

consider the majority of Catholic schools we cannot help wondering whether the ferment of that powerful leaven is working under so very placid a surface.

It is therefore a thing of great importance that the 'Association for Catholic People's Colleges' is about to open its first adult residential college—'a place of adult education whose corporate life flows from the daily Mass, where men and women can learn to take a more active part in the Catholic life of the country' (to quote its first Prospectus³). It is to be hoped that the education will be evangelical in the right sense, making the Gospel live in the students of the College, so that they can make a stand afterwards against the society in which they will find themselves. It will be an heroic undertaking. It will mean great hardship and suffering for those who take advantage of the facilities of such a college. But it is the only way in which a Christian can avoid the paganism into which he is born and to some extent inevitably bred.

THE EDITOR.

THE CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

I AM going to define education simply as the process of making a man of a man. First, note that the thing is a *process*, that is, something that takes time. In understanding any process the most important consideration is its end, and this we have said to be the perfection in his own kind of the person educated. We must notice further that any being of which it can be said that it is perfectible, in its own kind, can be perfect only in a relative and not in an absolute way. What is perfectible, even when perfect, will lack the perfection of having always been perfect. It will be perfect only in a particular kind, since what becomes must always be of a particular kind. God alone is perfect absolutely and hence the notion of education is not applicable to him, as it is to the pseudo-god of W. James. Further, what is perfect of its own kind or in a relative way, cannot be the sufficient reason for its own perfection. It must exist in view of that whose perfection is wholly contained in its own act of existence, that is in God. We may thus say that education is the process of making a man of a man because God is God. In other words, being a man makes no sense apart from God,

³ The College is to be opened at Swynnerton Park in Staffordshire if the sum of £10,000 can be raised: for this sum the Governors are now appealing.

being like whose perfection is the only perfection which a perfectible being can have.

To know what education is, therefore, we must know something about what man is and in order to know what man is we must know something about what God is . . .

This God, by whom and in whom alone we are men, is a God of truth. He is very subsisting Truth Itself. Hence it is our duty to learn the truth about him and to avoid and repel errors concerning his nature. We can know God as the Author of the orders both of nature and of supernature. Reason can tell us that he is the first cause of the natural order while by faith we recognise him as the source of the order of grace. Education, then, should aim at the Truth, and he who is well educated will possess in the first place the Faith, in the second an acquaintance with the rational arguments by which the existence of God as a First Cause is established, and thirdly an acquaintance with Apologetics by which error is repelled.

It is, of course, a further question how far these aims can be achieved at school. No one can deny that in a Catholic school pupils should not only be instructed in the Faith, but further that that is the most important part of their school education. To what extent they can and ought to be instructed in philosophy and apologetics is a matter for further consideration. I do not think that I need argue the necessity for every Catholic's being acquainted with the rational preambles to faith and with the arguments necessary both to defend what he believes, and to continue to convince and convert others. The question is whether the school is the place where these things should be learnt. The first point which I should like to make is that for the majority the school is the only place where they are ever likely to receive any systematic instruction in these matters. Formal education ceases for most young people when they leave school. Again, especially for those who are going on to University it is necessary that they should be firm in their Catholicism at the time when they leave school. There is of course the grave difficulty that Catholic schools admit non-Catholic pupils whom it may not be thought convenient and proper to instruct in this matter, to this I can reply only that the point about a Catholic school is that it should be Catholic. It does not become Catholic by the principal's wearing a habit, or the Bishop's worrying about the finances.

However, this paper is concerned with theory rather than with practice. The point upon which I want to fix your attention is that the aim of education is the acquisition of truth by the pupil and that the order of studies must be dictated by the order of truth.

Here I want to make two points: to emphasise firstly that there is an order of truth, and secondly, what it means to say that education has primarily to do with truth.

All truths cannot be equally important. It is true that the same thing cannot at the same time both be and not be. It is also true that Cape Town is bigger than Stellenbosch. The first truth is much more important and fruitful than the second, and in a very important sense comes first. For Cape Town could not be the larger were it not in the first place Cape Town. And secondly, the truths which I can derive from the first proposition form the foundation of all human knowledge, whereas the great majority of mankind could be ignorant of the second without being in any way the worse for it. Some truths come before others in the order of truth in the sense that given ignorance of the first we cannot regard the latter as well founded. A man may be able to tell you what Pythagoras proved in his famous theorem, but if he is ignorant of the first principles of geometry, then he affirms the relation of the squares on the sides of a right-angled triangle not as a matter of knowledge but as a matter of opinion. He may possess it as a useful rule of thumb but not as a truth. Similarly, the first principles of geometry are themselves not well founded until they are connected with the first principles of reason of which in metaphysics, we have express knowledge. In short, truths have a unity which is a natural unity of such a kind that they cannot be transposed at will. The order of truths is hierarchic, and the order of their importance does not depend upon you and me, but upon the nature of things. It must also be remembered that according to Christian philosophy some truths are, so to speak, more full of truths than others because some beings are more full of being than others. That the soul is immaterial is a more fruitful truth than that this paper is white because souls are more full of being than the objects of sense. Again, that God exists is a proposition much more pregnant with truth than the immateriality of the human soul because God is infinitely being, while the human soul is not. To know the truth is to know truths in order, and to know truths in order is to know things in order.

My second point is this: When I say that education has primarily to do with truth I mean that it has not primarily to do with practice. Catholic thought maintains the primacy of contemplation over action and of knowing over doing. Nothing is more symptomatic of the unchristian character of the modern world than its inversion of these rôles, and the popular philosophies of activism from which the behaviour of most modern Westerners emerges. Europe ceased

to be Catholic Europe when contemplation succumbed to action. In the Reformation when, for so many Europeans, fideism took the place of the Faith techniques of salvation came to be preferred to rational theology, and the vocation of worldly work to the calling of the religious. Science in the narrow sense of the word came to be preferred before philosophy because it enabled us to handle nature and to subdue it to our needs. We are only too well aware of the contemporary insistence that knowledge must be, in a direct and obvious way, practically fruitful, even to this extreme of the pragmatist, that is true which works. The practical man, he says, has to do with realities, the philosopher or contemplative with a dream-world. Thus for every ten thousand persons who have heard of Marconi perhaps one has heard of Icheeben. Yet the whole point about action is that it is transitive and that to be intelligible it must be for an end. And the action is intelligible only in so far as the end is abiding. When we take action for our end, it can mean only that this particular action, being transitive, must be for the sake of the next, and that for the sake of the next, to infinity. A world in which practice and practical efficiency are worshipped must of necessity be a buzzing, chaotic, meaningless world in which the armies march to and fro and no man knows whither. Truth, however, is not transitive, and it alone can give to action a dimension which makes it intelligible, and lifts it from the realm of the merely eventual.

The consequence of the slogan of truth for practice is a relativistic view of truth. Practice has to do with the changing and contingent, with situations which change from day to day. Hence the theory creeps in that truth ought to change from day to day, that truths get worn out, that the latest hypothesis or speculation is to be preferred to tradition. I need hardly mention the repercussions of this view within the Catholic Church itself. It led to the Modernism which was condemned in the famous syllabus. The wisdom of this condemnation must be apparent to all now, however many hearts and heads it may have broken at the time. Practice, as Aristotle demonstrated, has to do with the good of the agent. Hence truth for the sake of practice comes to imply truth for the sake of the agent or subject, that is, for something which is in a state of becoming.

Thus for Descartes the function of theology is purely practical: it helps us to get to heaven. It enables us to do or become something. He took the same view of mathematico-physical science. Like Bacon he declared that its function was, not to enable us to get to know nature as an image of the Eternal Truth, but to control it for

the sake of pleasing ourselves. If it gave us the inner satisfaction of possessing truths which had a mathematical clarity, or enabled us to adjust nature in a manner satisfying to the passions then it deserved the name of science. Truth, then, is for the sake of the subject. A development in this direction leads to the conclusion that it is conformity with the subject which makes a truth true. The order of truth becomes what suits the agent or, let us add, his community at the moment. The dominion over the mind by the object is lost and a subjectivism reigns which takes the order out of truth, and the truth out of truth, because it has made man its measure. When we endeavour to measure God by our measure, or to love him for what we can get out of it, then the world is indeed standing on its head.

What has all this to do with schools? Everything. Let us try to apply some of these conclusions to our schools. People responsible for the structure of our schools must be able to answer the questions: what subjects must be taught and why? The second answer must be put first. I think that the most popular answer is likely to be, to learn to earn a living; or perhaps, to take a place in, or to serve the community. There is something to be said for both these answers, but I should like to point out their dangers and inadequacies. The first answer was: To learn to earn a living. On this view the final end of education is to set men to work. To work means to do a job. To do a job means to be a carpenter, a bank-clerk, a shop-assistant, a motor-mechanic, an attorney, a druggist, an accountant, etc. Upon this ideal, then, the school must become a polytechnic: it must teach some to type, others to keep books, others to mend lavatory cisterns, others to operate machine tools. I do not wish to enlarge upon the practical difficulties which this entails, but to come at once to the main point that it identifies education with vocational training. The school becomes a mechanism for the production of employees. Its final end is economic. It produces admirable inmates for the servile state, but it does not produce free and responsible citizens. It makes of the mind a technical instrument for the carrying out of certain specialised operations. It does not create a common mind wherein persons may meet as citizens and as men. The only common end which employees have is wages, and the community will be for them only a certain organisation of production. Vocationalism in education thus leads straight into Marxism, and by the road of democratic egalitarianism. Mr C. S. Lewis writes, 'When societies become, in effort if not in achievement, egalitarian, we are presented with a difficulty: to give every one education, and to give no one vocational training is im-

possible, for electricians and surgeons we must have and they must be trained. Our ideal must be to find time for both education and training: our danger is that equality may mean training for all and education for none—that everyone will learn commercial French instead of Latin, book-keeping instead of geometry, and a knowledge of the world we live in instead of great literature. It is against this danger that schoolmasters have to fight, for if education is beaten by training, civilisation dies.' Mr C. S. Lewis knows that he is not saying anything which Aristotle did not say. Aristotle asked the question whether a human being had a good only as a shipwright, or a vintner or a statuary, and not also as a man. And when he answered, Yes, he has a good also as a man or a person or a whole human being, he made a distinction between training and education from which Catholic thought cannot depart. We have no right to say a word against the servile state if under utilitarian pressure we allow typing to take the place of Latin, or book-keeping the place of history. Typing enables you to earn more money, and if you want to make money your god you are, I presume, at liberty to do so, but not under the auspices of Catholic secondary education.

Let us turn to the second of what we have called the popular answers, that education is to enable you to take your place in or to serve the community. Again, there is considerable truth in the answer, but again it requires closer scrutiny. It is true that education is for the good of the person educated, and that there must be a congruence between his good and the common good. Man is naturally a social animal. But to say that men should act for the common good, and to say that they should adapt themselves to the ways and values of any particular community here and now are two entirely different things. St Augustine, in the masterly analyses of the *City of God*, has pointed out that there are communities and communities. Following Plato, in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, he declares that the principle of differentiation is to be found in the nature of the goods to which the common will adheres. Thus the good which dictates its organisation to a band of robbers is other people's goods. The good which dictates its organisation to a great empire like the Roman is the good of dominion. Another society may have the government, laws and institutions which it has because the prime concern of its members is money-making. The quality of a community follows the quality of its love. The only true community will be that whose institutions follow from the adherence of the wills of its members to God. It follows that while all true education is for membership of the City of God, education which is designed to assimilate us to a community whose organisa-

tion is dictated by a false and idolatrous love, is an idolatrous parody of education. Real education for the common good in such a community will produce men who are from the current point of view dangerous, undesirable, or at best inept. The fact, then, that in a particular community there is a demand for particular skills or for a particular type of person offers no criterion at all to the real educator. In a military society, where the highest common good is conquest, the schools will be required to turn out a good conscript type. In a money-making industrialised society like our own there will be pressure on the schools to turn out good mechanics and clerks and the minor bureaucrats who proliferate in this climate. It does not follow that we should endeavour to supply the demand.

The pressure on the schools today to teach 'useful' subjects arises from a conception of the common good unacceptable by Catholics, and the matriculation syllabus is better calculated to produce men able to take their place in a money-ridden society than good and free men, let alone good Christians. Technics presses in harder and harder on the schools. It invades the practice of teaching itself, until the 'good' teacher becomes a technician proficient in securing good matriculation results. A proficient technician can secure first-class results for a pupil who is incapable of thinking; has no habits of reading, let alone writing; and is totally without curiosity about the world he lives in. The arts starve, the engineering and medical faculties receive their predestined fodder, and the factory, or communist, or positivist state takes a further step forward.

In reality we should not aim at training workmen or at adapting people to the prevailing social climate, but in educating the young to become men. What is a man? A man is a rational animal, whose body and soul falls within the unity of a single substance, and whose faculties, whether of body or of mind, are unified by, and support each other in virtue of, the common end to which they all tend. Man is a whole whose other faculties subserve that activity of his which differentiates him from the other animals, namely his reason; and his reason in its highest and therefore definitory employment is a capacity for the truth. It is this truth which makes him whole. Making a man of a man, which is the proper task of the educator, is therefore a training in knowing what is true.

It follows then that in deciding upon what subjects should be taught at school. what must be considered is not utility or popular demand but the intellectual content of the subject. It must be taught with a view to creating that capacity for intellectual delight which according to St Thomas is the nearest we can get to beatitude in this life. This is another point on which we owe so much to the

Greeks, and all of us who have to do with education ought occasionally to read and catch the spirit of the seventh book of the *Republic*. Speaking of arithmetic Plato says: 'Then it will be fitting, Glanion, to prescribe this study by law, and to persuade those who are to share in the highest affairs of the city to take up calculation, and embrace it in no amateur spirit. They must go on until they arrive with the help of their intelligence at a vision of the nature of numbers practising it, for an easier conversion of the soul itself from becoming to truth and being. Further, it strikes me, now that we have mentioned the study of calculation, how elegant it is and in what manifold ways it helps our desires if it is pursued not for commercial ends but for the sake of knowledge.' And speaking of geometry, he adds: 'None who have even a slight acquaintance with Geometry will deny that the nature of this Science is in exact contradiction to the arguments used in it by its teachers . . . for they talk in a most ridiculous and beggarly fashion. They speak like men of business, and as though all their demonstrations had a practical aim, with their talk of squaring and applying and adding and so on. But surely the whole study is carried on for the sake of knowledge.' Let Plato's commendation of Mathematics be mine. I left school with my head full of fields and cisterns, which did not interest me, instead of surfaces and volumes, which might have done so; and in possession of methods of calculating my gains from usury, or the present value of my stocks and shares in none of which by the grace of God I took any interest nor have had any occasion to use. Catholic teachers, being human, may point with pride to past pupils who are successful bankers and stockbrokers and merchants, but how much more does Christ crown the work of those educators who have fitted their pupils to be poor and despised by the world.

I am willing to admit the Physical and Biological sciences on the same terms as the Mathematical, that is to say, primarily as elements in a well-educated mind and only secondarily as the instruments by which we turn nature to our own uses. There is a considerable danger that too great emphasis will be laid upon these studies in modern education because modern civilisation stands in a thoroughly false relation to nature, not treating it as a creature and gift of God which we must offer to him in the act of using it, but as something to be exploited for our own comfort and power. This is the primary term of contemporary industrialism which by infecting society may over-burden the school syllabus with science because of the motives of money and power.

The relation in which men stand to God and to other men however is more important than the relation in which they stand to sub-

human nature. I have already dealt with the importance of theology and apologetics, so that I can now confine myself to those studies which arise out of our relations with other men. Since man is naturally a social animal, and since language is necessary to the social condition the study of language is an essential part of education.

Again, and with a Catholic emphasis on the object, we must study language for what in its own nature it is, a public means for conveying thoughts which have a universal and proper content. Dr Leen, in his book *What is Education?* writes:

Few things are more disheartening for those who are earnest in the re-moulding of things to a Christian form than the growing disregard for the practical significance of words. There is no care taken to seek the apt word for real thought, and to make thought itself be the intelligent expression of what is thus for thus, independently of our feelings about it. It has come to be considered legitimate that words should be but the manifestation of feelings and inclinations, and should change as the interest of the hour might dictate. . . . For a man who has a sense of the commitments of the practical reason. . . . There can only be the scrupulous care to shape his thought to reality and then to seek the apt word for the thought. If language is what it is meant to be in the intention of nature, it is the verbal impression of what a man is in conviction, and what he is prepared to be in action but where there is no correlation between words and reality on the part of speakers and writers, then the words tend to become mere sounds, valuable as pleasing or displeasing the senses of those who read or hear.'

What Dr Leen is calling attention to are the effects of that philosophy of pragmatic or utilitarian subjectivism about which I spoke earlier. If a man is the measure of what is, and if it is he that makes truth, then, because he is in a state of becoming, there can be no stability in words. Language is a mere cry out of the flux which is each one of us, and its function cannot be properly speaking to communicate but only to infect. When we speak it can only be to invade the personality of another with propaganda, so that we cannot speak without disrespect for human dignity. This is a point which Mr C. S. Lewis has made. The action of his novel *That Hideous Strength* reaches its climax with the glad cry of Merlin, '*Qui Verbum Dei contempserunt eis auferetur etiam Verbum hominis*'. If language is regarded as the vehicle of truth, and if truth is related to its eternal Fount, then both language and human dignity are saved from the curse of Babel.

Language, then, must be studied as the vehicle of truth. It must be taught with the first emphasis on its public, formed structure,

that is, grammar must be emphasised. Further, respect for the meaning of words has to be created and nothing serves better for this than knowledge of their history and etymology. The pupil has to learn to feel that in handling language he is handling a tool with which he can expose the articulations of reality. He must learn to write both in prose and in poetry. And since man is made to look outwards rather than inwards, through the window rather than in a mirror, a simple supple narrative style is perhaps the most important thing to cultivate. To teach language for 'self-expression' in a certain sense of that term is to ruin it. I am not for a moment overlooking the fact that the study of language is one of the best forms of inner cultivation, but since we are made for truth and not truth for us, our inner life becomes what it should be when the eyes of the mind are directed outwards towards that for which they are made. It is a great pity that composition in poetry is not more cultivated in schools. Poetry requires such a fine discernment of the articulations of things—one recalls here the notebooks of G. M. Hopkins—that it is invaluable in the creation of a robust and sensitive mind. I recall here words which Etienne Gilson has written about St Thomas:

It must not be thought, he says, that the wise ordering of the *Summa Theologica* and the steady progress of reason adding stone after stone to this immense edifice, are . . . merely the product of a superficial activity, beneath which a richer, deeper, more religious life freely pulsates. . . . Such mastery of expression and of the organisation of philosophical ideas cannot be achieved without a full surrender of oneself; the *Summa Theologica* with its abstract limpidness and impersonal transparency is the interior life of St Thomas itself, crystallised under our eyes and, as it were, fixed for eternity. . . . By virtue of that very reason, which he served with so ardent a love, St Thomas has become a poet, and, if we may believe an unbiassed judge, the greatest poet of the latin tongue of the whole middle ages. It is noteworthy that the great beauty of the works attributed to this poet of the Eucharist, results almost entirely from the incomparable accuracy and closely packed thought of the words which he uses; the *Ecce panis angelorum* or the *Adoro te devote* . . . are truly concentrated theological treatises.

It is high time that the works of St Thomas were studied as literature, and the conclusions used in our schools. I cannot delay to speak of the right use of literature, but perhaps something of what I would say can already be inferred.

I would add that I should hate to see Latin ousted as a school subject. I need not stress that it is the common language of Catholics, the language of the Holy Mass, through which the very beauty

of Christ himself has informed a human tongue. The study of Latin gives an invaluable insight into the objective structure of language, and to construe a sentence correctly is a finer exercise of the reason than to spend perhaps a whole afternoon in a laboratory handling things. Further, in a so-called 'dead' language the meanings of words are fixed. The words cannot be trusted to mean what we want them to mean; and to determine precisely what they do mean is a discipline in that objectivity which is the natural climate of a human mind. English itself becomes a tool of much greater precision when the Latin embodied in it is recognised. Finally, it puts us in touch with the historical source of our civilisation and helps to create that sense of the past without which a man is failing in humanity.

It is in the study of history, however, that this sense of human continuity is best developed. To Catholics the study of history is of special significance because Christianity is in a special and radical way a historical religion. History is, so to speak, the medium of God's revelation of himself to man, and in its contingencies his Providence operates. The Incarnation gives an entirely new significance to the things of time, so that henceforward *res gestae* have a new intelligibility as the anticipations and consequences of the life of a God who was made flesh and dwelt among us so that we beheld his glory. When Kant attacks the Catholic faith he attacks it because it is sacramental, or, what comes to the same thing, historical. He cannot tolerate the givenness of the historical religion and wishing to found religion on human reason which is quite inadequate to the concrete uniqueness of actual history, he attacks historical revelation and the historical Church. But history is the medium in which Truth Itself has made itself visible and if the human mind is made for the truth the study of history is in a special way necessary for its education. He who would defend his faith, furthermore, must be able to handle especially the external historical evidences.

But beyond this first and most important consideration it is true that also the the natural man as essentially rational is historical. We cannot seek truth except in the company of our fellows, and it is in this sense that we say that society is a work of reason. The very language which we require in order to think and to communicate thought is a social growth. Further, it is not the work only of our contemporaries but of those who went before us. Hence to be rational we must live also in the company of the dead. Truth for beings like us, who are members of a species, is tied up in the circumstances of sense and time, and we can extract it only

by a co-operative process requiring law, tradition and certain physical continuities. Further, because we are conscious beings these bonds must live in our minds so that the study of history is a condition of our very existence as rational creatures.

It is on this account that attacks on history and on the historicity of our culture are among the surest marks of a spirit of opposition to reason and to humanity. Getting rid of history or falsifying it is one of the chief contemporary effects of pragmatism and utilitarian materialism. It makes of historical truth what suits it, since man is the measure, and turns it into mere propaganda. The planned rootless mechanised industrialised factory state has no use for history on any terms. That is why there is a tendency in our schools to do away with history, and why anybody who encourages its abolition is a traitor to the human race.

I must call your attention to the fact that it is only as historical animals that we are moral. This follows directly from the fact that it is only as historical animals that we are rational, for morality is a work of reason.

But further our actions mean something to us largely because of their effects on others, that is, because of their effects on the community which is an historical entity. Again, moral actions are actions for which we are responsible, and responsible actions are those whose consequences we can be expected to foresee. What we can foresee, however, depends very considerably upon what we know to have happened in the past and such knowledge is historical knowledge. History, in fact, has to do with *res gestae per homines*, that is, with human acts. Hence history has a spiritual quality derived from the quality of the human or moral acts which are the object of the moralist. On this account history is a medium not only of intellectual but of moral culture and with literature forms the chief discipline through which at school the culture of the personality can be achieved. The study of history is no mere study of physical events but of human motives and of the human heart, a study by which a man warms to his kind, knows himself to share a common destiny and a common goal, and thus becomes capable of responsible, public and really political acts.

On this account it is the most philosophic of the subjects generally taught at schools, and that which is most capable of telling the pupil what it is to be human, and why he is at school, and why he studies what he does. Can a human being really be said to study for instance mathematics in an intelligent way unless he knows why he is studying it? And does he know why he is studying it unless he knows how our culture came to be one in which the mathematical

sciences are important? History is, of all the human sciences actually taught at school, the one most capable of saving the curriculum from being a hotchpot of unrelated studies which insult the unity of a personality made in the image of the One God.

It may be questioned, however, whether history is adequate to this end. Towards the beginning of this address I mentioned the orderly or hierarchical character of truth, and pointed out that knowing the truth meant knowing truths in order. Can it be said that the student emerges from our schools with a knowledge of truths in order? Dr Leen speaks of 'our unmapped, uncharted system of secondary studies. The different subjects, he says, are jumbled together as the tiny pieces of a child's Meccano set. They cling to one another in patternless, uncouth and purposeless coherence. There is nothing to reduce them to an ordered pattern. When the student proceeds to the University, things from the intellectual point of view, instead of improving become worse.' In support of the last statement let me quote Principal R. M. Hutchins. 'The modern university may be compared with an encyclopedia. The encyclopedia contains many truths. It may consist of nothing else. But its unity can be found only in its alphabetical arrangement. The university is in much the same case. It has departments running from art to zoology; but neither the students nor the professors know what is the relation of one departmental truth to another, or what the relation of departmental truths to those in the domain of another department may be.' Both Leen and Hutchins propose the same remedy, the introduction of philosophic studies.

The former writes: 'Mental formation in the right sense of the words cannot be pursued successfully unless there is a unification of the elements of knowledge. This unification cannot come from the subjects themselves, Latin, Greek, Mathematics, Modern Languages and the rest. It must come from something outside and above these. That completely and fully unifying principle in the realm of mind is philosophy.' I am prepared to argue, therefore, that since Catholic education must be directed towards the truth and since it must lead the mind into a *unified order* of truths it is necessary to introduce some philosophy into the school curriculum. This is the right reply to the challenge of utilitarianism and the urge towards mere practical information. For philosophy, says Dr Leen, is the most practical of all the sciences, theology alone excepted.

I put this statement in conclusion as a challenge and as an ideal.

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