modern order. But neither Mill nor Tocqueville were willing to speak of the progressive self-revelation of the Absolute, whereas Hegel had no trouble with it. Moreover, keeping to Hegel's "overall vision" risks diluting Hegel's views into something more a kind of composite of Fernand Braudel's *longue durée* with Tocqueville's analysis in *The Old Regime and the Revolution.*

How to navigate that? Obviously, one turns to Hegel's views on the French Revolution, an event he lived through as a teenaged student into his early twenties. Bourke dismisses the idea that Hegel never changed his early admiration for the revolution. Evidence that he might well have done just that (e.g., in the way he celebrated every July 14 with a toast) are dismissed: "The meaning of the gesture is less frequently examined, let alone contextualised" (p. 114). But as it turns out, the contextualization offered is just Bourke's alternative interpretation. (Not mentioned are other events such as Hegel's going out of his way in the 1820s to visit Lazare Carnot—the main author of the *levée en masse*—who was under house arrest in Magdeburg, a visit which Hegel warmly remembered in a letter to his wife.) Now, there is no doubt that Hegel was strongly opposed to the Jacobin interlude and he was more impressed than he should have been with Napoleon's rule, but in his lectures on the philosophy of history in the 1820s and shortly before his death in 1831, he seemed to praise the Revolution while blaming French Catholicism for the fanatical turn it took. One cannot have a Revolution without a Reformation, he told his students, offering that along with his claim that genuine reform has to come from above (as in the reform period in Prussia and under Napoleon's rule in France). He praised the violent Dutch revolt against the Spanish in no uncertain terms in his lectures on the philosophy of art, and he also remarked there that it was because the Dutch had undergone the Reformation that they were able to succeed. In all of this, Hegel emerged as the kind of authoritarian liberal extolling reform from above—a characteristic shared by much other nineteenth century liberalism.

Bourke notes that Hegel held the same negative views about the Reformation as he did of the French Revolution: "Each of these adventures had misfired, Hegel contended, because they pitted an awakening of moral conscience against existing means of improving ethical life" (p. xiii). However, if anything is clearer than Hegel's great admiration for the Protestant Reformation, it is hard to know what it might be. Moreover, when Bourke says that "[t]his led Hegel to place the individual will at the centre of his political philosophy" (p. 168), he seems to be ignoring Hegel's signature dramatic insistence that one cannot *separate* the individual will from the universal will, even though one can clearly *distinguish* them. That is the essence of Hegel's dialectic, and the basis for his defining *Geist*, Spirit, as the "I that is a We," and a "We that is an I."

Finally, coming back to Marx—What Marx praised in Hegel was the "method" for embodying the idea of dialectical self-transformation. Namely, he thought Hegel captured the way in which a form of life breaks down under its own weight, becomes unable to reform itself and must instead transform itself into something new that both preserves the part of the past that was so successful while jettisoning all the elements that had led to its failure. Can one really hold onto Hegel's world revolutions without that idea of dialectical self-transformation, as Bourke's book seems to imply?

AMERICAN POLITICS

Lyman Trumbull and the Second Founding of the United States. By Paul M. Rego. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2022. 336p. $54.95 cloth.
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Among the major political figures of the Reconstruction era, Lyman Trumbull tends to get short shrift. Less flamboyant than Charles Sumner, less pugnacious than Thaddeus Stevens, and less statesmanlike than John Bingham, Trumbull tends to fade unjustifiably into the shadows. A scion of two prominent New England families, the Trumbulls and the Mathers, Trumbull settled in Illinois, where he practiced law while climbing through the state's Democratic Party establishment. Elected to the U.S. Senate in 1854 as a critic of the Kansas–Nebraska Act and its "popular sovereignty" approach to the extension of slavery, Trumbull joined the Republican Party in 1857 and allied himself with another rising Illinois Republican, Abraham Lincoln. As chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1861 until he left the Senate in 1873, Trumbull was at the center of many of the critical legislative and constitutional developments of the Civil War and Reconstruction.

The arc of Trumbull's senatorial career is something of an enigma. As a committed abolitionist, he was a strong supporter of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He sponsored two of the key building blocks of Congressional Reconstruction—the Freedman's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866—which both passed over President Andrew Johnson's vetoes and served as important pillars of the attempt to reconstitute federal authority to enforce democratic rights and advance racial equality in

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the postwar South. If Trumbull's career had ended in 1867, he would rightly be regarded as one of the heroes of Reconstruction.

In 1868, however, Trumbull was one of 10 Republican senators who voted to find Johnson not guilty in his impeachment trial; Johnson was acquitted by a single vote. Over the rest of his term in the Senate, Trumbull grew increasingly skeptical of Reconstruction. During the Grant administration, he went on to oppose several key enactments that aimed to empower the federal government to enforce civil rights and to take on white supremacist paramilitary violence by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. Trumbull broke with the Republican Party mainstream in 1872, when he joined the breakaway Liberal Republicans, who supported the Democratic nominee Horace Greeley on a fusion ticket and called for the dismantling of Reconstruction and the restoration of autonomous government in the southern states.

Given this puzzling trajectory, Trumbull's career seems ripe for reconsideration. How and why did he travel this curious path, and what can his political and ideological meanderings tell us about this critical but ultimately doomed experiment in American democratization? In this book, Paul Rego admirably resurrects Trumbull and effectively puts his career and thought in the context of the turbulent and rapidly shifting political and constitutional currents of his era. As Rego's title suggests, many scholars have identified the Civil War and Reconstruction as a "second founding," in which a series of constitutional amendments and other legislative measures and institutional developments substantially reordered the foundations of American governance. The Constitution of 1787 set up a constrained democracy and took at best a skeptical view of broad claims to political equality. The "second founding," by contrast, was built on the promise of equal citizenship across the color line and rooted in the democratic and egalitarian aspirations of the initial founding that Lincoln had invoked at Gettysburg. Trumbull's contribution to this "second founding" has been underappreciated, and Rego's work of reconstructing his role in both its articulation and the often-byzantine legislative politics that brought it to life is a valuable contribution.

But the realization of the second founding's promise proved elusive. The federal government's enforcement commitment wavered in the face of increasingly violent white supremacist reaction, and ultimately the federal military occupation of the South ended. The Supreme Court hollowed out the meaning of the Reconstruction amendments, diluting their force and neutering them as instruments of racial equality. The promise of a new political economy in the South gave way to new means of labor repression for Black workers, and the rise of a new color line helped turn back the Populist challenge and stifled the development of a cross-racial working-class coalition. By the turn of the twentieth century, the South was well on its way toward the authoritarianism of the Jim Crow era that seemed to utterly negate the democratizing promise of the second founding.

Rego's analysis is particularly illuminating about Trumbull's role in this transformation as well. He carefully parses the way Trumbull articulated his constitutional principles as he and his congressional colleagues worked through the complex politics of the 1860s and 1870s. Building his argument on careful and judicious readings of congressional debates, private papers, and other sources, Rego finds a measure of consistency in Trumbull's words and actions: fidelity to the founders' vision of a federal republic; a vigorous but ultimately limited national government; and carefully constrained emergency power that could meet crises without overriding state prerogatives or dictating the terms of local governance. Trumbull's adherence to these values during his time in the Senate in many ways prefigured the constitutional and political denouement of the Reconstruction experiment.

Rego's analysis of Trumbull's political and ideological arc deftly captures the political complexities and controversies of the Reconstruction era, and particularly the confrontation over the necessity for the U.S. government to conjure a broad spectrum of forceful federal power—legislative, administrative, military, and legal—in order to advance Reconstruction as a democratizing project. Reconstruction was at least partially successful because the national state embraced its aims; it set standards for equal citizenship, and it deployed a range of coercive tools to try to enforce those standards against the recalcitrant local agents of white supremacy. In Rego's largely persuasive account, Trumbull is emblematic of the conflict over this new constitutional vision, and Reconstruction's ultimate failure is an echo of his own failure (along with others) to grapple with the limitations of his constitutional temporizing in the face of resurgent authoritarianism in the South.

The book's analysis would benefit from a bit more engagement with the historiography of Reconstruction as a way of locating Trumbull's role in the larger story of American political development. Trumbull's career serves as a stark reminder that Reconstruction's demise came about because of political failure among its northern supporters rather than because of its inherent flaws. Black Americans in the South played an active part in forging their own path to citizenship, only to be thwarted by resurgent white violence and the failure of northern political nerve. To what extent does responsibility for the country's inability to successfully reshape the South's political economy and build democratic institutions in the region rest on the shoulders of politicians like Trumbull who might have pushed Reconstruction forward but chose instead to back away?

Questions such as these are, of course, unanswerable. But by shedding new light on Trumbull's role in this

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important story, Rego makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of constitutional transformation, democratization, and backsliding in this crucial period of American political development.

Gun Country: Gun Capitalism, Culture and Control in Cold War America. By Andrew C. McKevitt. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2023. 319p. $99.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
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In many respects, historian Andrew C. McKevitt's new book covers familiar ground. A growing number of studies have plumbed the intersection of gun rights activism, gun culture, and its swirling political and policy environs, including Mark R. Joslyn's *The Gun Gap: The Influence of Gun Ownership on Political Behavior and Attitudes* (2020), Matthew LaCombe's *Firepower: How the NRA Turned Gun Owners into a Political Force* (2021) Scott Melzer's *Gun Crusaders* (2009), Melissa K. Merry's *Warped Narratives: Distortion in the Framing of Gun Policy* (2020), Noah Schwartz's *On Target: Gun Culture, Storytelling, and the NRA* (2022), and my own book, *The Politics of Gun Control* (9th ed. 2024). McKevitt, however, provides a fresh perspective and a persuasive argument on this otherwise well-examined subject.

McKevitt states his thesis succinctly: "The Cold War and consumer capitalism were the structures that made the gun country what it was by the 1990s" (10). Post-World War II entrepreneurs like Samuel Cummings made a fortune by purchasing massive quantities of war surplus weapons from war-weary European nations at bargain basement prices and then stoking U.S. market demand for the guns "with new styles of advertising that pitched dirt-cheap rifles as throwaway toys for the weekend warrior" (11). Even in the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration weighed whether to intervene, but ultimately decided that it was better to direct the flow of guns to the U.S. domestic market instead of to international communism. That decision kept the arms spigot open and delayed governmental action until assassinations and spiraling crime in the 1960s spurred congressional action that, in turn, activated the first coordinated gun-control movement and correspondingly radicalized the gun rights community.

The book's ten chapters break down into three sections: an exploration of the roots of post-World War II gun entrepreneurial capitalism, culminating in the passage of the 1968 Gun Control Act (Chs. 1–4); an analysis of the limitations of that law and how they were exploited by gun capitalism (Chs. 5–8); and a discussion of how these forces yielded America's modern gun predicament (Chs. 9–10).

Most importantly, McKevitt debunks the naïve myth that the American gun culture is mostly a bunch of fun, gun-loving hobbyists besieged by gun-control zealots. There is of course a multifarious gun culture, and other books—Pamela Haag's *The Gunning of America* (2016) and Cameron McWhirter and Zusha Elinson's *American Gun: The True Story of the AR-15* (2023)—explore the role of the gun industry and gun organizations in shaping and promoting that culture in the nineteenth century and for the modern AR-15 assault rifle, respectively. McKevitt's book centers on the Cold War era to map how gun manufacturers and entrepreneurs built and stoked that culture. For example, out of the debate over the GCA came the paradigm of the "virtuous gun buyer and owner, the 'law-abiding citizen,' and counterposed his rights against the unvirtuous criminal and radical, all the while accommodating… the virtually unchecked expansion of gun capitalism" (109).

He also debunks other gun tropes, like the assumption that California's 1967 Mulford bill—which criminalized the public carrying of loaded firearms—was enacted as a hysterical racist reaction to disarm African Americans after some armed Black Panthers entered the State Capitol (the Mulford bill passed thereafter). Race-based fear certainly served as a catalyst, but Mulford's bill and many others then before the legislature predated that demonstration. As McKevitt points out, "Mulford's bill was just one of a range of gun control bills the California State Assembly took up in May 1967" as "legislators feared a range of extremists across the spectrum having access to the leftover weapons of war that continued to flow into the United States" (78–79). In addition to rising fears of extremist armed groups like the Minutemen, the biggest news headline from a few weeks earlier had covered a police raid on the Pacific Heights, San Francisco mansion of a wealthy eccentric and his wife who had quietly amassed a "fantastic cache of war weapons" (80) in their home, amounting to 30 tons of armaments. Further investigation uncovered another 77 tons of weapons they had stored nearby, "an arsenal fit to topple a small country" (80–81).

In Chapter 8, McKevitt sidesteps the NRA-centered gun-rights leadership narrative to concentrate on the lesser-known (though also less consequential) component of that movement—what the author calls "an un-NRA history of the early postwar gun rights movement" (180). This non-NRA gun rights movement, spanning grassroots groups and organizations formed in the 1970s including the Gun Owners of America and the Second Amendment Foundation, deserves the treatment he gives it. But McKevitt's own examination makes clear that these individuals and groups revolved around the NRA sun. When grassroots gun activists "located freedom not in the will of a democratic populace but in the vigilance of an armed citizenry" (189), the NRA co-opted this rhetoric and embraced the view that an armed population was the very definition of a free nation. The springboard for that was

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