

mean achievement, for Newman seems often at pains to cover his tracks and prevent critical notice of 'influences'. It is all the stranger, therefore, that Professor Ferreira should be insisting that a line of influence which he did acknowledge is of no great importance for the shaping of Newman's treatment of 'probability'.

'What is distinctive about Newman's position', she says, 'cannot derive from Butler's influence'. But both the 1864 and 1865 versions of the relevant section of *Apologia* announce, what might otherwise be confidently read out of the *University Sermons*, the *Essay on Development* and the *Grammar of Assent*, that Newman felt himself to belong in a line with those for whom 'probability is the guide of life'. His understanding of 'probability' develops from Keble's supplement to Butler. Newman acknowledges 'I made use of it myself', but since it 'did not even profess to be logical', he tried 'to complete it with considerations of my own'. Newman seems to be indicating Butler and keeping quiet about Reid.

Perhaps Professor Ferreira is anxious to be rid of Butler lest Locke come along with him. After all, Fairbairn thought Butler 'borrowed his doctrine of probability from Locke', and even Gladstone, denying the borrowing from Locke, allowed that Butler 'takes up the question at the point where Locke had laid it down'. That would suggest the possibility of reconstructing a tradition of Locke, Butler, Keble, and Newman. However, what Professor Ferreira will do for Hume, she will not do for Newman. She will now allow him this complexity. But then, as 'cable' betrays Newman's reading of Reid, Professor Ferreira's language betrays her appreciation of Newman's place in a Butlerian line.

Appraising Reid's rope, she gives italicizing emphasis to two elements: 'such reasoning is understood, therefore, as *convergent* and *reinforcing*'. A rope's slender filaments twisted together may very well express the reinforcing character of helical contributions to an argument. But converging? When Newman writes of 'absolute certitude' resulting from an *assemblage* (his italics this time) of concurring and converging probabilities, his language does not suggest a remembrance of Reid's rope. And my sense of 'converging' as a Butlerian element in his thought is, paradoxically, reinforced by a sentence of Professor Ferreira even as she denies any such thing: 'as Newman saw it, nothing in Butler's notion of convergence of probabilities implied more than "practical" certainty'. It should, surely, be possible to entertain a view of Newman and his idea of certitude which attends to more than one tradition in British philosophy.

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**PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA** by Frederic C. Copleston. *Search Press. University of Notre Dame. 1986. Pp.445 + x. No price given.*

The well-known Russian religious thinker N.A. Berdyaev said of himself once with disarming honesty that he had little, if any, capacity for 'analytical discursive reasoning' (Cf. his *Dream and Reality*, quoted in Copleston p. 355). A very large proportion of Russian philosophers that Copleston is writing about seem to fall in this category. They are, very often, brilliant writers, versatile expositors, accomplished pamphletists, visionaries, eulogisers or masters of invective. In a word, they are long on rhetoric and short on argument. But, then, in Russia the word 'philosophy' tends to mean something different to what it means in English philosophy departments. Patient probing of the structure of arguments or analysis of linguistic meaning are hardly seen as philosopher's main preoccupation. Russian philosophy has always been closely associated, on the one hand, with religion, and, on the other hand, with political theory, and the central issues in both these fields have been disputed about with a large measure of commitment and passion.

This preoccupation with religion and politics, and a distrust of abstract theorizing, which characterizes the mainstream Russian philosophical thought, is well brought out by Copleston's book. With an incredible industry Copleston has worked his way through what

must have been a veritable mountain of material, including, it would seem, some sources in their original Russian, and has produced what is certainly an immensely readable, even though not always evenly balanced account of Russian philosophy in the past hundred and fifty years.

He wisely begins by sketching out in a longish chapter the key events in Russia's history. Incidentally, I should point out that the title of the book 'Philosophy in Russia' is a little misleading, since Copleston devotes two full chapters to Russian philosophers in exile. Similarly, the subtitle 'From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev' might have been phrased differently, for Herzen does not get discussed till chapter four. But these are minor points. The leisurely start is on the whole helpful, in that it allows the reader to acclimatize himself to the historical ambience in which Russian philosophy developed and from which it derived most of its central themes.

An historical event which left a deep mark on Russia's life and was a decisive influence in her development as a nation was the Mongol invasion, and the resulting domination of the country by the invaders which lasted over two hundred years, from 1240 to 1480. In 1547 the various Russian principalities finally united under the first Tsar, the notorious Ivan the Terrible, who promptly initiated a policy of ruthless centralisation of power in his own hands, combined with an equally ruthless imperialist expansion into the neighbouring regions. The more assiduously these policies were pursued by him and his successors, the more obvious it became that the success depended on technological innovation, and this, eventually, led to an 'opening to the West', which began in earnest with Peter the Great. The result, as always, was a mixed blessing. For close on the heels of the new technology there began pouring into the country what the traditionalists perceived with considerable alarm as dangerous western ideas which threatened to subvert and poison the fabric of Russian life. The scene was thus set for a great intellectual and political debate at the beginning of the nineteenth century between the 'Slavophiles' and the 'Westernizers'; a debate which in one form or another has continued to the present day.

The 'Slavophiles' drew their inspiration from the Russian tradition, which included the messianic belief that Russia with her own indigenous culture and indigenous values was called upon to perform a special mission in the world; the 'Westernizers', on the other hand, looked for their inspiration (though not uncritically) to western rationalism and western liberal ideas. The former tended to be intensely nationalistic, whereas the latter on the whole were cosmopolitan in their outlook. The former ranged themselves politically on the right, while the latter inclined naturally to the left. At the present time, it is the Communists (having imported from the West a foreign ideology into the country) who in a sense qualify as 'Westernizers'; which explains the deep hatred of the Communist regime felt by people like Solzhenitsin, who belong to the 'Slavophile' tradition. The position of Solzhenitsin in this context is highly characteristic and important, and it is surprising that Copleston fails to make this clear.

The conceptual tools in terms of which these two factions originally tended to articulate and defend their respective positions were largely derived from contemporary German philosophers, like Hegel and Schelling. The 'Westernizers' tended to prefer Hegel, while the 'Slavophiles' found Schelling's ideas more congenial, although, as Copleston rightly points out, the latter were ultimately interested in developing a specifically Russian line of philosophical thought.

In political terms, the 'Slavophiles' largely identified themselves with the monarchy, and such social changes as they envisaged never called into question the position of the Tsar. In 1839 the distinguished literary critic Belinsky wrote '... the principle of Russia's life can be expressed in the one word "Tsar"'. Later he revised his position and became a severe critic of autocracy. But the sentiment he expressed at the time was by no means isolated, particularly among 'Slavophiles'. It was those who sympathised with Western ideas that tended to be more critical, and suffered for it in consequence. When in 1836

Chadaev, though only a 'qualified' Westerniser himself, dared to publish an article comparing Russia unfavourably with the West, he was promptly declared insane and placed under house arrest by the Tsar Nicholas I. That Belinsky felt no qualms eulogizing the monarchy only three years later, when the same Tsar was still on the throne, shows that any sense of outrage that may have been felt at Chaadaev's treatment soon evaporated.

At the same time, the 'left-wing' Westernizers were of course still a relatively small minority. But their influence was growing, and intellectually many of them soon progressed from Hegel to Marx. It is here, I think, that Copleston's book begins to falter. He is on the whole much happier when he deals with literary figures and religious thinkers, than when he is trying to unravel the mysteries of dialectical thought. Consequently he lavishes on the former a great deal of space and attention. The discussion of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Solovyev alone occupies nearly a quarter of the book. Now, of course, there is no question that these three towering figures have exercised a profound influence on the intellectual life of Russia, and Copleston is right in emphasising their importance. Yet one wonders whether in a book of this sort the right balance has been struck, and whether, for example, the discussion of Russian Marxism from its beginnings in the nineteenth century to Lenin and Stalin, which is given about the same amount of space, should not have been discussed in more depth, given the immense consequences that the seizure of power by the Marxists in 1917 has had not just for Russia herself but for the world as a whole. The treatment of Plekhanov and the marxist-inspired social-democratic movement, is woefully inadequate. In his discussion of Lenin, Copleston concentrates almost exclusively on Lenin's 'Materialism and Empirio-Criticism', while Lenin's immensely influential work 'State and Revolution', which has been studied like a biblical text by generations of Communists, is mentioned only in a footnote. Stalin's once enormously influential 'Voprosy Leninisma' ('The Problems of Leninism') does not get discussed at all, and it would appear that what Copleston has to say about Stalin is mainly derived from a few articles that are available in English translation.

Still, despite these failings, the book as a whole is a remarkable achievement. With the exception of Marxist philosophy it provides what seems to me to be a thoroughly reliable as well as sympathetic insight into the Russian philosophical scene. It is also—like all Copleston's books—immensely enjoyable for its lucidity and the elegance of its prose.

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**THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM** by William Charlton, Tatiana Mallinson, Robert Oakeshott. *Sheed and Ward*. 1986. Pp. 263. £9.50.

One would not have thought the Christian response had been so various, occasionally eccentric but occasionally also effective. This is a lively and readable text, equally for learning as for teaching, which fairly states the record. Shepherd for Dr. Sheppard of Liverpool in the index is perhaps a happy fault and the undeserved omission of the Oxford Movement's own social criticism understandable. It is also a statement of intent, or rather a confession of interest in the co-operative solution.

It is achieved with conviction. Take the persuasive case histories of recent examples: Bewley's Cafes in Dublin, made over by its original Quaker owners to the employees, the Scott Bader Commonwealth, similarly Quaker in origin, now worker owned, the Antigonish movement founded by the two priests, James Tompkins and Moses Coady, which helped to bring Nova Scotia through the depression, the co-operatives of Mondragon in the Basque country, which have been 'almost unbelievably successful', now employing 19,000 and providing social security for 50,000. Mondragon is the model for a solution to the problems generated by the Industrial Revolution. Co-operatives form the eye of the needle through which the camel of human cupidity and ambition can safely pass