the "minor" influences in Tully's theoretical pantheon such as Karl Polanyi and Peter Kropotkin, both through written works of Tully's in which the two appear and through Livingston's introduction to the book and his interview with Tully. The volume's chosen writings, organization and original contributions show the ways that those like Polanyi and Kropotkin, by influencing Tully's ideas on modern subjects or the importance of mutual aid, act more as a supportive theoretical substratum for Tully's work than as passing influences. This kind of attention to detail and approachability makes the collection a valuable acquisition for graduate students and senior academics unfamiliar with Tully's work and for those returning to Tully's thought after a hiatus.

Despite including several previously unpublished writings, this collection might offer less for those familiar with Tully's work. More companion volume for the unfamiliar than replacement for Tully's major works, it contains few new works. While the structure of such a collection might prefigure limits to such possibilities, the volume seems surprisingly monological, given the repeated stress within Tully's own work (and the volume) on the importance of the dialogical quality of democratic politics. This impression is sharpened by the volume's conclusion on an interview of Tully by Livingston, granting a medium for additional original contributions and a protracted back-and-forth. Unfortunately, the succinctness of this interview is punctuated by revisiting well-trodden ground, with some minor additions, leaving the feeling of a missed opportunity. Given Livingston's own rich work on democratic theory, with writings on pragmatists such as William James (Livingston, 2016), the interview could have provided a space to discuss things further afield such as—to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein via Tully—"family resemblances" (47) between Tully's and James's thinking. How might Tully and James be speaking to the same phenomena of "pluralism" or "diversity"? Does Livingston see a similar structure and persistence of imperialism to Tully? While this might seem a specific referent, James's "successor" to the pragmatist tradition, John Dewey (Ferguson, 2007), is briefly mentioned in Livingston's introduction, and with similarities between James and Tully in the deployment of ideas such as the "pluriverse" (49) (James, 1909; Ferguson, 2007), these and many other topics could have been further discussed. This could have engaged Tully himself in the Tully Circle he so inspired and contributed additional insights unique to the volume for those more familiar with Tully's work.

Niche criticisms aside, Livingston has done a service by consolidating such important writings. As guides to Tully's innovations in political thought, collections of his works are instructive for those in the discipline and assist in finding public philosophy's "new key."

References

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Heidegger in Ruins: Between Philosophy and Ideology

Richard Wolin, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023, pp. 488

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Richard Wolin seeks not to destroy Heidegger but to show that he lies, already, in ruins. In part, this is because the Heidegger estate, Wolin claims, has shadow-edited his oeuvre. This raises

difficult questions: Can one meaningfully engage with Heidegger's writing when one cannot guarantee the authenticity of what is written? And to what extent does this matter to the public meaning of Heidegger's works? Sadly, *Heidegger in Ruins* does not answer these questions. Instead, the strongest chapters of this book challenge common arguments of scholars who place a "cordon sanitaire" between Heidegger's philosophy and politics (2). Wolin then confronts "New Right" appropriations of Heidegger's thought, but at 53 pages this treatment is too attenuated to add to the work of Julian Göpffarth. Ultimately, one laments spending so many pages with Dugin and Evola—to say nothing of Bannon and Trump—rather than with Heidegger.

Wolin pre-empts the critique that he has added nothing new (22), but this charge only sticks insofar as there are no "bombshells" regarding the well-covered matter of Heidegger's actions during the Third Reich. Wolin's great contribution lies in his confrontation with purportedly untainted elements of Heidegger's thought, such as his understanding of work and care, which Wolin links to a dichotomy, with distinct Nazi resonances, between "planetary technology" (172) and communities of blood and soil (279). Wolin also challenges the image of a political quietist more concerned with poetry than politics, arguing that this constitutes an irrationalism and a chauvinistic embrace of myth (86–88) that, in fact, connects Heidegger to Nazism (289–91). In these chapters, Wolin undermines intuitively convincing defences of Heidegger and characterizes purportedly "clean" parts of his oeuvre as thoroughly fascistic, while challenging, for example, the separation of Heidegger's "metaphysical" antisemitism from the antisemitism of the Nazis (76–94).

Wolin believes that "textual approaches to Heidegger's work must yield to new interpretative paradigms" (20) and thus gives priority to contextual proofs. Any expectation that Wolin will deal comprehensively with counterarguments arising from Heidegger's works will be disappointed. For example, Wolin skims over a passage from *What Is Called Thinking?* (365) where Heidegger identified ahistorical mythmaking with *Seinsvergessenheit*, but rather than reconciling this with his association of Heidegger's poetics with Nazi propaganda, he provides a lengthy treatment of Nazi ideologue Alfred Baeumler (295–301). This is illustrative of a tendency to leap from provocative interpretative claims to disquisitions upon Heidegger's contemporaries, with the result that Wolin's intriguing arguments will not convince many Heidegger scholars.

Wolin's approach invites familiar charges of guilt-by-association tactics, especially when linking Heidegger to Nazism via Oswald Spengler (61, 172, 176) and Hans Zehrer (14)—who had an antagonistic relationship with Nazism—or via broadly held beliefs in the special calling (164–66) and virtue (271–27) of one's country. Wolin also invites criticism with his division of the secondary corpus according to a Manichaean dichotomy between noble realists and shamefaced apologists. While Donatella Di Cesare and Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei can rightfully object to their representation in these pages, Ingo Farin, who is charged with being a "Heidegger loyalist" (83) and diagnosed (in a lamentable ad hominem) as a "classic example of Freudian wish-fulfillment" (84), can feel particularly aggrieved. Farin's conclusion—that Heidegger "makes room for anti-Semitic content," but it is not a "systemic, essential, or inevitable component of his philosophizing" (Farin, 2016: 311)—is both narrower and less obsequious than Wolin allows.

Wolin has opened new battlefronts against Heidegger's defenders and compromised the fortifications to which they have retreated, such as the "safe ground" of Heidegger's antibiologism and political quietism. At the same time, a scattered organization and overly broad contextual argumentation prevent Wolin from mounting a sustained assault against these redoubts. On the whole, Wolin's book represents a fascinating contribution to the scholarly literature on Heidegger but tries to do too much at once and, as a result, falls somewhat short of its lofty ambitions. Sadly, the titular metaphor does not reverberate throughout this work. Wolin states that Heidegger "opened up significant new pathways and possibilities" (22), but quite what we are to do with Heidegger's ruins where the very material is corrupted is unclear. Wolin's

metaphor holds many possibilities, for there are many ways in which ruins enlighten. Are we to look upon Heidegger's ruins in search of signs of lost wisdom? Are we to seek the cause of their fall? Are we to look upon them, like the feet of Ozymandias, as a warning to overmighty philosophers? Are we to cannibalize the ruins to build something else? Or, if nothing else, should we simply use them for target practice? Wolin leaves us in suspense.

Heidegger in Ruins is, ultimately, an effective piece of counter-apologetics, one that will arm any critic of Heidegger's defenders with new, effective weapons but will not greatly satisfy those who hope for substantial engagement with the ambiguities of Heidegger's thought.

Reference

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Blue Storm: The Rise and Fall of Jason Kenney

Duane Bratt, Richard Sutherland and David Taras, eds., Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2023, pp. 508

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> Jason's decades-long dedication to our province and our country have been marked by lasting transformational change that will be studied and applauded by generations to come.
>
> —@stephenharper, Twitter, October 6, 2022.

The timely publication of *Blue Storm* seeks to begin and perhaps conclude the first part of Harper's hypothesis. Edited by Mount Royal University professors Duane Bratt, Richard Sutherland and David Taras, the collection analyzes the inaugural term of Jason Kenney and the United Conservative Party (UCP) in the Albertan legislature. *Blue Storm* is a comprehensive work covering Kenney's discourse, strategy, policy, and even vehicle choice from the 2019 Alberta provincial election to his resignation as premier in late 2022. Kenny was perhaps the last remnant of the Harper establishment, and his exile from provincial party politics represents a critical point for Canadian conservatism which calls for reflection and analysis. At a commanding 500 pages and 21 chapters, the collection includes some redundancy as it repeats Kenney's story across its chapters of unequal strength and pertinence. Still, it excels when delving into the broader and theoretical aspects of the UCP's much-lauded "return to 'true' conservatism" (1).

To this end, contributors Anthony Sayers, David Stewart, Jared Wesley and Melanee Thomas put forward especially notable chapters. Stewart and Sayers continue to be authoritative voices on the behaviour of Albertan voters. They provide insightful data to substantiate commonly held understandings regarding the incoherent coalition within the UCP. It remains to be seen if the subsequent victories of Danielle Smith will lead to greater co-operation within that coalition or if her success is indicative of the supremacy of the Wildrose wing of the party. Jared Wesley's discussion of the Fair Deal Panel provides policy-based and discursive evidence of Kenney's outwardly antagonistic style towards the federal government, the previous Albertan