

Notes

PREFACE

1. Although there are a number of channels that can carry the effects of foreign disturbances to an economy (namely, in the alteration of foreign currency prices of traded goods, quantities of traded commodities demanded or supplied, and credit and capital markets), the focus of this book is on labor and remittance flows. This is because for the remittance economies the latter is the most important in terms of both the nature of the disturbance and the extent of the links between the domestic and global economy. This in turn allows us to draw some causal inferences with regard to the political, social, and economic ramifications of exogenous shocks on domestic politics. For a full discussion on the subject, see Laura D'Andrea Tyson and Peter B. Kenen, "The International Transmission of Disturbances: A Framework of Comparative Analysis," in *The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Transmission and Response*, ed. Egon Neuberger and Laura D'Andrea Tyson (New York: Pegamon Press, 1990), 33–62.
2. Indeed, as Charles Tilly famously observed, throughout history, subordinate populations have participated in trust networks including clandestine religious sects and kinship groups as a shield against the repression of rulers and to protect themselves from dispossession and exploitation. Charles Tilly, "Trust and Rule," *Theory and Society* 33, no. 1 (2004): 1.
3. Leonardo A. Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 36.

INTRODUCTION

1. Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics* (New York: Routledge Press, 2014); Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
2. Millard J. Burr and Robert O. Collings, *Alms for Jihad* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Hernando De Soto, "The Capitalist Cure for Terrorism," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 2014.
3. John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Timor Kuran, *Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

- University Press, 2004); Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Vali Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism: Why the New Muslim Middle Class Is the Key to Defeating Terrorism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Free Press, 2010); Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Changing Face of Political Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
4. Mark Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis,” in *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*, ed. John Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 93–126; Eli Berman and Laurence R. Iannacone, “Hammas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist’s View of Radical Religious Militias,” *NBER Working Paper*, no. w10004 (2003); Eli Berman and Laurence R. Iannacone, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly,” *Public Choice* 128, no. 1–2 (2006): 109–129; Anne B. Krueger and J. Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper*, no. 9074 (July 2003): 1–36; Jacob Shapiro, *The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
 5. Gilles Keppel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2005); Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2006); Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Teri Ostebo, “African Salafism: Religious Piety and the Politicization of Purity,” *Islamic Africa* 6 (2015): 1–29.
 6. Judith Scheele, *Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
 7. It is important to note the significance of international remittances. In 2008, for example, remittances to developing countries reached an estimated \$305 billion, registering a growth of 120 percent from 2002. In Africa and the Middle East, workers’ remittances are the largest source of development finance, exceeding both official development assistance and foreign direct investment. Moreover, these capital inflows have increased dramatically, up from \$0.5 billion in 1975 to over \$8 billion in 2005. Over roughly the same period, informal markets increased dramatically in size. A World Bank study estimated that in Africa over 60 percent of the population relied on the informal economy for their livelihood. These trends of international economic transactions and increasing domestic informal economic activity have coincided with the rise of the politics of ascription in African countries most deeply affected by these developments. Samuel M. Miambi and Dilip Ratha, eds., *Global Development Finance* (Washington, DC: World Bank Report, 2007), 14.
 8. Most new institutionalist studies on the politics of internationalization take increase in trade as proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) or the ratio

- of a country's net foreign investment to its total domestic assets as indicators of internationalization. As a consequence, the least-developed countries have been routinely left out of the analysis. In fact, most conceptualizations of the politics inherent in the process are applicable to Third World countries. Jeffrey Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45 (Autumn 1991): 425–452; Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
9. Tariq Banuri has demonstrated the extent to which the integration of domestic financial sectors with international financial markets increases with the expansion of "black market" activities. Tariq Banuri, *United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) Working Paper: Black Markets, Openness and Central Bank Autonomy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1988), 2–3.
 10. Among some notable exceptions that examine the influence of informal networks and political transitions across cases, albeit in the context of Central Asia, is the work of Kathleen Collins, *Clan Politics and Regime Transitions in Central Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 11. Important research on the relationship between informal institutions and democratization while contributing a great deal toward laying a theoretical foundation for informal institutional analysis does not take into account informal economic institutions. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds., *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2006). The authors acknowledge that they "leave aside economic (e.g., black markets) institutions" in their work. *Ibid.*, 4.
 12. Scott Radnitz, "Informal Politics and the State," *Comparative Politics* 43, no. 3 (2011): 351–371.
 13. Robert H. Bates, for example, while correctly pointing out that risk averse agents behaving rationally prefer regulated incomes, assumes that market liberalization would summarily shrink informal activities. This ignores the structural underpinnings of how informal markets are created and which historically specific institutions would end their resiliency. Robert H. Bates, *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development* (New York: Norton, 2001), 115–132.
 14. The scholarship in economic sociology is particularly useful in helping us understand the similarities between different markets and social movements. Neil Fligstein, "Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 656–673; Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Mark Granovetter, "The Old and the New Economic Sociology: A History and an Agenda," in *Beyond the Marketplace*, ed. R. Friedland and A. F. Robertson (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 89–112. Granovetter, taking a middle position between new institutionalist and neo-classical economic perspectives, argues that differences in social structure, institutional history and collective action

- (i.e., “embedded social relations”) in addition to power relations crucially shape future possibilities.
15. Deborah Brautigam, “Substituting for the State: Institutional and Industrial Development in Eastern Nigeria,” *World Development* 25, no. 7 (1997): 1063–1080; Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Diane Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements,” in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach*, ed. Quinton Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 143–163; Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Social Welfare and the Middle Class: Networks, Activism, and Charity in Egypt, Yemen and Jordan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Jillian Schwedler, “Myth, Menace or Mobilizer?” *SAIS Review* 21, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 1–17; Quinton Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism*; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
 16. Frances Cleaver, “Institutional Bricolage, Conflict and Cooperation in Usangu, Tanzania,” *IDS Bulletin* 32, no. 4 (October 2001): 26–43; Janet I. Guyer, *Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Karen Tranberg Hansen and Mariken Vaa, *Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives from Urban Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitute, 2004); Janet MacGaffey, *Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) originally published in 1987.
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 18. Diego Gambetta, *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Frederic Varese, *The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Edgar L. Feige and Katarina Ott, eds., *Underground Economies in Transition: Unrecorded Activity, Tax Evasion, Corruption and Organized Crime* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999).
 19. Kate Meagher, *Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria* (London: James Currey, Africa Issues Series, 2010).
 20. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, “The Quality of Terror,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 515–530.
 21. Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
 22. See, for example, the influential work of Krueger and Maleckova. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4

- (2003): 119–144; Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
23. There is, of course, a long tradition in political science that argues that economic and ideological factors are important determinants of violent mobilization. See, for example, Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Mark Irving Lichbach, “An Evaluation of ‘Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?’ Studies” *World Politics* 41, no. 4 (1989): 431–470.
 24. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
 25. Henry Munson, “Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” *Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (2002): 487–521.
 26. Jika Maleckova, “Impoverished Terrorists: Stereotype or Reality,” in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed. Tore Bjorgo (New York: Routledge, 2005), 35. See also Alan B. Krueger, “Poverty Doesn’t Create Terrorists,” *The New York Times*, May 29, 2003.
 27. The fact that militancy and terrorism have been correlated to economic contraction and deprivation has been documented in both the Middle East context and across regions. See, for example, S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess, and Akila Weerapan, “Terrorism from Within: An Economic Model of Terrorism,” *Claremont Colleges Working Papers*, no. 2002–14 (2002).
 28. Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (1987): 13–31; and Martha Crenshaw, “‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism: A Critical Appraisal,” in *Jihad Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe*, ed. Rick Coolsaet (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 25–36.
 29. Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model,” *Journal of Public Economics* 92, no. 10–11 (2008): 1942–1968.
 30. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in the Arab World,” *The Middle East Journal* 60, no. 3 (2006): 444–466.
 31. Zafiris Tzannatos and Iqbal Kaur, “Welfare State Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” in *When Markets Fail: Social Policy and Economic Reform in* Ethan B. Kapstein and Brando Milanovic, eds. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 146–182.
 32. *Ibid.*
 33. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
 34. Notable examples include Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*; Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*.
 35. State repression can lead to either increased or decreased mobilization of militant groups. In the contest of Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, this appears to depend on the timing of government crackdowns and the level of strength of the target group or groups in civil society. Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*.

“THE HOUSE THE BOOM BUILT”: THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND ISLAMIST POLITICS IN EGYPT

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2. Interview with Mr. Magdi Mahmoud Ali. Interview with the author, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba Cairo, Egypt, January 18, 1999. Although economic incentives were clearly the driving force behind his choice to emigrate, Mr. Ali also noted that an important reason why he chose Libya as his first destination was because of the “cultural affinity” between Egyptians and Libyans.
3. Charles Tilly, “Trust Networks in Transnational Migration,” *Sociological Forum* 22, no. 1 (March 2007): 3.
4. John Waterbury, “The ‘Soft State’ and the Open Door: Egypt’s Experience with Economic Liberalization, 1974–1985,” *Comparative Politics* 18, no. 1 (October 1985): 67.
5. Ragui Assaad, ed., *The Egyptian Labor Market Revisited* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009), 8–9.
6. Ragui Assaad and Rania Roushdy, “Job Quality among the Non-Wage Workers in the Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors in Egypt,” *Economic Research Forum Working Papers* 386 (2008): 37.
7. *Ibid.*, 18.
8. *Ibid.*, 38.
9. *Ibid.*, 21.
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12. Assaad and Roushdy, “Job Quality,” 9.
13. Waterbury, “The ‘Soft State’,” 70.
14. Essam Mitwally, “On the Emerging Industrialization Policies and Practices in the Arab Republic of Egypt,” *Journal of Economic Cooperation among Islamic Countries* 20, no. 1 (1999): 22.
15. Galal Amin, “Some Economic and Cultural Aspects of Economic Liberalization in Egypt,” *Social Problems* 28, no. 4 (April 1981): 430–441.
16. Waterbury, “The ‘Soft State’,” 66.
17. MERI Report, *Central Bank of Egypt* (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Viewswire, 1985), 79.
18. Hamza Ateş, Mehmet Duman, and Yüksel Bayraktar, “A Story of *Infitalah*: Egyptian Liberalisation under Stress,” *Yapı Kredi Economic Review* 17, no. 1 (2006): 66. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ebe9/0230896a1c71dccfaea-def2ed3eb4e763b73.pdf>.
19. *Ibid.*, 65.
20. *Ibid.*, 69.
21. *Ibid.*, 79.

22. Eva Bellin, “The Political Economic Conundrum: The Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series*, no. 53 (November 2004): 6–7. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2004/11/09/political-economic-conundrum-affinity-of-economic-and-political-reform-in-middle-east-and-north-africa-pub-16051>.
23. Ilya Harik, *Economic Policy Reform in Egypt* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 27.
24. *Ibid.*, 37.
25. Hans Löfgren, “Economic Policy in Egypt: A Breakdown in Reform Resistance,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25 (August 1993): 407–421.
26. *Ibid.*, 408.
27. Robert Springborg, “Egypt,” in *Economic and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East*, ed. Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 161.
28. Löfgren, “Economic Policy.”
29. Springborg, “Egypt,” 161.
30. Delwin A. Roy, “The Hidden Economy of Egypt,” *Middle East Studies* 28, no. 4 (1991): 697.
31. Waterbury, “The ‘Soft State’,” 69.
32. Roy, “The Hidden Economy om Egypt,” 692.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Eric Denis, “Cairo as Neoliberal Capital? From Walled City to Gated Communities,” in *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East*, ed. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 47–72.
35. Jackline Wahba, “Informality in Egypt: A Stepping Stone or a Dead End?” *Cairo, Egypt: Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working Paper*, no. 456 (2009). Informal employment refers to workers in informal enterprises as well as wage employment in formal enterprises, households, or those with no fixed employer, and who are not covered by social security and have no formal contract.
36. B. McCormick and Jackline Wahba, “Migration and Mobility in the Egyptian Labor Market,” *Economic Research Forum Research Report*, no. 0401 (2004).
37. David Sims, *Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City Out of Control* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2010), 99.
38. Charles Tilly, *Trust and Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
39. Ministry of Planning, *Five Year Plan for 1978–1982* (Cairo: Ministry of Planning, 1977), cited in Rodney Wilson, “Wither the Egyptian Economy,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 2 (1993): 205.
40. Roy, “The Hidden Economy,” 690.
41. “Al-bunuk wa munafasat sharikat tawsif al-amwal” [The Banks and the Competition of the Money Management Companies], *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, December 2, 1987; “Kayf nawajih tahdiyati sharikat tawsif al-amwal” [How do

- We Confront the Challenges of the Money Management Companies], *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, February 8, 1988.
42. Abdel-Rahman Aql, “Difa’ wazir al-iqtisad an tadil qanun al-bunuk” [The Minister of the Economy’s Defense of the Amendment of the Banking Law], *Al-Ahram al-iqtisadi*, April 2, 1984, cited in Robert Bianchi, “Businessmen’s Association in Egypt and Turkey,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 482, no. 1 (1985): 152.
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 44. Björn Olav Utvik, *Islamist Economics in Egypt: The Pious Road to Development* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner Press, 2006), 170.
 45. Bianchi, “Businessmen’s Association,” 152.
 46. “Islamic Banks Bury the Egyptian Economy,” *Middle East Economics Digest (MEED)* (July 7, 1992): 20.
 47. Mahmoud ‘Abd al-Fadil, *Al-khadi’a al-maliyya al-kubra. Al-iqtisad al-siyasi li-sharikat tazwif al-amwal* [The Great Financial Deception: The Political Economy of the Investment Companies] (Cairo: Dar al-mustaqbal al-‘arabi, 1989) cited in Utvik, *Islamist Economics*, 204.
 48. *Ibid.*, 66.
 49. *Ibid.*
 50. Kuran, “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy. 168.
 51. Sami Zubaida, “The Politics of Islamic Investment Companies in Egypt,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no 2 (1990): 158.
 52. Zubaida, “The Politics of Islamic,” 160.
 53. *Ibid.*, 160.
 54. *Ibid.*, 76–77, cited in Utvik, *Islamist Economics*, 207.
 55. Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, *Al-iqtisad al-siyasi li sharikat tazwif al-amwal* [The Political Economy of Islamic Investment Companies] (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, 1989), 64.
 56. Dr. Hamid al-Ghazali, interview with the author, November 12, 2008, Cairo, Egypt; Utvik, *Islamist Economics*, 141.
 57. Samer Soliman, “The Rise and Decline of the Islamic Banking Model in Egypt,” in *The Politics of Islamic Finance*, ed. Clement M. Henry Moore and Rodney Wilson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 21.
 58. *Ibid.*, 271.
 59. *Ibid.*, 270.
 60. *Ibid.*, 274.
 61. Waterbury, “The ‘Soft State,’” 79.
 62. Soliman, “The Rise and Decline,” 272.
 63. See Umar al-Tilmisani, “Idha ja’a al-muslimun fa-la mal li-ahad” [If the Islamists Come There Will be No Money for Anyone], *al-Dawa* 383 (February 1977).
 64. Utvik, *Islamist Economics*, 151.
 65. *Ibid.*
 66. Bianchi, “Businessmen’s Association,” 153.

67. Adel al-Mashad, “Al-ghazu al-istithmari lil-niqabat al-mihniya wa al-‘ummaliya” [The Entrepreneurial Invasion of the Professional and Labor Syndicates], *Al-Sha’ab*, January 25, 1983.
68. Bianchi, “Businessmen’s Association,” 156.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Timur Kuran, “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 155–173.
72. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt,” *Third World Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1993): 163.
73. ‘Issam al-Eryan (official spokesperson of the Muslim Brotherhood), interview with the author, November 12, 2008, Cairo, Egypt.
74. “Tahweel al-anshita al-Ikhwaniiyah min al-nizam al-fardi ila al-muassasah” [The Transformation in the Ikhwan’s Activities from the Individual Effort (Nizam) to an Institution], 24 *Sa’ah*, August 13, 2007.
75. Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 3 (2005): 373–395. However, as El-Ghobashy noted, there was no question of legalizing the organization, only “de-facto” toleration. 377.
76. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 95.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., 99.
79. Clark, *Islam*, 28.
80. Author interviews with the staff of the Islamic Welfare Association, December 14, 2008, Zamalek, Cairo, Egypt.
81. Singerman, “The Networked World”; Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*.
82. Singerman, “The Networked World,” 149.
83. Ibid.
84. Author interview with activist Islamist leader and rank and file members of the Muslim Brotherhood, November 14, 2008, Helwan, Cairo, Egypt. [Names withheld by request.]
85. Mohamed Asim (Muslim Brotherhood activist leader), interview with the author, October 3, 1999, Western Mounira, Imbaba, Egypt.
86. Singerman, “The Networked World.”
87. Janine A. Clark makes this important observation in her review of the literature on how social movements adapt their recruitment methods. Clark, *Islam*, 24.
88. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*.
89. ‘Issam al-Eryan (official spokesperson of the Muslim Brotherhood), interview with the author, May 14, 2009, Cairo, Egypt.
90. Clark, *Islam*, 67.
91. Author interviews with leaders and rank and file members of the Brotherhood, November 16, 2008, Helwan, Cairo, Egypt.
92. Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8–9.
93. Speech given by Khaiteer al-Shater, “Mashru’u al-Nahda al-Islamiyya” [The Islamic Renaissance Project], amlalommahtv, April 13, 2011, YouTube

- video, 92:03, www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnSshs2qzrM. The importance of Khaiteer al-Shater in terms of the Brotherhood's leadership is by now widely acknowledged. Shater was the candidate that was selected by the Brotherhood's General Guide as their party's first presidential candidate following the Tahrir uprisings of January 2011.
94. Ibid.
 95. This analysis of the recruitment and mobilization process is based on my interviews with members and recruiters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Helwan, Cairo, in November and December 2008.
 96. Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
 97. Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
 98. Saskia Sassen, *A Sociology of Globalization* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 119.
 99. Galila El-Kadi, "Market Mechanism and Spontaneous Urbanization in Egypt: The Cairo Case," *International Journal of Urban Regional Research* 12, no. 2 (1988): 22–37. Another often-cited study estimated that by 1982, 84 percent of new units built in Cairo were supplied by the informal sector, and by 2009 approximately 17.3 million of Cairo's residents (an estimated 63.65 percent) lived in informal settlements. Sims, *Understanding Cairo*, 64, 96.
 100. Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, "Egyptian Workers and Gulf Migration" (unpublished manuscript, December 1995); Dr. Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, interview with the author, December 1998, Cairo, Egypt.
 101. Ragui Assaad, *The Egyptian Labor Market Revisited* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009).
 102. Ibid.
 103. James Toth, "Beating Plowshares into Swords: The Relocation of Rural Egyptian Workers and Their Discontent," in *Directions of Change in Rural Egypt*, ed. Nicholas S. Hopkins and Kirsten Westergaard (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998), 66–87.
 104. This historical analysis is based on my interviews with local residents and my own participant observation. I am particularly grateful to colleagues at *Markaz al-Ard* (The Land Center) for guiding me through Imbaba's social and economic history.
 105. Indeed, prior to Sadat's assassination by militants in 1981 when the state cracked down on militant activists, Telmasani, the then General Guide of the Brotherhood, argued that the militant *Jama'at* were officially sponsored, and even "created," in order to counterbalance his movement. Interview with Omer Tilmisani, *Al-Ahwar*, February 15, 1982.
 106. Author interviews with local residents in Imbaba, Cairo, December 1999.
 107. According to one estimate, the number of Ahali Mosques increased from 20,000 in 1970 to 46,000 by 1981. In 1981 only 6,000 of them were under the control of the Ministry of Religious Endowments, *al-Awqaf*, and maintained by 3,000 officially appointed Imams. *Al-Liwa' al-Islami*, February 25, 1982, cited in Hamid Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 218.

108. There was a markedly low voter turnout in the elections to the parliament (Shura Council) of 2011 in Imbaba most likely due to the population's low education levels as well as poor social and economic conditions. Nevertheless, residents gave their largest support to the two Islamist political parties. The Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Al-Nour registered clear victories. Of the 179,000 validated votes the FJP captured 84,000 and *Al-Nour* 54,000 votes. *Al-Wafd* recorded 18,000 votes, and *al-Wasat* received 10,000 votes. "Al-Misrawi yanshur natayij al-marhalah al-thanyah lil-intikhabat al-barlamaniyyah" [Al-Misrawi Publishes the Results of the Second Round of Parliamentary Elections], *al-Misrawi*, August 6, 2011.
109. *Al-Syasi al-Masri*, August 27, 1995.
110. In terms of Western Mounira's religious profile, 92 percent are Muslims and 8 percent Coptic Christians, "Dirasa fi al-intikhabat fi Mounira al-Gharbiyya: Imbaba" [A Study on the Western Mounira Elections: Imbaba], *Al-Ahram*, Cairo: Center for Strategic Studies (unpublished report, 1995): 3–4.
111. The wealthiest families (*'aylat*) in Imbaba such as *al-'Amarna*, *al-Hamayda*, *al-Morganan*, and *al-Salmaniya* all made their fortunes in land speculations. Other families representing the "medium" rich and who also made their fortunes in land speculation include *al-Hanadwa*, *al-Shwaikhiyya*, and *al-'Atabi*. Still, other families eventually invested capital derived from land speculation into other business ventures ranging from leather, automobile parts, and clothing factories to retail trade in consumer goods and carpet imports. Thus, the *Surur Sabah* family now operates a clothing factory; *Nabil Adawil*, a carpet store; *Abdel-Moneim 'Amara*, a car horn factory; *Mohamed Wagdi*, a leather factory; and *al-Makawi*, a chain of grocery stores.
112. Rather than merely representing a series of self-contained incremental changes or transitional arrangements, the expansion of market forces is characterized by forms of displacement, reformulation, and adaptation of nonmarket systems to market principles. See Timothy Mitchell, "The Market's Place," in *Directions of Change in Rural Egypt*, ed. Nicholas S. Hopkins and Kirsten Westergaard (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998), 34. In the case of Western Mounira, the relaxing of regulations and controls over housing and labor markets did not lead to a free-market system but cartels and price-fixing, on the one side, and reintroduction of new forms of social control and coerced forms of labor, on the other.
113. Varese, *The Russian Mafia*.
114. Gambetta's influential work on the Sicilian Mafia has shown that the expansion of market capitalism in combination with high levels of societal distrust, and the absence of clearly defined property rights, increases the demand for protection. Importantly, however, the particular form that this protection assumes is dependent on the context and historical timing of the transition to the market. See Gambetta, *The Sicilian Mafia*.

115. Significantly, many long-term residents of Imbaba claim that this period witnessed the first incidents of terrorism (*irhab*). However, this resentment also stems from a clear social conflict between the “new” class of wealthy real estate entrepreneurs and the older, more urbanized, middle-class strata of residents.
116. The severity and violent nature of these tactics came with huge financial rewards. Ali Morgaan, for example, made an estimated 4 to 5 million Egyptian pounds from land speculation in this period.
117. Among the residents of al-Waraq that held seats in the Egyptian parliament were Surur Sabbah, Nabil ‘Adawil, and Abdel Moneim ‘Amara all of whom represented the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) in the district’s Local Council (*Majlis Mahali*).
118. One can thus observe that the expansion of the market mechanism played an important role in disrupting the social balance of kinship society, first by turning some kin into “rich” and others into “poor” families, and later by disrupting the kinship structure itself. As an example, the traditional institution of blood vengeance (*tar*) became transformed producing a myriad of “modern” feuds into which an element of class conflict was clearly realized if not acknowledged.
119. For one of the rare studies on the persistence of regional and ethnic identities in Cairo, see Catherine Miller, “Upper Egyptian Regionally Based Communities in Cairo: Traditional or Modern Forms of Urbanization?” in *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East*, ed. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 384.
120. Melvin L. Oliver, “The Urban Black Community as Network: Toward a Social Network Perspective,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (1988): 623–645.
121. Author interviews with local residents in *Waraq al-Arab*, *Beshteel*, and *Ezbat al-Mufti*, Imababa, December 16, 1999.
122. Leila Vignal and Eric Denis, “Cairo as Regional/Global Economic Capital,” in *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East*, ed. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 101.
123. Nabil Omar, “Imbaba’s Empire of ‘Terrorism’,” *Al-Ahram*, December 8, 1992, 3.

INVESTING IN ISLAMISM: LABOR REMITTANCES, ISLAMIC BANKING, AND THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN SUDAN

1. Daniel Beyman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 41–43; Jane Perlez, “Sudan Is Seen as Safe Base for Mideast Terror Groups,” *New York Times*, January 26, 1992.
2. *Min ayna ja’u hawalahi?* [From where did they come?] *Al-Sudan al-Hadith*, June 12.

3. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Henry Munson, Jr., *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Hassan Turabi, "The Islamic State," in *Voices of a Resurgent Islam*, ed. John Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 241–251; Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Grey Seal, 1991).
4. For a classic description of state formation see Douglas C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1981), 21–22.
5. For a comprehensive account of Sudan's civil war, see Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
6. Riad Ibrahim [Khalid M. Medani], "Factors Contributing to the Political Ascendancy of the Muslim Brethren in Sudan," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 3/4 (1990): 33–53: 13.
7. Khalid M. Medani, "Sudan's Human and Political Crisis," *Current History* 92, no. 574 (1993): 204.
8. Ali Salih Karrar, *The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Sudan* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1992). See also Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, *The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development?* (London: Zed Books, 1984), 135.
9. Carol Collins, "Colonialism and Class Struggle in Sudan," *Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) Reports* 46 (1976): 3–20. See also Muhammad Mahmoud, "Sufism and Islamism in the Sudan," in *African Islam and Islam in Africa*, ed. Eva Rosander and David Westerlund (Athens: Ohio State University Press, 1997), 170–177.
10. Karrar, *The Sufi Brotherhoods*, 40–41.
11. Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in Sudan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 51.
12. While political science research often makes use of state capacity to explain a variety of outcomes across cases, there is no clear consensus on the meaning of the term. But as Margaret Levi has noted good analysis requires conceptually differentiating among the features of state capacity in order to assess its importance in comparative analysis. Margaret Levi, "The State of the Study of the State," in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: WW Norton, 2002).
13. C. H. Harive and J. G. Kleve, "The National Income of Sudan, 1955/56," Khartoum: Department of Statistics, 1959, cited in Richard P. C. Brown, *Public Debt and Private Wealth: Debt, Capital Flight and the IMF in Sudan* (London: Macmillan 1992), 90.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Michael Gilsenan, "Some Factors in the Decline of the Sufi Orders in Modern Egypt," *Muslim World* 57, no.1 (1967): 13–14.
16. J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders of Islam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
17. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, *The Sudanese Bourgeoisie*, 134.

18. "Islam: Blueprint for a New Century," *Sudanow*, November 1979, 11.
19. Hassan al-Turabi, interview with the author, *al-Manshiyya*, December 14, 1997.
20. Hassan al-Turabi, quoted in Peter K. Bechtold, *Politics in Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation* (New York: Praeger, 1976), 89.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Tijani al-Tayib (deputy chairman of the Communist Party), interview with the author, June 24, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya. For confirmation of these strategic objectives as articulated by Hassan al-Turabi at the time, see Alexander S. Cudsi, "Islam and Politics in the Sudan," *AFRICA* (March 1978): 48.
23. Hassan al-Turabi, interview, "An Equal Place for All," *Sudanow*, February 1980, 12.
24. Brown, *Public Debt and Private Wealth*, 109–110.
25. The World Bank, *World Debt Tables: 1989–1990*, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1991).
26. For figures on the uneven regional distribution of public expenditures, investment, banks, and educational and health facilities see B. Yongo-Bure, "Prospects for Socioeconomic Development of the South," in *The Search for Peace and Unity in Sudan*, ed. Francis M. Deng and Prosser Gifford (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, 1987), 36–55; Ali Abdalla Abbas, "The National Islamic Front and the Politics of Education," *Middle East Report* 21, no. 5 (September–October 1991): 22–25.
27. World Bank, *World Debt Tables*, 111.
28. Dirk Hansohm and Karl Wohlmuth, "Sudan's Small Industry Development: Structures, Failures and Perspectives," in *Industrialization in the Third World: The Need for Alternative Strategies*, ed. Meine Pieter van Dijk and Henrik Secher Marcussen (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 146–155.
29. Ali Abdel Gadir, "A Note on the Brain-Drain in the Sudan," *Sudan Journal of Economic and Social Studies* 2, no. 1 (Summer 1977): 16.
30. Khalid M. Medani, "Funding Fundamentalism: The Political Economy of an Islamist State," in *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, ed. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 166–177.
31. Nazli Choucri, "The Hidden Economy: A New View of Remittances in the Arab World," *World Development Report* 14, no. 6 (1986): 702–709. See also *Al-Majalla*, "Ithnayn milyar dulaar tahwilat al-sudaneen fi al-khalij" [Two billion dollars worth of remittances from Sudanese in the Gulf], *Al-Majalla*, June 11–17, 1986, 31.
32. Richard P. C. Brown, "The Hidden Economy," *New Internationalist*, June 1991, 12–13; Richard P. C. Brown, "Migrants' Remittances, Capital Flight, and Macroeconomic Imbalance in Sudan's Hidden Economy," *Journal of African Economies* 1, no. 1 (March 1992): 59–85.
33. Mark Duffield makes a similar point in "Where Famine Is Functional: Actual Adjustment and the Politics of Relief in Sudan," *Middle East Report* 21, no. 5 (September–October 1991): 23–30.

34. Ibrahim Elbadawi, "Real Overvaluation, Terms of Trade Shocks, and the Cost to Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of the Sudan," *Journal of African Economies* 1, no. 1 (March 1992): 79.
35. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Price of Wealth: Business and State in Labor Remittance and Oil Economies," *International Organization* 43, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 101–145.
36. Interviews with black-market currency traders, Khartoum, December 22, 1998. Names withheld by request.
37. Jeswald W. Salacuse, "Arab Capital and Middle Eastern Development Finance: The Emerging Institutional Framework," *Journal of World Trade Law* 14, no. 1 (1980): 302–303.
38. Elfatih Shaaeldin and Richard C. Brown, "Towards an Understanding of Islamic Banking in Sudan: The Case of the Faisal Islamic Bank," in *Sudan: State, Capital and Transformation*, ed. Abbas Abdelkarim and Tony Barnett (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), 133.
39. Interviews with black-market currency traders. Khartoum, January 15, 2008. Names withheld by request.
40. The Muslim Brotherhood's National Islamic Front party was the first organization to mobilize the savings of expatriate workers through informal channels; by 1985, the year Al-Nimeiri was deposed, 2/3 of the professional and skilled workers were employed outside Sudan. They sought ways to smuggle funds back to Sudan without being taxed. The NIF established a network of currency traders and took the money of the expatriates, and after deducting a percentage, gave it to their families in Sudan. Gabriel R. Warburg. "The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: From Reforms to Radicalism," *The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM)*. Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Islam in Africa Research Project (August 2006), 4.
41. "Kilmīt al-sir baskawīt: khamsa tujjar yasaytarun 'ala al-suq al-aswad fi al-Sudan," [Password biscuit: Five merchants dominate the black market in Sudan], *Al-Majalla*, no. 331 (June 11–14, 1986): 30–31. While the expatriate remitting part of his wages can conduct these transactions directly with one of the big currency traders, it is more reliable to get a check drawn on a bank in Sudan, especially when large sums are being transacted.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Ibrahim Wade, *Islamic Finance in the Global Economy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 212–213.
44. Henry and Wilson, *The Politics of Islamic Finance*, 41.
45. The six largest Islamic banks in Sudan include Faisal Islamic Bank, Islamic Cooperative Bank, the Sudanese Islamic Bank, the Islamic Bank for Development Cooperation, the Western Sudanese Islamic Bank, Al-Baraka Bank, and Umdurman Islamic Bank. The latter's chairman and CEO is none other than former President Omar al-Bashir. By the end of the remittance boom period in 1987, the share of the total paid-up capital of these Islamic banks to that of the commercial banks was equal to 43 percent. Muhammad Hashim 'Awad, "Al-Bunuk al-Islamiyya: haqa'ik wa arqam" [Sudanese

- Islamic Banks: Facts and Figures] (unpublished paper: University of Khartoum, 1987), 11.
46. Mansour Khalid, *The Revolution of Dismay* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1985), 63.
 47. Rodney Wilson, *Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 85. See also 'Awad, "Al-Bunuk al-Islamiyya," 1–18.
 48. Mansour Khalid, *Al-Nukhba al-Sudaniyya wa idman al-fashal* [The Sudanese Elite and the Addiction to Failure] (Cairo: Dar al-Amin, 1993).
 49. Muhammad 'Umar Khalifa, *Malamih min tajribat al-islam al-iqtisadi fi al-Sudan*, [Characteristics of the experiment in economic reform in Sudan] (Khartoum: The National Center for Media Production, 1995).
 50. Abdin Ahmad Salama, "Islamic Banks: Economic Significance and Methods of Control," *Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan Publications*, no. 3 (1984): 18–19.
 51. Badr al-Din A. Ibrahim, "Poverty Alleviation via Islamic Banking: Finance to Micro-Enterprises (MEs) in Sudan: Some Lessons for Poor Countries," in *Sudan Economy Research Group Discussion Paper: Institute for World Economics and International Management (IWIM)*, no. 35 (March 2003): 3.
 52. Badr al-Din Ibrahim, "Some Aspects of Islamic Banking in LDACs: Reflections on the Faisal Islamic Bank, Sudan," in *The Least Developed and the Oil-Rich Arab Countries*, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih and Kunibert Raffer (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), 222.
 53. *Ibid.*, 224.
 54. 'Abd al-Rahim Hamdi, "Islamization of the Banking System in Sudan." Paper presented at the National Assembly, Khartoum, December 1984.
 55. The governor of Kurdufan at that time made a public statement saying that Faisal Islamic Bank caused a dramatic rise in the sorghum price in the region because it monopolized the sorghum trade. *Al-Ayyam*, December 1984, 5.
 56. Al Bagir Yusif Mudawi, "Islamic Banks Problems and Prospects: Islamic Banking Evaluation of Experience," *Faisal Islamic Bank Publications* (1984): 10.
 57. In *Murabaha*, the client applies to the bank for financing his purchase of specific raw materials or assets. The bank buys and resells the raw materials or assets at a price, which covers the expenses and allows the bank a profit margin upon which the two parties agree. The partner usually pays the bank back in agreed installments. Ibrahim, "Poverty Alleviation," 8.
 58. Interview with prominent Sudanese journalist, June 17, 1990, Khartoum. Name withheld by request.
 59. This observation can be generalized to explain the timing of the Islamist "revolution" in much of the Muslim world in the 1970s and 1980s. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History*, 49–50.
 60. Kuran, *Islam and Mammon*.
 61. Endre Stiansen, "Interest Politics: Islamic Finance in Sudan, 1977–2001," in *The Politics of Islamic Finance*, ed. Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 159.
 62. *Ibid.*
 63. Interview with black-market trader, June 15, 1989. Name withheld by request.

64. Author interviews with members of the National Islamic Front (NIF), University of Khartoum, Faculty of Medicine, January 10, 1990, Khartoum, Sudan. Names withheld by request.
65. Ahmad al-Batthani, *Economic Transformation and Political Islam in Sudan, 1975–1989* (unpublished paper, University of Khartoum, 1996).
66. For a comprehensive analysis of the Shari'a laws, see Aharon Layish and Gabriel Warburg, *The Reinstatement of Islamic Law in Sudan Under Numayri: An Evaluation of a Legal Experiment in the Light of Its Historical Context, Methodology, and Repercussions* (London: Brill, 2002). See also Kend Benedict Gravelle, "Islamic Law in Sudan: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of International and Comparative Law* 5, no. 1 (1988): 1–22; Carolyn Fleur-Lobban, "Islamicization in Sudan: A Critical Assessment," *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 4 (1990): 610–623; El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*; and Carolyn Fleur-Lobban, *Islamic Law and Society in Sudan* (London: Frank Cass, 1987).
67. Tim Niblock, "Sudan's Economic Nightmare," *Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)* 135 (1985):15–32.
68. Mansour, *The Government They Deserve*, 312–324.
69. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*.
70. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 113.
71. Mohammed Bashir Hamid, *The Politics of National Reconciliation in the Sudan: The Numayri Regime and the National Front Opposition, 1956–1985*, Washington DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University (1984).
72. *Ibid.*, 9. Similar arguments are made by Gabriel Warburg. See "The Sharia in Sudan: Implementation and Repercussions, 1983–1989," *The Middle East Journal* 44, no. 4 (1990): 624–637. And Layish and Warburg, *The Reinstatement of Islamic Law*, 41–50.
73. Layish and Warburg, *The Reinstatement of Islamic Law*, 35.
74. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, *Manichean Delirium: Decolonizing the Judiciary and Islamic Renewal in Sudan, 1898–1985* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 222; Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 158; Victoria Bernal, "Islam, Transnational Culture, and Modernity in Rural Sudan," in *Gendered Encounters: Challenging Cultural Boundaries and Social Hierarchies in Africa*, ed. Maria Grosz-Ngate and Omari Kokole (New York: Routledge Press, 1997).
75. Elbadawi, *Islamic Finance*, 221–272.
76. Alex De Waal, ed., *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 80.
77. Layish and Warburg, *The Reinstatement of Islamic Law*, 144–145.
78. Tamir Moustafa, *The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
79. Abdelrahman Omer Moheiddin, *Turabi wa al-inqath [Turabi and the 'Salvation']* (Damascus, Syria: Dar Ekrema Publishing, 2006), 176.
80. Gabriel R. Warburg, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan*, 5.
81. Moheiddin, *Turabi and the "Salvation,"* 178.

82. *Ibid.*, 27.
83. *Ibid.*, 28.
84. *Ibid.*, 27.
85. Sudan National Democratic Alliance, “Bayyan min far’ al-tadamun al-watani al-dimuqrati bi Washington,” [Memorandum from the Branch of the National Democratic Alliance in Washington] *Sudan National Democratic Alliance* (unpublished document, January 5, 1989).
86. Niblock, *Class and Power*, 226.
87. Sudan National Democratic Alliance, “Bayyan min far’ al-tadammun al-watani al-dimuqrati bi Washington.”
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*
90. Mubarak al-Fadl (former Sudanese minister of the interior), interview in *Al-Hayat*, /September 2–3, 1989.

ISLAMIC VERSUS CLAN NETWORKS: LABOR REMITTANCES, HAWWALA BANKING, AND THE PREDATORY STATE IN SOMALIA

1. Title III, USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 107 P.L. 56, 115 Stat. 272, 2001.
2. Title II of P.L. 95–223 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq).
3. US law enforcement official also shut down al-Barakaat headquarters in Dubai, and its offices in Boston, Minneapolis, Columbus, and Seattle, as well as in Mogadishu and Bossaso, in southern and northeast Somalia, respectively.
4. One senior US official said that the incriminating information came from a single source. As he put it at the time: “This is not normally the way we do things. We needed to make splash. We needed to designate now, and sort it out later.” *New York Times*, April 13, 2002.
5. *Reuters*, December 5, 2001.
6. “Chapter 5: Al-Barakaat Case Study,” in National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. New York: Norton, 2004.
7. *BBC News*, “US Ends Somali Banking Backlist,” *BBC News*, August 28, 2006.
8. The World Bank, *World Bank Makes Progress to Support Remittance Flows to Somalia*, June 10, 2016, accessed August 9, 2019. www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/06/10/world-bank-makes-progress-to-support-remittance-flows-to-somalia.
9. “Financial Action Task Force,” *Terrorist Financing* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008), 8. See also the initial report on the subject, *Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002), 1.
10. For a comprehensive analysis of the effect of the War on Terrorist Finance, see Jennifer Turner, “Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Chilling Muslim

- Charitable Giving In the ‘War on Terrorist Financing’” (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, June 2009).
11. For more on the development of contemporary Muslim pious activism, see Mahmoud, *Politics of Piety*, 3.
 12. Jane R. Harrigan and Hamid el-Said, *Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).
 13. See, e.g., Medani, “Funding Fundamentalism.”
 14. Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy: the Challenge of Capitalism* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 15. A number of scholars and policy analysts have argued that there is a link between failed states and international terrorism. See, most notably, Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” *Foreign Affairs* (2002): 153–163; Sebastian Mallay, “The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire,” *Foreign Affairs* (2002): 2–7.
 16. Associated Press, November 28, 2001.
 17. Kathleen Day, “US Islamic Cash Outlets Investigated as Source for Terror Funds,” *Washington Post*, November 7, 2001. www.unitedstatesaction.com/islam-money-changing.htm.
 18. By January 1, 2002, anyone who wants to operate a money transfer agency in the United States must obtain a license from the Department of Commerce. The application must show a net worth of \$100,000 and pay upward of \$70,000 in licensing fees – the most expensive application for a nonbanking financial institution in the United States. *Financial Times*, January 5, 2002.
 19. One Treasury Department investigator admitted that the hawwalat system is an “alien concept” to US authorities. *Financial Times*, January 17, 2002.
 20. Vali Jamal, “Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy,” *Development and Change* 19, no. 2 (1988): 203–265.
 21. Anna Lindley, “Migrant Remittances in the Context of Crisis in Somali Society,” (London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2006). See also, Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland* (London: James Currey, 2008).
 22. Khalid M. Medani, “Survey on Internal Migration and Remittance Inflows in Northwest and Northeast Somalia” (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Coordination Unit (UNCU), 2000).
 23. It is worth noting that the average Somali household is composed of eight members.
 24. *Reuters*, December 3, 2001.
 25. Director of Amal Hawwalat Agency, interview with the author, July 14, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.
 26. For a good review of this literature, see Peter Andreas, “Illicit International Political Economy: The Clandestine side of Globalization,” *Review of International Political Economy* 11, no. 3 (2004): 641–652.
 27. Mark Bradbury also makes this important point. See Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 150.
 28. *Africa Confidential*, July 12, 1990.

29. For a comprehensive analysis of the distinctive nature and political objectives of insurgent militia organizations, see Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*.
30. Interviews with Dahabshil Hawalat Brokers, December 14, 2000, Hargeisa, Boroma, and Boosaso, Somalia.
31. Director of Amal Hawwalat, interview with the author, July 14, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.
32. The above figure is derived from interviews with al-Barakaat and Dahabshil representatives in Hargeisa and Bossaso.
33. Director of Amal Hawwalat, interview with the author, July 14, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.
34. Hawwalat brokers freely discuss their support of al-Ittihad but firmly deny any interest in Somalia's militants. As one broker informed me: "Why would we support them? They are bad for business." Interview with Amal Hawwalat Broker, June 15, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.
35. Interviews with manager, and staff, of the Mattawikil Hawwalat, July 20, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya. Remittance brokers stated that young Somalis join the militant al-Shabbaab for two reasons: a decidedly low level of education and poor employment prospects. It is worth noting that *al-Shabbaab* enjoyed unprecedented success in its recruitment drives following the Ethiopian invasion and US air bombing of central Somalia beginning in the summer of 2006 and not due to funds received from the *hawwalat*.
36. David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, *Somalia: A Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 45.
37. *Ibid.*, 41–44.
38. Abdi I. Samatar, "Dictators and Warlords Are a Modern Invention," *Africa News*, January 3, 1993, 5.
39. Goran Hyden, *African Politics in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
40. I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 170–171.
41. Abdi I. Samatar, *The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884–1986* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 80–81.
42. *Ibid.*, 86.
43. Michael Bratton makes this important general point in his review of Goran Hyden's *No Shortcuts to Progress* (London: Heineman, 1983). Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics* 41 (April 1989): 413.
44. Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress*, 7.
45. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Book, 1973), 225–310.
46. Jamal, "Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy."
47. *Ibid.*
48. A. A. Aboagye, *The Informal Sector in Mogadishu: An Analysis of a Survey* (Addis Ababa: International Labour Organisation/Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa, 1988).
49. *Ibid.*, 222.
50. World Bank, *World Debt Tables*.

51. David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, "Somalia and the World Economy," *Review of African Political Economy* 11, no. 30 (1984): 71.
52. *African Business*, "Will the Forex Bureaux Close Zongo Lane?" *African Business*, June 1989, 1–2.
53. Jamal, "Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy," 213.
54. Laitin and S. S. Samatar, "Somalia and the World Economy," 45.
55. John Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 222.
56. Jamal, "Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy," 224.
57. *The Somali Social and Institutional Profile: An Executive Summary* (Working Papers, no. 79, African Studies Center, Boston University), 5.
58. Aboagye, "The Informal Sector in Mogadishu," 13.
59. *Ibid.*, 93.
60. Abdi I. Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 4 (1992): 625.
61. Vali Jamal, "Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy," 243.
62. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Price of Wealth: Business and State in Labor Remittance and Oil Economies," *International Organization* 43 (Winter 1989), 112.
63. David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, "Somalia and the World Economy," *Review of African Political Economy*, 58–72.
64. *IMF Adjustment Programs in Africa: 1985 Occasional Paper*, no. 5 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1985).
65. By the end of the 1980s, the formal financial sector essentially collapsed. The Commercial and Savings Bank was declared officially bankrupt, and none of the few formal banks in the country were able to provide lending by the end of the decade. Mubarak, "The 'Hidden Hand,'" 2028.
66. To make matters worse for Somalis dependent on the formal economy for their wages, salaries of the civil service drastically declined in 1989 to less than 3 percent compared to their levels in the early 1970s. *Ibid.*, 2028.
67. Charles Tilly, "Trust and Rule," *Theory and Society*, vol. 33, 2004: 1–30.

ECONOMIC CRISIS, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIST POLITICS IN EGYPT

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3. Hinnebusch, "The Politics of Economic Reform," 161.
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5. *Ibid.*
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8. *Mudun Masr Taht al-Hisar* [Egyptian Cities under Siege], *Al-Sha’ab*, January 19, 1993.
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11. *Al-Sha’ab*, “The Crisis Continues in Imbaba: Expect More Clashes,” *Al-Sha’ab*, December 15, 1992.
12. *Al-Hayat*, “Cairo: Detention of 290 Fundamentalist Militants in a Wide Campaign in Imbaba,” *Al-Hayat*, December 9, 1992.
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15. Moneep, *Natayij al-Ahkam al-‘Askariyya ‘ala al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen*.
16. Soliman, “The Rise and Decline,” 266.
17. Utvik, *Islamist Economics*.
18. Ahmed ‘Alawi (member of the Muslim Brotherhood), interview with the author, November 6, 1998, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
19. Ahmed ‘Alawi, interview with author, Cairo: Egypt.
20. Abdel-Fadil, 66, cited in Utvik, *Islamist Economics*, 205.
21. Samer Soliman, “The Rise and Decline,” 272.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, 276.
24. *Ibid.*, 6.
25. Daria Solovieva, “A Trillion Dollars and Counting: How Egypt’s New President Will Boost Islamic Banking,” *International Business Times*, July 18, 2012. See also Jonathan G. Burns, “The Banking Sector in Post-Revolution Egypt: Is Islam the Solution?” *Banking & Finance Law Review* 319, no. 2 (2014): 319–352.

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29. *Ibid.*
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31. *Al-Hayat*, November 15, 1995. The secretary general of the Nasserist Party, Dia al-Din Daoud, stated that they pulled out of their coalition with the Tagammu Party in Imbaba in order to avoid any violent clashes that might take place in an area where the Muslim Brothers and other Islamist groups enjoyed overwhelming popularity. *Al-Ahali*, November 1, 1995.
32. Abdel Hamid Barak, “A Study on the Imbaba Elections,” Unpublished Report, Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 1996.
33. *May Newspaper*, November 11, 1995.
34. *Sawt Giza* (Voice of Giza), November 1995.
35. *Al-Masaa*, November 15, 1995.
36. *Al-Wafd*, November 10, 1995; *Al-Wafd*, November 19, 1995; *Al-Wafd*, November 28, 1995.
37. *Al-Ahali*, December 1, 1995.
38. *Ibid.*
39. E.g., Abdel Hamid Barakat ran in his neighborhood of al-Munira al-Gharbiyya, and Salah al-Maliji in al-Mo’tadadiyya where he had strong kinship ties among local residents.
40. *Al-Sha’ab*, November 31, 1995; *Al-Sha’ab*, November 11, 1995.
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47. *Ibid.*
48. Wagih Abdel-Raziq (member of the Muslim Brotherhood), interview with the author, December 12, 1998, Al-Waraq, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
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FROM REMITTANCE ECONOMY TO RENTIER STATE:
THE RISE AND FALL OF AN ISLAMIST AUTHORITARIAN
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STATE COLLAPSE, INFORMAL NETWORKS, AND THE DILEMMA OF STATE BUILDING IN SOMALIA

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70. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali*, 476.
71. *Ibid.*, 283.
72. Bradbury, Abokor, and Yusuf, “Somaliland: Choosing Politics over Violence,” 461.
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90. Interview with livestock traders. December 7, 1999. Buroa, Toghdeer: Somaliland.
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93. *Ibid.*
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96. Dr. Ahmad Yusif Farah, interview with the author, October 2, 1994, Nairobi: Kenya.
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106. Isaaq and Majerteen businessmen, interviews with the author, June 17, 2010, Nairobi: Kenya. Names withheld by request.
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113. Abdurahman Moalim Abdullahi, *The Historical Evolution of the Islamic Movement in Somalia*. Unpublished PhD diss., McGill University, 2010, 197.
114. *Ibid.*, 198–199.
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120. *Ibid.*, pp. 372–373.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RADICALIZATION: INFORMAL NETWORKS AND THE RISE OF AN URBAN MILITANT ISLAMISM IN CAIRO

1. Salwa Ismail, "The Politics of Urban Cairo: Informal Communities and the State," *The Arab Studies Journal* 4, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 119–132.
2. Diane Singerman, *Avenues of Participation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 173.
3. Amr Ismail Ahmed Adly, "When Cheap Is Costly: Rent Decline, Regime Survival and State Reform in Mubarak's Egypt (1900–2009)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no. 2 (2011): 295–313.
4. Enzo Mingione, "Life Strategies and Social Economies in the Postfordist Age," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 18, no.1 (1994): 25. For a more detailed review of Mingione's argument in favor of a social analysis of economic behavior see, Enzo Mingione, *Fragmented Societies: A Sociology of Economic Life beyond the Market Paradigm* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991).
5. Charles Tilly, "Models and Realities of Popular Collective Action," *Social Research* 52 (Winter 1985): 717–748.
6. Ragab Gabir Mohamed (shop owner), interview with the author, December 18, 1999, Imbaba: Cairo.
7. From data collected about Islamist militants arrested and charged for acts of violence, the average age of members dropped from twenty-seven years in the 1970s, to twenty-one years in the 1990s. Moreover, while in the 1970s as many as 80 percent of militants were college students or graduates, this figure dropped to a mere 20 percent in the 1990s. Guenena and Ibrahim, "The Changing Face of Egypt's Islamic Activism: 1974–1995," 7–8.
8. *Ibid.*, 7–8.

9. The study was conducted in Imbaba by a team from the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies. However, while this study pointed to the increasing recruitment of juveniles it did not survey the occupational profile of rank and file members (or former members) of the Islamic Group. See *ibid.*
10. Given security constraints this is necessarily a small sample. However, the findings are corroborated by my ethnographic research in Western Munira.
11. For example, a number of these leaders had university degrees such as Sheikh Ali Ryan and Sheikh Essam al-Ginda. Both were imprisoned in the 1990s following the 1992 siege.
12. See, for example, Guenena and Ibrahim, “The Changing Face of Egypt’s Islamic Activism: 1974–1995.”
13. Patrick Heller, “Social Capital as a Product of Class Mobilization and State Intervention: Industrial Workers in Kerala, India,” *World Development* 24, no. 6 (1996): 1055–1071.
14. Ragui Assaad. “Formal and Informal Institutions in the Labor Market, with Applications to the Construction Sector in Egypt.” *World Development* 21 (June 1996).
15. Tariq Hassabo, interview with the author, December 18, 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Cairo: Egypt.
16. “Egypt Holds Promise for the Patient,” *Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)* (May 1985): 10.
17. The sharp price increases – especially in cement, but also in steel – were the immediate source of the economic downturn for the construction industry. Official prices for cement rose by 50 percent in 1988, and the shortage of cement even at higher prices compounded the problem. “Egypt: Suffering from a Crisis in Confidence,” *Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)* (February 23, 1990): 15.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Magdi Mohamed Hussein, interview with the author, January 14, 1999. ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
20. By the late 1990s subcontractors and heads of the informal labor firms based in Imbaba had little choice but to compete, often with little success, in the far more competitive construction sites dominated by the large private construction firms in the new industrial and housing development areas such as *6 October*, *Toskha*, *Wad al-Gedid*, and farther afield outside Cairo in *Sinai* and *‘Arish*.
21. *Ibid.*
22. James R. Elliot, “Social Isolation and Labor Market Insulation: Network and Neighborhood Effects on Less-Educated Urban Workers,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (1999): 199–216.
23. Interview with informal construction laborer, March 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Cairo: Egypt.
24. In addition to the well-known private construction firm of Osman Ahmed Osman’s Arab Contractors firm, a host of new private sector construction firms emerged that resulted in further competition for contracts and jobs in the industry. Among the most notable of these companies that recruit

- subcontractors and laborers from Imbaba are *Nasr al-‘Ama li al-Muqawalat*, *Sharikat Hassan Mukhtar li al-Muqawalat*, *al-Istishareen li al-Muqawalat*, and *Sharikat Hassan Ismail li al-Muqawalat*.
25. Mohamed Ahmed Gohar, interview with the author, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, January 16, 1999, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 26. Toth, “Beating Plowshares,” 75.
 27. Akram Abdel-Moula, (Director: Land Center), interview with the author, December 20, 1999, Cairo: Egypt.
 28. Selim Hafez, interview with the author, December 18, 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba: Cairo.
 29. Heller, “Social Capital.”
 30. One leader of the Jama’a in Western Munira acknowledged privately that the Group was surprised to find such great success in attracting adherents to their cause when they first introduced their Da’wa to residents in Western Munira in the late 1980s. Ahmed Sabri (former Jama’at Leader), December 24, 1998, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Magdi Hussein (subcontractor), interview with the author, December 14, 1998, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 33. Author’s interview with construction workers, December 23, 1998, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 34. Assaad, “Formal and Informal Institutions,” 97–112 and 935.
 35. Dr. Galal Amin, interview with the author, September 4, 1999, Cairo: Egypt.
 36. Author’s interviews with laborers, January 29, 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Western Munira, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 37. Author’s interview with laborer in *Dulab Mubayit al-Muhar* (Wall Bricklayer Firm), December 26, 1998, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 38. Magdi Hussein, interview with the author, January 28, 1999. Cairo: Egypt.
 39. Members of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, interviews with the author, January 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 40. Roel Meijer, “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya,” in *Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement*, ed. Roel Meijer (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2009), 204.
 41. Interview with Shopkeeper, January 28, 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 42. Tariq Hassabo (former member of Jama’at), interview with the author, December 29, 1998, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
 43. Author’s interviews with members of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in ‘Izbat al-Mufti that I conducted between November 1998 and March 1999.
 44. The Muslim Brotherhood’s long-standing support of the private sector and foreign investment is well known, and it has been repeatedly promoted by leading figures such Khaiter al-Shater, the deputy to the General Guide, as late as 2010. Ray Bush, “Marginality or Objection? The Political Economy of Poverty Reduction in Egypt,” in *Marginality and Exclusion in Egypt*, ed. Habib Ayeb and Ray Bush (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 61.

45. Salwa Ismail, “The Politics of Urban Cairo: Informal Communities and the State,” *The Arab Studies Journal* 4, no. 2 (1996): 119–132.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Manal ‘Awad, interview with the author, December 24, 1998, Western Munira, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*
50. Sermon at *Masjid al-Nur*, Agouza, Cairo, Egypt, November 1, 1998. It is important to note that the government-run mosques mirrored *salat al-masaha* in Cairo in that the sermons were broadcast via loudspeakers in order to spread the message beyond the congregation to the entire neighborhood.
51. Interview with former members of al-Jama’a, January 4, 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
52. I am grateful to Martha Crenshaw for this insight.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. Tariq Hassabo (former member of the Jama’at), interview with the author, January 4, 1999. Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*
58. Author’s interview with former Jama’a members, February 7, 1999, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
59. Author’s interview with cab driver (former member of Jama’at Al-Waraq), February 6, 1999, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
60. *Ibid.*
61. Excerpt from Sermon, *Masjid al-Nur*, March 21, 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
62. Safwat Abdel Ghani (leader of the Beni Mohamed Regional Association), interview with the author, February 14, 1999, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Ahmed Abdel Latif, Sami Abdel Radi and Ahmed Shalaby, “Twenty-Three Salafis Charged with Terrorism in Imbaba,” *Egypt Independent*, May 12, 2011. Ahmad Zaki Osman, “Cairo’s Copts Organize Groups for Self-Defense,” *Egypt Independent*, May 8, 2011.
65. Author’s interview with Imbaba resident, December 14, 1998, ‘Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
66. Sheikh Osman Mohamed, interview with the author, January 2, 1998, Omda of Osim, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Ibid.*
69. Ahmed Salim, interview with the author, February 14, 1999, Osim, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Sayed Abdel Hamid, interview with the author, January 21, 1998, Omda in Osim, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.

72. Author's interview with Sayed Abdel Hamid. December 9, 2008. Cairo: Egypt.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Author's interviews with members of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, January 12–14, 1999, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
77. Author's interviews with local council members, December 15–16, 1998, al-Warraq and 'Izbat al-Mufti, Cairo: Egypt.
78. Author's interview with resident, February 14, 1999, 'Izbat al-Mufti, Imbaba, Cairo: Egypt.
79. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist*; Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*.

CONCLUSIONS: INFORMAL MARKETS AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

1. Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes have made this point in "The World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy," in *The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Advanced Countries*, ed. Manuel Castells, Alejandro Portes, and Lauren Benton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), 33.
2. Karl Polyani makes this point with respect to the social disintegration ("massive suffering") caused by attempts to free economic activity from government regulation in nineteenth-century Europe. Karl Polyani, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 249–258.
3. Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment."
4. Interviews with members of *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, January 12–14, 1999, Imbaba, Cairo, Egypt.