various commodity unions attempt to influence agrarian food policy. The success of Vladimir Putin's food policy rests on the ability to coopt these groups for their support of government policies.

The analytical framework yields some interesting insights and works best in the chapter on food production. The use of technology for political ends is especially germane to the period since 2010 as Russia has emerged as a food exporter. That said, the argument is not entirely convincing. The application of technopolitics at times seems forced. For example, the argument that technology was used for political ends seems curious for an agricultural system in which manual labor accounted for about two-thirds of labor into the late 1960s and early 1970s. Further, the political purpose of importing western agricultural technology is not clear. In other places, the framework seems inappropriate, for example in the discussion of household plots (*lichnoe podsobnoe khoziaistvo*), which the Soviet regime wanted to keep rudimentary and unmodern so as to avoid challenging *kolkhozy*.

The last two chapters, about food consumption and nature, veer away from the technopolitical framework and thus are disconnected from the early chapters of the book. Once again drawing on previously-known material, the consumption chapter discusses access and availability, processed foods, consumer options for eating out, and the rise of fast food. The coverage in the consumption chapter has considerable overlap with my *Russia's Food Revolution* book, which was published in September 2020, although that book does not appear in the endnotes. The final chapter, on nature, likewise has little to do with technopolitics but does contain some interesting information on cattle breeding.

Finally, the title of the book is confusing. It is well-known that in Russian culture white bread is considered inferior to Russian black bread, which represents the "soul" of Russia. It is not clear what meaning the choice of "White Bread" in the title is meant to convey.

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"Islam, Imeiushchii mirnuiu i dobruiu sushchnost": Disckurs o traditsionnom islame v srede tiurok-musulʹman evropeiskoi chasti rossii i kryma. Ed. R. I. Bekkin. Studia Religiosa. Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2021. 278 pp. Notes. Glossary. Index. ₽950.00, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2023.214

The present volume *"Islam with a Peaceful and Kind Essence": The Discourse on Traditional Islam among Turkic Muslims of the European Part of Russia and Crimea* brings together six contributions examining a dichotomy that, while not new in the history of Islamic societies, has acquired particular salience in the twenty-first century: "traditional" vs. "nontraditional" Islam. While the book does not advance a central argument, its main point is perhaps best summarized by a Crimean respondent quoted in one of the articles: "There are probably more sects here in Crimea than in a society of one hundred million people" (255). In the competitive religious sphere of contemporary Russia, Islamic organizations have deployed, and in some cases weaponized, the discourse of "traditional" Islam in disputes that often crystallize along generational lines.

The number of official mosques in Tatarstan increased from eighteen in 1985 to 1,531 in 2019, operating within the aegis of two competing muftiates (17). As of 2020, neighboring Bashqortostan boasted 1,173 official mosques, also divided between the

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successor to the Soviet-era muftiate and a newer "Bashkir" muftiate (214). Readers expecting Crimea's embattled Tatar population to have escaped the burn of clerical politics will be disappointed by the findings presented in El′mira Muratova's excellent article: not to be outdone, the Crimeans also have two Islamic organizations. Until 2014, one was loyal to Ukraine's muftiate (led by a disciple of an Ethiopian shaykh, whose followers are known as "Abyssinians" [*khabashity*]), the other a younger and smaller affair. Both organizations, and their mutual disdain, have endured beyond Russia's annexation (254). The authors draw little attention to the fact that, in each case, an organization associated with one of the Soviet-era muftiates found itself challenged by younger religious figures often trained abroad, who formed their own organizations. As during late socialism, these youngsters found themselves labeled as "Wahhabis" by their Soviet-trained elders.

Historians of religion will not find the result surprising: there is no agreement on what, in fact, constitutes "traditional" Islam. In their article on Tatar intellectuals, scholars Leila Almazova and Azat Akhunova introduce readers to at least five religious and secular figures, each with his own definition of the term, ranging from a variation on folk religion, to an ecumenicism bringing Islam and Christianity closer to mutual understanding, to a "renaissance of medieval traditionalism and appeals to Sufism," to a dynamic and adaptable interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) "that adheres to the views of the majority," to a "multifaceted complex" emphasizing women's leadership, *shemayil* craftsmanship, and pilgrimage to the sacred site of Bolgar (66). Unsurprisingly, the Soviet legacy of Islamic education also informs the discourse. For example, the well-known Islamic scholar and public intellectual Damir Mukhetdinov lists "knowledge of political science and sociology" and fluency in at least five languages as core characteristics of a "modern" Islam (139).

A more straightforward conceptualization of the term comes from a contributor who chooses not to use it. Part tract and part polemic, theologian Damir Shagaviev's piece addresses the controversy surrounding the 2016 "Grozny *Fatwa*," in which Islamic scholars from thirty Muslim countries (including Ahmad al-Tayyib, Grand Shaykh of Al-Azhar, the Islamic world's most prestigious university) and across Russia gathered in the Chechen capital for an international conference dedicated to denouncing Islamic extremism. Widely assumed to have been organized by the Russian government to counter Saudi influence and draw Muslim states such as Egypt closer to Moscow, the conference featured no small measure of acrimony, considering that the foreign participants, and even some of the Russian muftis in attendance, refused to sign the concluding fatwa. The author, one-time head of the Faculty of Theology at the Russian Islamic University in Kazan, attributes opposition to ignorance: "It was the reaction of simple-minded people who [only] know how to perform basic Islamic rituals, who lack substantial grounding in Islamic sciences" (76). The criticism got personal: "A certain Abdulla of Kazan" wrote a letter accusing the author of "creating a new Islamic sect that would foster division within the *umma*" (76). Shagaviev contrasts these detractors' mudslinging with the main aim of the conference: to promote a concept advanced by an eleventh century theologian, Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi, "People of *Sunnah* and Consensus." It consists of eight categories of Muslims rightly considered to hold Islamic authority, including jurists, scholars of Arabic grammar and syntax, Sufi ascetics, and pious folk (80). The implication is that fundamentalists, who reject the traditional schools of jurisprudence, as well as Sufism, are not Muslim, or at least this is how many perceived the conference. Shagaviev admits as much: "The negative reaction among some Muslims . . . stems from fear about a federal Russian prohibition of Wahhabism similar to bans in certain Muslim countries" (102). Curiously, the author fails to clarify that Baghdadi's inventory of authoritative figures would, by implication, exclude historical personalities lionized by the Russian state

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and its domestic Muslim allies from the purview of "true" Islam: modernists who also vehemently rejected madrasa education and Sufism. Notwithstanding editor Renat Bekkin's assurance that Shagaviev "ranks among the most original Islamic theologians in contemporary Russia" (8), the piece has a partisan flavor in the best clerical tradition.

Other contributions advance interesting arguments that certainly merit attention from specialists. Rezeda Saifullina-Ibragimova's article on Sufism in Tatarstan surveys different understandings of the term, while highlighting the popularity of the Cypriot Naqshbandi (some would say neo-Naqshbandi) Shaykh Nizam al-Hakkani (1922–2014) among Tatar businessmen. Zilia Khabibullina places Bashqortostan's Islamic scene in dialogue with nationalists whose heyday in the 1980s came to an abrupt end after 1991. As a whole, the volume constitutes a valuable document concerning the rich field of debate about "traditional" Islam in Russia over the past two decades, even if the reader comes away suspecting that "nontraditional" has become an uninspiring bogeyman and fitting successor to the *qadimchi* (traditionalist) epithet deployed by modernists a century ago.

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A History of Education in Modern Russia: Aims, Ways, Outcomes. By Wayne Dowler. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. x, 238 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. Figures. $119.00, hard bound.
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In this richly detailed book, Wayne Dowler harnesses the findings of existing specialist literature on Russian education to document the policies of successive regimes and their impacts on teaching and learning in schools and tertiary instruction from the eighteenth century to the present. Beginning with Peter the Great's inheritance of Muscovite practices, the content of each chapter is clearly signposted: an overview of political, economic, and social developments backlights Dowler's discussions of education policy, the rationale for reform and the specifics of curricula in state, church, military, private, zemstvo, non-Russian and girls' schools. Just how these measures played out is addressed in Dowler's closing remarks on the day-to-day experience of the classroom in the given period.

As far as the imperial era is concerned, the dominant picture to emerge from Dowler's survey is one of repeated short-circuited attempts by successive governments to modernize the educational system and varying degrees of non-compliance, whether for reasons of inertia, some resistance, or the realities of insurmountable financial burdens on the part of teachers, pupils, their parents, and local communities. On a policy level, the period witnessed repeated pendulum swings between principles of social estate integration and segregation (the latter fostered the creation of technical–vocational schools and classical gymnasia) and, likewise, a lack of clarity in government messaging regarding the ethos of education itself. The promotion of child-centered learning, for example, was repeatedly stalled by the practice of rote learning to which government authorities defaulted as a pre-emptive measure against the dangers supposedly associated with the awakening of intellectual curiosity in secondary school pupils.

Albeit in a different register, this pattern more or less repeated itself in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. On Iosif Stalin's watch the original merger of all existing school and tertiary level instruction into a single system of free, coeducational practice as

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