

THE EVOLVING SOVIET DEBATE ON LATIN AMERICA*

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Traditionally, Western scholars have spoken about “the” Soviet view of this or that question—even about “the” Soviet ideology with respect to it—and hence they have considered it legitimate to draw quotations from a wide range of persons and types of sources in order to assemble a composite summary of that view. Even if it has been recognized that there must be private differences of opinion among Soviet officials and specialists, it has usually been assumed that the censorship prevents any from being expressed in public. This assumption is simply incorrect. In the words of Brezhnev, “a party and state leader . . . cannot consider himself the sole and indisputable authority in all areas of human activity.” While jealously guarding their own right of ultimate decision, Soviet leaders now talk about problems being solvable only by “collective reason,” and insist that “it is necessary to listen to specialists and scholars, and, moreover, not only of one orientation or school.”¹

To obtain this advice on the international scene, the regime has created eight institutes within the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, which contain a total of two to three thousand scholars who study the outside world on a full-time basis. These scholars are expected to produce published books and articles, but those doing policy-relevant work—and there is enormous pressure to do so—can spend 25 percent of their time or even more on classified work, usually called “the director’s assignments” (the director in question is the director of the institute, but, of course, these assignments reflect demands or requests from higher authorities).

If a leader wants to listen to the views of “specialists and scholars,” he certainly wants those views to be informed and reasoned; and communication among scholars is crucial for this process. The printed work constitutes a major means of the dissemination of earlier and recently

*I would like to express my deep gratitude to the many Soviet Latin Americanists who discussed their views with me. Of course, none is responsible for any misinterpretations that I may have made. This article draws upon research the author is currently conducting for the Brookings Institution.

published work as the size of the scholarly community increases; thus the published Soviet scholarly literature indirectly becomes part of the overall process by which the leadership is informing itself. It remains subject to censorship, but, if the censorship destroys it, it cannot serve the functions that the leadership desires.

In practice, although certain statements absolutely cannot be printed in any Soviet source, the leadership has tried to balance its different needs by varying the degree of censorship with the audience that a piece is likely to reach. It has imposed a much tighter restriction on media reaching a mass audience than on those reaching a more specialized one.² No doubt as a means of further reducing the exposure of unorthodox ideas to the mass reader, it is also required that debates on the international scene generally be conducted in rather abstract Marxist jargon and that they not deal with concrete policy options directly but do so indirectly through discussion of the nature of the objective world situation.

We in the West have often had difficulty penetrating the jargon and have assumed that the discussion is simply of an abstract philosophical nature, but if we learn what is being said, we find that the debates are very real and concrete. The same people who are writing the classified memoranda and proposals, who know the concrete policy options being debated behind the scene, also write for the public as well. While many scholars want little more than to lead a pleasant life and to publish enough to keep their jobs, the important ones want to use their published work to support the policy options and the predictions they are advancing in private. They want to make a name for themselves as scholars who are interesting enough to deserve being read, and they want to change the perceptions of others they think are wrong and even dangerous. Some may even hope to build reputations strong enough to be selected for work in the Central Committee apparatus in the future.

None of the published Soviet debates on the outside world has been more sophisticated and free-swinging than that dealing with Latin America. Perhaps the Soviet policy options in that area of the world are considered not quite as sensitive, but the primary reason must be the editor of the major scholarly journal on Latin America, Sergei Mikoyan (son of the late Politburo member), who strongly believes in "the collective search for truth," who thinks that "if a question is debatable (*sporny*), it should be debated," and who has shaped his journal accordingly.³ The results provide a striking confirmation for John Stuart Mills' arguments. As Soviet Latin Americanists of all views testify, the process of debate in this case has involved not simply a clash of opinions, but a major increase in self-awareness of assumptions, in clarity of

analysis, and in sophistication of understanding among scholars of all opinions.

During the late Stalin era, the relatively few scholars studying Latin America had to fit their work within the straitjackets imposed on all scholars working on the Third World. At that time, the central focus of the analysis of Latin America, like that of Africa and Asia, was its dependent position in the capitalist world and the exploitative relationship of the United States towards it. From 1947 to 1953, Stalin drew a sharp distinction between the bourgeois and proletarian camps throughout the world, and one result was the insistence that the bourgeoisie in Latin American countries were allies of the American bourgeoisie in their domination of Latin America. The top Soviet specialists on Latin America worked within the Institute of Economics, and the orthodoxy of the time was well summarized in a book written by one of the foremost among them, Mariia V. Danilevich, *The Condition and Struggle of the Working Class of Latin American Countries*.⁴

With the death of Stalin came a deep questioning of the schematic way of understanding the outside world. The most dramatic changes occurred with respect to Asia and Arab Africa, for the repudiation of the doctrine that men such as Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno were agents of American imperialism was accompanied by arms sales, by the building of the Aswan Dam and a steel plant in India, by repeated Khrushchev visits to these countries, and the like. Yet, perhaps because the first arms sales to a non-Communist government were to the regime in Guatemala, the first semi-official denunciation of old orthodoxies on the Third World appeared in a blistering review of Danilevich's book in the Central Committee journal, *Kommunist*, in May 1954:

The Institute of Economics . . . has issued a book which will not be of use either to the Soviet or the foreign reader [and] this fact shows that the study of Latin America in the institute is conducted unsatisfactorily. . . . The theoretical generalizations of the author are based not on a detailed investigation of concrete material nor an illumination of the objective laws of development of the national-liberation movement in the specific conditions of Latin America, but on a dogmatic use of individual citations and formulations which refer to another time and other countries. Abstract schematism led to serious distortions in articulating the strategic line and tactical tasks of Communist parties of Latin American countries.⁵

The basic *Kommunist* criticisms were severalfold. First, Latin America is not a uniform whole; there are differences from country to country. In particular, the degree and form of dependence upon the United States varies substantially. "The time has passed when Wall Street inspired and carried out the overthrow of governments in Latin America without obstacle."⁶ Second, the bourgeoisie in Latin America—

let alone the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia—are not united in their point of view, and many are opposed to the United States and to American corporations. Third, as a consequence, the local Communists in Latin America should be making alliances with the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie in the struggle against the United States and international corporations.⁷

In subsequent years, these three criticisms of the traditional analysis became the major foci of debate: How dependent, in fact, are the various Latin American countries and what are the trends in this respect? What is the nature of the non-Communist forces there and to what extent should the Communists cooperate with them? An authoritative review in the Central Committee journal did not end the issue. Thus, in a collection of articles published five years later by the major Latin Americanists, one younger scholar, Anatolii Shul'govsky, did spend so much time discussing main-line politics in Venezuela that he was chided in a review for devoting too little attention to the workers' movement, while another asserted that nationalization within non-Communist Latin American countries was an "effective means" of strengthening their independence.⁸ Yet, a number of the articles were notable for the degree to which their interpretation had not changed. One author cautioned against "absolutizing" the progressive significance of nationalization in non-Communist countries. He described Latin American relations with the United States in extremely traditional terms, and he proclaimed that the economic growth of the previous two decades was a temporary phenomenon. Another treated agriculture in a basically undifferentiated way throughout Latin America.⁹

The victory of Castro in Cuba and especially the evolution of his revolution from the "bourgeois-democratic" category to the "socialist" one—an "absolutely unexpected event," according to a leading Soviet scholar—obviously had a major impact on Soviet Latin American studies. An Institute of Latin America was created in 1960, and behind the scenes Soviet scholars conducted "heated arguments about 'the paths of development of the Latin American revolution.'"¹⁰ The specific arguments about Castro in the early 1960s were not, however, permitted to surface in print, except indirectly (see, for example, note 13.)

The most striking general feature of the published work of the Soviet Latin Americanists from the mid-1950s into the late 1960s was not the development of debate and theoretical innovation but its absence. The major Soviet scholarly journal about the outside world, *The World Economy and International Relations*, carried a series of round-table discussions on the nature of the Third World, on the revolutionary forces within it, and on its relationship to the West. Nothing would have prevented Latin Americanists from participating in these broader theoretical

discussions, but, in practice, none did until 1968.¹¹ The significant theoretical articles about the Third World were likewise written almost exclusively by specialists on Asia and Africa, and they paid little attention to Latin America, seldom differentiating it from the other two continents. The standard reference was to "Asia, Africa, and Latin America," always in that order, and Soviet generalizations tended to be based implicitly on the experience of former colonies, which had had a much shorter experience of political independence and economic development than Latin America. *The World Economy and International Relations* continued to print relatively few articles on Latin America, in contrast with Asia and Africa. This is particularly striking, for it was the only major journal to which articles about Latin America could be submitted, while two other scholarly journals were devoted exclusively to Asia and Africa.

It was in the late 1960s and early 1970s that Soviet Latin American studies really came of age, especially in theoretical terms. One reason was simply the passage of time and the growing sophistication and accumulation of knowledge within the community of Latin Americanists. The number of specialized monographs was increasing rapidly, and they undermined a number of old stereotypes.¹² A second factor was the inauguration in 1969 of a special journal devoted to Latin America alone and the appointment of a lively editor for it. Sergei Mikoyan had been a specialist on India, but in February 1960 he had accompanied his father to Cuba for two weeks. He formed a strong emotional attachment to the Cuban Revolution and especially took to Che Guevara, with whom he had had a good deal of contact. Young Mikoyan had been the first man in the Soviet Union to publicly call the Castro revolution a socialist one,¹³ and in the 1960s he increasingly moved into Latin American studies. As editor, he not only deliberately published articles with conflicting views, but organized round-table discussions on major issues and devoted dozens of pages to the publication of the exchanges. With leading specialists on Europe, Asia, and Africa also being invited to the round-tables, the result was not only a major theoretical advance within Latin American studies, but also greater inclusion of the Latin American experience into Soviet generalizations about development.

The third factor of enormous importance to the theoretical development of Latin American studies in the Soviet Union were events in Latin America itself. First, the growing sophistication of the debates on dependency and on revolutionary tactics within Latin America during the 1960s stimulated and sharpened the debates among Soviet scholars who read them. Then the establishment of the Allende government in Chile and a leftist military regime in Peru raised a series of most urgent questions about the potential for socialism in major Latin American

countries, the nature of the social forces there, the paths by which socialism could be achieved, and the speed with which revolutionary tactics should be pushed in transition stages.

As is true with scholars in all countries and at all times, the Soviet Latin Americanists held views that ranged over a broad spectrum, and even the views of individual scholars were marked by inconsistencies and fluctuations over time. Basically, however, views of the early 1970s tended to cluster around three points of a triangle. The most widespread position, at least among senior Latin Americanists, seems to have been that expressed by Viktor Vol'skii, the director of the Institute of Latin America. Vol'skii had a bleak image of the situation in Latin America. He emphasized the dependent position of the continent, even asserting that governmental dependence on international financial capital was growing. He denied that Latin America had reached a "medium level of development" (that is, medium between the West and the Asian-African underdeveloped countries) and insisted that in its economic development it was falling behind "all the more."¹⁴

Yet, for all his pessimism about the prospects of Latin America within a capitalist framework, Vol'skii was still cautious in his analysis of the short-run revolutionary outlook. He quoted Lenin against "subjective attempts 'to jump' several stages of revolution" and heaped scorn upon foreign leftists who thought otherwise. He contended that the "revolutionary potential of the bourgeois-democratic movements in some countries is still far from exhausted" and that in such cases the Communists should cooperate with the bourgeoisie rather than attempt a premature revolution.¹⁵ Vol'skii did not mention Chile in the article, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he had it in mind and that he feared the kind of military coup that later occurred.¹⁶

In the West, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) has the reputation of being a "liberal" one—that is, of having scholars who have moved a great distance from the traditional tenets of Marxism-Leninism in a "Western" direction—but this image is a gross oversimplification. Thus, the position taken by the institute's top specialist on Latin America, Kiva Maidanik, was far more prorevolution in the short-run than that of Vol'skii. Maidanik was as pessimistic about the prospects of Latin American development under capitalism, especially about the possibility of its dependent and deformed economies solving the growing social problems and the "revolution of rising expectations."¹⁷ He was even more doubtful about the ability of the continent's bourgeoisie or intermediate forces (the intelligentsia, the army, the petty bourgeoisie) to make any progress. He described Latin American representative government—where it existed—in negative terms and saw little future in any kind of reformism or populism.

In the majority of Latin American countries, particularly in the post-Cuban political situation, the government could not, as it had before, seek to strike a balance between the direct interests of the ruling social groups and the long-term goals of economic development, between the demands of the oligarchy and the new strata of the bourgeoisie, of foreign capital and "national prestige," of the middle strata and organized labor. It was obvious that the denial of any of these interests or demands would lead—directly or indirectly—to instability, to a sharp intensification of social and political strife. But to preserve the former course also became objectively impossible.¹⁸

Nevertheless, Maidanik's analysis did not give any cause for despair, for he was much more optimistic than Vol'skii about the near-term possibility of revolution. He saw history as discontinuous in nature, with some stages of development being inherently conducive to revolution and others being more stable. He saw Latin America as a continent whose countries shared much in common, for instance, that they were "experiencing a critical, objectively revolutionary phase of development."¹⁹ In these circumstances he saw any "lengthy alliance between revolutionaries and bourgeois reformism" as being "objectively impossible," and he treated any real collaboration with the latter as a betrayal of the revolutionary struggle at a time it might succeed.²⁰ Later he explicitly indicated that any alliance between the Popular Front and the Christian Democrats in the Allende period was covered by this generalization.²¹ (In the Vol'skii view, history was more continuous, with each year bringing movement forward and there being no reason for revolutionaries to rush prematurely and real dangers in doing so.)

The third major position of the early 1970s is more difficult to pin down, for it tended to be expressed very cautiously. Perhaps the problem was that many had considered the outcome of the revolution in Cuba "a miracle" and hence could not feel confident that something similar was not happening in Chile and Peru. Perhaps there was a reluctance on the part of authors and especially editors to say anything in print that might harm the revolutionary process in those countries. But whatever the reason, there were a number of articles in 1971, 1972, and 1973 that did not even mention Chile, but which had a very different tone than found either in Vol'skii's or Maidanik's work.

The position that was being developed by these authors began essentially with the contention that the major countries of Latin America had become quite different from the countries of Asia and Africa. Most fully developed by Boris Koval', then of the Institute of Latin America, this argument insisted that the major Latin American countries had not only reached the middle stages of capitalist development, but were moving towards more advanced stages—even towards the "state-monopoly capitalism" found in the West. In 1972, Koval' conceded that Latin America remained dependent to a considerable degree, but he insisted

that “[while] dependence . . . deforms development, it in no way stops it totally.” Moreover, instead of seeing increasing dependence upon the United States, he asserted that “the government in Latin America often plays the role of a defender of the interests of local capitalism from the dictation of foreign monopolies.”²² A 1974 book that he co-authored with Sergei Semenov (the same Semenov who co-authored the 1954 *Kommunist* review) and Anatolii Shul’govsky did not mention any scholarly opponents in the Soviet Union, but it was blunt in its criticism of “bourgeois literature” that “still characterizes imperialism as having the chief and decisive role in the development of productive forces and productive relations in Latin America” and even more of the extreme views of “left radicals” abroad: “Here one can name the theses about the colonial character of Latin American capitalism. . . . From this it is concluded that capitalism in Latin America is imported instead of being the result of the processes of internal development. . . . Left radicals absolutize the tendency for foreign monopolistic capital to be strengthened in Latin America, and they turn it into the dominating factor of the life of Latin American countries.”²³

Several different political implications could be drawn from this line of analysis, but those advancing it generally were cautious in their appraisals of the short-run prospects of a socialist revolution. The author of the articles on the army—Shul’govsky, by now head of the social-political problems department of the Institute of Latin America—did begin the 1970s writing about the possibilities of a relatively rapid “growing over” of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist, as had occurred in Russia, but by 1971 he was emphasizing that many armies (including, presumably, the Chilean) were professional in character and nonsupportive of revolution, and by mid-decade he was acknowledging that he had been overly optimistic about the revolutionary possibilities in Peru.²⁴ Koval’, while damning the bourgeois-class nature of reformist philosophies and policies, consistently warned against “an underevaluation of [their] great political influence on the formation of a conformist public opinion and the expectations of the masses.” He said that it was “a falsification of the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint” to charge that Communists believed bourgeois democracy to be no better than a reactionary military regime and explained at length why this was so.²⁵

The overthrow of Allende in September 1973 led to a major widening of the debate about Chile, both in terms of the people involved and the frankness of the discussion. In the postmortem, most of the major outsiders argued that the prime mistake had been a failure to move towards a consolidation of political power by extra-legal means. This was the position of the deputy director of the Institute of the International Workers’ Movement and the head of its Communist move-

ments department—both specialists on Asia—as well as that of a scholar from the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, a generalist.²⁶

At times the outsiders' analysis could be maddening in its non-reality. Thus, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism scholar argued that the revolution should have been pushed forward without interruption (although not to the point of nationalizing small business and trade), the workers prepared for armed struggle, a mechanism created to "compel the exploiting classes to agree with the will of the people"—and, of course, that the economy should have been run smoothly and the alliance with the middle strata and with the army strengthened.²⁷ The strategy advocated was incontestably correct, if only it had been explained how the last two points could have been achieved while uninterrupted revolution was being carried out. As a specialist on Europe observed tartly, "it is easy today to fault the Chilean comrades . . . for not creating a counter-army, but surely this attempt would have given the old army the necessary pretext to act even sooner."²⁸

The specialists on Latin America had a much clearer sense of the dilemmas involved, and they often wrote about the tragedy involved—indeed, in a tone suggesting that they had been hit by a personal tragedy. Again, one polar position was occupied by Kiva Maidanik. Just as his view had been indirectly criticized in attacks on left radicals, so he directed his first fire at a *New York Times* editorial which had blamed Allende's overthrow on the decision to push beyond the original nationalization of foreign firms and the failure to try to win over the left Christian Democrats. Maidanik scoffed at such a policy as understandable for "liberal-reformist circles," but scarcely appropriate for those who favored the goal of revolution. To slow down would have meant the demoralization of radical workers and would have set the stage for a possible return to power by the bourgeoisie and their parties. Acknowledging that continued revolution might have failed, he argued that winning over the middle strata and the army was impossible without abandoning the revolution and that the only hope was "to go forward." The right time for more direct action, he suggested, was after the elections in the spring of 1973. He admitted that various mistakes had been made by the Popular Unity, but he spoke with sympathy of the problem of the revolutionary in the midst of flux and uncertainty and cautioned against facile second-guessing.²⁹

By contrast, a number of the leading Latin Americanists—a majority, so far as can be judged from the journals—saw the basic cause of the tragedy not in excessive caution by the revolutionary forces, but in an excessive lack of caution. This position was advanced most forcefully by Evgenii Kosarev, the deputy director of the Institute of Latin America,

in an article in the same issue of *Latin America* as Maidanik's piece. (Such a juxtaposition of totally differing interpretations of a key event was extremely unusual, perhaps unprecedented, behavior for a Soviet journal devoted to the outside world.) Kosarev ripped into "revolutionary romanticism," into "the illusions, the chief consequence of which became an unbalanced acceleration of the process of transformation." He accused the Allende regime of violating its own campaign promises about respecting private property, and he argued that a sound and careful economic policy should have been the first priority.³⁰ Irina Zorina, a specialist on Chile in IMEMO, made a similar point about deviations of the Popular Unity from its program, but she went further to insist that there should have been "political compromises, collaboration, and alliances with the parties representing [the peasants and the middle strata]" —that is, first and foremost, the Christian Democrats.³¹ What seemed to be involved in this view was not simply a difference in judgment on tactics, but a different conception of the forms that a successful revolution might take, specifically of the possibility of a gradual revolution whose contents were of such a nature as to be able to retain the support of the center.³²

Between the two polar positions, a wide range of opinions were expressed on such questions as the point beyond which economic transformation should not have been pushed, the degree to which censorship was compatible with democracy, and the extent to which workers' organizations independent of the old bureaucracy and army should have been created. Disagreements also arose about the relative role of foreign intervention and internal forces in producing the final outcome, but, on balance, the tendency of the participants in the debates to focus on internal factors is quite striking.³³

The key fact about the postmortem on Chile, however, was that it marked not the end of debate on Latin America, but more the beginning of a re-examination of basic conceptions about the continent. *Latin America* began to carry the stenographic reports of long round-table discussions to which proponents of the differing views were deliberately invited. In this context it was easy to move beyond criticism of left-radicals and *The New York Times* to a direct comparison and confrontation of opinions, and, in fact, this happened on a variety of themes in the 1970s. What is the nature of the military in Latin America?³⁴ What is the nature of right-wing regimes there? (For example, how much popular support do they have and where, how does this support change after they are in power, do they deserve the label "fascist"?)³⁵ What is the nature of Carter's human rights program in Latin America? (Is it a cover for American support of military regimes, is it the expression of an overt policy of replacing military regimes by representative democracy, or is

American policy simply confused and inconsistent?)³⁶ On all these questions, participants in the debates held sharply different opinions, and they were free to express them in print.

The most important debates have centered on two major questions: (1) the degree of dependence and the level of development of the major Latin American countries, and (2) the probable line of political development in Latin America over the near term and especially the medium term.

The debate on dependence and level of development has been the most confused of the Soviet debates—or, to phrase it differently, it has been the one in which the most genuine clarification of issues and concepts has been taking place. In its simplest form, the level of economic development question—whether Latin America has reached the stage of middle-level capitalism and is moving on to higher ones—is one of the autonomy of the study of Latin America from that of Asia and Africa. If the Latin American level is much higher than the Asian or African—indeed, actually closer to that of southern Europe—Latin America really needs to be understood in terms other than the usual ones about developing nations.

In its simplest form, the dependency question can have much the same character. If the dependence of Asia, Africa, and Latin America on the Western capitalist countries is so great that it remains the determining factor in their development, then it seems to follow that the commonality of the three continents should be emphasized. If the dependence is unchanging, perhaps the developing nations cannot advance to middle levels of development, let alone higher ones, until they break out of the capitalist mold. Thus, especially when this debate began in earnest, Zorina could review the 1974 Koval', Semenov, and Shul'govsky book emphasizing Latin American distinctiveness and a simultaneous IMEMO book based on the concept of "dependent development" as essentially opposing works.³⁷

Even at the beginning, however, the two debates were not as completely intertwined as appeared on the surface. Maidanik, for example, was one of the first to insist in print that the major Latin American countries were essentially at middle levels of capitalist development,³⁸ and he simultaneously was one of the driving forces behind the "dependent capitalism" theme in the IMEMO. In the last five years the debates have diverged even further. By the end of the decade, the old opponents of the notion of middle-level development were generally abandoning this position, while still insisting that the level of development in Latin America was a relatively insignificant fact in comparison with the fact of its dependence.³⁹

As nearly everyone began to accept that the level of development in Latin America is between that of the advanced capitalist countries on the one side and Asia and Africa on the other, the debate on level of development shifted to two other questions. First, is there a special stage of historical development, "middle-level capitalism" (say, France in the 1850s, Russia in the early 1900s, Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s), which for structural reasons is especially conducive to revolution? (This is Maidanik's position.⁴⁰) Second, even if Latin America today should not be understood in terms of Russia of 1900, let alone France of the 1850s, is there a group of countries today (notably in Latin America and southern Europe) that have a number of common characteristics that are more important to emphasize and study than those associated with Latin America's "Third World" position?⁴¹

Thus, the debate on dependence has tended to become separate from that on level of development, for one can argue about the relative importance and nature of dependence at different levels of development or in different historical circumstances. However, the dependency debate has continued to be marked by difficulty. Part of the problem is that a number of the leading scholars of IMEMO have been conducting a simultaneous debate with those of the Institute of Oriental Studies, who have been suggesting that most developing countries of Asia and Africa are "multi-structural" (*mnogoukladnyi*) and transitional in nature rather than basically capitalist.⁴² In this debate, the thrust of the label "dependent capitalism" for the Third World was an insistence that all but the most backward countries were already launched on the capitalist path, however dependent and deformed. In the Latin American context, on the other hand, the term "capitalism" would be accepted by everyone as appropriate for nearly all of Latin America, and the part of the phrase that sprang to attention was "dependent." Hence, instead of implying forward development as it did in the debate on Asia and Africa, "dependent capitalism" tended to imply retardation of development in Latin America, and this difference contributed somewhat to confusion in the discussion.

A second part of the problem is simply definitional. The IMEMO definition of dependence has much of the complexity of dependency theory in Latin America, and it tends to focus on the historical origins of industrial development and the impact of these origins upon internal economic and social development of Third World countries. That is, in this view dependency means a type of development, and it is compatible with a country passing through different stages of development. For many others, dependence refers simply to current relationships, political as well as economic—the extent to which Latin American countries

are following or can follow domestic and foreign policies not dictated by the United States. As a result, the participants in the debates sometimes talk past each other.

A normative element, it should be noted, also intrudes into the debate on dependence. As one participant stated, "people assert, moreover, that the theory of dependent capitalism answers the needs of the development of the anti-imperialist struggle, while the conception of middle-level capitalism implies a reconciliation with it." This man (Victor Sheinis) "categorically objects" to such an argument in scientific discussion (and besides adds that "revolutionary or non-revolutionary conclusions can be drawn from either theory"),⁴³ but the statement certainly indicates that there are "people" who think otherwise and who presumably are being guided by this consideration.

Basically, everybody agrees that the industrialization of Latin America (and Asia and Africa) at a later stage than the United States and West Europe and the early foreign dominance of its economy did deform it in important ways. The real arguments today center on the trends in the present and the future. Vol'skii (still the director of the Institute of Latin America), Lev Klochkovsky (the head of its economics department), and Igor Sheremet'ev (the institute's top specialist on Mexico) cite statistics on trade and investment to argue that Latin America is becoming more dependent rather than less. They contend that this remains the dominant fact about Latin America, and that it makes it very unlikely that the economies of countries such as Brazil and Mexico can continue to develop vigorously under capitalism, let alone that they can move on to more autonomous lines of development.⁴⁴ Maidanik agrees that dependence remains a central fact about Latin American development, but he emphasizes the changes in the forms of dependence. He strongly argues that the continuing gap in development with the West and the continuing dependence are but two of the factors preventing balanced social-political development under capitalism, but he sees the possibility of substantial, if deformed, economic growth.⁴⁵ Those who talk about analogies to Europe, on the other hand, tend to be suggesting that Latin America has been moving more in the direction of self-sustaining, even partially self-defining economic growth. They see dependence as one of the important factors defining the Latin American situation, but insist that the question of dependence (or interdependence) is extremely complicated in the modern world and that the degree of dependence can change with the level of development.⁴⁶ In addition, there also are real arguments about the degree of independence from the United States that is possible in foreign policy, and, in private, some see a major clash between the United States and Brazil looming on the horizon.⁴⁷

The debate on the future political development of Latin America is conceptually clearer than that on dependency and level of development, although to a considerable extent the debates overlap. Essentially if one believes that the economies and societies of the major Latin American countries are becoming like Europe, then it is natural to raise the question whether their politics are on the verge of Europeanization as well. In particular, it is natural to wonder whether the movement from dictatorship to representative democracy in Portugal, Spain, and Greece does not foreshadow a similar development in Latin America in the relatively near future. If, by contrast, one believes that Latin America is trapped in an economic-social bog, it is difficult to see a serious possibility for the government to “maneuver” (the word for a policy of social and political concessions to various mass groups) or for the population to be sufficiently moderate for the bourgeoisie to be able to trust representative democracy.

The thesis about a Europeanization of Latin American politics was already implicit in the writings of Boris Koval’ since the early 1970s, and it appeared in partial form in various statements by participants in round-table discussions in *Latin America* over subsequent years. However, the May 1976 Caracas conference between thirteen leaders of European social democracy and representatives of sixteen reformist Latin American parties provided the impetus for a focussed discussion on the political development of Latin America—specifically on the future of social democracy in that continent. In 1978, I. Danilevich, the daughter of the leading Latin Americanist of two decades before, published an article on the relationship of the Sotsintern and Latin America, which asserted that “essential social-economic changes had occurred in the last two years which on a series of parameters have brought it closer to the countries of developed capitalism.”⁴⁸ Acknowledging that in the 1960s she had seen little future for social democracy in Latin America, she argued that social democracy’s tendency to become more nationalistic had changed the situation in a substantial way.⁴⁹ *Latin America* then published a long round-table discussion on the subject, with a full spectrum of views expressed.⁵⁰

The discussion of social democracy was not simply an abstract exercise of prognosis. One of its central foci was the normative aspect of the question: What should be the Communist attitude to this development? How important is it for the Communists to try to ally with the moderate left to try to promote representative democracy and fight military dictatorships? On these issues, much the same lines that formed during the Allende years continued to exist.

As before, Kiva Maidanik expressed one of the clearly defined positions. Just as moderate socialists had not fared well in Russia in the

early twentieth century nor in Spain in the 1930s, so he did not believe that they would be successful in Latin America, which is passing through an analogous revolutionary phase. He argued that cooperation with the social democrats (and even the bourgeoisie) was vital in countries with military dictatorships, so that such governments could be overthrown. However, once that was achieved, he saw no need (or possibility, without abandoning the revolution) for major collaboration with the social democrats to forestall the reestablishment of a military dictatorship in the future. "The growth of the fascist threat in no way means that there is a need for revolutionaries to adopt a strictly 'defensive' strategy, a strategic moderation in raising and deciding problems of social transition in order to defend the institutions of bourgeois democracy."⁵¹

Koval', Semenov, and Shul'govsky again occupied leading positions near the other pole. Koval', who had been promoted to the deputy directorship of the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, insisted that "In a whole group of countries the toilers, in practice, have to select not between capitalism and socialism, but between bourgeois democracy and fascism." Indeed, he went so far as to suggest that the struggle for democracy (in a presocialist system) would be the determining feature of Latin American politics for many years and perhaps decades. He left no doubt about his opinion about the position of the Communists in this struggle. While maintaining their independence, they should be willing to cooperate with the moderates when there was a coincidence of interests—and the preservation of representative democracy was certainly one such case. Maidanik had dismissed it as "fictitious in a majority of cases," but Koval' asserted that "a widening of democracy is a necessary precondition for a successful struggle against imperialism and for socialism."⁵² Shul'govsky too strongly condemned the notion that the only choice was "fascism or socialism."⁵³

Obviously, these few excerpts do not fully express the subtleties of thought of these men on this subject, or on any other analyzed in this article. Just as obviously, a brief summary of the polar positions does not illuminate the range of views held by people in between. This article has named only a few of the leading participants in an effort to indicate that there exists a lively community of scholars who are debating—even in print—many of the same issues being debated in the West, who are grappling towards an understanding and conceptualization of phenomena that pose great difficulties to Westerners as well. For a student of the Soviet political system, the central interest of the Soviet Latin Americanists is the case study they provide of the growing sophistication and freedom of within-systems political discussion. For individual

Western specialists on Latin America, on the other hand, the most interesting ideas and subdebates are likely to be those on specific countries and specific topics that are simply too detailed to be covered in a brief survey article of this type. Particularly since the journal *Latin America* is published in Spanish as well, the opportunity to read and profit from these discussions should be much greater than in realms where the work is available only in Russian.⁵⁴

It is possible that some readers will assume that the view expressed by Maidanik is the "party view," while that held by Koval', Semenov, and Shul'govsky is that of the more "nonparty" specialists. Even leaving aside the fact that all the scholars mentioned herein are surely members of the Communist party, it is worth noting that Semenov is the only Latin Americanist cited who does not work in an Academy of Sciences institute. He is the only one employed in an institute attached to the Party Central Committee, the Institute of Social Sciences, where he is its leading Latin Americanist. Similarly, the most ideologically sensitive of the Academy of Sciences institutes is the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, and it contains the younger Danilovich and has Koval' as its deputy director (in his previous job, Koval' worked with Semenov in the Central Committee's Institute of Social Sciences).

It is also worth noting that many Soviet scholarly books have a "responsible editor"—an outsider who in a general way vouches for the book's quality and contents. Usually it is a fairly high-ranking scholar, but the man who played this role for the 1974 Koval', Semenov, and Shul'govsky book was Vadim V. Zagladin, the first deputy head of the international department of the Central Committee. In 1979, Koval' published another book on the workers' movement in Latin America, and again Zagladin (still holding the same post) served as responsible editor.⁵⁵ This is not to say that the Koval' position is necessarily the "party" one, for the Maidanik view, perhaps with some qualifications, undoubtedly also has adherents in high posts. Another deputy head of the international department (Rostislav Ul'ianovsky) debates with the specialist on Asia, A. I. Levkovsky, in a way that suggests sharp divergence with Zagladin's viewpoint (see note 42). The discussions that we see in print, the attempts to move towards greater understanding of murky phenomena, have their counterparts within the party and governmental apparatuses as well. That, too, is part of the complexity of the Soviet Union on which an examination of the evolving debates on Latin America and the rest of the outside world begins to shed a bit of light.

NOTES

1. Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Tselina* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), p. 21.
2. Either because of censorship or self-censorship, Soviet scholars are also much more cautious in their papers prepared for foreign conferences or conferences that foreigners attend. This practice has greatly strengthened the Western belief that Soviet social science is very simple-minded or that the censorship is totally restrictive.
3. This journal, *Latinskaia Amerika*, is also translated in substantial part in a Spanish edition, *América Latina*. For the statement about "the collective search for truth," see *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1978), p. 119.
4. M. V. Danilevich, *Polozhenie i bor'ba rabochemo klassa stran latinskoï ameriki* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk, 1953).
5. V. Ermolaev, S. Semenov, and A. Sivolobov, "Ser'eznye oshibki v knige o rabochem dvizhenii v Latinskoï Amerike," *Kommunist*, no. 7 (May 1954), p. 127. See the discussion in Herbert S. Dinerstein, *The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 3–6, 10–14.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 121, and 122.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
8. M. V. Danilevich and A. F. Shul'govsky, ed., *Problemy sovremennoi latinskoï ameriki* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo instituta mezhdunarodnogo otnosheniia, 1959). The latter statement, by A. I. Kalinin, is on p. 85. The criticism of Shul'govsky is contained in a review by A. N. Glinkin in *Mirovaia ekonomia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 5 (May 1961), p. 148.
9. See the articles by M. Grechev (the statement on absolutizing is on p. 35) and Iu. G. Onufriev in *Problemy sovremennoi latinskoï ameriki*. Some of the points are criticized in the Glinkin review.
10. I. N. Zorina, "Narodnoe edinstvo burzhuaznaia demokratiia," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1972), p. 41.
11. These discussions are found in *Mirovaia ekonomia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 3 (March 1962), pp. 20–49; no. 4 (Apr. 1962), pp. 68–98; no. 5 (May 1962), pp. 85–108; no. 6 (June 1962), pp. 85–105; no. 4 (Apr. 1964), pp. 116–31; no. 6 (June 1964), pp. 62–81; no. 8 (Aug. 1965), pp. 86–103; no. 9 (Sept. 1965), pp. 77–89; no. 10 (Oct. 1965), pp. 105–19; no. 11 (Nov. 1965), pp. 88–97; no. 12 (Dec. 1965), pp. 113–22; no. 4 (Apr. 1967), pp. 106–27; no. 5 (May 1967), pp. 93–108; no. 5 (May 1968), pp. 90–104; no. 8 (Aug. 1968), pp. 82–96.
12. M. V. Danilevich, *Rabochii klass v osvoboditel'noi dvizhenii narodov Latinskoï Ameriki* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962); I. K. Sheremetev, ed., *Tendentsii ekonomicheskogo razvitiia stran latinskoï ameriki* (Moscow: Mysl', 1969); B. I. Koval', *Proletariat latinskoï ameriki* (Moscow: Mysl', 1968); Iu. G. Onufriev, ed., *Sel'skoe khoziaistvo i agrarnye otnosheniia v stranakh latinskoï ameriki* (Moscow: Mysl', 1971); A. F. Shul'govsky, ed., *Sel'skie trudiashchiesia latinskoï ameriki* (Moscow: Mysl', 1972); A. F. Shul'govsky, ed., *Srednie gorodskie sloi latinskoï ameriki* (Moscow: Mysl', 1974). In addition, there were innumerable specialized books and articles.
13. S. Mikoian, "Narodnaia revoliutsiia na Kube," *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, no. 3 (Mar. 1961), pp. 21–31, and "Kubinskii narod boretsia za svetloe budushchee," *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, no. 5 (May 1961), pp. 10–21. Compare these articles with the much more cautious discussion published months later in "Tekushchie problemy mirovoi politiki," *Mirovaia ekonomia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 1 (Jan. 1962), pp. 35–37.
14. V. V. Vol'skii "Leninizm i problemy revoliutsionnogo protsesssa, v Latinskoï Amerike," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1970), esp. pp. 8–11, 16–17 and 23 (n. 27).
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 19–23.
16. In the postmortem after the military coup, Vol'skii was the scholar to talk most about American intervention. "Problemy mirnogo puti k sotsializmu," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1974), pp. 42–45.

17. K. Maidanik, "Sotsial'no-politicheskii krizis v Latinskoi Amerike i perspektivy ego predoleniia," *Mirovaia ekonomia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 7 (July 1973), pp. 28–29, 30–35; and no. 8 (Aug. 1970), p. 77.
18. Maidanik, "Sotsial'no-politicheskii krizis," p. 37.
19. K. Maidanik, "Sumerki liberal'nogo reformizma," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1970), p. 60. See also Maidanik, "Sotsial'no-politicheskii krizis," p. 29, for a similar statement about Latin America passing through a "common epoch of revolution."
20. Maidanik, "Sumerki liberal'nogo reformizma."
21. K. I. Maidanik, "Vokrug urokov Chili," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1974), pp. 119–21.
22. B. I. Koval', "Nauchno-tehnicheskaiia revoliutsiia i Latinskaia Amerika," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 5 (Oct.–Nov. 1972), esp. pp. 15, 16, and 21.
23. B. I. Koval', S. I. Semenov, and A. F. Shul'govsky, *Revoliutsionnye protsessy v Latinskoi Amerike* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), pp. 29–30, 287, and 298.
24. A. F. Shul'govsky (all in *Latinskaia Amerika*), "Leninskaia teoriia pererastanii revoliutsii v sotsialisticheskuiu i Latinskaia Amerika," no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1970), pp. 55–80; "Latinskaia Amerika: armiia i politika," no. 4 (July–Aug. 1971), pp. 7–41; "Armiia i politika v sovremennoi Latinskoi Amerike," no. 3 (May–June 1977), p. 52.
25. B. I. Koval' (all in *Latinskaia Amerika*), "'Sotsial'noe souchastie ili bor'ba za demokratiuu?," no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1973), pp. 33 and 34ff; "Vliianie mirovogo sotsializma na rost politicheskogo soznaniia proletariata Latinskoi Ameriki," no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1974), pp. 23–38, esp. pp. 32–34.
26. The Asian specialists were A. A. Kutsenkov and S. A. Agaev. *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1974), pp. 139 and 141. The article by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism scholar is A. I. Sobolev, "Revoliutsiia i kontrrevoliutsiia: opyt Chili i problemy klassovoi bor'by," *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1974), pp. 3–22.
27. Sobolev, "Revoliutsiia i kontrrevoliutsiia," *passim*. The quotation is from p. 15.
28. A. A. Galkin of the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1974), p. 133.
29. Maidanik, "Vokrug urokov Chili," pp. 112–33.
30. E. A. Kosarev, "Ekonomika i mirnyi put' revoliutsii," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1974), pp. 92–100, especially pp. 95, 96, and 99–100.
31. I. N. Zorina and Iu. F. Kariakin, "Politicheskaiia khronika chiliiskoi revoliutsii," Part 2, *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1974), p. 148. Also see Zorina's statement in the discussion published in *ibid.*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1974), p. 136.
32. This seems to be the meaning of statements such as the following by Zorina: "The participation of the Christian Democrats would not have hindered the enactment of the planned program of democratic transformation, but could have achieved its full realization and made it really irreversible." I. N. Zorina, "Revoliutsiia i khristianko-demokraticheskaia partiia," in M. F. Kudachkin and A. A. Kutsenkov, eds., *Uroki Chili* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), p. 197. For a fuller expression of this point of view in a more general setting see S. I. Tiul'panov and V. L. Sheinis, *Aktual'nye problemy politicheskoi ekonomii sovremenного kapitalizma* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo LGU, 1973), pp. 252–60.
33. For example, the head of the Latin American section of the Party Central Committee, M. F. Kudachkin, began with a fairly straightforward position about the need for more drastic political action under Allende. "Nekotorye uroki revoliutsii," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1975), pp. 59–66. In a subsequent popular book, he moved to the middle position calling for more political action and a strengthening of ties with the middle strata, and, despite the nature of his position and the nature of the book (both of which would have given reason to stress the American role in Allende's overthrow), he gave little enough attention to this factor that he was criticized for it in a review by a scholar at the more conservative Institute of World History. (I. I. Ian-chuk in *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 4 [1978], p. 189.)

34. "Armiia i politika v sovremennoi Latinskoii Amerike," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 3 (May–June 1977), pp. 49–85, and no. 4 (July–Aug. 1977), pp. 113–49.
35. "K probleme sovremennykh pravoavtoritarnykh rezhimov," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1975), pp. 97–122, and no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1976), pp. 98–113. V. P. Totskii, "K voprosu o tak nazyvaemykh pravoavtoritarnykh rezhimakh," *ibid.*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1975), pp. 115–26.
36. "Administratsiia Kartera i Latinskaia Amerika, (kruglyi stol)," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 4 (July–Aug. 1979), pp. 100–60.
37. The review, one of the best in a Soviet or any other journal, is found in *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1975), pp. 196–200. The IMEMO book was *Razvivaiushchiesia strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), and was heavily influenced by Maidanik.
38. *Mirovaia ekonomiiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 8 (Aug. 1970), p. 77.
39. In an extremely interesting, day-long discussion held in June 1978 (and published in the first two issues of *Latin America* in 1979), Lev Klochkovsky, the head of the economics department of the Institute of Latin America, began by denying the appropriateness of the "middle-level capitalism" label for Latin America, but ended the day by supporting Maidanik's suggestion that the term "middle-level dependent capitalism" be applied. *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1979), p. 62, and no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1979), p. 131.
40. *Ibid.*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1979), pp. 86–91.
41. This is the position of Victor Sheinis, a comparatist at IMEMO. "Strany sredenrazvitogo kapitalizma," *Mirovaia ekonomiiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 9 (Sept. 1977), pp. 150–57 and "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaiia differentsiatsiia i problemy tipologii razvivaiushchikhsia stran," *ibid.*, no. 8 (Aug. 1978), pp. 93–107. Also see his contributions in *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1979), pp. 63–73, and no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1979), pp. 128–30.
42. In particular, see two books by A. I. Levkovsky, *Tretii mir v sovremennom mire* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979) and *Sotsial'naia struktura razvivaiushchikhsia stran* (Moscow: Mysl', 1978). Also see the exchange between Levkovsky and "A. U. Roslavlev" (a pseudonym for R. A. Ul'ianovsky, a deputy head of the international department of the Party Central Committee) in *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1974), pp. 103–14; no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1975), pp. 136–50; no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1977), pp. 136–45.
43. V. L. Sheinis, in *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1979), p. 130.
44. L. Klochkovsky and I. Sheremet'ev, "Latinskaia Amerika: krizis zavisimogo kapitalizma," *Mirovaia ekonomiiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 4 (Apr. 1978), pp. 53–66, and V. Vol'skii, "Otnositel'naia zrelost', bezuslovnaia zavisimost'," *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, no. 6 (June 1979), pp. 48–53. Also see the debate about Mexico, "O sovremennom etape razvitiia kapitalizma v Meksike," *Latinskaia amerika*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1978), pp. 70–119, esp. 78–82, and that about dependence and level of development, "Kak otsenivat' osobennosti i uroven' razvitiia kapitalizma v latinskoii amerike," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1979), pp. 53–100 (esp. pp. 56–62 and 85–89), and no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1979), pp. 82–131 (esp. pp. 130–31).
45. *Ibid.*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1979), pp. 86–91 and 108–14, and no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1978), pp. 100–5 and 112–14. Also see V. M. Davydov, "O stepeni zrelosti i osobennostiakh kapitalizma 'latino-amerikanskogo' tipa," *Mirovaia ekonomiiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 3 (Mar. 1979), pp. 116–29.
46. *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1979), pp. 63–77 and 80–84; no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1979), pp. 122–25 and 128–30; no. 5 (Sept. 1978), pp. 114–19.
47. For an interesting matrix analysis of the level of support of different Latin American governments for the United States, see E. V. Levykin, "K voprosu o metodike prognozirovaniia mezhgosudarstvennykh otnoshenii," *ibid.*, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1978), pp. 125–35.
48. I. V. Danilevich, "Mezhdunarodnaia sotsial-demokratiia i latinskaia amerika," *ibid.*, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1978), p. 81.

49. *Ibid.*, no. 4 (July–Aug. 1978), pp. 89–90.
50. "Mezhdunarodnaia sotsial-demokratiia i latinskaia amerika," *ibid.*, pp. 88–146.
51. *Ibid.*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1975), pp. 107–8. See also *ibid.*, no. 4 (July–Aug. 1978), pp. 106–14.
52. *Ibid.*, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1975), p. 111; no. 4 (July–Aug. 1978), p. 103. See also B. I. Koval' and S. I. Semenov, "Latinskaia amerika i mezhdunarodnaia sotsial-demokratiia," *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, no. 4 (July–Aug. 1978), pp. 115–30.
53. *Latinskaia amerika*, no. 4 (July–Aug. 1978), p. 101. Also see A. F. Shul'govsky, "Revoliutsiia i kontrrevoliutsiia v latinskoj amerike v svete opyta velikogo oktiabria," *ibid.*, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1977), p. 44.
54. Unfortunately, only four issues of the Spanish edition are published a year, instead of six for the Russian edition, and hence it does not include all of the material of the original. On the basis of a limited comparative examination, it does not seem that there is a policy of cutting controversial material. For example, the 1974 exchange between Maidanik and Kosarev on the reasons for the overthrow of Allende is published in *América Latina*, no. 2 (1975) and the discussion of right-wing regimes in no. 3 (1976).
55. B. I. Koval', *Rabochee dvizhenie v latinskoj amerike* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), p. 2.