

facts from all levels of reliability (virtually anything is accepted as evidence), of ill-remembered testimony, of pointless anecdotes, of citations from other books of even less historical authenticity, and its utter disorganization, what may be extracted that is of real importance?

The moral issues are unavoidable and it is entirely to Tolstoy's credit that he insists on them. They are not simple, because many of the people in question had chosen to be soldiers of a particularly detestable government and enemy. On one of them, however, there is no room for debate. To return by force or trickery people who had never been Soviet citizens, because they had fought with the German armies, was a disgraceful act which no confusion at the time can condone, whatever unpleasant acts these people may themselves have committed earlier during the Russian civil war. Not to have returned them would not even have stood in the way of the political expediency which, it might be argued, had to take precedence over morality. But by what morality should a historical judgment be reached? Apart from a relatively short period in the history of Europe and North America, the normal fate of captives has been death or slavery. The conventions which protected certain persons from these fates were based on assumptions about the individual's "rights" which were entirely unacceptable in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. For Tolstoy to point out repeatedly that the Nazi government frequently behaved in accordance with these conventions—for example, by accepting as British prisoners of war all those serving in British uniform—is a moral hypocrisy surpassing the cold and prejudiced cruelties of the Foreign Office. More than a million Soviet prisoners of war died or were killed in Germany. Those whose individual rights were protected anywhere in the war and its immediate aftermath were but a favored few. All others depended not on the law but on sporadic human compassion. Had an Allied country taken more than five million prisoners of war (the number of Soviet prisoners taken by Germany), would it still have behaved in full accord with the Geneva Convention? The Allied response when faced with about two million liberated Soviet peoples in Western Europe suggests not. It was in fact the sheer numbers involved which presented Western Allies with a problem they had been able to avoid during the war itself. Could they have given political asylum to perhaps one million Russian soldiers and an unestimated number of civilians? It would have been no mercy to have dumped them on Germany.

The book makes no attempt to answer the extremely important questions about how many Russians were in all of the relevant categories, and, indeed, numbers slide around vaguely throughout. It is true that both the Foreign Office and the State Department took refuge in legal dodges and hypocritical evasions, only rediscovering the morality they stood for when a manageable number of Russians was left in their hands. It was only to be expected that the Soviet Union, so desperately in need of labor for reconstruction, should simply assume that anyone found in Germany was tainted and a suitable subject for a further period of slavery. But, rather than anger at diplomats, what this story should evoke is a deep sadness for those chance victims of both German and Russian slavery and sometimes, in between, of Allied cruelty.

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PAMIAT': ISTORICHESKII SBORNIK, part 1. New York: "Khronika," 1978
[Moscow: Samizdat, 1976]. xiv, 600 pp. \$15.00, paper.

Russia has need of bridges spanning the rifts that separate generation from generation. It is a land torn by massive catastrophes. Yet there lie even deeper chasms separating a Russian from himself. An abyss cannot be bridged. It is there, and it stares up at you.

When Il'ia Ehrenburg's memoirs appeared, they were at best treated guardedly in the West: "inadequate," too much left out. Since then, however, nothing has appeared in print officially in the USSR that has "put more in." But outside the Gutenberg galaxy, in *samizdat*, there has been a remarkably sustained outpouring of memoirs and personal histories, collections of unpublished facts and "impermissible" life experiences, the overwhelming preponderance of which has its psychic center as well as its concrete locale in the *Gulag Archipelago*. Solzhenitsyn's three volume work, with the vast scope of its inquiry and the great organizing power of its metaphors, seems to be increasingly central, the sun around which more and more planets have fallen into orbit.

Pamiat' (Memory), a miscellany of reminiscences, accounts, analyses, documents, and reviews, moves in such an orbit and orients itself both to Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag* and to the *Chronicle of Current Events*. It is concerned with "what actually happened," with documentation and "setting the record straight" (whoever may be keeping it, in whatever place), with remembering and reexperiencing lives the integrity of which was shattered by arbitrary political intrusion, and not least, with justice and accountability—emergence from the bedazzlement of legend, propaganda, and amnesia.

Factuality and authenticity are exalted values in this book, which begins with four reminiscences of arrest and imprisonment, ranging from an ordinary, if well-educated, Russian woman who was a lawyer and journalist in Harbin at the time of the Soviet occupation in 1945 to a stalwartly loyal party member who served eight years in Vorkuta before emigrating to Israel. Four essays recount incidents and "cases" drawn from the entire Soviet period, the most interesting of which (to this reviewer) is the *Kolokol* case, the first large-scale political trial of the post-Khrushchev era which immediately preceded the arrest of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Four letters written in a peculiar Soviet genre that the editors identify as "intercessory" show signs of a common style. These include letters from Nadezhda Mandelstam to Molotov, from Voloshin to Kamenev, and from Lili Brik to Stalin. A book published abroad, Abraham Shifrin's *The Fourth Dimension*, is measured as scrupulously against known facts as official publications. *Pamiat'* contains an analysis of the professional editing of photographs of Lenin as well as a study of the Academy of Science's jubilee volume that lists (presumably) all its past members.

These are the highlights; there is more. And this miscellany is declared to be only part one of what promises to be a long series—"if!" I hope the editors succeed, for their work is in the service of that memory which is mother of the Muses, of the integrity of personality and political rationality as well.

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MOSKOVSKJE GODINE 1956/1958. By *Veljko Mićunović*. Monografije, Biografije, Dokumenti, no. 6. Zagreb: "Liber," 1977. 530 pp. Illus.

There are two kinds of books that describe and analyze internal and external policies of the Soviet Union: those written by Western observers (the outsiders) and those written by Communist or ex-Communist participants (the insiders). The former are numerous, speculative, and often based upon guesswork, since information is hard to get from closed societies. The latter are scarce and often full of propaganda and purposeful misinformation, leaving the Western reader more confused than enlightened about what is actually going on in the Soviet Union. Very seldom do we find an objective study about the USSR written by an insider. Many Soviet dissidents have written true accounts of the internal life of the USSR, but few have held any position of importance which would enable them to describe the foreign policy process. Thus, we must rely upon the memory of Mićunović, Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow from