

as our distinction between natural and supernatural, nor between faith and reason. At times Dr Brunner seems to speak as though God-truth were not truth in the same sense as world-truth. Any facts found in the Bible are presumably world-truth for Dr Brunner, and so we are at liberty to follow the verdict of science or criticism in accepting or rejecting them. What are the facts about God? Are they facts about reality in the same way that world-facts are? If God-truth has no analogy to world-truth, why does Dr Brunner use the word truth at all for God-truth? The use of a common term where there is no common meaning seems to confuse the issue. God-knowledge, he tells us, is not knowing God, but being known by him; it is not possessing God, but being possessed; it is not having the truth, but being in the truth. Dr Brunner says that this is the meaning of St Paul in 1 Cor. 8, 2-3; though for the life of me I cannot see how he reads this dialectical philosophy into St Paul's simple words. If 'knowing God' in no way means 'knowing God', how does the way God knows me differ from the way he knows a stone or plant? Is it not that I can respond, and the stone cannot? Dr Brunner admits that I respond by loving. Must I not have some knowledge in order to love?

I must confess that I do not understand how far Dr Brunner means to be taken at his word. If he really teaches either that faith gives us no knowledge in the normal sense, or that there are two kinds of truth, one for faith and another for reason, then, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, he is a modernist in the sense in which the Catholic rejects it as heresy. Perhaps he will be pleased to know that we will have none of such views, but I hope it is not as bad as that. His inability to appreciate the Catholic notion of dogma and Church authority would tend to suggest that it is.

If I have completely misunderstood Dr Brunner, I am probably not the only one. I feel it can only do good to make public one's doubts, in the hopes that he or his followers may be provoked to make their position clearer.

H. FRANCIS DAVIS

JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY. By James Parkes. (Gollancz; 10s. 6d.)

Christianity demands an unwearying regard for truth, justice and charity in the relations of its members with all men, either as individuals or groups. That is why category-hatred, with its accompaniment of lies, robbery and murder, must be opposed by Christians. Even when category-hatred is stimulated by economic or racial friction the Christian position is absolutely clear. When such differences exist there is all the more need for religious leaders to stress the obligations of truth, justice and charity. There is also need for all concerned, Christian or non-Christian, to try to reach a dispassionate understanding of the situation and to find a solution of the problems which are involved. No good is served by the publi-

cation of partisan accounts, by retailing atrocity stories and past scandal; nor can a man tackle one form of category-hatred adequately if his mind is influenced by other forms of the same disease. In the matter of antisemitism there has been often in different times and places a scandalous gap between Christian teaching and the practice of Christians. There is also a long record of authoritative defence of Jewish rights, not least by recent Popes. It is more likely to help Jewish-Christian relations if attention is given to the latter rather than the former. Dr Parkes's book has too much atrocity narrative, helped by an apparently superficial knowledge of the middle ages. In his eyes Jews have done little wrong, and Christians little good in their contacts hitherto. (Hitler's massacres are the responsibility of the Christians ultimately.) Both orthodox Christian and orthodox Jew will find his extreme modernism irreconcilable with their belief. Catholics will see in his attitude to themselves many of the faults he would deplore in other men's attitudes to Jews. Altogether, while sharing Dr Parkes's keen desire for mutual understanding between Christian and Jew, one cannot but regret his latest book. It is the type of work which by its own prejudice and muddled thinking plays into the hands of antisemitism, and which by the assumptions of its obiter dicta, if by nothing else, strengthens injustice and misunderstanding in one direction while fighting passionately for their removal elsewhere. There is too much of that in the modern world; there are too many people, Catholic and non-Catholic, who will fight for justice in a particular case but not in all cases. What is needed now is not partisan championship of Jews, or Irishmen, or Catholics or Protestants, an open eye on Spain and a closed one on Russia or vice versa, but a defence of ultimate principles wherever we see them threatened.

ANTHONY ROSS, O.P.

KIERKEGAARD THE CRIPPLE. By Theodor Haecker, translated by C. van O. Bruyn, introduction by A. Dru. (Harvill Press; 5s.)

It appears that the indefatigable researches of a certain Magnussen have proved beyond doubt that Kierkegaard was a hunchback, and that the puzzling 'thorn in the flesh' to which he so often referred was neither more nor less than his hump and the disabilities which it entailed. The discovery of this matter of historic fact may disappoint readers of Kierkegaard who have hitherto been free to project their own private thorns on to his. Undaunted, the late Dr Haecker set about to reevaluate Kierkegaard's life and work precisely in the light of this discovery, and incidentally to offer some reflections on the interaction of corporal disability and spiritual living in Kierkegaard's own terms. His short but pregnant study is offered us in this English translation; and it need hardly be said that we are taken far beyond the confines of an Adlerian study in organ-inferiority. For Haecker, as the introduction points