

But, in the main, we are in full agreement with Dr Schär's appraisal of Jung's importance in the contemporary religious crisis; and we are beholden to him for bringing so much of it to light. We may however ask whether the restricted conception of *transcendence* (p. 131) allows an adequate discrimination of the distinctive character of the 'higher' from the 'nature' religions, and of Christianity from both. We do not ask the psychologists to affirm the validity of the psyche's own affirmations of transcendence or of the transcendental (whether in religion or elsewhere), but we must demand of them to take account of them as facts of paramount psychological importance, and without recognition of which the specific core of the higher religions is not touched. Is it some shortcoming here which, as Dr Schär remarks, prevents Jung from taking the last step to the Carus-Hartmann conception of the Unconscious as ultimately Absolute?

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LA THEORIE DES PREMIERS PRINCIPES SELON MAINE DE BIRAN. Par A. M. Monette, O.P. (Editions du Lévrier, Montreal; Vrin, Paris; n.p.)

Cartesianism is acknowledged to be his 'mother-doctrine' by Maine de Biran, the subject of Père Monette's workmanlike study. In opposition to the physiological fatalism of Hume and Condillac, Biran took his departure from the 'primitive fact' of reflection. This fact envelops a double awareness: of the thing known and of the I that knows. Not the subsistent thought, but the I that knows, is the centre of this primitive datum, and the Cartesian doubt that imagines the body annihilated though thinking remains plainly contradicts this primary datum. So that the questions that bristle round the *Cogito*—as to whether into 'thinking' Descartes does not really insinuate the reality of everything thinkable and into the subject of thinking the being that always contains it as well as the being it contains—apparently do not arise. The author points out that the expression 'primitive fact' is used polemically against Condillac who made great play with adherence to fact: and Biran invents *le sens intime*, a super-sense that feels its way to causes, again with one eye on the sensationalists.

The word 'effort' becomes a keyword here. It stresses the hard work of metaphysical disciplines as against the facile constructions of the 'geometrical mind'. In mathematics thinking is possible (as it is in Eddington physics) without continual reference to the external world, but elsewhere the act of knowing involves close attention to something external, an outward-turning of the self, the intellectual dynamism that makes intelligibility (which is not just the same as knowledge) possible. Another Biranian term is 'resistance' used of the object, which is envisaged as an obstacle—whether because of its material condition or because its substance is a 'force' does not clearly emerge. The doctrine of memory is also interesting and aimed apparently at the sensationalists: the representative memory, for

instance, prevents the 'central thinking' from substituting memory for perception.

The real value of Biran, however, seems to lie in his witness. As Diogenes *stepped out* to put the logicians of his day in possession of the fact of movement, as Pascal inveighed against geometrical thinking and Kierkegaard against the crippling of life by the all-devouring dragon of Hegelian logic, so Biran by lifting his finger hoped to convince the empiricists that a dead hand is, so to speak, not a principle of movement. *Le sens intime* emphasises the need of intension as well as of extension in logic and is freely translated by contemporaries like Le Senne and Lavelle as 'the sense of being'.

The present study is academic and necessarily leaves much unresolved. For instance, is Maine de Biran attempting to solve what is intrinsically a problem of being by an analysis of mind? The origin of the concept is not clarified; could not a strong point be made with Hume, for example, that thinking apprehends the reality of the universalised form only in the image of the individual reality? An account too of the origin of first principles that skimps sensation seems a little rushed. The author hints at a certain Stoicism in Biran, a hint worth developing: the effort to overcome the resistant flux of existences? (Incidentally an overdoing of 'resistant reality' only prolongs the war between being and good started by Kant's disjunction).

Again, the background is barely sketched (except for Descartes). Hume had displaced the eighteenth-century natural man who was a Man of Reason by the new natural type, the Man of Feeling. Maine de Biran's 'Moi' tries to unite both in the whole man, but too much weight is laid on 'interiority' and volition (as he explicitly defines 'effort' in one place). Also, is it not principally intuition and not effort that is involved in the primitive fact—effort is rather the later elaboration? Further, as in Buber's 'primary word', is it not rather the togetherness of the I and reality rather than their duality that is given fundamentally, and is not the direction of the act of apprehension primarily towards an exterior presence? The notion of 'engagement' or 'being committed to reality' (which is so valuable in recent existentialism) seems missing here. Finally, although Père Monette quotes Pascal on the evidence of the 'heart', and Kierkegaard, Biran's contemporary, stresses 'interest', one misses any such note in Biran, and the author says that it is useless to point out that Biran does not envisage causality within a metaphysic of being, since the choice was between him and the extremes of innate ideas and Hume's scepticism. Perhaps it needed a philosophy for which Descartes was not too confessedly a 'mother-doctrine' to reinstate the key doctrine of finality once more.

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THE NATURE AND UNITY OF METAPHYSICS. A dissertation by Rev. G. M. Buckley, M.M., M.A. (Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C.; \$3.00.)

It is surprising that the Catholic University of America is so care-