

CHALLENGES TO U.S. INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE THIRD WORLD: AGENDA 1982. Prepared by ROGER D. HANSEN et al. for the Overseas Development Council. (New York: Praeger, 1982. Pp. 248.)

COLOSSUS CHALLENGED: THE STRUGGLE FOR CARIBBEAN INFLUENCE. Edited by H. MICHAEL ERISMAN and JOHN D. MARTZ. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. 260. \$17.00.)

U.S. INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1980S. Edited by ROBERT WESSON. (New York: Praeger, 1982. Pp. 242. \$23.95.)

THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL: LIMITS OF INFLUENCE. By ROBERT WESSON. (New York: Praeger, 1981. Pp. 179. \$21.95 hardcover, \$9.95 paperback.)

These four books describe U.S. relations with the countries of Latin America from a nondependency perspective. Most of the authors do not believe that the fundamental problems of Latin America are caused by U.S. policies and the structure of the international economic order.¹ Instead of assuming that nation-state behavior is determined by Marxist imperatives, these writers believe that enlightened U.S. policies can reconcile the interests of Washington and those of most of the governments in the Western Hemisphere. Most of these essays are therefore prescriptive in style, describing what has happened in the past decade or so and advocating what ought to be done to improve inter-American relations.

Because three of the four books are edited works to which a number of authors have made contributions, these books suffer from the chronic problem of unevenness. Some of these essays are good; a few are awful. Edited books also seem to encourage essays that are long on facts and short on analysis. Although each of these books attempts to be relevant and topical, none of them deals extensively with the major issue of today's (early 1983) headlines, namely, the problem of Latin America's soaring foreign debts. Also missing is a theme that is mentioned in

several essays but should be developed in a systematic way: the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America over the past several decades. Ironically, this decline began at the same time that the dependency perspective began to gain influence among students of Latin American politics.

Economic Relations

The one book that deals explicitly with economic issues is *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World*. It consists of one hundred pages of excellent statistical data and four essays: Roger Hansen on national security, Albert Fishlow on liberal trade policies, Robert Paarlberg on food security, and John Lewis on development assistance. Hansen is worried that the perceived decline of U.S. power will cause the Reagan administration to overreact militarily to the problems of chronic instability in the Third World that periodically provide the Soviet Union with "targets of opportunity." Hansen argues that a policy that ideologically reacts to stabilize Third World turbulence is a policy likely to misinterpret events and fail in its objectives. He urges U.S. policymakers to distinguish between indigenous Third World "socialism" and conflicts to achieve it on the one hand and geopolitical gains in power by the Soviet Union on the other. Hansen's policy prescription is nicely summarized in these words: "The United States accepts the legitimacy of developing country objectives and goals as they evolve indigenously, retaining the right to articulate its own beliefs (e.g., with respect to nonproliferation, economic policy, human rights) in attempts to influence the course of that evolution, and obviously retaining the ultimate right—which all states retain—of imposing sanctions against specific countries whose actions are deemed to threaten the security of the United States" (p. 45).

These ideas are hardly profound; one expects college sophomores to understand them. But it is a measure of the way the Reagan administration is regarded by many in the academic community that scholars feel it is necessary to preach such conventional wisdom out of fears of some future policy disaster. In addition, Hansen's advice that Washington should support the outcomes of conflicts between indigenous social forces requires more refinement because in the Third World, especially in Central America, most internal social forces have external ties.

Albert Fishlow's essay is essentially a plea for liberal trade policies. The unprecedented expansion of world trade since World War II has slowed down since 1973 because of oil shocks, stagflation, and new protectionist measures. Whereas world trade expanded at an average rate of more than 8 percent between 1962 and 1972, it grew at an average rate of less than 5 percent from 1973 to 1981. The Third World now buys 40 percent of U.S. exports. As a liberal economist, Fishlow sees expanding world trade as an engine of growth that can promote prosperity in

the West and development in the Third World. This “positive sum game” is threatened by protectionism among Western nations, which attempts the impossible and self-defeating task of freezing present trade patterns. The international economic order must be flexible enough to allow and encourage Third World nations to expand their exports of both primary and manufactured goods. In Fishlow’s words, “What is at stake politically is the task of peacefully integrating into the international system a series of middle-income countries whose increasing technical sophistication and nuclear capacity remind us of the consequences of failure” (p. 61). Unfortunately, this statement unintentionally leaves the impression that middle-income countries might increase their economic bargaining position by obtaining nuclear weapons.

For the most part, I found Robert Paarlberg’s essay on food security to be a first-rate piece of policy analysis. Whereas some have argued that food security is a global problem that can only be resolved by a global solution, Paarlberg argues that the problem can be handled reasonably well at the national level. This view is fortunate because during the 1970s, when the international environment was conducive to international cooperation under the influence of *détente*, no such agreement was reached. According to Paarlberg, “It is at the national level that the most potent instruments—price, tax, monetary, budget, and public investment policies—are available for increasing food security. These national policy instruments have far greater reach into the rural food economy than any that might be conferred upon a global food authority through international agreements” (p. 8). Paarlberg warns, however, that a powerful minority in the North (rural producers) has joined in a tacit alliance with a powerful minority in the South (urban consumers), which results in a North-to-South flow of food and inhibits the urgent task of agricultural development in poor countries.

Food policy is particularly important for the American economy because the United States now supplies more than 40 percent of all wheat and nearly two-thirds of all coarse grains entering international trade. Paarlberg advocates that Washington utilize its food power not through embargoes, which have been ineffective against the Soviet Union, Iran, and Nicaragua, but in assisting the food security of poor countries by accumulating adequate reserves, continuing commercial and concessional sales in periods of tight supply, and not engaging in excessive acreage withdrawals or export subsidies in times of abundance. Such a policy would satisfy U.S. economic interests and serve international humanitarian needs. This kind of happy compatibility does not occur too often.

U.S.–Latin American Relations

The other three books deal specifically with U.S. relations with the different nations of Latin America. The volume that Robert Wesson edited, *U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980s*, deals with U.S. military, economic, and cultural influence in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, and Cuba. Most of the contributors are authors of monographs in the Hoover Institution series on Latin America. The Michael Erisman and John Martz volume, *Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence*, grew out of a panel at the 1981 Caribbean Studies Association meeting and is concerned with the Caribbean policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Central America, and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Each of the major chapters of this book includes the following: background information regarding the specific country's policy evolution; an analysis of the main variables affecting the state's definition of its interests and its choice of strategy to maximize its presence in the area; and an assessment of the current policy's effectiveness and of the country's prospects for exercising significant regional power in the foreseeable future. Finally, the Wesson book on Brazil inaugurates the policy-oriented series entitled *Studies of Influence in International Relations*, under the editorial supervision of Alvin Z. Rubinstein. This series, according to Rubinstein's preface, is designed to examine "the great paradox of the second half of the 20th century, namely, the great difficulty encountered by the powerful in imposing their preferences (short of the outright use of force) on the weak, the vulnerable, the dependent—in a word, the limited ability of a superpower to exercise influence at a time when it possesses awesome military and economic power" (p. v).

In general, these three books describe U.S. influence in Latin America as significant, but declining. Wesson's contribution to his own edited work claims that the United States established "a loose sort of hegemony" in the hemisphere based on the political exclusion of competing powers. Declining U.S. influence is attributed to growing Latin American nationalism, the increased tendency of Latin American nations to identify with the Third World, the virtual elimination of U.S. aid programs, proportionally decreased trade with the United States, and the rise of alternatives (international organizations, Europe, Japan, the Middle East, the Soviet Union) to which these nations may turn for help. A United States that appeared invincible after World War II has now been defeated in South Vietnam, economically humbled by OPEC, out-hustled by Japan, and proven unable to oust a Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba. The decline in Washington's influence was demonstrated by the general noncompliance (except for the right-wing governments of Ar-

gentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay) with President Carter's call for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Similarly, Carter's grain embargo against the Soviet Union was thwarted by Argentina and Brazil, who took advantage of the opportunity to increase agricultural exports to the Soviet Union. Wesson concludes that "if the United States cannot make itself felt in Latin America, its position in the world will have sunk low indeed" (p. 225).

In the beginning, the Reagan administration obviously shared this view and seemed determined to change our Latin American policy. Influenced by such conservative Latin Americanists as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Roger Fontaine, James Theberge, and Constantine Menges, the Reagan government replaced Carter's emphasis on human rights with an emphasis on national security. The message seemed to be that the United States would no longer be squeamish about supporting right-wing authoritarian governments because many of their policies were compatible with U.S. interests, and they had the potential (which countries like Castro's Cuba allegedly do not) to evolve into more democratic forms. U.S. national security was redefined in terms of anticommunism and increased military aid; conflict was viewed mainly in terms of the East-West ideological dimension. Fear of Soviet expansionism caused Reagan, and especially Alexander Haig, to stress the external causes of strife in the Caribbean area. During the first few months of the Reagan presidency, Secretary of State Haig blustered that the way to handle revolution in Central America was to "draw the line" in El Salvador and go directly to "the source," which he identified as Cuba acting as a surrogate for the Soviet Union.

When public opinion in the United States and in Congress made it clear that there was more fear of a Vietnam-type quagmire than support for military involvement in El Salvador, however, the administration retreated considerably from its rhetorical commitments and followed much of Carter's policy. Spokesmen now claim that the four basic tenets of Reagan's Caribbean policy are support for democracy, support for economic development, security assistance, and cooperation with others.² This policy can be effective in Costa Rica, but it encounters a dilemma in countries like El Salvador and Guatemala, where there are no effective democratic middle groups to work with. In such countries, power is mainly derived from armies, and only the extreme left and extreme right have armies. Moreover, increasing military aid to right-wing oligarchic governments only hardens their determination to prevent the reforms necessary to develop internal support. Hence, Erisman (in the Erisman and Martz book) concludes that "the Reagan Administration's 'get tough' reaction has not really resolved anything. Instead it has prolonged and will probably even intensify tensions by helping local elites perpetuate what is to many people a totally unacceptable social

order. . . . Washington therefore has been making a cardinal error—it has been pursuing a policy which actually aggravates the situation which it is supposed to ameliorate. From such contradictions fiascos are born” (p. 32). Given the nature of the Reagan administration, “benign neglect” toward Latin America is likely to be more successful than “malignant attention.” In brief, the danger exists that if the Reagan government pursues an overly military response to Central American problems, it could unintentionally destroy any chances for success of the new civilian regime in Honduras, seriously weaken democracy in Costa Rica, prevent the necessary reforms and prolong the blood-bath in Guatemala and El Salvador, and perhaps tip the scales towards a left-wing authoritarian government in Nicaragua.

Both Erisman and Charles Ameringer (in *U.S. Influence in Latin America*) are critical of Carter’s policy toward Nicaragua as helping to produce an unpleasant outcome for Washington. According to Erisman, “In its [the Carter administration’s] indecisive efforts to prevent a Sandinista victory while still trying to disassociate itself from the discredited Somoza, the U.S. managed to antagonize everyone. Right-wingers condemned it for abandoning a faithful anti-communist ally; anti-Somoza liberals, including the Mexican and Venezuelan governments, accused it of trying to perpetuate *Somozismo* without Somoza; and the radical left resurrected the spectre of imperialistic Yankee interventionism” (p. 8). Ameringer argues that U.S. policy was burdened by the widespread belief that the declining and increasingly despised Somoza dynasty was “made in the U.S.A.” Our policy was perhaps fatally damaged by the assassination of newspaper owner Pedro Joaquín Chamorro on 10 January 1978, which eliminated the most effective leader of the democratic opposition and deprived the Carter administration of an acceptable, popular alternative to Somoza. The result was a violent civil war in which forty-five thousand Nicaraguans were killed and the economy was devastated by almost \$2 billion in property damage. Ameringer stresses that with the demise of the National Guard, “what had happened in Cuba twenty years earlier had reoccurred in Nicaragua: the most radical elements of the antidictatorial coalition had a monopoly of arms” (p. 156).

Hence, both the Carter and Reagan administrations were confronted with a situation somewhat analogous to the one that the Eisenhower and Kennedy policymakers faced, a situation that required the most subtle and sophisticated diplomacy. The goal was to prevent the radicalization of the Nicaraguan Revolution, but because of past U.S. support for Somoza, any group that the United States supports automatically becomes ideologically suspect in Nicaragua. Furthermore, U.S. demands that the Sandinista government conduct free and competitive elections are often considered to be hypocritical because no such pressure was applied to the Somoza regime until the very end. Because of a

multitude of embarrassing leaks, the CIA's covert support of former Nicaraguan National Guardsmen has probably become the most "overt" covert operation since the Bay of Pigs. The CIA's effort to cut off arms to guerrillas in El Salvador and to destabilize the Sandinista regime has obviously been counterproductive. The Reagan policymakers want to pressure the Sandinistas in a direction more compatible with U.S. interests or else topple them from power. U.S. pressures, however, have strengthened the Sandinistas internally, while providing them with a justification for imposing increasingly authoritarian controls on the population and for employing several thousand Cuban advisers.

The fear that Nicaragua will become another Cuba may be blinding the Reagan administration to how different the Nicaragua of early 1983 is from the Cuba of, say, 1961. Nicaragua still has a mixed economy in which two-thirds of the GNP is privately controlled; most land is still privately owned; the Catholic Church is still independent, vocal, and powerful; the opposition press, although too often subject to censorship, is still publishing; and the nation is ruled by a collective leadership rather than a charismatic socialist like Fidel Castro. Nicaragua today is best described as being in a state of "harassed pluralism," rather than being an increasingly totalitarian state as is charged by the Reagan government.³ Washington's best chance of preventing this fluid situation from shifting decisively against U.S. interests is to utilize the good offices of Mexico and Venezuela. These two new regional powers, aided by a surplus of oil, share U.S. desires for stability in the region, but may be more capable of achieving success because they are not burdened with the stigma of previous interventions. The chief risk of this policy is that because neither Mexico nor Venezuela has had experience in such matters, some doubt exists that they have the ability to carry out such tasks. Most Latin Americanists nevertheless believe that Mexico and Venezuela have a greater probability of achieving some success in Central America—or at least of averting a disaster—than does the Reagan administration.

While El Salvador and Nicaragua dominate today's headlines, the most persistent problem for U.S. policymakers in the Caribbean region has been Castro's Cuba. Both Edward González in the collective work edited by Wesson and W. Raymond Duncan in the Erisman and Martz volume suggest that no American administration has constructed an effective policy toward Cuba. In the early 1960s, the primary objective was to destroy the Castro regime; in the 1970s, U.S. objectives were to reduce Soviet influence in Cuba and to prevent Cuba from intervening in Third World political conflicts. Neither set of objectives has been achieved. It is not clear what President Reagan's objectives toward Cuba are.

Duncan claims that Cuban foreign policy has completed a full cycle. In the early 1960s, Cuba advocated armed guerrilla struggle; in the

early 1970s, it emphasized internal development and pursued peaceful government-to-government relations; and by 1975, Castro reemphasized armed struggle first in Africa (Angola and Ethiopia) and eventually in Nicaragua and El Salvador. It should be noted that the Cubans have been willing to commit their own troops only in Africa (and only with the logistical support of the Soviet Union) and never in the Caribbean area. Cuba's internationalist position is exemplified by the fifty thousand military and economic advisers that Castro has exported to the Third World. Cuba provides leftist revolutionaries in several Caribbean countries with arms, training, and political advice. The latter is especially helpful in coordinating the activities of the chronically divided radical left in Latin America. Duncan stresses, however, that Cuba's efforts to extend its influence within the Caribbean area are constrained by three factors: problems created by Cuba's links to the Soviet Union; weaknesses in Cuba's own capabilities as measured against the developmental needs of the region's countries; and the waning image of Cuba as a viable alternative model of development in the area.

González has written an excellent analysis explaining why attempts by the Ford and Carter administrations and the Castro government to reduce hostility between the two countries were not successful. González suggests that Cuban public policy is mainly determined by the interactions of the three elites. The dilemma for the United States is that only the weakest of these three elites, the one with pragmatic economic goals, which is headed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, is really interested in having better relations with Washington. The revolutionary political faction headed by Castro is mainly oriented toward a foreign policy position of promoting "liberationist," "anti-imperialist," and socialist causes in the Third World. The fidelista group is ready to sacrifice more pragmatic economic goals in order to achieve maximum revolutionary objectives. The third group consists of the top layers of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) headed by Army General Raul Castro. Beginning in the early 1970s, the U.S. military threat to Cuba relaxed under *détente*, and as party and governmental institutions were strengthened to assume the developmental role previously performed by the army, the FAR strengthened its military capabilities to encompass overseas operations. Thus the FAR became the principal instrument for advancing the Castro government's ideological foreign policy objectives. The FAR's internationalist role also served the Cuban military's organizational interests by improving its combat efficiency and by acquiring new Soviet military equipment. In brief, the continuing hostility between the two countries is caused by the fact that Washington cannot satisfy the major interests of the dominant elites within the Castro regime while the Soviets can—and have. From 1976 through 1979, Soviet cumulative economic assistance totaled \$9.6 billion, representing a 135 percent increase over the 1961–75

total. González therefore concludes that “Cuba’s relationship with the USSR, and its role as a global paladin that advanced Soviet as well as Cuban interests in Africa, the Third World, and the nonaligned movement, not only permitted the Castro regime to fulfill its preferred foreign policy inclinations, but also to generate new leverage with Moscow and ever-higher levels of Soviet economic, military, and political support” (p. 211).⁴

In the Erisman and Martz book, Edward J. Williams has written an interesting essay entitled “Mexico’s Central American Policy: Revolutionary and Presidential Dimensions.” Mexico has become increasingly interested in Central America since early 1966, when President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz launched the first goodwill tour of southern neighbors ever undertaken by a Mexican chief of state. Mexico’s initial interest in Central America was economic because it was trying to diversify its trading partners and increase its export earnings. Today Mexico’s interests are economic and political; Mexico wants to ensure that the results of the inevitable political upheavals in Central America will be compatible with its national interests. Williams’s thesis is that Mexico’s Central American policies are inconsistent because some of them are revolutionary while others are prudential (conservative). Mexico has fully supported the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, partially supported the guerrillas in El Salvador, and has been fairly conservative toward Guatemala. In mid-1980 Mexico joined with Venezuela in an arrangement to supply Caribbean nations (the revolutionary, the moderate, and the conservative) with petroleum at cut-rate prices.⁵ The agreement authorized a credit of 30 percent on the market price for oil. This credit, in turn, is provided in low-interest, long-term loans for development projects. Mexico and Venezuela are each supplying eighty thousand barrels of oil per day, which means that Mexico’s financial assistance to the Caribbean nations totals about \$300 million per year. This apparent inconsistency can be explained in two ways. First, Mexican foreign policy becomes more conservative the closer the threat of revolutionary violence approaches her southern border. Two of Mexico’s largest oil-producing states, Chiapas and Tabasco, are located on the southern border with Guatemala. Secondly, in the words of Susan Kaufman Purcell, “Mexican foreign policy has generally been more progressive than its domestic policy in its support for revolution, social justice and equity. The Mexican government often seems to use a progressive foreign policy as a way of ‘paying off’ leftist groups within the government coalition so that it does not have to make in Mexico the changes demanded by them.”⁶

In his book-length study, *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence*, Robert Wesson tries to measure the influence of the United States on Brazil. To accomplish this task, he analyzes the diplomatic history of U.S.–Brazilian relations, the role of the Johnson administration

in the 1964 coup, President Carter's efforts to alter Brazilian nuclear and human rights policies, and the history of our economic and cultural relations. In the conclusion, Wesson talks of the "excessive complexity" of this subject because there are so many actors and channels that "nowhere is it possible unequivocally to assess actions on one side in terms of desires on the other" (p. 163). Wesson concludes that "U.S. leverage on specific issues is very limited, unless this country is prepared to make a much larger economic or political investment in swaying or coercing Brazil than it has made in the past. And while diplomatic leverage is slight, the most effective U.S. influence on Brazil is diffuse and unplanned, the general impact of one society, economy, and culture on another" (p. 167). Wesson captures nicely the complexity of the interactions between the two nations by quoting a Brazilian, Bruce Lamounier, "The enormous presence of the United States produced two compulsions in our intellectuals, artists, and public men: the compulsion to imitate and the compulsion to warn against imitation. In these past two hundred years many found in the United States the prototypes to imitate or the prototype of what was to be rejected" (p. 151).

While many students of Brazilian politics would disagree with this thesis, Wesson presents plenty of evidence suggesting the complex interdependence between the two giant countries. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a special relationship developed between the United States and Brazil because of the latter's anxieties concerning Spanish America, especially arch-rival Argentina. Brazil aided Washington by supporting the Monroe Doctrine, declaring war on Germany in World War I (it was the only Latin American nation to do so) and World War II, sending twenty thousand troops to fight in Italy in World War II, becoming the first Latin American country to enter a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States in 1935, and supporting the U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo in 1965. In return, Brazil has received significant political, economic, and military aid. Brazil displayed her independence by refusing to send military forces to Korea and South Vietnam, pursuing her own nuclear energy program, arguing for 200-mile territorial waters, supporting the Arabs in their anti-Zionist resolution in the UN, supporting radical groups in Angola, sending a team to the 1982 Olympics in Moscow, and selling more grain to the Soviet Union in defiance of Carter's grain embargo. This history indicates that since 1970, Brazil has pursued a more independent foreign policy from the United States than Cuba has from the Soviet Union.

In reviewing the history of U.S.–Brazilian relations, Wesson claims that the more democratic the Brazilian political system has been, the more likely its policymakers have been to oppose Washington's policies. Hence, Vargas as dictator sent Brazilian troops to Italy, but Vargas as elected president refused to send troops to Korea. This generalization

suggests that if Brazil succeeds in becoming more democratic, there will be increased diplomatic strains between the two countries. In short, Brazilian foreign policy is determined not by U.S. interests or pressures, but by a variety of factors: Brazil is a Latin American nation, a Third World nation deep in debt, a giant economic power that needs to increase its exports and to import 80 percent of its oil, and a continental nation that aspires first to be a regional power and then a Great Power.

Conclusion

In summary, these four books convey the following messages. U.S. influence is declining in Latin America but is still significant, and in a few cases, overwhelming. The dilemma for Washington's policymakers is how to employ its powerful, but declining and increasingly resented, influence to achieve favorable outcomes in the fluid situations in Latin America at a time when the overt use of U.S. power can often be counter-productive because of the suspicions Latin American nationalists harbor about Washington's motives. For liberals, the problem is how to prevent the extension of Communism in Latin America without adopting the self-defeating stance of forbidding any social change. The United States is now less of a colossus to the countries of Latin America. Washington is thus confronted with an emerging, more complex regional-international system in which there will be increasing challenges to U.S. hegemony. While during most of this century, the bulk of Latin American policymakers considered U.S. support indispensable to their survival, today many policymakers believe that their political survival is dependent upon proving their nationalism, which is authenticated in turn by asserting their independence from the United States. Although most countries will not challenge the United States as Castro did, traditional relations with Washington are being contested by a wide range of regimes in Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Nicaragua, Grenada, Brazil, and Argentina. All of these countries want to run their internal affairs without any negative interference from the United States, and the larger ones now expect to play a more significant regional role, which will constitute a further challenge to Washington's influence. Several authors in these four books nevertheless hope that these challenges to U.S. influence will provide an opportunity for Washington and many of the Latin American countries to enter into more healthy and less dependent relationships.

NOTES

1. For a differing view, see *Capitalism and the State in U.S.—Latin American Relations*, edited by Richard R. Fagen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979).
2. John A. Bushnell, "Sustaining a Responsible Middle Course," *Orbis* 26 (Summer 1982): 305–11.

3. Paul E. Sigmund, "Latin America: Change or Continuity?," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (Winter 1981–82): 640.
4. For some contrasting views, see Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy* 48 (Fall 1982): 157–75; and *Cuba in the World*, edited by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979).
5. For an excellent summary of Venezuela's Caribbean policy, see John D. Martz, "Ideology and Oil: Venezuela in the Circum-Caribbean," in *Colossus Challenged*.
6. Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Mexico–U.S. Relations: Big Initiatives Can Cause Big Problems," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (Winter 1981–82): 389.