

ADEL UND ADELSOPPOSITIONEN IM MOSKAUER STAAT. By *Hartmut Rüss*. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, vol. 7. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975. x, 196 pp. DM 40, paper.

In this analysis of the Muscovite service aristocracy, Rüss devotes particular attention to the relationship between the members of the upper elite and Moscow's grand princes from the late fourteenth through the mid-sixteenth century. He disagrees sharply with the school of Soviet historiography which sees Muscovite centralization as a process carried out by the grand princes with the support of the lower-ranking servitors (*dvoriane*) over the strong opposition of "reactionary" boyars and appanage princes with "feudal separatist" tendencies. Instead, Rüss contends, the relationship between the Muscovite sovereign and his high-ranking servitors was marked throughout this period by cooperation and mutual interdependence.

At the same time, Rüss argues, this small group of the upper elite retained a near monopoly of top military and administrative positions and a major share in political authority from the reign of Dmitrii Donskoi on. Thus, the Muscovite elite had neither reason nor opportunity to band together corporatively for defense of its rights. And when the decisive break with traditional politics occurred, in the form of Ivan IV's expression of his autocratic powers, the elite was totally incapable of organized resistance, lacking not only the will but also the practical and conceptual capacities required.

Although his overall conclusion that there was no significant boyar opposition to Muscovite centralization is sound, Rüss exaggerates both the influence exercised by the elite throughout the period and the restraints imposed on the sovereign's authority by custom and tradition. Even his own evidence indicates that rulers before Ivan IV had adopted policies designed to ensure control over the elite and restrict its real share in the exercise of power. Moreover, a strong argument can be made that the increasingly bitter conflicts within the elite—over status, power, and influence—contributed at least as much as, if not more than, elite cooperation to the consolidation of power in the hands of the sovereign.

Nevertheless, Rüss's monograph is a major—and provocative—contribution to the current reassessment of the position of the Muscovite service aristocracy and its role in the development of Russian absolutism, and it deserves careful consideration.

ANN KLEIMOLA

University of Nebraska, Lincoln

ÖFFENTLICHE MEINUNG UND IMPERIALE POLITIK: DAS BRITISCHE RUSSLANDBILD 1815–1854. By *Hans-Jobst Krautheim*. Osteuropastudien der Hochschulen des Landes Hessen, series 1. Giessener Abhandlungen zur Agrar- und Wirtschaftsforschung des europäischen Ostens, vol. 81. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot in Kommission, 1977. 411 pp. Paper.

At the close of the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain's imperial position was well established: the defeat of France, Britain's chief rival, was confirmed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, in a settlement essentially concerned with European matters. Nevertheless, Anglo-French imperial rivalry persisted, worldwide to some extent, but with a marked Mediterranean focus; Bismarck at one point was able to dangle before Napoleon III the bait of the Mediterranean as a French lake. At the same time, Napoleon's expedition to Egypt served to emphasize to the British the importance of the Near Eastern route to India. But Russian interest in the Near East, long focused on Constantinople, increasingly asserted itself. Moreover, Russian interest reached into central Asia, and had in it the seeds of a threat to India itself. Britain and Russia together had

been the chief architects of Napoleon's defeat, hence they subsequently alternated between cooperation and rivalry in their relations. Already at the Congress of Vienna, Britain joined Austria and France in resisting too great an extension of Russian influence in Europe.

An additional factor—ideology—compounded the ambiguity. Unlike the three absolute monarchies in the east, Britain and France were the states which, together, constituted liberal-minded Europe, and they tended to regard themselves as representing the vanguard of civilization, especially in contrast to backward and barbaric Russia. The intrusion of ideology in relations among states, strongly inclined to behave as such where the national interest is concerned, makes for awkward complications, as has been amply demonstrated in our own time. This last consideration is especially important in regard to public opinion, for which *raison d'état* tends to be an esoteric factor. The questions arise: What precisely constitutes public opinion, and how can it be assessed? The media were far more limited in the first half of the nineteenth century, and there were no Gallup polls.

What this study amounts to, therefore, is an attempt to evaluate the role of public opinion in a condition of diminishing, though persisting, French rivalry and increasing Russian rivalry in the imperial domain, in addition to commercial Britain's tendency to be more sensitive to possibilities of trade (Russian tariffs, for example) than to territorial control, a marked Russian inclination.

Consequently, the principal subjects of this study are the press, periodicals and other literature, and parliament, and the author deals with them in a thorough and industrious manner, although he is regrettably careless in his numerous English quotations. The dimensions of the electorate, the accessibility of the press, and the nature of parliamentary representation should have been taken into account, and the relationship among these elements could have received greater attention in the author's discussion of the various issues and occasions in which Britain and Russia were involved, such as Near Eastern developments, Greek independence, the Russian push in the Balkans, and the crises growing out of the emergence of Egypt. In 1840, Britain and Russia were able again to cooperate in checking French ambitions, yet, fourteen years later, Britain and France joined forces in a war against Russia, and the book concludes with the outbreak of the Crimean War. But the author does not treat other events—the Polish uprising of 1830–31 and the Russian intervention in Hungary in 1849, for example—when British reaction was influenced by sympathy for the freedom fighters.

On the whole, the author's tendency to treat topics has the disadvantage of making it more difficult to assess the intertwining impact of distinct issues, but the organization of a book is always a problem.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ
Columbia University

APOSTLES INTO TERRORISTS: WOMEN AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE RUSSIA OF ALEXANDER II. By *Vera Broido*. New York: The Viking Press, 1977. xii, 238 pp. Illus. \$15.00.

Vera Broido, daughter of the Menshevik leaders, Eva and Mark Broido, offers in this book an account of the "nihilist," Populist, and terrorist women of the Russian radical movement in the years 1855–81, an eminently sensible unit of study. Starting with an explanation of how an equal lack of rights on the part of both sexes in tsarist Russia helped give form to the "equal rights" mentality of the intelligentsia, Broido then takes the reader on a tour of the revolutionary movement and weaves female radicals into the story as she goes along. The personal element—the author met some of her heroines