

the author in the original galley proofs have been reintroduced in this edition by the use of innumerable footnotes. This is a frustration, partly because it detracts from readability but mainly because the deleted material does not appreciably alter the tone of reserve and caution which pervades the self-censored manuscript. As Ms. Greer concedes, "In her autobiography Kollontai is reticent about her theories of morality and sexuality and even her references to women's liberation are guarded and unemphatic."

Kollontai played an important role in the development of the women's movement. Many of the programs she advocated, such as those concerning maternity and child care, have been adopted or are becoming realities, both in her country and ours, and the present sexual mores would far exceed her expectations. Yet I think she would find many of the concerns of the contemporary Women's Liberation Movement frivolous expressions of middle-class self-indulgence. She believed, first and foremost, in a proletarian revolution and regarded bourgeois feminist movements with disdain and distrust: "Only a country of the future, such as the Soviet Union, can dare to confront woman without any prejudice . . . , only the productive-working people is able to effect the complete equalization and liberation of woman by building a new society."

Also included in this book is an essay "The New Woman," a chapter from Kollontai's book *The New Morality and the Working Class*. Written with great enthusiasm in the early postrevolutionary years, it is tendentious and repetitious and finally becomes quite boring. The afterword by the editor, Iring Fetscher, is by far the most interesting part of the book. It provides a human dimension to the remarkable Kollontai, describes her intriguing involvement in the struggle of the Workers' Opposition against NEP, and reveals her prophetic concern that burgeoning bureaucratism in the Soviet Union would smother the revolutionary dreams of the early idealists.

JERI LABER
New York City

ZHUKOV. By *Otto Preston Chaney, Jr.* Foreword by *Malcolm Mackintosh*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971. xxiii, 512 pp. \$9.95.

Among leading Soviet personalities, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov bears the unusual distinction of being the only professional military man to have held a seat on the ruling Politburo, and of twice being resurrected from the limbo of official unpersons, the second time after barely escaping being formally charged with Bonapartism, one of the most heinous crimes in the Communist lexicon. The extraordinary seesaw of Zhukov's career testifies not only to his record as a foremost Soviet military leader but also to the increased influence wielded by the Soviet Armed Forces in the post-Stalin era.

Soviet military historiography reflects the shifts in party-military relations. Because Stalin lay claim to being the prime architect of Soviet victories in World War II, after his death and especially after Khrushchev's fall there remained no political leaders able to claim a leading military role in the war. Consequently the Soviet marshals have been able publicly to reassert their wartime records and to claim for themselves the victories on the battlefields. In the Brezhnev era, with its campaign to popularize the "combat glory" of the Soviet Armed Forces, there has

been a veritable flood of published war memoirs and histories by Soviet military leaders, including Zhukov's own recollections.

This trend has resulted in the rehabilitation of Zhukov, and indeed also of Stalin, as a wartime leader. But the party's dispensation in the matter of the wartime role of the military does not include Zhukov's postwar political role, discussion of which is carefully avoided. Chaney's exhaustive research on Zhukov reflects these trends in Soviet historiography, although he has tried to fill in the gaps from Western sources. His material leads him to provide a detailed and thorough treatment of Zhukov's wartime role as a planner and commander of most of the key battles on the Eastern Front. It is to this subject that the major part of the book is devoted, the accounts being amplified by photographs and maps. But the portrait of Zhukov as a person and the description of his political role, especially in the hectic days of Khrushchev's climb to the pinnacle of power, unavoidably remain sketchy and uncertain.

Although the book falls short of a comprehensive case history of the making of a Soviet marshal and minister of defense in the Stalin-Khrushchev era, it provides important details on how the Soviet leadership waged war and interesting glimpses of the competition and jealousies among Soviet commanders. It also provides insights into the attitudes of the present Soviet military leaders who are essentially products of the same experience and system as Zhukov.

LEON GOURE
University of Miami

RUSSIAN TANKS, 1900-1970: THE COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF SOVIET ARMoured THEORY AND DESIGN. By *John Milsom*. Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1971. 192 pp. \$11.95.

T-34 RUSSIAN ARMOR. By *Douglas Orgill*. Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II, Weapons Book, no. 21. New York: Ballantine Books, 1971. 160 pp. \$1.00, paper.

It may not surprise us to learn that today the Soviet Armored Forces are the most powerful in the world, since the Soviet Union, a great but solitary land power located in the huge European and Asian land mass, has already faced the German threat in World War II and growled at NATO ever since, and now is showing active hostility toward China, the most populous country on earth. Though accepting the fact, we have been waiting for a comprehensive historical explanation of how this came about. We are at last rewarded by the appearance of *Russian Tanks, 1900-1970* by John Milsom, who has compiled a complete and concise illustrated history of Soviet armored theory and design. The author traces the evolution and development of Soviet armor from its early confused and amateurish fumbings to present-day practical and professional efficiency. The fascinating background and story is unfolded in chronological order in part 1, where after describing Russian pre-revolutionary concepts the author goes on to outline the foundations of the Soviet tank industry, the effects of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, the dark Stalin purges which crippled the Red Army for so long, and practical experience in Spain, Manchuria, and Finland. Simple maps, and lucid but staccato prose, silhouette the armored contribution to the Great Patriotic War clearly, and in the final chapter Milsom discusses the role of "Armour in the Nuclear Age." In the seventies the