look like in a world without so-called national interest translated into law and policy. The comparison between this model and estimated actual migration numbers reveals that there is much less legal immigration than there would be if push and pull factors acted unobstructed by law (p. 133). So, I left this section wondering, is the baseline model just estimating migration in an open borders world? And if so, why did Rosenberg make the choice to not frame it that way? I think a more explicit discussion of what the model is imagining would have been really powerful.

Finally, I finished the book wondering how Rosenberg's clear findings of culpability could be translated into a sense of obligation among the powerful. He argues that rich countries tend to "ascribe economic insecurity as a deserved status for those living in poor countries" (p. 202). This point seems key, as it highlights the ways in which former colonial powers continue to benefit from a total denial of the negative impacts of colonialism. It is because of this denial, and the depth with which the current state of affairs benefits the powerful, that I am not optimistic that sovereignty can be reconceived, even by an "exogenous shock" like climate change, as Rosenberg suggests (p. 283). We see how miserably the world has failed to respond with "cosmopolitan empathy" for fellow humans in need during the COVID-19 pandemic (p. 283). Thus, I am deeply skeptical that any form of migration "cooperation" between states could be free from the dynamics of "uneven sovereignties" (Hamlin 2021). As Rosenberg acknowledges, the concepts of national interest and national security have become convenient stand-ins for racism, and as I have argued, even the concept of the "refugee," a supposed exception to the rule of sovereign border control, has been used in this way. Given how convincingly he establishes the entrenched roots of the current system, I would have liked to hear more about whether Rosenberg truly is optimistic about the potential for change.

Response to Rebecca Hamlin's Review of *Undesirable Immigrants: Why Racism Persists in International Migration*

— Andrew S. Rosenberg ⓘD

I thank Rebecca Hamlin for her generous and thorough review of my book. I am heartened that the book's main purpose to, in Hamlin's words, "point very clearly to colonialism as the root of the persistent racial bias we see in international migration today" shone through. I particularly enjoyed engaging with her insightful comments on its shortcomings, addressing which would have made the book stronger. My comments on her main points follow, and I hope that this conversation will encourage scholars of

IR and migration to continue to center colonialism and racism in their examinations of contemporary politics.

In her review, Hamlin suggests several topics, authors, and literatures that she wished I had engaged with. They include, among others, exploring law and legality, connecting my argument to the literature on the "migration state," and discussing how the West developed the concept of sovereignty to serve the colonial project. Each of these suggestions is spot on. Some absences reflect my attempt to avoid spreading the analysis too thin, such as my discussion of the role of unauthorized immigration. However, my argument is certainly compatible with the expanding literature on the migration state. In particular, Adamson and Tsourapas' work on its *postcolonial* variant dovetails with my analysis of the performance of sovereignty in the Global South, and I regret not making this connection explicitly. Engaging with Achiume's work on "migration as decolonization" and discrimination against refugees provides a possible way forward to integrate these themes into an expanded analysis of how state sovereignty allows color-blind racism to fester in international migration.

Hamlin also raises questions about the language I use to describe the baseline model. She notes that the analysis "reveals that there is much less legal immigration than there would be if push and pull factors acted unobstructed by law," and wonders whether the model estimates migration in a world with open borders. I frame the model as I do for two reasons. First, the law's obstructions are implicitly included in the model because variables like regime type and conflict are correlated with migration policies. Second, although my initial inclination was to explicitly model an open borders world, I settled on a more conservative strategy to guard against criticisms that the analysis was too far-fetched or idealistic. One benefit of this choice is that the results provide a best-case scenario estimate for the amount of racial bias in global migration.

Hamlin's final point concerns the possibility of change. I show that Global North states continue to benefit from a denial of colonialism's effects, which makes systemic change unlikely. Yet I speculate about whether certain exogenous shocks like COVID-19 or climate change will exacerbate or ameliorate racial bias. Living through the pandemic made me less sanguine about the possibility of the latter, and my recent work on the moral basis of public attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants reflects this pessimism (Rosenberg, "Agents, Structures, and the Moral Basis of Deportability," *Security Dialogue*, 1-18 [2022]). Indeed, one lesson of both Hamlin's and my own book concerns not only the persistence of systemic inequalities, but also their intractability. Future work should dig further into the overlapping international and domestic mechanisms that entrench this system.