

the power of cumulative experience, and utility matters more than ultimate truth; in fact, the author asserts, there is no system of theology, no system of philosophy, that is 'true no matter what.' 'The values that doctrines mediate are indeed timeless, as attested by religious experience, but the formulas have to be revamped again and again.' And so a large part of the book is devoted to revamping, a process which is not of great interest, except for those actually engaged in eirenic work.

Without the last chapter the book could be dismissed with the foregoing judgement, but when he comes to write of 'Democracy and the Christian Ethic' the author provides some illuminating insights which owe nothing to the preceding chapters. He writes lucidly and well of the problem of power and of the necessity of recognising functional difference and of centering responsibility in the functional group. There are so many good things in this chapter that one wishes the publishers could see their way to publishing it as a separate pamphlet.

JOHN FITZSIMONS.

THE SCIENTIFIC LIFE. By J. R. Baker. (Allen and Unwin; 7s. 6d.)

THE VALUES OF SCIENCE TO HUMANITY. By A. G. Tansley. (Allen and Unwin; 1s. 6d.)

The debate on the planning of science and its relation to technology continues. Some hold that science and technology are one and indivisible, therefore the whole must be planned (or co-ordinated). Others hold that pure science is essentially different from technology, in that it is a branch of learning, developing only by free investigation unhampered by problems of technical application; and that therefore it cannot be planned except by the individual investigator (with such helpers as he can personally supervise). The 'planners' accuse the 'anti-planners' of social irresponsibility and a selfish adherence to personal pleasure. The anti-planners accuse the planners of shackling science to technology and so frustrating its functions as a branch of knowledge and a life of investigation; they picture the totalitarian uniformity which lies that way. Both of the books here reviewed should be read by those who have to deal with the effects of the recent spate of literature on the planners' side.

Dr. Baker's book clearly distinguishes the role of planning in technology from that in pure science, and points out the dangers of an over-planned technocracy. He stresses the value of pure science apart from its technical applications; one of the most valuable parts of the book is the chapter in which the personal characteristics of the sincere scientist are sketched. Science is conceived as a life, and not as a centrally-planned machine; this is a point of view which stands in great need of emphasis. Unfortunately, Dr. Baker does

scanty justice to the solid truths of which the planners' view is an exaggeration. These truths seem to be : (i) when science is applied, it ought to be applied for the common good, rather than private advantage alone ; (ii) certain social abuses could be swiftly righted if the results of science were properly handled ; (iii) in the younger sciences, such as bio-chemistry, there is a case for planned teamwork in preliminary explorations of certain parts of the field.

Professor Tansley's lecture is in some ways more satisfying, because he seeks the root of the planners' views in order to accept what is true in them and attempt to complete them, in terms of liberal humanism. He points out that confusion has arisen because science and technology are historically and materially interdependent, although pure science—the pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge—is an activity distinct in its object from the pursuit of control over nature. Like Dr. Baker, he holds that science ought to increase certain virtues, such as the respect for truth and the humility which comes from submission to facts and from co-operative effort ; and he notes the evil effects in education of over-stressing material achievements due to science.

Both these authors express the two main reasons for our need of pure science, namely (i) restriction of science can only lead to bad technology ; and (ii) science in itself has a human value, because, along with literature and art—and the other elements of traditional liberal education—it has a contribution to make to the development of the mind. We think that the second reason is often expressed rather unconvincingly, because a distinction is made between 'science as useful' and 'science as valuable in itself.' No body of knowledge is valuable *in itself*, but only in that it promotes the good of *people*. The distinction would be better expressed if we said that one of the ways in which science is useful is that it helps people to live well, to become wise and good, by favouring a sincere regard for truth and a true love of the search for it. Another way in which it is useful is that it can be applied to control nature and so raise material standards of living. And it is more important to make people wise and good than to make them rich.

E. F. CALDIN.

THE FRENCH CANADIANS TO-DAY. By Wilfrid Bovey. (Penguin Books ; 9d.)

Mr. Bovey describes the French Canadians as 'the most important political minority in the British Empire as it exists at this moment.' Their importance derives not merely from their numerical strength (estimated at some 30 per cent. of the total population), but even more from their solidarity : 'a compact people more homogeneously French than the French themselves.' They are characterised by a strong sense of racial continuity and by strong attach-