

Greater attention is given to developments in the Soviet Union, which are usually contrasted with trends in the other countries. In general the contrast shows that the Soviet thinkers put more stress on the collective and the others more on the individual. Stojanović of Yugoslavia sees Marxism as concerned with men as individuals, and argues against the "collectivistic deformation of Marxism" (p. 71). The Soviet Marxists, on the contrary, see man as derivative from society, defined not by his inherent attributes but by social relations, and malleable not by individual effort (à la Sartre) but by social change. The Party Program of 1961, therefore, is permeated with paternalism; men are to be made free and happy by making society free and happy. The Yugoslav Gajo Petrović rejoins that "freedom cannot be given as a gift or forced upon anyone. An individual becomes a free human person only through his own free activity" (p. 81). Karel Kosík, the Czech, suggests that neither the collective nor the individual can claim primacy. The individual is shaped by his social heritage, but he must live his own individual life; if he would be autonomous he must neither be subsumed by the collective nor negate and oppose it (p. 72).

In the field of ethics, De George finds, it follows that for the Soviet Marxist "the basic moral choice is not personal but social, the ultimate court of appeal is not one's conscience but society's decision" (p. 109). Hence the regime of pervasive party tutelage, which the other New Marxists so sharply criticize. They, however (with the exception of Georg Lukács), while much concerned with morality, have made little progress toward a satisfactory Marxist system of ethics.

With regard to dialectical materialism, De George describes a constructive retreat from the efforts made during the Stalin period to deduce theories and truths in specific sciences from the ideas of dialectics—the rejections of relativity theory, quantum mechanics, Mendelian genetics, and so forth. The impossibility of such deductions now being generally seen, the scientists are freer to follow empirical evidence. Moreover, like scientific laws, specific courses of action are neither entailed nor prescribed by the laws of dialectics. For some of the New Marxists it follows that not only several courses of action but also several political systems can be compatible with Marxism. The implications of such thinking for established regimes are clear.

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DIE DIALEKTIK IM WANDEL DER SOWJETPHILOSOPHIE. By *Helmuth Dahm*. *Abhandlungen des Bundesinstituts zur Erforschung des Marxismus-Leninismus (Institut für Sowjetologie)*, vol. 2. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1963. 152 pp. DM 19.80.

Whatever else one may be able to say about this book, it is very difficult to read. To some extent this is because of the author's style. The main obstacle to clarity, however, lies in the very complexity of his enterprise. He shows the untenability of the Marxist-Leninist version of the dialectic: he also shows the invalidity of Marxist-Leninist philosophy's critique of Thomism: on top of all this, he tries a "dialectical" comparison of the relative applicability of the Thomist and Soviet conceptual apparatuses, especially with reference to philosophic questions arising from contemporary natural science. This is perhaps too much for a mere 152 pages.

These difficulties and this complexity serve to explain why the book is composed not of chapters but of more or less independent essays, varying in length

from two to forty-three pages. The first few essays deal with the notion of fideism and with the problem of faith and knowledge, the latter being central to neo-Thomism—as well as to a Marxism-Leninism which refuses to see it as central to itself.

Dahm then gives a careful analysis of the elements of the dialectic that are said to be scientific in Marxism-Leninism but which he considers to be at least a priori if not fideistic. He uses long quotations from G. A. Svechnikov and others in the discussion of “Law, Order, and Principles” (pp. 21–28), “Work and Humanization” (pp. 29–34), and “Causes and Causality” (pp. 35–47). The subsequent two sections deal with problems arising out of science: “Quantum Mechanics and Information-Theoretical Probability” (pp. 48–69) and “Neurophysiology and Cybernetics” (pp. 70–72). The last four sections (or essays) take up the often discussed problems of subjective and objective, real contradictions, abstraction and the epistemological function of practice, and the nonviability of the famous “negation of the negation.”

Professor Dahm’s treatment of his subject matter is original in at least two respects. First, he confronts Marxist-Leninist philosophy on the battlefield of ontology, whereas most other critics are satisfied to remain on the relatively tranquil plane of epistemology and logic. Second, he uses a philosophy that is a complete system (i.e., Thomism) to oblige Marxism-Leninism to confront basic philosophic issues all along the line and not just on particular points. It is a refreshing, if inconclusive, experiment.

Almost incidentally the book serves to introduce the reader to the people and topics that are important in contemporary Soviet philosophy: again, no mean feat in such a limited space.

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SOVIET POLITICAL SCHOOLS: THE COMMUNIST PARTY ADULT INSTRUCTION SYSTEM. By *Ellen Propper Mickiewicz*. Yale Russian and East European Studies, 3. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967. ix, 190 pp. \$6.50.

Mass political indoctrination, so common in Communist China today, was also a feature of the Khrushchev era in the USSR. In the words of the author, “In September 1964, just one month before Khrushchev fell from power, the system of adult education encompassed some 36,000,000 people, of whom more than 25,000,000, or at least 78 per cent, did not belong to the party” (p. 10). The study by Ellen Propper Mickiewicz is essentially a description and analysis of adult education under Khrushchev. The author discusses the Evening University of Marxism-Leninism, the *politshkola*, and the circle and independent study as ways and means in which adult education is carried on. Of these, independent study is, paradoxically, highly organized and the most advanced form of adult instruction. It may serve purposes other than education. As the author notes in describing a theoretical seminar meeting: “By requiring actors, musicians, scientists to report on principles of the political doctrine as it relates to their own work, the leader of the seminar can ascertain where each person stands” (p. 140).

The collective leadership which ousted Khrushchev also got rid of many programs he had instituted. As a result, mass political propaganda lost its previous priority, and political education reverted to its earlier elitist tradition of training