

not particularly helpful — whereas the chapter dealing with the situation in Europe is more constructive and outlines the real progress that has been achieved in improving the welfare of sows, chickens and veal calves. The title of the chapter *Against zoos* and its closing words “humans and other animals will both be better off when they are abolished” mark it out as polemic; however, the argument that links these two owes a lot to cool reason and is therefore more persuasive (to me) than some of the shriller contributions.

The final section, ‘Activists and their strategies’, consists of a series of essays from individuals who have actively campaigned for animal welfare. These range from one who writes (apparently) from prison having been convicted for the achievement of smashing up an abattoir, to a sane account of how activists in Austria, working within the law, have been able to achieve real changes in the buying habits of consumers on the basis of increased respect for animal welfare. One constant theme throughout this section (and one that I endorse) is that it is quicker and more effective to operate through the power of public opinion and consumer behaviour than it is to attempt to work through legislation. To my surprise, this section contains perhaps my favourite bit of the entire book, namely Henry Spira’s ‘*Ten point for activists*’. These are sensible, charming and wickedly effective, and should be pinned to the wall wherever an animal welfare campaigning body chooses to meet.

So what are readers of *Animal Welfare* likely to gain from this book? Not much, I fear. The target audience would appear to be young animal welfare activists seeking fuel to drive their outrage and some direction in which to point it. Viewed in this context, this is an honourable book and one that contains a few good tips. However, it is not one that I would recommend to serious students of animal welfare science, ethics and law. It contains no new science and little on international developments in animal welfare through new legislation or politics by other means. I also have difficulty with the philosophical basis for animal liberation. We may consider it to be our moral duty to set them free, but before we do, we should (a) have somewhere for them to go and (b) be absolutely sure that this is what they want. I suggest that the ethical argument would be enriched by a reading of Rousseau’s *The Social Contract*. Rousseau may be most famous for the line “Man was born free but he is everywhere in chains”, which sounds like a copper-bottomed argument for liberation. However, he was also rational enough to acknowledge that most of the people, most of the time, choose to sacrifice the freedom of the noble savage for the food, comfort and security that can be achieved through submission to the rules of a (benevolent) state. We cannot be sure that domesticated animals, offered their freedom, would choose the security of the good shepherd but we should not dismiss the possibility without asking them first.

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Animal Ethics

R Garner (2005). Published by Polity Press, 65 Bridge Street, Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK. 224 pp Paperback (ISBN 0 7456 3079 0). Price £15.99.

In *Animal Ethics*, Robert Garner strives to provide a comprehensive account of the major philosophical perspectives in the animal ethics debates. He aims to position these different literatures in relation to each other and to study the implications of philosophy in a multitude of animal sites.

Thematically, the book is divided into two major parts. In the first part (Chapters 2–6), Garner broaches a multitude of different and central issues in the ethical debates: equal consideration of interests (Chapter 2); direct and indirect duties owed to animals — for example the argument from marginal cases and ‘personhood’ (Chapters 3–5); and contractarian approaches, utilitarianism, and rights (Chapter 6). This first part of the book not only examines and lays out the arguments of the major philosophers in the animal ethics debate, but also positions these different perspectives and principles in relation to each other. In the second part (Chapters 7–9), Garner studies the implications of these more abstract philosophical debates for different animal sites — farm animals, laboratories, zoos, circuses and hunting. In the last chapter (Chapter 10), Garner provides us with a more programmatic roadmap, by asking where, who, and how we should act in order to reduce the mistreatment of animals.

Garner is at his best in the first part of the book (Chapters 2–6). He provides an informative, coherent and readable account of the enormous literature that is now available on animal ethics. Garner presents each major view, its principles, and its strengths and weaknesses — and does so in a very fair and balanced manner. He tackles many of the major writers on animal ethics and maintains a dialogue between these different positions. I note, however, that Garner does not really elaborate on the views of Bernard Rollin, a variety of feminist approaches or more recent attempts to apply pragmatism to the animal ethics question. His exposition of the views that he does present is succinct, concise and penetrating¹. For the animal welfare scientist who is willing to delve into these questions and persevere, this first part of the book would be of great service as a general introduction to the various positions; this first section of the book should clearly be praised.

I found the second part of the book — the ‘applied’ ethics — weaker than the first philosophical section. Garner quickly (too quickly, in my opinion) applies the somewhat more abstract principles of the ethical debate to real-life situations. Furthermore, this second applied section did not help me, as a reader or teacher of animal/veterinary ethics, to better come to terms with these complex issues — on the ground — or to move more assuredly from the good philosophy to the different realities of animals in our society. Many of the descriptions that appear in these sections regarding, for example

farm animals, will be familiar to readers of Singer and other writers. This second section is also much less intellectually open-ended than Garner's first section and appears to lead the reader to a particular conclusion, rather than to explicate the complexities of the different positions. This somewhat forced conclusion, which Garner interjects in various places throughout the book, is that our existing beliefs regarding how animals should be treated (what Garner refers to as the 'moral orthodoxy') require that we immediately overhaul the way that we currently treat animals. I note in passing that the book is clearly written from a British, or at least, a Western perspective (this is not a criticism). Garner's 'moral orthodoxy' — which is supposed to represent what most of 'us' believe about the ethical status of animals — clearly represents a particular subgroup of 'us'.

One issue that is directly pertinent for the animal welfare science community, and which appears in Garner's study — as in many other studies — is the growing reliance on scientific facts in establishing the moral status of individuals or species. Because some of the major moral theories, for example of Peter Singer or Tom Regan, rely on animal capacities, such as sentience, emotion, self-consciousness or intelligence, in order to determine the moral standing of the species, then who is to decide whether particular animals have these capacities. Who and how are we to decide which animals are capable of feeling pain or experiencing emotions? Garner, like many other writers, appears to assume that these are scientific questions, but they are clearly not — at least not for this reviewer. Scientific definitions of pain, emotion or intelligence are products of various social, cultural and political forces — in addition to scientific ones — as many studies in the history of science have illuminated and elucidated over the past several decades. In addition, who is to decide whether an animal does or does not have emotions?² Is it the scientific community with its expert techniques, or is it individuals who interact over many years with their companion animals and who might disagree with animal welfare science? Who has the right or authority to answer these questions is a political issue, not a scientific one. It is also an epistemological question for a scientific community that has to define terms like animal 'emotion' or animal 'intelligence' and must invent techniques for gauging what it has defined as 'emotion' or 'intelligence' in animals. These types of issues are marginalised in Garner's philosophising about animal ethics.

As in other books on animal ethics, Darwin seems to appear as the harbinger of human-animal congruency. But a close reading of Darwin's work will reveal that even Darwin — the great iconoclast — believed that humans were different from animals. For example, Darwin argued that only humans blushed because blushing required the capacity for self-consciousness, which animals did not possess — so says Darwin; Darwin was not totally the person that we have made him out to be.

In the last chapter — Chapter 10 — Garner wishes to contribute an additional perspective to his discussion of animal ethics. His objective is to strategise, in a sense, regarding who, how and where one should act in order to achieve the objectives of the animal rights or liberation movements. After examining and rejecting various possibilities, Garner determines that a 'left-leaning liberalism' and a 'liberal theory of justice' (the Democrats in the United States and the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom) offer the best opportunities for furthering the goals of animal liberation/rights. Theoretically Garner might be correct, but he leaves us with several conundrums. Historically, we know that the link between rights/liberation and left-leaning liberalism was not necessarily as we would have imagined it to be. The Nazi regime, for one, implemented laws that, taken out of their specific Nazi context, would have appeared to be extremely progressive in terms of animal rights/liberation. The activism of the left in human eugenics during its early, pre-1920s stage, also presents the paradox of a left that proclaimed anti-liberalist doctrines. History and society work in ways that challenge our generalising and rationalised theories. In addition, I wonder whether Garner might be doing a disservice by tying left-leaning liberalism with animal rights/liberation. Non-left animal rights/liberation activists might be lost to the cause, in a sense, if Garner makes these political connections between the left and animals an obligatory passage point. There are — and were — many non-left animal 'liberationists'.

Garner's book will be of great value for the non-professional philosopher who is looking for a roadmap into the complex world of animal ethics. The book's strength lies in Garner's ability to present and position a variety of different philosophical perspectives in a succinct and cogent manner. I greatly applaud this effort on Garner's part and encourage the uninitiated reader to delve into the philosophical complexities with the help of Garner's guiding hand.

¹ **McKenna E and Light A (eds)** (2004) *Animal Pragmatism: Rethinking Human-Nonhuman Relationships*. Indiana University Press: Bloomington, USA. For Rollin, see eg, **Rollin BE** (1998) *The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, & Science*. Iowa State University Press: Iowa, USA; **Rollin BE** (1995) *The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. There is much literature on animals, women, and feminism, see eg, **Adams CJ and Donovan J (eds)** (1995) *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations*. Duke University Press: Durham, USA.

² See eg, **Gould SJ** (1981) *The Mismeasure of Man*. WW Norton and Company Ltd: London, UK. **Rey R** (1995) *The History of Pain*, translated by Wallace LE, Cadden JA and Cadden SW. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. **Dror OE** (1999) The affect of experiment: the turn to emotions in Anglo-American physiology, 1900–1940. *Isis* 90: 205–237

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