

the majority. It would take a lot more evidence than Obermann offers to prove the contrary.

The third difficulty with Obermann's handling of his evidence is that there is a great deal of confusion between the Germans living in Germany and Austria and those living in Hungary. One does not know, for instance, what proportion of the minute German legion which fought in Transylvania came from outside the Habsburg Monarchy, in spite of Obermann's cover statement (p. 37) that the legionaries came from all lands of Germany. Moreover, and this is probably the greatest fault of the book, the sympathies of the Germans, Austrians, and the Magyars for each other are intermixed to the extent that Obermann must have thought them to be equivalent. Yet it is surely obvious that the Germans had more reason to be interested in the events in Vienna than in Buda, and that the Austrians had more of a vested interest in the outcome of the war in Hungary than the Germans did. In spite of the sympathies manifested and however widespread they might have been (and this Obermann cannot bring himself to admit), the Germans of Germany did little, if anything, for Hungarian independence.

It is one thing to write inspiring pamphlets about the brotherhood of peoples and another to take up arms in support of that principle. In brief, the book is too idealized and loosely argued, hence not recommended to the academic reader.

JOHN KOMLOS
University of Chicago

AZ ÚTON VÉGIG KELL MENNI. By *György Marosán*. Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1972. 475 pp. 31 Ft.

This book is the second volume of an intended three-volume memoir by Marosán, and it has caused a mild sensation among Budapest intellectuals. The fascinating, now already obviously Soviet-staged and Communist-featured parliamentary struggle in post-World War II Hungary is shown through the eyes of the author and involves mostly the Social Democratic Party's leaders and their relations with the Communists. The theme of the book is the merging of the two Hungarian Marxist labor parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, into one cohesive unit.

Marosán rose from the ranks of bakery workers to the highest echelon of the Social Democratic Party. After his party's fusion with the Hungarian Communist Party in 1948, he continued organizational activities in the Hungarian Workers' Party and was appointed minister of light industry in the Rákosi regime. He also served in the Kádár government as a state minister without portfolio from November 4, 1956, to January 16, 1960, and as one of the three vice presidents of the Hungarian Presidential Council (Elnöki Tanács) from October 7, 1961, to March 3, 1963. Because of his pro-Communist and pro-Soviet stance throughout his career, Marosán was often labeled a "crypto-Communist" and a "Communist agent" among the Social Democrats. As a top party secretary he assumed the responsibility for campaigning in the provinces, where organized labor was the weakest and the "reactionary" clergy had the strongest influence. But whenever the question of dealing with the all-powerful Communists arose, Marosán was brought back to the capital—not so much because the Social Democrats had no other able representative but because the Communists always requested his presence, for they had complete faith in him.

Marosán's pro-Communist attitude earned him some unpleasant moments, especially following the municipal election in Budapest in 1945. For example, when the two parties ran on a joint ballot, the Socialists felt that they could have done better without the Communists. Also in 1947 Marosán was blamed for the humiliating Social Democratic losses. When he threatened to resign, the Communist leaders personally urged him "not to do such foolish things."

The personality vignettes of the Communist and Socialist leaders are the most readable parts of the book. Names from the past come alive: Rákosi, Révai, Farkas, Gerő, Rajk, and Vas from among the Communists, and Szakasits, Kéthly, Peyer, Böhm, Bán, Sélig, and Szeder from among the Social Democrats. László Rajk is shown in the most sympathetic light, and of all the Communist leaders is the one with whom Marosán could best identify. Marosán implies that he could never establish true rapport with the Soviet-bred Stalinist Communist leaders such as Rákosi, Révai, Farkas, and Gerő, who are among the unmentionables in today's Hungary. János Kádár, who was not an important political figure at that time, receives honorable mention. Within the Social Democratic Party the author distinguishes two groups, the left and the right wings. Although the left-wing Socialists are presented as forthright party workers, only a few distinguished leftist leaders are described intimately. Árpád Szakasits, the leader of the party, was really only a figurehead who at decisive moments took ill and often wavered under pressure. Antal Bán is made to appear as a talented leftist leader but at the same time a weak character who took up with his secretary and drank excessively. Anna Kéthly, although rarely on Marosán's side, is not labeled a reactionary or rightist, and he cannot help treating her with respect. Vilmos Böhm is introduced in the book as the elder statesman of the party, a seasoned political realist.

Marosán waged a continuous struggle against the "reactionary" right wing of his party. Károly Peyer, the former party leader and parliamentary representative during the Horthy era, is attacked from the time of his return from a Nazi concentration camp until Marosán had succeeded in ousting him from the Social Democratic Party. Sélig and Szeder are shown throughout the book as "reactionary instigators." Before the merger of the two parties the Communists insisted on the resignation of all effective Socialist leaders, especially those who had a substantial following. Marosán was assigned the task of arranging for the resignations of Kéthly, Sélig, Szeder, and Bán. The book ends with the Joint Communist and Socialist Unity Congress of June 13, 1948.

The value of the book is that it was written by an insider of the leftist bloc who had close personal contacts with most of the leading political figures. The book is dominated by lively, readable, and colloquial dialogues. The descriptive passages are more heavy-handed and saturated with pseudo-intellectual political jargon. Marosán quotes his own "impromptu" speeches and conversations which took place more than twenty-five years ago. Speeches by others are often recited with no reference to their sources.

Marosán's reporting consistently follows the Communist-accepted interpretation of postwar political events, but as long as the archives of the Social Democratic and Communist Parties remain closed to Western researchers, Marosán's publication will be useful, provided readers are aware of its limitations.

ANDREW FELKAY
Kutztown State College