⁵ Therefore, it is fitting that Wirth, Levine, and Love should all concern themselves with the way in which politics under the Old Republic affected economic growth and social change in their particular areas. Wirth, for example, shows that the Mineiro elite, by exercising extensive political influence, managed to secure federal funds for railroad building and valorization of the state's coffee crop (in collaboration with São Paulo, of course). This ensured Minas a respectable rate of economic growth in comparison to the impoverished states of the North and Northeast, but left it in a position of "relative decline" vis-à-vis São Paulo. Pernambuco, meanwhile, presents us with a case of outright decline, a situation exacerbated, according to Levine, by the state's weak position at the federal level and meager local revenues due to the falling price of sugar on the international market.

As for São Paulo, Love contends that the Paulista elite, representing primarily the interests of the coffee planting and banking sectors, created a powerful and resilient state machine which used its hegemonic position at the state level and control of the fiscal system at the federal level to appropriate funding and guarantees for economic programs that protected and prolonged the vitality of the São Paulo coffee economy. These, in turn, contributed heavily to the rise of industry since the coffee trade generated much of the capital that was channelled into manufacturing ventures. Thus, the Paulistas' rise to power not only ensured the prosperity of the local export sector, but also led to qualitative changes in the regional economy.⁶

In considering the impact of the political system on economic

development, the three authors have attempted to go well beyond the bounds of traditional political history. Unfortunately, their detailed and thorough narratives of political events and conflicts are not matched by similarly nuanced and perceptive analyses of economic life and social relations. For the most part, the authors restrict themselves to broad descriptions of economic problems, or to issues that were raised in formal political settings and that were the object of official policymaking. Consequently, their very approach to the subject makes it difficult for them to arrive at any conclusions about the relationship between the political and economic spheres that represent a major advance over previous studies.

One fundamental problem is their somewhat narrow definition of politics and political power. For example, when the three authors discuss political elites, they are really referring to the *upper echelons* of those elites. While they each note the key role played by local political bosses and power brokers in the various state machines, and even provide us with colorful portraits of individual *coronéis*, they are far more concerned with the careers and performance of politicians who held national and state-level offices. As a result, the way in which political power was exercised on the municipal level, and the way this reflected and affected local economic structures, receive relatively little attention.⁷ This, in turn, makes it more difficult to understand the relationship between political power and social control, or the precise nature of the economic base of the political elites.

By the same token, the authors fail to be sufficiently rigorous and analytical in their treatment of the political elite. For all the descriptive sections on the members of this elite, and the compilation of standardized biographical data, the authors generally avoid explicit discussion of the interaction between the ruling political groups and the dominant economic classes. There are occasional references to the “political elite and the larger social and economic elite,” but it remains unclear whether we are to assume that the former is a subset of the latter, and whether this is true in all three cases, especially since at other points in their narratives, the authors discuss the political and economic elites as identical sets. Furthermore, none of the authors really grapples with the issue of political differentiation—that is, the emergence of a political and bureaucratic elite with specific “corporate” interests that do not necessarily reflect the needs and demands of the dominant economic class. This is not to say that the authors are unaware of this process: the profiles of the respective political elites demonstrate that most key officials were lawyers or other professionals who, it appears, were not themselves major landowners or merchants, or close kin to either group. Yet all three authors concur that the state governments of Minas, Pernambuco, and São Paulo were generally solicitous of the large landowners’ inter-

ests. Presumably, then, groups that did not directly control the state political machine could still wield political power, whether it be through their ability to control the social order at the local level, or to influence decisions on the state level. But we need to know more about the mechanisms through which such control and influence were exercised before we can understand fully the connections between the economic and political elites, and the extent to which they cooperated in maintaining the existing political order.⁸

Perhaps an even more fundamental problem is the short shrift the authors give to the nature of production and exchange in the various regions and subregions, with Wirth and Levine being particularly remiss in this regard. If Brazil during the First Republic had been a country which had made, in its entirety, the transition to a capitalist mode of production—that is, had become a society in which there was a high rate of capital accumulation, where the vast majority of the population had been separated from the means of production, and where labor was generally compensated on a wage basis—then the authors might reasonably presume a certain uniformity of interests and economic behavior on the part of the regional elites. However, in socioeconomic terms, Brazil was anything but homogeneous. Of the three states studied (excluding Love's earlier work on Rio Grande do Sul), only São Paulo had a labor force regularly recruited on a wage basis; elsewhere, work arrangements tended to be more "paternalistic" or coercive, with the threat of violence and/or offers of usufruct rights on marginal lands being the usual inducements.⁹

These variations, naturally, would generate very different types of relationships between local economic elites and the rural population, and would affect the way in which municipal political bosses exercised their power, as well as their attitudes toward the state. As Linda Lewin points out in her study of politics in Paraíba, elites in areas which had been integrated into the larger commercial network, but still operated on a precapitalist basis, viewed access to economic resources (i.e., land and labor) as synonymous with political power. Indeed, without direct political influence, control over one's land and one's "clients" could prove to be ephemeral and subject to challenge.¹⁰ Thus, a family attempting to monopolize production and trade in some corner of the interior needed a state machine which recognized the family's supremacy in that area, or at the very least, did not intervene in local politics in any disruptive way. Of course, rural elites might also hope for a steady share of state revenues to help reinforce their dominant position, but would not necessarily trade local autonomy for occasional payoffs from the capital.

Some aspects of this question are implicit in the authors' arguments. For example, all three acknowledge that the effectiveness of a

state machine, and the extent to which a state could present a united front on the federal level, depended upon the ability of the state-level elite to control or appease municipal political bosses and the local interests they represented. Yet, too often the relative success or failure of a state republican party is attributed to its ability to secure and dispense sufficient patronage. This begs the question of how much patronage would be sufficient, and whether political cohesiveness can be viewed as a function of a strictly quantitative variable. Lewin's study of Paraíba and Eul-Soo Pang's study of Bahia demonstrate that elites in less commercialized areas primarily wanted near absolute political power at the local level. They did not object strenuously if the capital or the coastal areas received a disproportionate share of state revenues, but would not brook undue interference in local affairs.¹¹

Such demands for autonomy did not pose immediate or serious problems for the state machine as long as the political elite mainly represented traditional groups with little interest in restructuring regional production and trade. However, with the emergence of new commercial and industrial groups, who not only wanted a lion's share of the available state revenue but who also found it increasingly difficult to tolerate rural family feuds, widespread banditry, or resistance to outsiders, the potential for intrastate conflict heightened. Thus, before we can understand why some states were relatively free of deep-seated disputes, while others were subject to constant disruption, we have to examine the degree of dissonance between the municipal potentates and the state elite, and the extent to which the ruling groups in the capital needed to subordinate the outlying areas to their political and economic control.¹²

Variations in relations of production also have to be considered when exploring the impact of government financial intervention on regional economies. For example, Wirth points out that federal funds allowed the Mineiros to construct the most extensive railroad network in all of Brazil. But the intrusion of a railhead into a predominantly subsistence-oriented subregion of Minas Gerais may have only strengthened the position of a few wealthy local families, thereby making a thoroughgoing transformation of the area even less likely. Lewin contends, for example, that the spread of cotton production in Paraíba led to greater concentration of landholdings and prompted powerful rural families to dominate local commercial activities even more thoroughly than before.¹³ In contrast, the extension of the railroad network in São Paulo seems to have done more than just advance the coffee frontier; it also accelerated the circulation of commodities, the consolidation of the regional market, and the pace of urbanization throughout the interior.¹⁴

Physical improvements resulting from government subsidies may well have facilitated the expansion of markets and accelerated commer-

cialization, but they did not automatically produce fundamental changes in local economies, nor did they necessarily bring any benefits to the larger population. Perhaps the best example of this is the Pernambuco sugar industry where federal funds helped to modernize the milling process without in any way revolutionizing the actual production of sugar cane or raising the general standard of living in that impoverished area.¹⁵ Again, the availability of federal or state financial assistance, while a key variable, is not in itself sufficient to explain the relative success or failure of a regional economic elite. We also have to consider local relations of production, the position of the economic elite vis-à-vis the dominant mode of production, the extent to which the elite shares the vision of the ruling political clique in respect to regional development, and the level of resistance exerted by the local population to changes that could, potentially, erode what little autonomy or independence they still retain.

The authors, to some extent, justify neglecting local social configurations and power relations by citing the blatantly elitist character of politics under the Old Republic. We might ask, though, if it is possible to understand fully the causes and consequences of decentralization without taking into greater account the class structures and relations of production in the regions under examination. By failing to do so, we run the risk of reducing political cleavages and conflicts to nothing more than manifestations of personal rivalries, or the breakdown of political consensus, while ascribing cohesiveness to political acumen and greater party discipline. Such a perspective divorces politics from social and economic problems (except in regard to policymaking and patronage distribution), and grants the political system a degree of autonomy from the social milieu that obscures the reasons why political systems emerge in the first place.

Due to the common methods and interpretations employed by Wirth, Levine, and Love, it is tempting to continue appraising these studies as a unit. Nevertheless, the three volumes are, by no means, cut from whole cloth, and should be at least briefly evaluated as individual and independent efforts. For example, Wirth's study of Minas Gerais was probably the most formidable and difficult undertaking of the three. Minas, with its extensive political clout but limited economic growth, presents an extremely complex case, further complicated by an unusual degree of subregional diversity. It is also, of the four states covered by the authors, the one which has been subjected to the least amount of scrutiny by historians and other scholars. Therefore, Wirth's monograph is a welcome addition to the growing list of regional studies.

Much of the information presented by Wirth will be new even to the specialized reader; particularly notable is his discussion of religion

and the resurgence of Catholicism in the early 1900s. Little is known about the Catholic lay movement of the twenties, which seems to have been stronger in Minas than elsewhere, and Wirth himself does not attempt to analyze the phenomenon in detail since it lies somewhat outside his main concerns. Still, by revealing the extent and significance of this movement in both the cultural and political spheres, his work should help generate further research on this unjustly neglected topic.¹⁶ Wirth also includes a highly provocative discussion of elite social behavior, giving special attention to the “traditional Mineiro family” and the Mineiro’s notorious attachment to hearth and home. Unfortunately, his explanations for this longstanding stereotype tend to be a bit circular in their reasoning, and never really go beyond the parameters of accepted wisdom.

Wirth is at his best when he is guiding the reader through the twists and turns of the fragile *café com leite* alliance, or discussing Minas’ changing role in the federal government. His economic analysis, in contrast, is rather weak—perhaps due to the absence of previous studies of the Mineiro economy. Even in a predominantly political history, a two-page discussion of rural labor seems inadequate, and one can read the entire book without having the slightest idea of how the vast majority of the Mineiro population made its living during these years. Moreover, a recent study of slavery in Minas Gerais has demonstrated that the province had a sizeable peasantry during the nineteenth century, and one can only assume that the number of smallholders and tenants increased following abolition.¹⁷ Yet there is no hint of the existence of a large peasant class in Wirth’s study, nor of its “disappearance,” so we are left with no indication of the role it might have played in the state’s political or economic development.

Pernambuco, unlike Minas, has been the subject of several excellent historical studies, most of them concerned with the state’s economic stagnation and social problems.¹⁸ The political dimension, meanwhile, suffered from relative neglect until the publication of Levine’s study, which approaches the problem of economic decline from a political and institutional perspective. Consequently, we now have a much broader and more intricate picture of Pernambuco’s history during the crucial years of the Old Republic. Essentially, Levine demonstrates that Pernambuco’s weakened political position following the consolidation of the *café com leite* partnership further contributed to the state’s economic troubles and the regressive social views of the local elite. Indeed, Pernambuco provides us with a classic case of a region whose economy and finances were adversely affected by decentralization. At the same time, the *política dos governadores* served to entrench a regional upper class that had neither the disposition nor the funds to execute programs for

social reform or economic change. As Levine points out, this combination of factors produced one of the most intransigent and repressive state regimes to emerge under the Old Republic.

Much like the other authors, Levine stresses the strength of the party machines and the availability of federal and state revenue as the key determinants of regional power. Thus, he explains Pernambuco's political impotence, which sealed its dismal economic fate, as a function of the state's internal discord and inability to present a united front in Rio. The reasons for this failure, according to Levine, seem to be a combination of sheer political incompetence and meager patronage resources—factors that undoubtedly contributed to the state's political turmoil, but which should not be considered apart from socioeconomic structures and subregional variations as generators of intraelite conflict.

We might also ask whether Pernambuco, even had it managed to produce a cohesive political elite, would have been able to exercise any real political power at the federal level. Levine, himself, acknowledges that the state, given its small size and failing economy, would not have gone far on its own, but could have competed with the Center-South alliance as the leader of a North or Northeast bloc. Yet it was never able to form any sort of lasting coalition with the other northern states, and its inability to do so tells us a great deal about the nature of Brazilian regionalism under the Old Republic. Considering its economic, cultural, and topological characteristics, the Brazilian Northeast certainly seems to qualify as a region, and one whose severe economic and physical problems (e.g., intermittent but devastating droughts) should have produced a sense of solidarity between Pernambuco and the neighboring states. But there are many ways of defining a region, and during the republican years the definition followed geopolitical lines, so that the state and the region were identical entities. With state revenues being derived in many areas almost exclusively from export taxes, the dominant tendency was to think of development in state-wide terms, and not in terms of the larger geographic region.¹⁹ Indeed, the quest for revenue and for local control of commerce even led to interstate taxes that actually inhibited cooperative economic endeavors and made it virtually impossible for the various state elites in the Northeast to develop a broader, and genuinely regional, mentality. Again, Levine is not unaware of this aspect of Brazilian regionalism, but he never really explores its ramifications.

Love's study of São Paulo is, in many ways, the most ambitious and wide-ranging of the group, including his previous work on Rio Grande do Sul. More than the other two authors, Love systematically examines the political and economic behavior of his regional elite, exploring in detail such key issues as valorization, foreign dependence, and taxation policies. Stripped down to the bare essentials, the book

seems to focus on the ways in which the Paulista elite used its political preeminence to extract certain forms of fiscal support and economic cooperation from the state and federal administrations. For example, state immigration subsidies underwrote the transition from slave to free labor in the Paulista coffee zones, and federal backing ensured the Paulistas of continuing price supports for their coffee crops. However, the author also makes it quite clear that the Paulistas' power at the federal level was by no means absolute; even when a native son occupied the presidential palace, the Paulistas could not always determine the outcome of crucial decisions in Rio. Ultimately, São Paulo proved only partially successful in presenting its regional needs as synonymous with national interests.

Love's study deals with Brazil's most important economic region during a crucial period in its history, and as such it is bound to provoke further discussion and intensify certain debates. For instance, Love's brief analysis of the origins of the Partido Democrático—the only major opposition party formed in São Paulo during the republican years—adds one more element to the ongoing debate over the nature and composition of the Paulista elite during the final decade of the Old Republic. Early writings on the PD generally asserted that it was the party of the emerging industrial bourgeoisie, and an attempt to erode the power of the traditional coffee oligarchy. More recently, Boris Fausto has demonstrated rather convincingly that neither the membership nor the manifesto of the Partido Democrático reflects any particular concern with industrialization or enmity toward the planter class.²⁰ Love, on the other hand, claims that a careful analysis of the entire executive committee (instead of the few prominent members studied by Fausto) reveals that there were several industrialists in the party's leadership and that, overall, there was a striking similarity in the composition of the PD and that of its opponent, the Partido Republicano Paulista. How, then, can we explain the formation of the PD in the first place? According to Love, the conflict was generational in nature: the conservative and often inflexible PRP had failed to integrate young, ambitious politicians into the party hierarchy, thereby virtually forcing the new generation to form its own political organization.

The author does have considerable statistical evidence to support his claim about generational differences, but the conclusions he draws from his data seem a bit too tidy. It is unlikely that the PRP, which so skillfully absorbed new rural groups and urban industrialists into its ranks, would have balked at integrating talented young politicians into its leadership unless there were genuine differences in orientation that could have threatened the *status quo*. For many years prior to the founding of the PD in 1926, there had been a loyal opposition within the PRP, which intermittently attacked the extremely undemocratic features of the state machine as well as the rigidly conservative social policies of the

dominant political faction.²¹ Possibly, it was this opposition faction (or its offspring), composed largely of urban professionals, which allied with members of the planter class, stricken by the decline in coffee prices in the 1920s, to form the PD. The diverse backgrounds of the executive committee members would hardly invalidate this thesis: in general, twentieth-century political agglomerations have been characterized by a high level of diversity in membership, and the PRP, after more than twenty-five years of political dominance, had undoubtedly made enemies in all quarters of society. This is not to say that age differences did not enter into the matter, but they probably exacerbated existing grievances; they did not create them.

One of the most impressive features of Love's study is the amount of controversial ground that he covers. Even so, there does seem to be one significant issue that receives insufficient attention. In Brazil, as elsewhere, the new political alignments of the late nineteenth century coalesced around an emerging capitalist class which wielded extensive influence, if not absolute control, over the new order. However, in Brazil's case the new capitalist class had as its major economic base not urban industry but export agriculture. This simple fact had enormous consequences for politics, economics, and diplomacy under the First Republic, and therefore should have been addressed more explicitly in Love's study. It is a point that underlies his discussions of specific issues, such as the Paulistas' campaign to promote a monetary policy that would hold down the value of Brazilian currency—a measure that benefited the coffee planters, at least in the short run, but which hurt federal finances and impeded importation of machinery necessary for the early stages of industrialization. Clearly, the author is not unaware of this aspect of Brazilian regionalism, but he does not develop it fully or consistently, and his failure to do so handicaps him in answering certain questions of broader significance.

"Did Paulista regionalism at some point become a 'colonialism'?" It is a question that Love, himself, poses in his concluding chapter, and one that brings together a number of specific points analyzed in the body of the text. Thus, one would expect a more direct and definitive response than the one the author offers. Judging from his own data, there can be little doubt that the policies promoted by the Paulistas denied other major exporting regions of much-needed financial assistance, while also inhibiting the development of an internal market of national scope. On the other hand, there is little evidence of the type of direct intervention, manipulation, and outright control one associates with colonial relationships. Certainly, São Paulo's role in the economies of the other regions cannot compare to the hegemonic position of the Northern capitalists vis-à-vis the Southern United States in the post-bellum period.²² Nor was São Paulo's role likely to change substantially

as long as export agriculture was the main concern of the Paulista elite. In this vein, it seems significant that São Paulo (or its representatives at the federal level) did not begin to intervene on a regular basis in the political affairs of the “peripheral” regions until the lesser states began borrowing “irresponsibly,” thereby endangering São Paulo’s access to overseas loans.

As suggested earlier, the onset of decentralization in Brazil was only superficially exceptional. The reshuffling of political alliances and regional priorities can be seen as a worldwide phenomenon related to the rise of new capitalist classes. Yet regionalism and regional autonomy were more pronounced in Brazil than elsewhere, due mainly to the embryonic and uneven development of capitalist relations of production and the ongoing importance of export agriculture. While the studies authored by Wirth, Levine, and Love do much to illuminate the specific features of Brazil’s decentralization and subsequent integration under the Old Republic, they stop short of placing the process in a larger context. As a result, their work has only limited theoretical implications, and will not be of great interest to students of regionalism outside of Brazil. Nonetheless, they have made an invaluable contribution to the study of Brazilian history, and have indicated exciting new directions for future research.

NOTES

1. The broadest analysis of this process can be found in Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, 1966). See also Anton Blok, *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960* (New York, 1974), especially pp. 22–26 and the forward by Charles Tilly; Jonathan M. Wiener, *Social Origins of the New South: Alabama, 1860–1885* (Baton Rouge, 1978); Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider, and Edward Hansen, “Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14 (1972):328–50; Ernesto Yepes, “Burguesía y gamonalismo en el Perú,” *Análisis* 7, pp. 31–66.
2. For a detailed discussion of the failure to create a national republican party, see Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, “O processo político-partidário na Primeira República,” in Carlos Guilherme Mota, org., *Brasil em perspectiva* (São Paulo, 1978), pp. 162–226.
3. The only significant studies of state politics under the Old Republic published prior to Love’s work on Rio Grande do Sul included Jean Blondel, *As condições da vida política no estado de Paraíba* (Rio, 1957) and Ralph Della Cava, *Miracle at Joazeiro* (New York, 1970). The latter, in particular, has some excellent chapters on political conflicts in the state of Ceará, but focuses mainly on the links between a local millenarian movement and the regional political machine.
4. For a general discussion of regionalism, which lays out many of the premises for the subsequent studies of Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, and São Paulo, see Joseph L. Love, “An Approach to Regionalism,” in Richard Graham and Peter H. Smith, eds., *New Approaches to Latin American History* (Austin, 1974), pp. 137–55.
5. The origins and persistence of regional inequality are analyzed in Nathaniel H. Leff, “Economic Development and Regional Inequality: Origins of the Brazilian Case,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 86 (May 1972):243–63, and Wilson Cano, *Raízes da concentração industrial em São Paulo* (São Paulo, 1977).

6. For further discussion of the role of coffee production in the transformation of the Paulista economy, see Emilia Viotti da Costa, *Da senzala a colônia* (São Paulo, 1966), pp. 154–202; Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945* (Austin, 1969), pp. 3–15, and Cano, *Raízes da concentração*, pp. 31–87.
7. A recent regional study, which gives much greater emphasis to municipal politics and *coronelismo*, is Eul-Soo Pang, *Bahia in the First Brazilian Republic: Coronelismo and Oligarchies, 1889–1934* (Gainesville, 1979).
8. An extremely perceptive and detailed analysis of the links between a regional political elite and the dominant economic class can be found in Linda Lewin, "Politics and *Parentela* in Paraíba: A Case Study of Oligarchy in Brazil's Old Republic" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1975), pp. 275–96. Lewin demonstrates that the typical high-level officeholder in Paraíba (governor, federal senator and deputy) was a *bacharel* with few or no direct ties to the landowning class. In contrast, the state assembly and municipal governments were dominated by the *fazendeiros* or their relatives.
9. Lewin, "Politics," pp. 45–47; Florencia E. Mallon, "Peasants and Rural Laborers in Pernambuco, 1955–1964," *Latin American Perspectives* 5, no. 4(Fall 1978):51–53.
10. Lewin, "Politics," pp. 4–13, 78–79. According to Lewin, prosperity merely aggravated political conflicts by raising the stakes. For example, with the spread of cotton production in Paraíba, a loss of irrigation rights or refusal of a railroad line (due to a lack of political clout) could threaten a family with financial disaster. For a discussion of the relationship between economic and political power in another boom economy, see Barbara Weinstein, "Prosperity without Development: The Paraense Elite and the Amazon Rubber Boom, 1850–1920" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1980), especially pp. 332–48.
11. Lewin, "Politics," pp. 437–39; Pang, *Bahia*, pp. 89–147.
12. For a provocative approach to this question see Elizabeth Ann Kuznesof, "Brazilian Urban History: An Evaluation," *LARR* 17, no. 1(1982).
13. Lewin, "Politics," pp. 78, 83. For a highly illuminating discussion of the way in which superficially similar commercial trends can have very different ramifications, see Richard M. Morse, "Brazil's Urban Development," in A. J. R. Russell-Wood, ed., *From Colony to Nation: Essays on the Independence of Brazil* (Baltimore, 1975), pp. 171–74.
14. Love, *São Paulo*, p. 215; Dean, *The Industrialization*, p. 84.
15. Peter L. Eisenberg, *The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco: Modernization without Change, 1840–1910* (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 85–117; Levine, *Pernambuco*, pp. 21–27.
16. A brief discussion of Catholic influence in Brazilian political and intellectual life during the 1920s and 1930s can be found in Sérgio Miceli, *Intelectuais e classe dirigente no Brasil (1920–1945)* (São Paulo, 1979), pp. 51–56.
17. Roberto Borges Martins, "Growing in Silence: The Slave Economy of Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais, Brazil" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1980). Obviously, this work was not available at the time that Wirth was writing. See also Stuart B. Schwartz, "Elite Politics and the Growth of the Peasantry in Late Colonial Brazil," in Russell-Wood, ed., *From Colony to Nation*, pp. 145–52.
18. These would include Eisenberg, *The Sugar Industry*, and David Denslow, "Sugar Production in Northeastern Brazil and Cuba, 1858–1908" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1974).
19. Linda Lewin describes the long struggle of the Paraíba coastal elite to create a deepwater port at Cabedelo so that the state's exports would no longer be funnelled through Recife and Fortaleza. "Politics," pp. 75, 90, 200. For an account of the antagonistic relationship between the rubber-producing states of Pará and Amazonas see Weinstein, "Prosperity," pp. 349–84.
20. Boris Fausto, *A revolução de 1930: historiografia e história* (São Paulo, 1970), pp. 32–38.
21. The key figure in this loyal opposition was Júlio Mesquita, publisher of the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo*. For a brief and tentative analysis of the paper's political position see Weinstein, "Impressões da elite sobre os movimentos da classe operária: Cobertura da greve em *O Estado de São Paulo*, 1902–1917," in Maria Helena Capelato, et al., *O Bravo Matutino: Imprensa e ideologia no jornal O Estado de São Paulo* (São Paulo, 1980), pp. 162–68.
22. On the "colonial economy" of the postbellum South, see C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1887–1913* (Baton Rouge, 1971), pp. 291–320.