

Lonergan's Awake: A Reply to Fergus Kerr

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Reading Fergus Kerr's article 'Lonergan's Wake' (*New Blackfriars*, July 1975) as well as the book which inspired it¹ leaves one with a whole new insight into the plight of Jaius. Containing as it does many misleading comments about Lonergan's thought (for instance on p. 308 Kerr identifies the very common and ordinary occurrence of having an insight with the quite distinct and extremely rare event of self-appropriation) as well as totally destructive criticism it requires a reply. The criticisms given in *Looking at Lonergan's Method* are held to be irreparably damaging, mark a watershed, and make Lonergan's work seem ramshackle. *Method*, Kerr concludes, is a gross error. However, Kerr's own uncritical acceptance of the accuracy of the interpretations of Lonergan by the contributors, of the soundness and significance of their arguments and comments, as well as the severity of his own conclusions are not themselves beyond criticism.

It is claimed (p. 307) that firstly Lonergan has never engaged in even the most elementary analysis of the central concepts of his method, understanding and knowing; secondly, that he systematically misunderstands these concepts and makes all the mistakes that Wittgenstein warned us to avoid in his *Philosophical Investigations*. The first of these claims is preposterous. Lonergan has both written and lectured on Aristotelian, Medieval, Rationalist, Empiricist, and Idealist theories of concepts of knowledge and has worked out a highly sophisticated dialectical technique for choosing between conflicting theories. Granted that his starting point is not the analysis of concepts of understanding but of the more basic human performance of understanding itself. To simply study concepts of understanding without relating them to the experience of understanding, theological or otherwise, is to build castles in the air. The whole of *Insight* is a highly experimental study of the human performance of understanding and knowing (the former being a component of the latter), a study which firmly grounds his concepts of understanding and knowing. The work invites the identification of the role of understanding in the formulation of a mathematical definition, a scientific law of the classical, statistical, or genetic type, of the function of understanding in the common sense living of the individual, group, nation, world. In *Method* the scope is enlarged to include scholarship.

¹*Looking at Lonergan's Method*, edited by Patrick Corcoran SM, The Talbot Press, Dublin, 1975. It is my intention to deal only with points raised by Kerr in his article. In one or two instances a particular point has been filled out by drawing on its source in the book. Unqualified page references refer to the article.

Here he is concerned with the particular features of understanding involved, for instance, in interpreting a text or reconstructing history. At the term of this exhaustive analysis he has demonstrated what everyone takes for granted in education and communication, namely that despite enormous differences in the object of what one understands or knows the operation itself enjoys a basic identity or homogeneity. In any individual case is it not the *same* spirit of inquiry that operates in the realms of mathematics, science, common sense, and scholarship when the *same* intelligent subject operates in those fields? Is that human wonder not resolved by acts of understanding which, despite enormous differences in the objects, exhibit a remarkable operational similarity?

This of course presupposes that understanding is an event and this McGrath, under the inspiration of Wittgenstein, again disputes. Understanding cannot be a process because processes have duration and can be interrupted, they are extended in time. On this point it seems to me that Lonergan approaches agreement with Wittgenstein when he works out his very complicated distinction between the mental and the physical (*Insight* 514f, esp. 518). Understanding for Lonergan mediates between the temporality of the concrete object of inquiry and the concept, it is at the cross roads of the temporal and the a-temporal. There is then agreement between the two that understanding is in some sense not a temporal process, but is it or is it not an event? What marks the shift in anyone's understanding between not understanding and understanding the rule in a difficult mathematical series? What effects the transition from ignorance to enlightenment in any problem-solving situation? There is a growing literature at the present time² which witnesses that discovery is a very real and identifiable mental event. Geach is well aware of this problem with respect to judgement when he states :

Anybody performs an act of judgement at least as often as he makes up his mind how to answer a question and acts of judgement in this sense are plainly episodic—have a position in a time series.³

Judgements in this sense are events. At the same time he goes on to indicate that the assignment of positions in time differs basically when one is dealing with a mental event such as judgement rather than a physical event (*Mental Acts*, 104-5). Here again I believe that there is common ground with Lonergan.

McGrath objects that the question 'what is happening when we are knowing?' is unsound from a grammatical viewpoint or, as Kerr puts it (307), is fishy to a Wittgensteinian nose. Knowing for him is not something one does. We would never say that when I was knowing Pythagoras's Theorem the telephone rang. This of course reveals an obvious misunderstanding of the question. Understanding Pythagoras's

²To mention but two of a vast number, Maria Shradly, *Moments of Insight, The emergence of great ideas in the lives of creative men*, N.Y., Harper, 1972, and Taylor and Barron, *Scientific Creativity, Its Recognition and Development*, N.Y., Wiley, 1963.

³Peter Geach, *Mental Acts*, London, 1957, p. 9.

Theorem and hearing the telephone bell ring are two separate incidents to which there correspond two separate questions of the type—what happened? Perhaps the best way to illustrate the meaning of the question is to begin, not with the concept of knowing, but with the more primitive activity of questioning which promotes the human performance of coming-to-know. Is or is not questioning something which theologians, scientists, men of common sense, and philosophers *do*? Do we not ask questions because we are ignorant? Is or is not our ignorance an absence of knowledge? What then is knowing but answering questions. Is it something we do? How do we respond to questions? Is it not through acts and accumulations of acts of understanding and conceptualisation, through verifying or falsifying our understanding, through passing judgement, or is knowing some form of unconscious Platonic recall of the forms or alternatively, as the naive realist would claim, a matter of taking a good look at what is there to be seen? Human knowing is not a state or a disposition but a dynamically structured activity comprised of many different mental operations which assembles itself from questioning through to judgement. True one could talk about the *state* of questioning as being a state of ignorance, the state of judging as being a state of knowing. Again, the dynamically structured activity recurs cumulatively in our lives from early infancy and builds up cognitive dispositions and viewpoints which guide our living. However, I think the point has been made that it is not nonsensical to talk about knowing as something we do and accordingly the question ‘What is happening when we are knowing?’, theologically or otherwise, is a very real one.

The slogan of *Insight* about understanding understanding is, it is claimed (307), pointless and cannot ground an understanding of the broad lines of all that there is to be understood. If one’s vision of philosophy is such that its central task is the untying of knots and the avoidance of any fixed position then the programme of *Insight* will seem senseless. But if on the other hand one is alert to the growing problem of interdisciplinary relations, of the growing need for interdisciplinary collaboration, then the slogan of *Insight* will become extremely meaningful. Husserl in his magnificent ‘*The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology*’ stresses that the central task of philosophy is to work towards the unification of knowledge. Lonergan responds to that challenge by observing that questioning and understanding are common activities in common sense, science, scholarship, and philosophy. An understanding of those different types of questions and acts of understanding will ground a knowledge of the broad features of the worlds of common sense, science, scholarship, and so forth.

To turn to a second group of critics, it is claimed (308/9) that it is strange that in examining the method of theology we look, not at the subject matter of theology but the mind of the theologian. This resort to the ‘inner life’ of the theologian, to the basic structures of his personality, is lamentable. This criticism occurs in O’Donoghue, Torrance, Lash (he seems more concerned with Lonergan’s stress on the individual

theologian) and by and large it comprises Kerr's main grouse against Lonergan. Curiously he later includes a contrary criticism from Jossua to the effect that theology will only be taken seriously if 'it gives evidence of an experience which is lived and reflected on' (p. 314). The critics infer that Lonergan's preoccupation with the inner life of the theologian leads to a neglect of the objective material world of theology, documents, texts, history, and so forth. It is a complicated matter to deal with and my answer will unfold in four parts.

Firstly, I believe that Kerr's use of the phrase 'inner life' gives the game away. He seems to attribute a 'closed box' notion of mind to Lonergan⁴ in which the intentionality of the mental operations is rejected. For Lonergan, questioning, theologically or otherwise is the basic conscious and intentional operation, the core of interiority, the key mental act. Questions, however, always have objects and it is only if one misunderstands or denies this fact that one will conclude that his approach isolates the theologian from the objective world of theology. The methodological problem can be recast as—what are the distinct types of theological questions which theologians can raise and what are the structures of the anticipated answers. To conceive theology methodically is to grasp the structure of the complete set of such questions, their interrelatedness, and the corresponding structure of the anticipated answers. There is nothing sentimental or pious about this subject centred approach to the problem of method. Its starting point is intimate reflection on theologies and theologising of both the present and the past. In this context it is worth appreciating that Lonergan's familiarity with the specifically theological problems and tasks involved in teaching the treatise, *De Deo Trino*, played a vital role in his long struggle to work out a method for theology.⁵ The methodologist, however, is not concerned with resolving any specifically theological problem but with understanding the nature of the total theological enterprise. It follows that he must be extremely careful not to appear to violate the autonomy of the theologian in matters theological. This is one of the reasons why *Method* shies away from involvement in any specifically theological task. Presumably it is this which led Kerr to conclude that *Method* does not do justice to the objective world of theology. Let us now examine that claim.

Secondly, there results a definition of theology in terms of eight functionally interdependent tasks or specialties. These can be interpreted in the present context as eight distinct but interdependent types of theological questions and anticipated answers, the questions of research or textual criticism, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. There are quite distinct types of question. To ask who wrote this text and when, what the author of the text meant, what was going forward in history at the time, what

⁴Norman Malcolm in his *Problems of Mind, Descartes to Wittgenstein*, London, 1972, 10f, outlines the sources in Descartes, Locke and Hume of the closed-box notion of mind. In it the mind's internal ideas are its immediate objects. For Lonergan all mental operations are intentional, they have a world orientation.

⁵See Vass and Mathews, 'Lonergan's Method: Two Views', *Heythrop Journal*, XIII, No. 4, 1972, p. 428.

were the truths and values involved in the conflicts, what are the different intellectual, moral, and religious horizons within which those truths can be apprehended or distorted, is, in each instance to raise a distinct question. Yet the questions are interdependent for until one has discovered who the author was one cannot go on to ask what he meant; until a network of meanings has been established one cannot ask about the historical movements, and so forth. The interdependence can work both ways and should not be interpreted in a clockwork manner. The important point is that there is a set of quite distinct but interrelated questions and corresponding theological tasks. Lonergan in defining theology in terms of eight functional specialties does not specify any strictly theological questions but he does specify that there are eight distinct types. I would invite Kerr to propose any concrete theological problem that he cares to consider and see if it cannot be accommodated within the eight types. Do the questions of the source, form, redaction critics, of historical and dialectical theology, questions concerned with religious conversion, theological doctrines, systematic issues, and catechetics lie outside of the scheme that Lonergan has specified? If this is so in any single instance then Lonergan's *Method* will have to be revised or rejected. On the other hand, perhaps Lonergan has succeeded in classifying a possible complete set of theological questions from a methodological viewpoint in a manner that in no way interferes with the autonomy of the theologian in matters theological. It follows that I do not accept Kerr's claim that *Method* ignores the objective world of theology. What is needed here is a proper appreciation of the interrelation of theology and methodology.

Thirdly, to base one's theological method on transcendental method has a further advantage. Anyone familiar with the work of Kuhn will raise the question whether theological paradigms are culturally conditioned. If so will not further progress in theology lead to further revolutions in the understanding of the subject in which the present paradigms are not merely refined but rejected? Now revision itself has conditions of possibility in the inquiring theologian. It implies that present understanding of some topic is incorrect. New discoveries emerge which render the old redundant. However, these newer insights are not themselves beyond criticism and further revolutions are possible, the whole process converging on the truth. But in all theological revision there is presupposed an intellectually, morally, and religiously conscious subject who performs the revision. Those mental, moral, and religious operations are not revised in the revision but in fact perform it. Now Lonergan's theological method is specified in terms of a set of complexifications of those basic operations, the functional specialties and the principle of religious conversion. It follows that if he has done his work correctly he has specified in his method the conditions of possibility of any theology and of the revision of any theology. Those conditions of possibility can be apprehended with ever-increasing clarity as theology progresses but they are not in themselves open to revision. It follows that a theological method based on transcendental method can be refined.

The theological tasks sketched in *Method* could be explored and expressed with increasing precision by future generations of specialists. A succession of further books could emerge. Yet if the foundations of the enterprise are correctly conceived, in that future collaboration the basic theological paradigm will not be rejected in a revolutionary manner but rather will be appropriated with increasing precision.

Fourthly and finally there is a further aspect of the subject-centred approach to method and theology which cannot be avoided by the theologian himself, namely that of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. All theology is subjective or intersubjective in the sense that it is either the work of a particular individual or group. Individuals and groups have unavoidable intellectual, moral, and religious horizons. Yet all theologians aim at objective results. There seem at present two contrary approaches to the problem of objectivity. The first amounts to a variation of 'the principle of the empty head' (*Method*, 157), namely that the less you know about yourself the more likely it is that your results will be objective. This seems to me a basic form of self-deception. The alternative is that the more you know about yourself the more likely it is that your judgement will be objective. No individual or group can do theology so objectively that they can escape their intellectual, moral, and religious horizons and perspectives. This is not a strictly academic matter but one which is at the heart of a dispute about how to teach religion 'objectively' in schools at the present time. In Lonergan's scheme the specialties dialectic and foundations are concerned with a methodical approach to the contextual and existential dimensions of these very difficult problems. The more one knows about the different types of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, about the factors which define the horizon of the individual or group, the better one's theology will be. The alternative to this methodical approach to objectifying the horizons from which one selects one's doctrines will be an apparently arbitrary selection of religious (or atheistic) and moral doctrines without any appreciation of a number of factors which are unavoidably involved in that selection. The choice is between clarity and obscurity and there is no way of resolving it except through an objectification of the possible types of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion that any subject can achieve. If the subject centred approach to method has its advantages, later when I come to consider the criticisms of Pannenberg and Lash I will show that it does not lead to a theology in which the role of the individual theologian is central and that of the community peripheral.

Kerr's second grouse centres around the topic of faith and beliefs (pps. 310-312). He asks, does not Lonergan's distinction make faith 'an act, or an experience, outside the order of meaning' (p. 312), and secondly what sorts of judgements of value could come from the eye of a religious love which is faith? With regard to the latter I believe that Lonergan has provided his answer in *Method* (pps. 116-7) where a series of the values discerned by faith are set forth :

Without faith the originating value is man and the terminal value is

the human good that man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is the divine light of love, while terminal value is the whole universe' (116).

Faith recognises that true human self-transcendence and achievement is an orientation towards the mystery of love and awe that is God. Without faith the world is too evil for God to be good. Faith recognises that man has been called to overcome evil with good, to promote true human progress and undo decline. Faith discerns the particular value of believing in a revealed religion or in a particular set of religious beliefs. From all of this I do not think that Kerr's claim that faith is outside the order of meaning has any foundations. His account of Lonergan's position on faith seems to me to diverge in places from what is in the text of *Method*. The root of the confusion here seems to be an identification of what Lonergan calls the inner word of God's love, which does pertain to the world of immediacy, with faith. Religious experience, the experience of the gift of God's love in one of its dimensions has an unavoidable orientation away from man's world of space and time, history and meaning, and an otherworldly orientation into mystery and holiness. On the other hand, faith which is the discerning knowledge that stems from love is radically concerned with man himself and his world, with a transvaluation of human values in every culture.

Theological disagreement is Elizabeth Maclaren's main concern. Lonergan holds for a universalist faith and a generous pluralism. This leads her to conclude that his method is impotent when it comes to using it for identifying theological truth (p. 312). These accusations hardly do justice to Lonergan's account of the theological task of dialectics. One cannot authentically take one's place in the arena of dialectics unless one has sufficient openness to acknowledge that one might have to radically revise one's understanding of oneself and one's world. Dialectics brings together all the conflicts that arise in research, interpretation, and history. It invites the theologians to take their stance, to acknowledge the truths and values which they accept and those which they reject, to align themselves with those individuals and groups with whom they agree and to acknowledge those with whom they disagree. From that stance they are invited to objectify the extent of their intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, factors otherwise implicit in their stance. Finally, it involves a comparison of such horizons. Seriously pursued it will, to use Tillich's phrase, shake one's foundations. Such a procedure is hardly impotent.

A final group of criticisms are concerned with the place of the individual theologian within the theological community as a whole, with the social and cultural role of that community, and with its historical context. Pannenberg accuses Lonergan of failing to allow the priority of the order of meaning over against the individual subject (p. 309). Kerr, under the influence of Foucault calls for a decentring of the subject (p. 314). In *Method* Lonergan clearly affirms that the mother tongue, the available language moulds the development of conscious

intentionality. 'Not only does language mould developing consciousness but also it structures the world about the subject' (*Method*, 71). Related to this there is the treatment of the contextual aspects of judgement in *Insight* (176f, 285f). Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of a term cannot be reached by bare ostensive definition but only by considering its place in the overall language. Lonergan holds that judgements never take place in isolation but in the context of an accumulation of understanding which has been provided largely by the education of the individual in his society. At the same time when he considers the origins of common meaning he stresses that creative individuals do have an innovative role to play in the field of meaning.⁶

Pannenberg distinguishes analytical, hermeneutical, and intentional theories of meaning. Lonergan follows the third type which it is claimed suffers from two serious defects. Firstly it cannot cope with the issue of context and of understanding human historicity in terms of parts and wholes. Secondly, it renders meaning dependent on subjective decisions with the consequence that the analysis of meaning cannot be followed through to intersubjectivity. The problem then is how can intentionality analysis be reconciled with intersubjectivity and history. I maintain that Lonergan has achieved such a reconciliation. *Method* can be read with either individual, social, or historical spectacles. The individual theologian can read it in order to see if it can help him in the performance of his own strictly individualistic tasks and this seems to be how Lash reads it. On the other hand when Lonergan states that 'recourse must be had to teamwork' (*Method*, 142) it is clear that for him the role of the individual in methodical theology is not central. I would like to take the liberty of enlarging on this point.

Method is precisely a response to the totalitarian tendencies inherent in both scriptural scholarship and dogmatic theology on the one hand and the anarchy and cultural impotence of a laissez faire theology on the other by redefining theology in terms of a structured interdisciplinary collaboration whose keynote is not individuality but teamwork. It is concerned with establishing 'a framework for collaborative creativity' (*Method*, xi), or to use Kerr's term with a 'decentering' of theology, with a movement away from the individual or particular theological specialty towards the theological community. Within this framework, mainly specified by the function specialties, we are able to locate and appreciate the contribution of such diverse groups of theologians as source, form, and redaction critics, the historical theologians such as Kelly and Grillmeier, ecumenical theology, the concern with conversion and religious experience in theologians such as Schleiermacher (absolute dependence) and Tillich (ultimate concern), the contribution to doctrines of Barth and Rahner, to systematics of Rahner and Tillich, and finally the work in communications of pastoral theologians, catechists, journals, and the media. Because the validity of the distinct theological tasks is acknowledged the tendency to play off the exegete against the systematic

⁶On the genesis, history, and transmission of common meanings see Lonergan, *Collection*, London, 1967, p. 245, *Method*, 356f. On the innovative role of creative individuals in the field of meaning see *Method*, 255f.

theologian is eliminated. At the same time because the interdependence of the tasks is also recognised the systematic or pastoral theologian will have to acknowledge the precise nature of his dependence on the rest of the collaboration, the exegete that his work feeds into a further series of specialties. *Method*, properly understood, will promote theological progress by restoring to present theology an inner coherence and unity.

In presenting this view of theology as a collaborative and intersubjective enterprise I believe that Lonergan successfully links his intentionality based theory of knowing and meaning to the fields of both intersubjectivity and history. Transcendental method specifies the basic intentional structure of any human subject. When Lonergan formulates the complexification of that method into the functional specialties he is incarnating it in an essentially intersubjective context, the context of the theological community. The distinct types of theological questions previously considered are pursued, not by an individual but by the theological community. The functional specialties objectify the intentional structure of such an intersubjective collaboration. In this manner it goes far beyond Husserl. Finally, when in his analysis of the stages of meaning (*Method* 85f) Lonergan considers the historical complexification of transcendental method in terms of such stages he is incarnating it in a historical context. In this manner his intentionality based theory of meaning can incarnate the individual in the social context and both the individual and the social in the historical.

Lash, in his criticism of the treatment of the problem of cultural discontinuity (312/3), makes little reference to the analysis of the realms of meaning and the differentiations of consciousness. It is here that the main contribution to his problem lies. Again interpretation must stem from an individualistic, social, and historical perspective. Undifferentiated common sense is one level of cultural development. To it all other common sense cultures, all science, scholarship and philosophy are alien and senseless. Due to the biases of common sense there is a tendency to reject anything which cannot be explained within one's own world or the world of one's group. A first cultural discontinuity emerges in the shift from undifferentiated to differentiated common sense. Such acknowledges the existence of distinct common sense cultures, does not ridicule them and their strange behaviour patterns but recognises their distinctiveness and the problem of understanding them. Beyond this there is a further cultural discontinuity well illustrated by the tribulations of Socrates and Galileo brought about by the emergence of the theoretical or scientific differentiation of consciousness. Science is not just more common sense. It involves a change in the direction of one's understanding of one's world and so there is a discontinuity. As science had to battle its way against the biases of common sense so today scholarship is having to establish itself as a separate field of activity distinct from common sense and science and is, of course, meeting considerable resistance. After all, to the man in the street, what is the sense or value of solving the synoptic problem?

Now the differentiations of consciousness are to be interpreted not

arithmetically as some have suggested but rather cognitively, sociologically, and historically. Cognitively they are distinct and to some extent discontinuous modes of complexification of the basic cognitive theme, transcendental method. Thus any individual may in his intellectual development have attained a greater or lesser degree of differentiation, he may feel at home in some or all of the realms of common sense, theory, scholarship, philosophy, and religion. Individuals multiply into groups who share the same combination of differentiations of consciousness. Between such groups and others enjoying greater or lesser differentiations there will of course be tensions and misunderstandings. The group with the lesser differentiation will try and reduce the horizon of the other into its own and ridicule what it finds senseless. Finally, the different differentiations, realms of meaning, emerge in history. It follows that in objectifying the differentiations of consciousness Lonergan has objectified a set of categories applicable to individuals, groups, and history, all of which are concerned with cultural discontinuity. The achievement of a sufficiently differentiated consciousness on the part of the theologian in order to deal adequately with the problem of cultural discontinuity is a task which is neither trivialised nor underestimated by Lonergan. He affirms 'the enormous labour of becoming a scholar' (*Method*, 160). Again, the application of those categories extends to all eight functional specialties. In the first phase of theology they will be applied in the tasks of research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. A proper grasp of the permanent as well as the discontinuous elements involved in such cultural discontinuities is crucial for an understanding of the development of doctrines. In the second or existential phase of theology it is central in determining how the same religious doctrines can be expressed in the ordinary language of widely distinct and alien common sense cultures, in the available categories of the natural and human sciences, of the philosophies, and in the realm of scholarship. In short the problem of cultural continuity and discontinuity pervades the whole of *Method*.

A number of questions centre on the cultural role Lonergan assigns to theology (313, 314). Is it not a highly specialised activity which takes place in an ivory tower or university? Does it not promote a formal language and is not its only point of contact with the market place in the specialty, communications? As Lash points out, the professional interpreter's world of meaning can become so restricted that he is accused, not without justice, of living in an academic ivory tower (*Looking at Lonergan's Method*, 136-7). Rather than being a specialist should not the theologian become a jack of all trades? The questions pertain not to the internal structuring of theology but to its external relations, to its overall goal or purpose. Although a great deal of further work is necessary here Lonergan has provided some guidelines. Theology is not something which exists for itself. It is basically reflection on the religion of a culture. Religion pertains to the experience of the gift of God's love by the community in its particular historical and cultural context. That experience has implications for cultural progress and decline for God's love is not unconcerned with these matters. The

purpose of theology is to reach an adequate understanding of the religion in its context in order that it might properly appreciate its truths and values and achieve its cultural aims. Now it is a matter of fact that religions in general and Christianity in particular are historical. It follows that part of the task of reflecting on religion will be a proper assimilation of the past. It is from the past that a religious community derives its present identity. However, in methodical theology the dimension of remembering the past is not the same as living in the past. Dialectics is concerned with preparing for an existential encounter between present religious truths and values and those objectified by the exegete and historian. If this is neglected exegete and historian will be open to Lash's criticism. At the same time given the complexity of the tasks of interpretation and history I cannot see them being properly executed except by experts of the highest degree.

The whole of the second phase of methodical theology is existential in that it pertains to the present and future living of the overall religious community which it serves. It too will require its experts but will tend to invite an active participation of the whole community. One suspects that internal communication between the specialties will go hand in hand with widespread communication on all levels with the community as it faces educational, moral, social, economic, and political issues in the light of its religious truths and values. Lonergan has not specified what institutional form a methodical theology might take so the extent of the role of university theology is an open question.

In conclusion, the arguments of the prosecution are unsound. *Method in Theology* has a profound contribution to make to theology on two fronts. It will help promote the inner coherence and unity of the theological enterprise while at the same time restoring its cultural role in relation to the religious community.

(Fergus Kerr will reply next month and Nicholas Lash will reply in March.)