terms of paradigms or archetypes as in terms of that which is saturated with the sacred. In this respect he resembles Walter Otto, whom Hinz mentions (p. 912), without, however, attending sufficiently to his remarkable mythic point of view. For Walter Otto, cultus (including, of course, ritual mimesis) is a "mighty creation called into life by the divine afflatus of a god who reveals himself," while myth likewise bears witness to "this same encounter with the Sublime." Both cultus and myth are, for Otto, "great languages with which mankind speaks to the Almighty, . . . for no other reason than that it must."

To the extent that Otto's point of view is tenable, it is not correct for Hinz to assert, *as a generalization*, that "Mimesis *had* for primitive man and *has* for the mythic writer a sacred and a practical function: it is the means whereby what happened *in illo tempore* can be made to happen again" (p. 908). For example, Yeats's "Leda and the Swan" is mythic, but not because it recounts a hierogamy (although it does), not because it abrogates historical time (it doesn't), but because it exhibits Rudolph Otto's *mysterium tremendum* and was "called into life by the divine afflatus" of Zeus.

In conclusion, I might observe that Hinz unintentionally comes closest to a Christian orientation near the end of her essay. Although her discussion of the regenerative effect of the *hieros gamos* in *Landlocked* (and elsewhere) is unconvincing (because it commits the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy), and although her notion of ritual cosmic regeneration is essentially pagan, the kind of moral-metaphysical flow of which she speaks strikingly resembles the interconnectedness of the human and physical cosmoses in the Christian myth. Witness the cosmic degeneration that occurs in *Paradise Lost* when Eve eats the forbidden Fruit:

> Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat
> Sighing through all her works gaves signs of woe,
> That all was lost. (IX. 782–84)

What Hinz says of mythic hierogamy is equally true (*mutatis mutandis*) of the above lines: they are "experienced subjectively, but [they are] also an experience that brings cosmic consciousness, a consciousness of the way things *are* when viewed from a cosmic perspective" (p. 911).

What makes a narrative mythic is precisely that it views things religiously from a cosmic perspective. Had Hinz been willing to admit the possibility of there being more than *one* such perspective, her extraordinary essay would have been definitive rather than merely seminal.

PHILIP J. GALLAGHER
University of Texas, El Paso

To the Editor:

A theory does not stand or fall on a single example, and Evelyn J. Hinz's argument for a reconsideration of the generic labels, novel and romance, contains many fine observations, but there seem to me to be serious difficulties with its overall argument as well as with its handling of one of its illustrative cases.

Although the romance may well be generically distinguished from the novel, marriage is not a sufficiently defining criterion so that its appearance in romance should cause a redrawing of boundaries. Indeed, from Chrétien's *Erec* through Chaucer's Franklin's Tale and Shakespeare's *Tempest*, marriage has informed both the *conte* and the *conjointure* of romance, to use Vinaver's terms (*The Rise of Romance*). On the other hand, objects that are indisputably novels, for example, the prose fiction of Dickens, have often next to nothing to do with marriage. In *Great Expectations* there is no marriage at all (and if one calls out here: "But that is the point, for what we have is the solitary quest hero of romance," then I suggest that we abandon the enterprise and use less vexed terms such as prose fiction or narrative). And, in *Martin Chuzzlewit*, to take a perhaps more typical example, there is indeed a marriage plot, but that is so peripheral, so external to what happens inside the novel, so little felt, either structurally or symbolically, that its protagonists do not share many more than thirty pages in the book's thousand.

But what I should like to take issue with more explicitly is Hinz's reading of Forster's *The Longest Journey*, for it perpetuates a fairly common misinterpretation and suggests certain of the difficulties of the overall thesis. Hinz argues that "the novel ends with Agnes and Stephen happily married" (p. 903). But Mr. Pembroke's haughty reply, "my sister leads a busy life," to Stephen's suggestion that "Mrs. Keynes" write an introduction to Rickie's posthumous collection is our only clue that Agnes has married again. "Happily" is a conjecture that nothing we know of Agnes supports. That this last irony should become evidence for a reading "where love or nature conquers all for the good of society and the continuation of the human race" (p. 903) seems to me terrifically lopsided. Even Stephen's marriage, which at least we cannot accidentally overlook, is presented in purely symbolic terms. He is married to no novelistic character, for his wife is clearly none other than the Demeter of Cnidos, whose picture hung in his room: "she faced the sunrise; and when the moon rose its light alone fell on her, and trembled, like light upon the sea" (*LJ*, p. 138). Neither Stephen's nor Agnes' marriage has

https://doi.org/10.1632/S0030812900193927 Published online by Cambridge University Press

anything to do with the "good of society," although there are obviously strong fertility associations with Stephen's. In fact, in terms of Hinz's argument, it is the mythic mode—hierogamy not wedlock—that Stephen illustrates (Demeter, goddess of the heavens; Stephen, son of earth).

More important, however, neither marriage in any way balances the Rickie plot. There, indeed, in his relation to Agnes, "the emphasis is upon *lock*," but the "entrapment [that] leads to suffering" does *not*, contrary to Hinz's assertion, lead "to concomitant moral development" (p. 903). Forster makes exactly the reverse point: Rickie "remained conscientious and decent but the spiritual part of him proceeded to ruin" (p. 223). Rickie's "tragedy" lies in his flickering, self-deceiving, "second class" attempts to reach Stephen through that arch that "became a fairy tunnel, dropping diamonds," before the vision vanishes. Rickie is not righting social injustice, although Mr. Failing would have seen it that way. He is attempting, and failing, to get in touch with his own nature. But his failure "to connect" is not entirely his fault. Forster examines the entrapments of marriage by setting them against other relationships (Rickie/Ansell, Rickie/Stephen —here presented under the acceptable labels friend, half brother) that would offer, if the "registry office" for such marriages could be found (and that it could not was the true social injustice), the alternative to tragic wedlock. "The cries still call from the mountain, and granted a man has responded to them, it is better he respond with the candor of the Greek" (p. 302). Neither the marriage of Stephen nor the incidental transformation of Agnes into Mrs. Keynes seems to have much to do with that.

Judith Scherer Herz
Concordia University

Ms. Hinz replies:

To a great extent, the objections raised by both Gallagher and Herz are like the questions asked by a student who has missed the class or who is basing his objections on his own garbled version of what was said. Though I expressly emphasize in my title and elsewhere that my concern is with "prose fiction," Gallagher and Herz attempt to fault my observations by introducing the example of works like Genesis, Revelations, *Paradise Lost*, *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, "Leda and the Swan," Chrétien's *Erec*, Chaucer's Franklin's Tale, and Shakespeare's *Tempest*. To his credit, Gallagher does seem to sense the ludicrousness of such an attempt to refute an argument concerning "prose fiction" with examples drawn from outside of such a category; but, unfortunately, instead of admitting that he thus has no case, he attempts to turn those *limits* of my essay which make his comments irrelevant into the *limitations* of my essay.

To the same effect, both Herz and Gallagher distort my meaning and ignore the context of respective observations. Thus Herz, for example, turns my qualified observation that the presence of a "wedlock" plot in prose fiction is typically *an* index to the novelistic orientation of the work into an absolutist argument that for a work to be a novel it *must* be concerned with marriage—which faulty and imputed argument she then attempts to refute by alluding to novels in which marriage plays little or no role (*David Copperfield*, *Martin Chuzzlewit*). Similarly, by quoting me out of context, Gallagher attempts to present me as narrowly arguing for "hierogamous marriage" as the definitive characteristic of "mythic narrative," which argument he then tries to disprove by referring to works like *Moby-Dick*. But, needless to say, except to point out Gallagher's literal-mindedness, when I come to describe "hierogamy" as the "prototype" for "mythic narrative," I am no longer speaking specifically of a marriage plot per se but rather by extension of the interaction between the cosmic and the historical, the divine and the human, that characterizes the style and content of "mythic literature"—and of which *Moby-Dick* is one of the best examples.

I am also quite amazed that Gallagher should resort to a question-begging invocation of the Bible and "Judeo-Christian myth" in his attempt to challenge my argument that "mythic narrative" operates to abolish profane time or history: In myth criticism the Bible is not "Scripture." That "Yahweh" is a god of history is not proof that the "mythic" is concerned with the historical; the emphasis upon history in the Bible is a feature of the Judeo-Christian "signature," while the "mythic" element resides in the archetypal character of the figures and events that in places it evokes. Thus my definition of "mythic narrative" does not categorically rule out the Bible or related works, although it does rule out a fundamentalist approach to such literature.

As for Gallagher's attempt to use a poem concerned with a classical rather than with a "Christian myth" to refute my position, in his choice of "Leda and the Swan" he epitomizes one of the most common errors made by would-be myth critics: namely, the confusion of "literature about myth" with genuinely mythic literature, the confusion of invocation and evocation, the confusion of nostalgia and re-experience. Far from reflecting a mythic spirit, the speaker in Yeats's poem asks questions of myth, that, if they reflect a yearning for the mythic ethos, also thereby emphasize its remoteness. If anything,

https://doi.org/10.1632/S0030812900193927 Published online by Cambridge University Press