

personally as a prophet of the psychedelic generation; he was asked to contribute an article to the *London Oz*, and (this, too, is interesting), he thought it worth while to do so *free*. Furthermore, he has been offering a prize of £100 for the best lateral thinking.

This merely factual point must be taken in the theoretical context provided by Marshall McLuhan (whom de Bono does not seem to have read). Readers of McLuhan will have no difficulty in recognizing de Bono's message, for it is quite simply a call to us to acknowledge the passing of the Gutenberg era. Vertical thinking is precisely the sort of linear, serial, 'objective' approach typical of the Gutenberg era.

Now in view of this, we may see de Bono as himself evidence of the correctness of McLuhan's diagnosis. And, if we accept the diagnosis (as, with reservations, we probably have to), then we must also welcome de Bono's missionary zeal (his aim is patently kerygmatic): it is *important* that our ways of thinking should adapt to the new cultural age we live in.

But this is where one begins to lament de Bono's ignorance of the true parentage of his eggs. Because the position is far more complex than he seems to realize. It is no longer a question of new grist for the old mill; we need a new mill.

Already in 1914, Bertrand Russell advanced similar views in the first part of *Our Knowledge of the External World*. But there, the role played by lateral thinking is filled by logic, and this is surely important. De Bono still talks as if logic were the paradigm of vertical thinking, but this completely ignores modern symbolic logic and mathematics, which are largely an exercise in lateral thinking. Especially with the use of computers, it is possible to pursue all the vertical implications of any idea in no time at all; so that vertical thinking, far from waiting till we have finished toying laterally with ideas, has become ancillary to this very business of toying.

In fact, we have to recognize that we can, and must, get beyond the old problematic as we find it in Blake, for instance, of Logic v. Imagination. Logic has played traitor to its own side. The whole point at issue now is the role of logic in the post-Gutenberg world.

And we must be quite clear that the novel alliance between logic and imagination has changed the whole scene. Many of the prime virtues of the Gutenberg era are now obsolete. For instance, modern science and all types of modern philosophy are abandoning the serial, linear model of reality in favour of an approach which is both more holistic, and more diversified, in that it uses different models as the need may arise, even to talk about 'the same thing' (e.g. light-waves and quanta). Austin's analysis of the performative aspect of words (situational semantics), and Wittgenstein's concept of language-games both point the same way. Again, the concept of objectivity has been radically undermined both by the phenomenologists and by the scientists; as McLuhan insists, this is the age of involvement.

This calls for a much more radical critique of our ways of thought than de Bono has to offer. Non-European cultures which have never passed through our Gutenberg period may well come to be of crucial importance. For instance, the Zen doctrine of time can cast a great deal of light on the re-analysis of the subject which has been attempted, in different ways, by Wittgenstein, Heidegger and McLuhan.

So what are we to say, then? Perhaps we might adapt Wittgenstein's alleged comment on the *Tractatus*, and say that it is a bad book, but an important bad book. It is bad, in that it does not begin to tackle the really fundamental problems, but it is important both as a symptom, probably unconscious, of the new age, and as a call to action. Sumer is icumen in: lude sing, cuccu!

SIMON TUGWELL, O.P.

LAW AND THE LIBERAL ARTS, edited by Albert Broderick, O.P., *The Catholic University of America Press, 1967, 229 pp.*

This book consists of the edited transcript of the proceedings at a conference held in December, 1964, at the Catholic University of America in Washington. Those who attended came from the whole range of American higher educational institutions from Berkeley and Columbia to the Ancilla Domini College and the College of St Rose. Of varying disciplines and faiths, the

common interest that brought them together was the subject 'law and society'. Despite its title, the real subject of this book is law and the social sciences. The active and articulate participants, who read the papers and largely monopolized the dialogue, were mostly social scientists and academic lawyers, presided over by those who had a foot in both camps. The

conference, and consequently the book, had a practical educational objective related to the American undergraduate college system—hence the ‘Liberal Arts’ of the title. Most of the more passive participants, who had come to listen and learn, came from this level of American higher education. A major part of the discussion and the concluding section of the book are preoccupied with the organizational and administrative problems of introducing a new kind of course in ‘law-society’ into undergraduate teaching. Such courses are intended to be radically different from the courses given in law schools. They are not to be in any sense a professional training. They would not necessarily be taught by lawyers and would consist of legal topics and materials studied in relation to the relevant areas in history and the social sciences. Much of the book is taken up with eminently practical questions about how to plan such courses. What should be the shape and content of the syllabus and course materials? Should such courses form a major or a minor subject or a catalyst in other subjects? Should those who teach them form a separate department or be integrated into existing social sciences departments? What kind of people should give such courses? How should this be organized nationally and who should supply the funds? Anyone in academic life who has been involved in working out the relationship between law and the social sciences will find much of the debate relevant and stimulating.

Such an interest is, however, rather a specialized one. The wider interest of this book should have been the more fundamental issues of higher education to which the discussion of the law-society question give rise. Clearly the purpose of a law-society course was not to give specifically legal education of a watered-down variety, but to provide a medium for studying social problems and issues of policy which are otherwise neglected in higher education. It also had other educational implications. As the editor notes in the introduction, the undercurrent of these discussions ‘calls in question some inherited dogmas that encrust much American higher education’. These dogmas he lists as follows: ‘That disciplinary simplicity, and atomization, afford the best educational preparation for dealing with the complexities of life; that undergraduate education is purely a training of minds and not of the whole man; that values are not a fruitful, or proper, subject for educational discourse; that dialogue and

interchange among social disciplines, professions, philosophies and faiths, is not a function of education in a nuclear-scientific age.’

Proper consideration of these dogmatic negations involves large and profound issues meriting serious discussion in any higher educational system, not least in our own. But the medium certainly determines the calibre and coherence of the message. A large number of short papers, interspersed with platform discussion, is a medium ill-adapted to the sustained and penetrating examination which these questions demand. Not only is the discussion crowded by the practical educational and administrative problems referred to, but the level and coherence of the thought and language is that to be expected from a gathering of educators of very varying abilities. One has to wade through much that is banal and repetitious for the occasional shrewd observation or perceptive insight. This is not to deny that such conferences have a very valuable ‘political’ function in generating enthusiasm for academic reform and in providing a sense of direction in seeking immediate practical goals. The prime purpose of this book is to communicate this to a wider audience, a legitimate form of academic journalism.

The two sections of this book most likely to arouse the interest of the English reader are peripheral to its main theme. The account of the Russell-Sage Foundation projects are of interest not only to lawyers and social scientists. Those who are directing these research projects in five American universities describe current and planned research in the sociology of law and in the application of the other social sciences to law. A major part of this work consists in teaching lawyers and social scientists the necessary inter-disciplinary knowledge and skills to prepare them to undertake research of this kind. In this country almost nothing has been attempted in this field except in criminology and penology. The reforming work of the Law Commission should be based on more than the conventional wisdom of lawyers.

In a paper on law and poverty, Edgar Cahn (from the Office of Economic Opportunity) expresses something of the moral vision which inspired the poverty programme and shows how effective it might still be in the American political and legal context. His ‘Brief for a Course on Law and Poverty’ is in part a proposal for the social and political education of the American middle classes to the problems of poverty. The re-education of middle-class

attitudes is plainly one essential condition of effective public action in a federal system where power in social and economic matters is so widely dispersed. It is a tragic reflection that

the genuine aspirations and initial achievements of the poverty programme have since been blighted by the consequences of the war in Vietnam. A. J. BOYLE

JOHN XXIII, SIMPLETON OR SAINT? by Giacomo Lercaro and Gabriele de Rosa. Translated by Dorothy White. *Geoffrey Chapman, London, 1967*. 120 pp. 18s.

This book has three parts—'Suggestions for Historical Research', by Cardinal Lercaro; 'Angelo Roncalli and Radini Tadeschi', by Professor de Rosa; and an appendix, 'Selected Passages from the Works of John XXIII'. Cardinal Lercaro is suggesting how an appraisal of Pope John should be approached; Professor de Rosa is following his advice; and the appendix provides a fraction of the available sources.

Cardinal Lercaro's talk is very remarkable, and we should remember it was given in 1965. He states his firm belief that Pope John was not only a saint, but also 'the great Doctor of the Church in the new era he himself inaugurated'. 'He is either a holy Doctor of the Church or he is nothing.'

There are those, says the Cardinal, who suspect that he is nothing, just a good old man, 'not expert and not cultured', who released forces and permitted freedoms that in the end worried him because, so they say, he realized he could not control them. Most of those who think like this are in positions of authority, men of intellectual and moral stature who lack 'a clear understanding of the most advanced position taken up by this Pope, above all of his mature and firm determination to throw all his energies into the changes he wished to make inside and outside the Catholic Church'. As a result of this failure to understand what he was about, Pope John lived in 'a great institutional solitude', surrounded largely by people whose views and aims were in marked contrast with his own. There should be a serious historical examination, says the Cardinal, 'of the relations between the Pope and his immediate collaborators'. There will be found, he believes, a considerable 'contrast between the constant, insistent and unvarying intentions of the Council, in the mind and words of Pope John, and the projects elaborated [by his collaborators] during the whole of the preparatory phase'.

For those responsible, cultured and intelligent people who are ready to pay lip service to Pope John while regretting what he did, it will come as a surprise to read the Cardinal's urgent appeal 'to reconstruct the master lines of the most general and original resolutions of Pope

John, his major ecclesiological and historical theses'. He fears that these have only partially been accepted, 'while the possibilities which he pointed out to us are still . . . for the most part unexplored'. The Council was 'only a preliminary movement in the order of actual consequences and institutional applications'.

The Cardinal maintains that Pope John's life was all of a piece, that he was not 'merely a pure-minded innocent, a "Gospel-child" who because of his simplicity and purity was able to become, without any qualifications of gifts, knowledge and experience, a docile instrument of the Holy Spirit'—rather 'he was filled not only with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but also with exceptional treasures of knowledge and experience, not infused from on high, but patiently and laboriously acquired'. One of our troubles is that 'we could not keep up with him for we could not walk at his pace'.

Cardinal Lercaro roundly affirms that 'this man whom all judged to be without profound culture or great experience had decided, from the moment when he was elected Pope, and with the clearest possible purpose in his mind, to become a truly universal pastor and teacher'. If we do not understand that, he says, we do not understand Pope John at all.

We need a systematic and detailed inventory 'of all the material he left concerning doctrinal premises, theological pluralism, and the order of priority among the truths of Christianity, his theological view of history, his conception of the nature of the Church, of ecumenism, of the internal reforms of ecclesiastical organizations, reform of the priesthood and of religious life, of the relations between the Church and secular governments, etc.'. 'A careful and thorough search, such as heirs generally make, has not yet been begun, and perhaps we had no desire to make it.'

'If we do not begin without delay to inquire most earnestly into the reasons why and how we left him in such solitude, our devotion and our admiration may, earlier than we imagine, become tinged with hypocrisy, corrupt and sterile, and with a sterilizing effect upon the whole Church of God.'

BEDE BAILEY, O.P.