

Hudson looks at Soviet and Japanese approaches to Ainu ethnography and welfare policy, focusing on the contributions of Bronislaw Piłsudski and Oyabe Jenichirō in the nearly twentieth century. Lu Tian explores the contribution of the writer Itō Ken to cultural engagement between Japan and China in late 1920s Shanghai in the context of Soviet and Comintern ideas on proletarian literature that allowed them to position themselves outside the framework of western conceptions of international order. Dominic Martin and Igaue Naho document the work of photographer Yamazoe Saburō in recording the Old Believer community in the village of Romanovka in Manchuria between 1939 and 1941, and also the more recent project to work with descendants of the Romanovka villagers to reconstruct a picture of the Old Believer way of life. Larisa Usmanova investigates the migration of Turkic-speaking people from the Russian empire to Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, their attempt at political organization and the role they played in the nationalities policy of the Japanese state. Charles Lock explores the Russian-led development of communications networks across Manchuria to Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries alongside the expansion of Orthodox missionary activity, and dwells particularly on the melting-pot city of Harbin.

Other papers offer comparative insights on a range of cultural topics broadly conceived. Takashi Nishiyami questions the culturally determined conceptualization of *kamikaze* warfare as a manifestation of Japanese fanaticism by tracing parallels in the military doctrine and practice of both Russia and Germany. Olga V. Solovieva considers Akira Kurosawa's stance on Japan's reopening to the west in his first post-war film, *No Regrets for our Youth* (1946), and specifically the Russian inflection given by his inclusion of music by Modest Mussorgsky in the film's score. Elma Hoffman and Olga V. Solovieva discuss the response of the Japanese composer Takemitsu Torū to Andrei Tarkovskii's film *Nostalghia* (1983), and the emotional appeal of the nostalgia that it evokes. In a further chapter, Solovieva views Kamanaka Hitomi's documentary *Little Voices from Fukushima* (2015) about the recovery from the Fukushima nuclear power station disaster against the background of cooperative self-help among doctors and activists in Japan and Belarus, and Svetlana Aleksievich's documentation of responses to the similar disaster at Chernobyl in her book *Chernobyl' skaia molitva* (Chernobyl Prayer, 1997).

Japan's Russia covers an enormous amount of ground, and while its case for the pivotal role of Russia in informing Japan's negotiation of the "east-west paradigm" is made more securely in some chapters than others, the book never fails to interest, inform, and inspire.

DAVID N. WELLS
Curtin University

We Shall Be Masters: Russian Pivots to East Asia from Peter the Great to Putin. By

Chris Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2021. xx, 361 pp. Notes. Index. Maps. \$29.95, hard bound.

doi: 10.1017/slr.2023.60

Russia's repeated "pivots" to the east, or "cycles of interest and disinterest" (8), have consistently been overly optimistic and unsuccessful, and generally a distraction from "the reality that its interests and its capabilities are anchored in the West" (12). This remains the case even recently, concludes Chris Miller. To compete with the west, Mikhail Gorbachev once visualized a socialist world successfully imitating Chinese reform and the export-oriented Asian economies. Vladimir Putin's war

against Ukraine since the taking of Crimea in 2014 assumes the expansion of economic and technological exchange with China.

The author describes misplaced optimism and subsequent disappointment through biographic portrayals of figures such as Aleksandr Baranov, who worked for a leading Siberian fur trader determined to expand the trade to Alaska; Nikolai Rezanov, a noble with the support of high imperial officials interested in the expansion of Russian influence in California; and Georg Anton Schaffer, a German physician in the imperial service who explored trade with Hawaii. These efforts, however, were abandoned by more skeptical voices in St. Petersburg. The window for “hatching exorbitant plans for empire” (43) was closing quickly, writes Miller, because of the challenge posed by the west. “Russia after the Napoleonic Wars was consumed by its European responsibilities” (42). Ukraine, Poland, and the Caucasus absorbed the attention of Russia’s tsars and imperial elites more so than Siberia, where “fur trappers set the agenda,” or the distant Far East, where few Russians and other imperials subjects lived (53). Nicholas I and his Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode were conservative and careful in their instincts, emphasizes Miller, again focused on the west and the prospect of revolutionary change that it sometimes threatened.

Nikolai Muravev, appointed governor-general of Eastern Siberia in 1847, by contrast feared “inactivity” more than change, “lest rivals gain at Russia’s expense” (59). China in decline was an opportunity for imperial Russia, and Muravev promoted Russian settlement, the development of the Siberian economy, and the seizing of the Amur River. Nikolai Przhevalsky, explorer and adviser to the military, similarly offered a vision of aggressive Russian expansion in the East that captivated the imagination of many among educated society. By the 1880s, however, his ideas faced skepticism from officials alarmed by the assassination of Tsar Alexander III in 1881 and convinced that events in Europe were more significant for Russia than Asia. His “memos to officials urging further conquest were politely ignored” (106). Minister of Finance Sergei Witte’s interests included the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway from 1891. Russia’s costly loss to Japan in 1905, however, diminished any enduring enthusiasm about industrial development and trade in the Far East, and instead meant accommodation and retreat in the last years of the imperial era.

Socialists such as Mikhail Borodin maintained hopeful ideas about Russia’s special mission and purpose in the East, redeploying these ideas in “communist garb” (164). Even further, socialists were comfortable with imperialism, explains Miller, and quick to address traditional geopolitical concerns. By the 1930s, however, the Soviets repeated the cycle explored by Miller throughout the book: disillusionment with the East yet again (evident in the adoption of only a “defensive orientation” toward Japan) while far more preoccupied with Europe (186–87). Only with the defeat of Japan and the weakness of China did Soviet ambition and optimism return after 1944. “Tsar Nicholas II’s territorial dreams had suddenly reemerged,” he writes (200). High hopes reappeared in the Soviet Union in the form of the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s, and Nikita Khrushchev’s outreach to the Global South in the era of decolonization. The “Great Friendship” between the Soviets and Chinese was soon overtaken by territorial conflicts along the long border, however, and the Soviets found themselves confronted by a painful collaboration between the United States and the PRC.

The author is an excellent synthesizer of secondary source literature, fluid writer and engaging biographer. The archival support for the book might be further developed, perhaps with attention to a particular problem or bureaucratic entity that would serve as a test case for his cyclical theme. Archival material pertaining to foreign policy, broadly defined, for the imperial era includes collections on foreign faiths, border commissions, settler colonialism, Orientalism and ethnography, and borderland administrators who sometimes served in both the western and eastern provinces

of the empire. For the Soviet era, the author might focus on an administrative body such as the International Department of the Central Committee or the Asian section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This book will prove useful and stimulating in both undergraduate and graduate courses on Russia's relationship to the world.

AUSTIN JERSILD
Old Dominion University

God Save the USSR: Soviet Muslims and the Second World War. By Jeff Eden. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. xii, 253 pp. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$95.00, hard bound.

doi: 10.1017/slr.2023.61

One of Iosif Stalin's survival tactics during World War II was to establish Islamic administrations that would support the Soviet state. Accompanied by his more famous embrace of the Russian Orthodox Church, this was part of Stalin's return to Russian imperial practices that had begun in the mid-1930s. This slim book discusses some of the essays and speeches by appointed Islamic leaders across the USSR, and analyzes samples of wartime poetry, letters, and memoirs by ordinary Muslims. Jeff Eden draws on Russian and Turkic-language archival documents, although he selects most of his texts from recent document collections and studies done by scholars in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and the United States. The book ends with English translations of texts from Islamic, Buddhist, and Jewish administrations as samples of pro-Soviet religious propaganda. Eden argues that the war sparked "a modest but meaningful social revolution" (154) by pushing the state to sponsor religious institutions, although he does not establish causal connections between that and the prayers of soldiers at the front.

After summarizing the last twenty years' of scholarship on Stalinist repressions of church and mosque, Eden discusses how Stalin eased pressure on the Russian Orthodox Church as soon as Adolf Hitler's invasion began. Stalin's rapprochement with Islamic clergy has never been as thoroughly documented, but the mufti of the Islamic Spiritual Administration in Ufa, Gabdrahman Rasulev, began publishing patriotic essays in the fall of 1941. Eden says that Rasulev met personally with Stalin after June 22, but neither he nor any of the sources he cites document a direct meeting. In June 1943, the Politburo approved creating a parallel administration for Muslims in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, led by the elderly Ishan Babakhanov. The heart of the book is a close reading of essays and speeches by these and other leaders, addressed to domestic and international audiences. These texts, like their Christian equivalents, are notable for the absence of communist ideology and use of traditional tropes like defense of the motherland. Strikingly, the muftis were allowed to depict a global Islamic community rallying against fascism, including the Ismailis who revered the Aga Khan (who lived in London). At the same time, Babakhanov emphasized the local sacred landscape of Central Asia, organized around Sufi shrines. The speeches provided a new space in which to envision a Soviet Islam.

Beyond rhetoric, Muslim communities received permission to open new mosques and begin limited publishing via the administrations. In 1944, a few men were allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. These moves were manifestations of new levels of state control: communities donated money to the war effort and cooperated with police surveillance in exchange for a legal mosque, registered with the state Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC). After the war new permissions dried up, but the wartime mosques remained. Eden argues that these small freedoms strengthened