

in that it proposes the humanity of God. For him the message of Jesus was the opposition and challenge of God to man. "What matters in Jesus's message is his sense of the abrupt juxtaposition of two opposed orders of things . . . the doctrine of the incarnation unified things which Jesus has kept in ironic contrast to each other." (p. 140) Don Cupitt comes clean; his article is an outright rejection of Catholic Christianity and in particular of the Catholic idea that 'grace perfects nature'. It is good, vigorous, Protestant stuff which it would be a pleasure to answer had we but space—suffice for the moment to say that it seems to me to involve an antithesis of God and man (as distinct from an antithesis of the World and the Kingdom) appearing, despite much wisdom and insight, in Luther and made fully explicit in Feuerbach, an antithesis which is not to be found in the New Testament. It will perhaps be even more pleasant to watch the debate on fundamentals which surely ought now to arise between Don Cupitt and his fellow-symposiasts.

Lonergeran : A Final Word

William Mathews S.J.

My reply to 'Lonergeran's Wake' has drawn widely contrasting reactions from Nicholas Lash and Fergus Kerr.¹ Lash, in leaping to the defence of the critics, presents me with a Catch 22 type dilemma by characterising in advance anything I might say in defence of Lonergan or against the critics as mindless discipleship.² I can but hope that there will be others who will have a more open

¹ 'Lonergeran's Wake' appeared in *New Blackfriars*, July 1975, my reply 'Lonergeran's Awake' in January 1976. The replies were printed in February and March. My present remarks deal mainly with the third and fourth criticisms of Kerr on pp 62–64 of his February article.

² Lash, after accusing me of not attempting 'first to understand the standpoints from which the scholars offer a critical response to Lonergan's achievement' then goes on completely to misunderstand the standpoint of my own article. He interprets me as attempting to defend the absurd position that (a) Lonergan's work is above criticism and (b) is definitive for theological method, whatever definitive might mean. I wish completely to dissociate myself from these positions. I welcome enlightened criticism and have in the present instance learned much from Torrance and Pannenberg, and from the rather constructive summing up by Outler in the Perkins Colloquy (*Perkins Journal*, Spring 1975). Rather than seeing *Method* as in any sense definitive I consider it as a very precarious first step towards coming to terms with the problem of the internal structure of current theology. Practically everything in it needs considerable further elaboration before it can become marketable. My reply to 'Lonergeran's Wake' had but one goal, namely to challenge Fergus Kerr's conclusion that *Method* was, as he put it, a gross error, ramshackle, that the Maynooth seminar was its watershed, in short, its wake. I thought I had made this clear in my opening paragraph. The body of the article was concerned with suggesting in the limited space available, that the various criticisms were not themselves definitive, above criticism. The final paragraph indicated the extent of the claim I was prepared to make on behalf of *Method*.

mind as to whether or not I can think for myself. Fergus Kerr, wisely I believe, has moved away from the individual trees in order to see what kind of forest it is that we are in danger of getting lost in. His compass becomes 'the question of the preconditions of future theology'. We find ourselves watching an exciting parade of expectations which it is claimed future theology must come to terms with, the negative criticisms of Kierkegaard, Freud, Marx, Heidegger, Wittgenstein (to these one could add from other critical sources the problems of revelation, authority, cultural pluralism and communication, and so forth). Curiously a major problem which Raymond Brown has recently drawn attention to,³ that of reconciling doctrines (and one could add systematic theology) with biblical and historical scholarship and which for me is a central concern of *Method*, is absent. The logic of the critics is simple. *Method* has not resolved any or all of our expectations. Consequently it has totally misdiagnosed the problem. Therefore it has missed the point. It follows that it still seems to be Kerr's conclusion that *Method* has no positive contribution at all to make to future theology. It is as he put it in his first article, a gross error. We must go beyond it in the sense of discarding it and look elsewhere. Obviously, to the extent that *Method* diverges from the problems one expects it to resolve, to that extent will one be disappointed by it. My problem however is that as Fergus Kerr believes that Lonergan has missed the point, so I believe that he has missed Lonergan's point. My suspicions are aroused by his clear affirmation that he cannot see the relevance of Lonergan's division of the tasks of theology into the functional specialties for the resolution of strictly theological problems. They deepen with his conclusion that given the alleged Protestant-Catholic division on the regulative priority of exegesis,⁴ the actual plurality of theological study, etc., 'the nature of any possible unity becomes a very serious problem'. Although Kerr seems to acknowledge (somewhat inadequately I feel) the difficult problem of the internal unity of theology, it is my impression that he does not see *Method* as directly and centrally addressed to it and he denies that it has made any impact whatsoever on that problem. I am not prepared to accept his conclusions because, on the basis of what he has said, I am not convinced that he has sufficiently articulated this very serious problem of the internal unity of theology and really given *Method* a chance to illustrate the contribution, how-

³ See his 'The Current Crisis in Theology as it Affects the Teaching of Catholic Doctrine' in *Crises Facing the Church*, London 1975. The first part of this book as well as Eric Doyle's 'Believing: Its Relationship to Scripture and Creeds', *Clergy Review*, May 1976, pp 178-182 provide some essential background for *Method*.

⁴ Is not this point raised by Kerr and Coulson nearly a dead issue in theology at the moment? Brown (op. cit. p 22) shows that the situation is not all that polarised with respect to Christology.

ever slight, it might have to make to that problem. Given the severity of the judgement that he has again passed on *Method I* I would like to develop this point

I

We have witnessed in recent times the emergence of a totally novel and revolutionary notion of historical questioning exemplified by the questions which the source, form, and redaction critics apply to the O.T. and the N.T.⁵ Corresponding types of questions are addressed by scholars to the Patristic, Medieval, Reformation, and Modern theological eras and sources. There has come to light the fact that Judaism and Christianity are not static religions but have undergone a succession of major historical reinterpretations. The deuteronomic historians during the exile reinterpreted the conquest and kingdoms from their own standpoint.⁶ In the N.T. we find significant reinterpretations of Judaism from the viewpoint of emerging Christianity. In the gospels, particularly Matthew, Luke and John, there is a reinterpretation of early apostolic Christianity. John reinterprets Christ (drawing for instance on the Wisdom traditions), his ancestry, titles, miracles, and his passion. Further reinterpretations of the tradition take place in the Patristic, Medieval, and later eras where Christian truths are transposed into very different cultures and languages. Again such movements tend to be responses to conflict situations in which different sets of truths and values are polarised. This presents the interpreter with an evaluative as well as a strictly factual task. The historical task will be to discover what in fact was the historical movement, reinterpretation, the evaluative to discover to what extent it was true to and developed the tradition.

Parallel with this development, there has been a philosophical interest in hermeneutics and critical history since Schleiermacher and Dilthey through to Gadamer and the Frankfurt school. Can interpretation be objective as Hirsch argues in his *Validity in Interpretation*, or is authentic interpretation really reinterpretation and application, as Gadamer argues in his *Truth and Method*? Theological or doctrinal statements of the past are now seen as unavoidably historically conditioned and limited,⁷ a fact which raises critical questions about the historicity of truth. Again, we cannot avoid the prejudgements of our own interpretative stance, but can we allow for them? Granted the different perspectives from which different traditions approach the same materials to what extent can one speak of objectivity in historical studies?

⁵ I have in mind here the very complicated studies of authorship, composition, and theology of, for instance, the Pentateuch and the Gospels, the works of Noth on the O.T. the redaction studies of Luke by Conzelman, Franklin etc. of Matthew by Bornkam et al, and the spate of exegetical works and commentaries on John. It is noticeable that few of the witnesses that Kerr summons against Loneragan are theologians.

⁶ See *The Jerome Biblical Commentary*, Vol I, p 209, for a summary of Noth's account of deuteronomic history.

⁷ See Avery Dulles, *The Survival of Dogma*, p 173.

The historical or positive phase of theology is recent, complex, and to those who do not have first hand familiarity with it (the majority of Christians), bewildering. The resolution of these historical and evaluative questions is extremely exacting and demanding. Although the movement is relatively young significant progress has been made. Despite the reaction to *Essays and Reviews* in the Anglican tradition and to modernism in the Catholic tradition, there is theologically, no going back. Every future generation will have to come to terms, historically in this novel sense with the Christian sources. We have to ease ourselves in to a permanent familiarity with this demanding art of historical questioning in theology.

As well as the historical phase there is also the existential phase of theology concerned with *our* religious present and future. Exegesis and history can liberate us from serious misconceptions we might have about the origins and nature of our religion. At the same time it is limited, it can trap us in the past. Doctrines are not things of the past but religious truths and values that inform our present and future religious living. With the proclamation 'Jesus is Lord' it could be said that they make their appearance in N.T. times, they are the truths of the early Christian communities. In recent times they have held in the Catholic tradition an excessively exalted position. Systematic theology was called upon to explain them, scripture and history provided 'proof texts'. The dominant outlook was that of classical culture. Doctrines were immutable unhistorical truths. Pluralism in any sense was unthinkable, development suspicious. The rise of the historical phase of theology and the replacement of the classical world view by a modern pluralist one has resulted in the breakdown of the classical notions of doctrinal and systematic theology. What has now grown in importance for the religious community is not so much doctrines as religious commitment, commitment to the person of Christ. Since Schleiermacher religious conversion has become a strictly theological topic but it is a troublesome one. Religious experience and conversion is not just a once for all experience but more akin to a personal relationship. It has to grow yet growth is precarious. Before the negative criticisms of Freud and Kierkegaard the O.T. prophets were familiar with infidelity, aberration, and neurosis in religion.⁸ Our response to God's love is in permanent need of purification from such tendencies. Conversion does influence the stance we adopt with respect to our religious past. Again the religious truths and values that are important for

⁸ Although Lonergan has not directly addressed himself to Freud and Kierkegaard I wonder if Kerr has given sufficient attention firstly to Lonergan's considerations of the dialectical development of religion (*Method* p 110f), and secondly, to his recognition in the chapter on Foundations that although the basis of theological categories is the love of God expounded by St Paul, none-the-less one has to account for neurotic and aberrant religion (*Method* p 284f).

our present religious living are seen as flowing from such conversion informed to a greater or lesser extent by the historical phase of theology. Theologians must then come to terms with the manner in which true and false religious conversion can influence their results.

There are some however, who wonder whether the rise of the historical phase of theology and the emergence of the modern notion of culture tolls the knell of all Christian doctrines and all systematic theology. Here I cannot but agree with Raymond Brown: "Because theologians are rethinking aspects of past doctrines, are teachers of doctrine to become tongue-tied as if there were nothing certain that they could pass on?—as if everything doctrinal were "up-for-grabs"? Personally I can think of no greater disaster for Catholicism." (Op. Cit, p 14). An updated doctrinal theology is needed which acknowledges its dependence on the historical phase, the historicity as well as the permanence of truth, cultural pluralism. A corresponding systematic theology is necessary which will attempt to reach some articulation of the mysteries of faith under the shadow of all the negative criticisms of the later Heidegger and Wittgenstein. God remains permanently mysterious yet can the mystery be articulated by human intelligence, in a phrase of Keats, can the mystery be made bearable?

I have no doubt that there is nothing like an adequate consensus among the theological community as to the division and validity of the different theological tasks. 'Sola scriptura' will still echo in some quarters, there will be those who would wish a plague on all systematics, others on all exegesis. At the same time within current theology as it in fact exists all the different tasks of the two phases get some attention from scholars of all Christian traditions. The new historical questioning has undermined both biblical and doctrinal dogmatism and in a sense sidestepped the older Catholic-Protestant conflict. The *Jerome Biblical Commentary*, Raymond Brown's commentary on St John, the writings of Leon-Dufour and others bear witness to the significant contribution of Catholic biblical scholarship. The concluding chapters of Moltmann's *The Crucified God* show that some of the best contributions to systematic theology come from non-Catholic sources. The questions which those last two chapters pose and the need to attempt to reach some *human* understanding of the significance of the mystery of the cross and resurrection for the personal and social liberation of mankind are too basic and important to be considered the prerogative of any Christian sect. A pastoral theology which does not stem from some such base will be seriously impoverished.

Method presupposes the above theological situation in all its pluralism, fragmentation, dynamism. The greater the familiarity with that situation that one brings to it the better. I believe that

it at least suggests *one* possible answer to Brown's problem of the relation of the biblical and the doctrinal, has made some impact on the question of the internal unity of theology. It has been objected that this problem is too complicated for any one man to tackle. Obviously no one man can raise and answer all the different questions of all the different theological specialties, do all theology on his own. One does not however have to know every term in a mathematical series before one can discover its principle of definition. The principle of theologising is human knowing; questioning, understanding, judging, etc. Perhaps one man with a sufficient grasp of the permanent structure of human questioning and knowing might be able to spot the different types of theological questioning and knowing that are involved in the theological enterprise, their interrelation, autonomy, unity, and the norms governing the proper unfolding of the different types of questions. Source critics dealing with different texts pose very many different specific questions yet they all belong to the same class. One does not have to know all the specific questions in order to determine the norms of the class. Likewise one does not have to know every specific question raised by hermeneutes in order to define that kind of questioning and knowing. This does not in any way detract from the dynamism and inventiveness of the human spirit of inquiry and of human knowing in those disciplines. The same comment holds for history, dialectic, and the rest of the functional specialties. Is it then not a valid enterprise to ask what are the different types of theological questioning, and what might be their interrelation? I don't see how Kerr concludes that the resulting division of the tasks of the theologians is irrelevant to the resolution of strictly theological problems. The alternative would seem to be some form of global theological confusion or undifferentiation in which all kinds of short cuts and 'cheating' are involved in the resolution of theological problems. There is an all too human tendency to shift from exegesis and history to communications avoiding dialectics and foundations, the two disciplines that invite the theologian to sort himself out. Systematic theologians can expound doctrines in complete oblivion of the findings of exegesis and dialectic.

I must then challenge Kerr's assessment. Is or is not the problem articulated by Raymond Brown concerning the internal unity of the theological enterprise a crucial and a permanent one? (It is of course not the only one). Does it make sense to talk about going beyond this problem by discarding it? Is or is not *Method* centrally addressed to this problem? Has it really made NO impact at all on it? Can it seriously be concluded that Lonergan has misdiagnosed a crucial problem of present and future theology? Perhaps the critics have misdiagnosed Lonergan.

II

If my first concern has been with keeping the central problem to which *Method* has addressed itself sharply in focus, my second is with stressing that a degree of self-knowledge is integral to Lonergan's proposed solution. *Insight* above all else invites its reader to discover something about himself: "The crucial issue is an experimental issue, and the experiment will be performed not publicly but privately. It will consist in one's own rational self-consciousness clearly and distinctly taking possession of itself as rational self-consciousness" (*Insight*, xvii). The consensus of opinion at Maynooth was that Lonergan's work could be critically assessed without reference to this personal challenge to discover something about oneself.⁹ On two occasions the relevance of the invitation was openly rejected, on the second by McDonagh, Mackey, Surlis, and presumably McGrath. The assembled critics did not challenge this rejection. There is a statement in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (4.0031): "All philosophy is 'a critique of language'". I wonder how students of Wittgenstein would feel if a conference of critics gathered to assess his thought and came to the conclusion that that statement was irrelevant to a critical assessment and could be ignored. Would they be inclined to take the critics seriously?

Despite the minefields that Wittgenstein, Frege, Geach and Norman Malcolm have laid in the paths of aspiring epistemologists the question still has to be posed—is there not a non-solipsistic sense in which we are all trapped in our own minds, does not everything that we come to know about the world and ourselves presuppose that it is by our own mental activity, the use of our own minds that we come to know it? Is it not impossible for any individual to get free from this presupposition, to get beyond this use of his own mind and arrive at a standpoint that does not presuppose it? Does not all theologising and philosophising presuppose that theologians and philosophers have minds and use them and that this is an unavoidable presupposition of what they do? If so might it not be a good idea to attempt to make explicit this foundational assumption of all our philosophising and theologising. Is everything else to become an object of critical scrutiny except our own minds, that which is involved in all our knowing? This is unhealthy obscurantism. Does not any critical effort to show that the question I am posing is nonsense not itself presuppose that the critic has a mind and is using it leaving him with the twofold embarrassment of firstly, an unobjectified presupposition, the use of his own mind in making the criticism, and secondly his affirmation of the obscurantist dogma

⁹ This is made clear in a report of the conference in the *Irish Theological Quarterly*, July 1972, p 294.

that although the mind is presupposed in all knowledge, it itself is permanently obscure. Again, can someone else make this presupposition explicit for you, tell you what you are doing when you are using your own mind coming-to-know? Lonergan's crucial experiment invites the comparison of theories of knowledge with one's own personal performance of coming to know or criticise them. There are affinities here with Wittgenstein's analysis of the use "as subject" of 'I'. Shoemaker sums it up:¹⁰

There is I think, an important sense in which each person's system of reference has that person himself as its anchoring point, and it is important for an understanding of the notion of the mental, that we understand why and how this is so. Fergus Kerr to some extent in his articles acknowledges the challenge that Lonergan is posing but in the end he cannot reconcile it with his commitment to analytical philosophy. He dismisses the invitation and the experiment as a form of experimental psychology. It is hardly philosophy at all and worse still, it is divorced from real life. I am of the opinion that despite some basic differences Wittgenstein and Lonergan have much in common. Kerr's response illustrates for me that the possibilities of mutual misunderstanding between the two approaches are enormous. Analytical philosophy has rightly revolted against Cartesian type self-knowledge (characterised by immediate access, infallibility, and a solipsistic independence of the world), against the 'introspection' and 'abstractionism' of Locke, and the 'empirical psychology' of Hume. It is vitally important to appreciate that Lonergan in his own way is equally critical of these doctrines. This amounts to considerable common ground.

Crucial here I believe is the issue of our *model* of mental acts. According to both Geach and Malcolm,¹¹ Wittgenstein does not deny that there are mental acts or occurrences such as anticipating, expecting, understanding, thinking, remembering, and so forth. What he does attack is the model of such mental occurrences as something that you can almost see going on inside you, the idea that the phenomena of the mind are "*inner, indescribable, and private*" Malcolm, op cit., p 18). If you start with that model which is the one that comes in different ways from empiricist and idealist philosophies then you have started off in the wrong direction. A second major defect of this model is that it makes mental occurrences independent of circumstances or con-

¹⁰ 'Self-Reference and Self-Awareness', *The Journal of Philosophy*, October 1968, p 567. See also Hacker, *Insight and Illusion, Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience*, Oxford 1972, pp 204f, and 262f.

¹¹ Geach, *Mental Acts*, p 3; *God and the Soul*, p 32. Malcolm, 'Wittgenstein on the Nature of Mind', *American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph*, No 4: *Studies in the Theory of Knowledge*, 1970, p 16.

text. Knowledge of mental acts become independent of the circumstances and context of our coming-to-know the world. This again according to Wittgenstein is a wrong move. As Malcolm puts it (op cit., p 15) 'Instead of looking *inside* ourselves we should be looking *around* us, at the context in which our words and pointing are located'. Lonergan again in his own way agrees with this.¹²

What then is Lonergan's model of mental acts? For him questioning, understanding, judging, and so forth have two unavoidable and indestructible qualities, they are *both* conscious and intentional.¹³ Physicists, men of common sense, exegetes, and historians question and attempt to understand data, situations, texts and authors, historical movements. In every instance the object of the questioning and understanding, the data, situation, text, author's meaning, historical movement, is always other than 'in the mind' of the questioner. The object of the questioning is the reality, not some kind of Humean 'ideas' or intra-mental image of it. Due to their intentionality mental acts open immediately to the world. Their objects are public. They relate the knowing subject and the knowable world. For Lonergan then mental acts are never inner, indescribable, and private. They are never totally in the mind like some kind of mental pain or ache. It follows that for him solipsism and private language are not possible positions. Obviously in their conscious dimension the same mental operations have a personal aspect but they are never simply conscious, they are also unavoidably intentional.

With this model then, the analysis of mental acts can never be independent of the circumstances or context in which we come to know the world, of real life. Questioning, understanding, and judging, are not something alongside, cut off from, so to speak, the data of science, the situations of common sense, or the texts of scholarship. Rather they focus our attention on such subjects and understanding makes them intelligible for us. The long first part of *Insight* invites the reader to engage mentally, with careful atten-

¹² Lonergan would never use the term 'looking' here. Malcolm (op cit. p 18, n 27) draws our attention to Wittgenstein's attack on the idea of the 'inner'. Lonergan's comparable attack is on the notion of knowing as a matter of taking some kind of look, and of self-knowledge as a matter of looking into oneself.

¹³ Olafson in 'Husserl's Theory of Intentionality in Contemporary Perspective' *Nous*, Vol IX, No 1, March 1975, holds that Husserl reacted against the mentalistic intentionality of Brentano and Meinong for whom the object of a mental act was internal, inner, intra-mental. For Husserl 'Intentionality is thus no longer the relationship of a mental act to its intra-mental object, but rather the basic vehicle of objective reference generally and thus of our knowledge of the world which Husserl speaks of as a comprehensive intentional object' (p 76). Olafson stresses that Husserl was not interested in the psychological factors governing mental acts but mainly in their referential functions, their semantic role, which is the concern of intentionality analysis. Lonergan's notion of intentionality corresponds with that which Olafson attributes to Husserl but not Brentano or Meinong.

tion to details, in the problems of the sciences and the situations of common sense. This is the basis of the philosophical inquiry. Obviously I cannot reproduce the details here but am more concerned with drawing attention to the overall strategy and the operative model of mental acts. Those studies parallel in their own way Wittgenstein's engaging and careful investigations of the way in which psychological terms are used in our language with due attention to context. It is striking that just as Wittgenstein's analysis has drawn attention to differences in the philosophical grammar of understanding, thinking, and meaning, so Lonergan's studies have drawn our attention to differences in the intentional and conscious qualities of questioning, understanding, and judging.

Is not this programme psychology as Kerr objects? Is he here attributing to Lonergan the model of mental acts as inner, private, and indescribable? Is he reading in to him the psychology of William James? With Husserl a distinction has to be drawn between the study of psychological factors which govern the emergence of mental acts and which are semantically irrelevant, and the intentionality analysis of mental acts which is semantically relevant. The latter which cannot take place with mental acts of the 'inner' type, is for me a central task of epistemology. The act-object correlation is unbreakable. It is only through mental acts that an author's meaning or a historical development becomes known by an agent. Obviously on one level one can interpret texts or understand history and not know what one is doing when one is so using one's mind. On the other hand if one wants to define interpretation or history, tasks central to the problem of method in theology, they can only be defined as the objects of interpretative or historical type questions and acts of understanding. One cannot define a historical question without reference to its intentional object, a historical situation. One cannot define history except as that which is intended by a historical type question.

Although the two approaches or methods differ, to view them at this early stage as mutually contradictory seems to me premature, mistaken, and sectarian. I am not convinced that the analysis of mental concepts in the writings of the later Wittgenstein (for instance, expecting, in *Zettel*, 53f) is totally 'linguistic'. I am of the impression that there is operative a tacitly unacknowledged dimension of reference to mental activity and not just to how the language works. At the same time I believe that Lonergan's approach has much to gain from the clarification that the analytical approach has yielded.

Through mental activity the world becomes known by the subject. The subject himself becomes known when those mental operations and their structural interrelation becomes understood and affirmed by any individual. Such is the goal of the analysis. No doubt there are very many further questions which could be raised

at this stage. Has the basic set of mental operations been correctly identified by Lonergan? Do they or do they not change over a lifetime? Are they the same for all cultures, Hebrew and Greek, ancient and modern? In what sense are they innovative, creative? Repeated questioning and understanding does not seem to yield the same results over and over again. How precisely does the present position relate to Wittgenstein's analysis of the use of "I" as the subject, to the works of Shoemaker and Strawson? I acknowledge very clearly these further issues. The concern of my present preliminary, tentative, and incomplete remarks on the relation between Wittgenstein and Lonergan is more limited. Firstly I have attempted to draw attention to the importance of dissociating Lonergan's position at most points from those rightly attacked by Wittgenstein. Secondly, I wish to counter the conclusion of Kerr that students of Wittgenstein have nothing at all to learn from Lonergan and vice versa.

Some brief concluding remarks. I agree with Fergus Kerr that *Method* is seriously deficient in its treatment of the poetic but unlike the *Republic*, I believe that poets and dramatists will be welcomed in Lonergan's theological democracy. As *Method* has addressed itself to the question of the internal unity of theology, it has not come to terms, directly, with the negative criticisms of Kierkegaard, Freud, Heidegger, and Marx. At the same time I would put the question back—do you think the kind of theology he is advocating is incapable in principle of meeting those challenges? I don't. The foundations he requires must come to terms with Freud and Kierkegaard. But here, dare I say it, his followers will have to think things out for themselves. There is, I believe, in Lonergan's published and unpublished writings sufficient interest in Freud, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard, to establish a basis for dialogue. With Wittgenstein it is different. The possibilities for mutual misunderstanding are enormous. Granted that let us not leap to any rash conclusions.

In conclusion I would like to make my overall standpoint clear. I have argued that a central problem of current theology is its internal unity. *Method*, I believe is addressed to that problem. If it is to be discarded as Kerr suggests, then it will have to be proved that it has no contribution to make to the problem. Secondly, I believe that we have much to learn from the grapplings of *both* Lonergan and Wittgenstein with the problem of self-knowledge.