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## The Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons

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This article tests the equal status contact hypothesis in the aftermath of desegregation in the Texas prison system. This study uses ten years of inmate-on-inmate assault data and compares the rates of violence among inmates racially integrated in a double cell versus inmates racially segregated in a double cell. The analysis revealed that violence between integrated inmates was not disproportionate to the level of violence between segregated inmates—in fact, it was lower. This article addresses the conditions under which positive racial group contact will likely be found in a prison setting and concludes with a discussion of implications.

### Introduction

**A**t the end of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, wave upon wave of immigrants poured into America. Irish, Italians, Germans, and a multitude of Eastern Europeans were absorbed into this country to forge one social and political community. Through this diversity came the notion of America as the great melting pot. Over time, however, it became evident that complete racial and ethnic assimilation did not take place (Berry

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1965; Marden 1952). Mass attempts at racial and ethnic “Americanization” did not create one unified culture, and many new immigrants had in a sense become “unassimilable” (Dinitz 1978: 234).

Racial and ethnic separation became the core topic of inquiry for early Chicago School sociologists who sought to understand the “unmeltables” (Berry 1965; Dinitz 1978:234). Although these researchers centered on criminality and delinquency, an important part of their work focused on the causes and consequences of intergroup contact in general, and in specific, interactions between different racial groups. Since then, race and racial relations has remained a major area of study in American society, and this is no less true today than it was a century ago.

Periodic events remind us that issues with race are endemic to American society. Earlier examples include *Brown v. Board of Education*<sup>1</sup> in 1954 and other important desegregation cases that followed in the ensuing decades—signaling legal attempts to minimize the distance between racial groups throughout public life. Racially charged riots in the wider society and the rise of the Black Muslims in prisons became important issues in the 1960s and 1970s, during the height of the civil rights movement. The infiltration of crack cocaine in American inner cities and the war on drugs response in the 1980s were replete with racial overtones (Walker 1998). More contemporary issues include the racially charged dragging death of a black man in Jasper, Texas; racial profiling in law enforcement; the Supreme Court’s stamp of approval on school vouchers, which some tout as the next wave of school desegregation; and just recently, allegations of police misconduct in Inglewood, California, where a white police officer slammed, punched, and choked a black teenager.

Importantly, these events have one thing in common: They all have an impact, both direct and indirect, on contact and outcomes between different racial groups. It is in the backdrop of these and other events that the study of race relations has remained prominent in sociological research. Indeed, whole subsections of sociology are devoted to studying everything from the concepts of race and ethnicity to stages and cycles of race relations, and finally to the determinants of interracial contact and the outcomes of that contact, including prejudice, discrimination, and conflict (Berry 1965).

In this same tradition, the present study seeks to understand the consequences of racial group contact in a prison setting. To do this, we examine ten years of inmate-on-inmate violence data from the Texas prison system in the aftermath of federal court intervention that required the desegregation of two-person cells.

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<sup>1</sup> Complete citation information for cases is provided in the references.

In short, this article examines the impact of forced desegregation on racially mixed cell partners.

## **Interracial Contact and the Equal Status Contact Hypothesis**

One theoretical framework on race relations that has received much attention by social scientists for nearly fifty years has been the equal status contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Powers & Ellison 1995). The contact hypothesis in its most basic form suggests that “prejudice may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups. . .” (Allport 1954:281). Advocates of this hypothesis suggest that interracial contact counters stereotypes and promotes positive racial attitudes by providing sensitizing information to the norms, lifestyles, values, and experiences of others—familiarity erases ignorance and paves the way for positive interaction (Ellison & Powers 1994). Beyond just interracial contact, however, the contact hypothesis contends that positive outcomes are more likely when both groups enjoy equal status in their environment (Allport 1954). Positive contact is also thought to be enhanced in the presence of institutional support and contact under cooperative conditions, such as common goals and interests (Allport 1954).

The equal status contact hypothesis was set out by Allport in the same year as the historic *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) decision. *Brown* signaled the beginning of the end of de jure segregation and spurred additional Supreme Court rulings and legislation that continually chipped at the walls of racial segregation in America. Not surprisingly, the contact hypothesis was subjected to numerous tests, most often in the aftermath of racial contact by way of racial desegregation.

### **Research on Interracial Contact and Outcomes**

Contemporary research on the consequences of desegregation has typically focused on settings where, through natural experiments, desegregation became public policy. For example, more recent studies have been conducted in residential settings (Sigelman et al. 1996), in the military (Moskos & Butler 1996; Scarville et al. 1999), in prisons (Carroll 1988 [1974]; Dishotsky & Pfefferbaum 1979; Henderson et al. 2000; Jacobs 1982; Walker 1985), in schools (Longshore & Prager 1985; Olzak, Shanahan, & West 1994; Schofield 1989), and in the general society (Ellison & Powers 1994; Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney 1996; Sigelman & Welch 1993).<sup>2</sup> These studies had two general aims. One was to

<sup>2</sup> Note that considerable variation exists among studies outside setting differences (e.g., prisons or schools) where the interracial contact occurs. These variations include theoretical framework, independent variable (contact measures or proxies), dependent

examine the level of interracial contact (see Sigelman et al. 1996). The other was to study the impact or outcome following contact. Because a full presentation of work on desegregation and outcomes would include a long and impressive list, we focus our attention on recent research on the contact hypothesis.

In an early test of the contact hypothesis, Robinson and Preston (1976) examined the aftermath of faculty desegregation in a public school setting. Their overall conclusion was that desegregation had a positive impact on interracial attitudes, especially when desegregation was among status equals, where there was intimate group contact, when institutional support was present, and when the faculty had common goals. Moving from faculty desegregation to prison inmates, Carroll (1988 [1974]) studied race relations in a maximum-security prison setting. Although he did not empirically evaluate the contact hypothesis, Carroll did offer insight about the conditions thought to promote successful interracial outcomes in prisons. He noted that racial prejudice might be decreased among prison inmates in the presence of an "equality of repression," in addition to contacts that were among status equals, in a nonthreatening environment, where racial contact was high in duration and intimacy (1988 [1974]: 214–20).

Studying racial contact and outcomes in the wider society, Sigelman and Welch (1993:784) tested the contact hypothesis using data from a national survey of blacks and whites on outcomes of prejudice (perceptions of hostility and endorsement of close social ties). Following interracial contact, respondents reported in general positive racial attitudes, especially in the presence of interracial friendships and more frequent contact with another racial group. Ellison and Powers (1994) also found support for the idea that contact lessens prejudice, particularly when contact came in the form of interracial friendships and early life contact with members of a different race. Studying military soldiers, Moskos and Butler (1996) found a relative absence of racial conflict and suggested that this finding was linked to the common goal of the military and the common status of front-line soldiers (see also Scarville et al. 1999).

Others have examined interracial contact and have uncovered essentially the same findings, generally that interracial contact protects against negative interracial outcomes (Desforges et al. 1991; Jackman & Crane 1986), especially in the presence of certain conditions.<sup>3</sup> In short, these studies relay that interracial contact does not necessarily result in increased prejudice and/or

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variable, unit of analysis, time frame of data, singular or multiple race examinations, and others.

<sup>3</sup> While the general finding of these studies is that interracial contact did not result in negative attitudes or conflict, several of the studies suggested conditioning factors for this relationship; that is, contact is not necessarily sufficient.

racial conflict, nor does it automatically result in positive attitudes or the absence of conflict. Rather, some conditions (e.g., equal status, cooperative conditions, interracial friendships, and common goals) are thought to promote positive interracial outcomes.

Despite evidence supporting the contact hypothesis in part or whole (Desforges et al. 1991; Ellison & Powers 1994; but see Powers & Ellison, 1995; Jackman & Crane 1986; Robinson & Preston 1976; Sigelman & Welch 1993)<sup>4</sup> this body of research has been met with criticism. First, Robinson and Preston (1976) noted that “equal status contact” may be viewed differently by blacks than by whites, and outcomes may hinge on these different perceptions by race (see also Butler & Wilson 1978 on “demographic imbalance” and Powers & Ellison 1995).<sup>5</sup> Second, Jackman and Crane (1986) remarked that with tests in the wider society there is difficulty in formulating “contact,” and racial group contact is likely minimal. Third, Desforges et al. (1991) and Ellison and Powers (1994) noted that particular and largely artificial circumstances might only garner favorable attitudes among different racial groups. Here, they claimed that evidence in support of the contact hypothesis has only been found under “ideal,” or the most favorable, conditions (see Robinson & Preston 1976), including but not limited to intimate contact, meaningful contact, voluntary contact, common goals, and equal status.

Fourth, Powers and Ellison (1995) suggested that research on the contact hypothesis has suffered from a selection bias. This criticism has come in two forms. First, the finding that interracial contact lessens prejudice is said to have resulted because respondents were those who actively sought out interracial contacts, while those who rejected such contacts were not examined (Powers & Ellison 1995; see also Sigelman & Welch 1993). Second, tests have focused on individuals who had little prejudice in the first place, regardless of interracial contact. Thus, what is known about the contact hypothesis and outcomes of prejudice has been derived from the “best risks,” or those most amenable to interracial contacts. Yet it is not known how these “best risks” compare to those who might be less tolerant to interracial group contact in the first place (Powers & Ellison 1995).

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<sup>4</sup> Several studies outside of the contact hypothesis disputed that interracial contact results in positive outcomes. These studies did not test the contact hypothesis, but nonetheless applied a theoretical perspective and ultimately concluded that interracial contact has resulted in poor racial relations. These studies, as in tests of the contact hypothesis, have uncovered conditions to explain negative relations. See Olzak (1992) on competition for job opportunities, Olzak and Shanahan (1996) on economic deprivation and job competition, and Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney (1996) on high levels of segregation and prior racial unrest. Also see Irwin (1980) and Jacobs (1983a, 1983b) on vying for positions of power and dominance in prisons.

<sup>5</sup> Most tests of the contact hypothesis use simple black and white distinctions rather than ethnicity or other racial categories.

Fifth, the various formulations of what constitutes contact and what qualifies as an outcome make it difficult to make comparisons among studies. For example, equal status, contact under cooperative conditions, and institutional support, including ideas about common goals, equality of repression, and others are relatively unclear theoretically and methodologically, and there have been various ideas about what they mean and how to measure them (see Sigelman et al. 1996). Finally, and most important, recent and former examinations of the contact hypothesis have almost exclusively formulated the dependent variable as prejudice (see Allport 1954; Ellison & Powers 1994; Powers & Ellison 1995; Robinson & Preston 1976; Sigelman & Welch 1993), yet attitudes as an outcome are problematic—attitudes do not necessarily translate into behaviors. In our view, attitudes are entirely in line with the contact hypothesis, but the most appropriate test of the true outcomes among different racial groups is behavior. We elaborate below.

### **Attitudes versus Actions: Contact and Outcome Measures in Recent Research**

This study differs from previous research on the equal status contact hypothesis. The present study does not focus on attitudes but on actual behavior in the aftermath of desegregation in the Texas prison system.<sup>6</sup> Despite the importance of attitudinal research on prejudice, whether prejudice increases, decreases, or remains the same following some degree of interracial contact, self-report data is fraught with issues of validity and reliability.<sup>7</sup> At best, these types of data are dictated by the people, times, and places surveyed, and how they might differ at any particular time.

Despite the general issues with validity and reliability, attitudinal research does not get to the heart of measuring true interracial contact and outcomes in the first place. First, dependent variables in the most recent tests of the contact hypothesis have measured whether respondents trusted the motivations of an opposite race or approved of interracial dating following interracial contact (Ellison & Powers 1994; Powers & Ellison 1995). Others have examined perceptions of hostility and a “deeper commitment to the maintenance of interracial social ties” following interracial contact (Sigelman & Welch 1993:783). While these outcome measures are consistent with the contact hypothesis, they beg the question of whether actual conflict or its absence might

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<sup>6</sup> See, however, Olzak and Shanahan (1996) and Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney (1996), who examined macro-level race rioting as a form of contact outcome instead of attitude. These studies were not couched within the contact hypothesis, but they nonetheless examined actual conflict instead of attitudes following interracial contact.

<sup>7</sup> This is even more the case with different populations studied in attitudinal research: for example, self-reports of children versus adults, or military soldiers versus prison inmates.

be a better indicator of positive and negative outcomes following interracial contact. Indeed, one of the lessons of self-report and other survey data is that individuals say one thing but often think and act in a different way. Much like Allport (1954) observed, “[w]hat people actually do in relation to groups they dislike is not always directly related to what they think or feel about them” (1954:14). Overall, actions speak louder than words.

Second, there is an issue with the independent variable in testing the contact hypothesis—namely, *equal status contact*. We fail to find much discussion about *equal status*, but *contact* has been operationalized in varying ways. For instance, some researchers have measured contact as a categorical “yes/no” of having close personal friends of the opposite race or as the racial composition of one’s neighborhood (Sigelman & Welch 1993). Others have formulated contact as self-reports of early childhood contact with other races or the racial composition of respondents’ junior high school, high school, and college (Ellison & Powers 1994; Powers & Ellison 1995). In one of the most recent studies on contact, Sigelman et al. (1996) examined whether contact has increased or decreased among racial groups over time. They measured contact as attending school with persons of another race, having on-the-job contact with persons of another race, living in neighborhoods with persons of another race, and visiting homes of another race (Sigelman et al. 1996:1310–14). While these forms of contact do not necessarily violate the assumptions of the contact hypothesis (see Allport 1954:262), they are relatively weak indicators. Having close personal friends of the opposite race or living in a neighborhood with large numbers of persons of another race is not necessarily contact, let alone equal status contact. Rather, in the latter example, it is a possibility for contact where potential is a proxy. Importantly, there is evidence that individuals of different racial groups will self-segregate and avoid each other, regardless of being in an interracial neighborhood or having interracial friends (Carroll 1988 [1974]). In this way, the degree of contact tapped in former studies is suspect (Jackman & Crane 1986).

Coupled with the last point is the *intensity* of contact. Of the ways contact has been formulated in prior research, it most closely resembles casual contact, which is much less intense than other forms of contact and, as Allport (1954) explains, “are [*sic*] likely to be wholly superficial” (1954:263).

The foregoing discussion suggests other limitations with tests of the contact hypothesis. One problem is the lack of inquiry on the intent or motivation behind negative interracial attitudes. For example, a finding that different racial groups have developed (or maintained) a negative attitude after contact does not necessarily mean that the prejudice was a result of a race bias—if not, it was simply a prejudice and race was not the motivating

factor (see Toch 1992). In short, negative interracial attitudes are necessary, but they are not sufficient to assume that the attitude is because of race. Overall, little attention is paid to the reason for negative attitudes following interracial contact, whether they are the result of race- or nonrace-related factors, stereotypes, or other experiences.

Finally, much of the literature on the contact hypothesis has been cross-sectional in nature and begs the question if prejudice, when found to be lessened upon interracial contact, remains that way over the long term. Tests on the contact hypothesis have also suffered because of time. The bulk of research on the contact hypothesis was conducted in the late 1950s and through the 1970s. Certainly, attitudes have changed considerably concerning race, and history has become an important threat to validity in dated studies (Sigelman & Welch 1993). Even the most recent research on the contact hypothesis has used data sets that are almost twenty years old (Powers & Ellison 1995). Only recently has research addressed these ideas, but these studies are few.

The “best” test of the contact hypothesis could only occur under the most rigid of laboratory conditions or as the serendipitous result of natural or field experiments (see, however, Powers & Ellison 1995). In this way, the penitentiary may be the best setting in which to fully explore Allport’s (1954) provocative hypothesis. We support this claim below.

### **Interracial Contact in a Prison Setting**

The penitentiary commands a degree of control not present in the wider society. However, some scholars have suggested that to test the contact hypothesis in institutional settings is a limitation because most interracial contact does not occur in these “highly monitored settings” (Powers & Ellison 1995:206) and there is no indication of whether the same results might apply to noninstitutional settings. This criticism has merit; however, desegregation in the wider society is also limited in terms of “contact” simply for the fact that individuals self-segregate, avoid, and ultimately thwart the effects of desegregation (Carroll 1988 [1974]). Individuals in the larger society, despite times of close proximity to other races, are not truly desegregated to a significant degree.<sup>8</sup> Yet in the context of the Texas prison system, desegregation is forced, total, and in cells. There is guaranteed desegregation for a significant portion of time in the most intimate living area, the cell. Actual interracial contact is thus more

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<sup>8</sup> This same argument holds true for free-world institutions such as the military and schools. While there is a component of forced interracial contact, the intensity of contact is likely less than in a prison setting, especially that within a double cell. Schoolchildren can go home at the end of the day, and military soldiers do have the freedom to avoid contact.



intense than in other social institutions, and this measure of contact seems considerably more rigorous than proxy indicators that merely tap the potential for casual contact.

In addition, no guarantee exists that individuals in the free society are of equal status even after being desegregated, and assuming they make contact. This is a key component of the contact hypothesis, but our reading of the literature has found little attention paid to this aspect (see, however, Jackman & Crane 1986; Sigelman & Welch 1993). Plainly, there is so much variation within and between groups in regards to “status” that it is especially difficult to talk about individuals or groups as status equals. There is truth to this argument in prisons as well (see generally Irwin 1980; Sykes 1958), yet prison inmates, once racially integrated, are more or less of equal status—this is especially true with “in-cell” desegregation. The desegregation of inmates within cells is a “flat hierarchy.” Theoretically, no inmate has greater status over the other, at least during the time inmates are in their cell.<sup>9</sup>

Goffman (1961) provided insight about the nature of status differentiation in total institutions such as prisons. He explained that inmates, upon entering prisons, experience degradation ceremonies—they are assigned a number instead of a name, are made to look the same, walk the same, talk the same, and follow no set of rules, formal or informal, other than that set by the prison administration.<sup>10</sup> Each inmate “enjoys” the same status. “Being squared away the new arrival allows himself to be shaped and coded into an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the establishment, to be worked on smoothly by routine operations” (Goffman 1961:16). No inmate is immune from this machinery. Status is more equal in prisons than in any free social institution, especially in a double cell. Although no social setting can totally suppress the development of subcultures and their own particular codes of organization and hierarchy, no matter how coercive (Bartollas, Miller, & Dinitz 1976; Irwin 1980), status differentiation among prison inmates, especially those housed in double cells, is no more so than in other free-world institutions.<sup>11</sup>

Prison desegregation in cells is an aberration, an effort at social engineering not possible to be accomplished (nor yet at-

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<sup>9</sup> Theoretically, two inmates in the same cell appear to be “equal.” However, in reality, even in the cell one inmate often dominates another. Perhaps there is no social setting where two people are ever true equals. The idea of “equal status” is a fleeting concept, but it can be approximated to a degree. We contend that cell integration equals status more than any other social setting.

<sup>10</sup> This is not to say that informal inmate codes and organization do not exist (don’t snitch, stay with your own race, etc.). See Sykes (1958).

<sup>11</sup> Of course it is a falsity to talk about prisons and prison life as if one singular type existed. There is considerable variation both within and between state and federal prison institutions.

tempted) in the wider society. Yet desegregation in a prison can be studied absent self-segregation and avoidance, which play important mediating roles in the wider society and its institutions. Despite any limitation associated with examining desegregation in this way, this study guarantees to inform about interracial contact and outcomes in prisons over the long term. This is where the generalizability of the findings will be most applicable. This study, then, is probably more important for prison administrators who are required to desegregate prisoners (Henderson et al. 2000; Slate, Johnson, & Hemmens 1999). Yet despite the generalizability issue, the outcomes of prison desegregation might help improve our understanding of interracial relations in the wider society as well (see Moskos & Butler 1996 on applying institutional lessons to the free society).

### **Relevance of this Study**

Ultimately, this research addresses many of the foregoing concerns. First, this research adds a dimension to testing the contact hypothesis by using behavior as an outcome instead of an attitude. Second, concepts including equal status contact, intensity of contact, duration of contact, institutional support, and cooperative conditions are more easily observed in an institutional setting. Third, the selection bias criticism can be addressed; that is, who is being integrated and why, and how might this impact the findings. Fourth, this research is longitudinal, and important historical factors can be taken into account in explaining the outcomes. Fifth, this research examines behavior in the most intimate, yet highly volatile areas of a prison—the cell. Finally, the present research involves tri-racial behavioral outcomes.

More specific to the correctional literature, this research improves on discussions of desegregation in prisons despite the absence of any empirical evaluations on this topic (Carroll 1988 [1974], 1998; Jacobs 1982; Walker 1985; see, however, Henderson et al. 2000). Although the correctional literature has never based racial desegregation in terms of the contact hypothesis (see, however, Carroll 1988 [1974]), the contact hypothesis offers a particularly appropriate perspective to frame the hypothesized versus the observed outcomes with in-cell desegregation. This research is also important because it discusses the impact of policy implementation and change in prisons and has the potential to fill several important gaps in both the sociological literature on interracial contact and the correctional literature on race relations and violence in prisons.

## Setting, Desegregation, and Double Cells

To test the contact hypothesis, we compared rates of violence among two populations of inmates over ten years—one group that was desegregated, and the other group that was not. Most important, however, both groups were housed in double cells.<sup>12</sup> This section focuses on the research setting and impetus for desegregation, the prison unit procedure for integrating inmates in double cells, and the number of racially integrated double cells over time. The goal of this section is to provide a picture of inmate desegregation in the Texas prison system.

### The Setting and Impetus for Desegregation

The research setting was the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), which is the second largest correctional system in the nation. Currently, the TDCJ-ID has 112 prisons, 67 of which are required by court order to integrate their inmates in double cells.<sup>13</sup> The Texas prison system has grown from 18,000 inmates and 13 prisons in 1974 to 131,000 inmates in the ID and 112 prison units in 2000.

The impetus for desegregation in the Texas prison system resulted from a class action civil suit filed in 1972.<sup>14</sup> Inmate Allen Lamar alleged systematic discrimination against black inmates in the Texas prison system pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The resulting case, *Lamar v. Coffield* (1977), was consolidated in 1973 as a class action affecting all past, present, and future inmates of the Texas prison system.

*Lamar v. Coffield* was decided in 1977. To avoid a judgment that systemwide patterns of discrimination and the denial of equal protection under the laws existed, the prison system entered into a consent decree in which administrators agreed to integrate inmates in double cells to the maximum feasible extent based on rational objective criteria (e.g., criminal sophistication, sex, age, health status), but not on race. Ultimately, the consent decree required the prison system to eliminate the “last vestiges

<sup>12</sup> It should be noted that the “groups” were not a panel of the same inmates over the ten years. We saw groups as either segregated or not segregated in a double cell despite the fact that the inmates could change.

<sup>13</sup> The number 67 represents the actual number of prison units with double cells present and under the stipulations of the *Lamar v. Coffield* (1977) consent decree and order. Prison units not subject to *Lamar* integration stipulations include transfer facilities, state jails, initial diagnostic facilities, and substance abuse facilities. This does not mean that inmates in these facilities are not integrated (with the exception of initial diagnostic facilities). Much of the Texas prison system consists of dormitory-style housing where inmates are racially integrated. This study, however, is concerned with double-cell integration. The Texas prison system has, since 1965, integrated large areas of the prison such as dorms, cellblocks, and wings (see Crouch & Marquart 1989).

<sup>14</sup> Space limitations preclude an in-depth analysis of the *Lamar* suit over time, including other issues within the suit. For an in-depth analysis see Trulson (2002) and Trulson and Marquart (2002).

of state-sanctioned segregation” by developing an affirmative action plan to address and remedy inmate racial segregation (*Lamar v. Coffield* 1977:4). Per the stipulations, each prison unit in the TDCJ-ID was to integrate at least 70% of its available double cells in any given year.<sup>15</sup>

For years, the Texas prison system was noncompliant with the consent decree. This led to several coercive orders against the prison system. For example, in 1986, fines in excess of \$5,000 per day for each nonintegrated cell were threatened (Trulson & Marquart 2002). Finally, after years of foot dragging and in the face of increasingly stiff contempt sanctions, in 1991 the TDCJ-ID agreed to integrate all major custodies in available double cells. These custodies included minimum, medium, and close—the custodies that house 95% of all Texas inmates.<sup>16</sup>

Since late 1991, the prison system has progressed with desegregating the inmate population. From 1992 through 1999, the prison system neared the 70% guideline by averaging 55% integration of its available double cells. The Texas prison system has also remained in compliance with the court despite the addition of several new prison units currently holding an inmate population of more than 130,000 inmates, including 80,000 new felony offenders who entered Texas prisons in the 1990s (approximately 48,000 inmates of whom are in 24,000 double cells). See Table 1.

### **Prison Unit Procedure for Integrating Inmates in Double Cells**

The court held that the TDCJ-ID must racially integrate cells to the maximum feasible extent without compromising institutional security, control, and rehabilitation. After beginning compliance with the court’s mandate in late 1991, the TDCJ-ID implemented extensive training at the administrative, regional, and prison unit levels on the procedures for inmate desegregation. This process is briefly described below based on an inspection of training manuals, including authority interviews and observations made at several Texas prison units.<sup>17</sup> Particular attention should be paid to the rational objective criteria for cell assignments and the changing of cellmates.

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<sup>15</sup> This is 70% of double cells, not 70% of inmates. This 70% figure carries for all eligible prison units. Each has a number of double cells, and 70% of them must be integrated.

<sup>16</sup> This is not to suggest that 95% of all Texas inmates are integrated in double cells. At year’s end 1999, approximately 30,000 inmates were racially integrated in double cells, and another 18,000 inmates were in double cells that were not racially integrated (thus, about 24,000 double cells in the prison system). The most substantial housing area in the Texas prison system is dormitory-style housing arrangements.

<sup>17</sup> We interviewed several prison personnel in the course of this research on the making of cell assignments. We interviewed individuals who were responsible for constructing the guidelines in 1991, and we also interviewed several individuals who actually implement the integration scheme on a day-to-day basis.

**Table 1: Populations and Double Cells in the Texas Prison System**

Year	Number of Units	TDCJ-ID Population	Race Percentages			Total Double Cells	Total Double Cells Integrated	Percent of Double Cells Integrated	Number of Inmates Integrated	Number of Inmates Segregated
			B	W	H					
1990	42 (40)	43,897	47	30	22	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1991	44 (41)	47,262	47	29	23	12,168	3,234	26.6%	6,468	17,868
1992	55 (48)	48,510	47	28	24	12,461	5,454	43.8%	10,908	14,014
1993	62 (52)	57,038	47	28	25	16,799	8,844	52.6%	17,688	15,910
1994	75 (57)	65,107	47	27	25	18,877	10,516	55.7%	21,032	16,722
1995	104 (66)	96,487	46	27	26	22,154	12,581	56.8%	25,162	19,146
1996	106 (67)	116,121	46	27	27	24,373	14,419	59.2%	28,838	19,908
1997	112 (67)	118,752	45	27	27	24,099	14,557	60.4%	29,114	19,084
1998	112 (67)	123,449	45	28	27	23,977	15,028	62.7%	30,056	17,898
1999	112 (67)	126,280	44	30	26	23,831	14,805	62.1%	29,610	18,052

NOTE: Population information obtained from TDCJ-ID Fiscal Year Statistical Reports. Parentheses indicate units under *Lamar* stipulations. Totals are averages for the years indicated and include only male inmate totals.

In assigning inmates to cells, the TDCJ-ID must make assignments that are race neutral and based on rational objective criteria. The only time the prison system may take race into account when making cell assignments is when a particular inmate has been found to be *ineligible* to share a cell with a different race. Instances that “could” make an inmate ineligible for an integrated cell include (1) confirmed gang membership along racial and ethnic lines, (2) previous race-related problems in prison (defined as three racially motivated incidents in the past two years), and (3) confirmed free-world victimizations with complaint against integration (i.e., son was murdered by [race] and objects to integration).

If an inmate is deemed not eligible to share an integrated cell based on one or more of these criteria, the classification committee of each prison unit assigns the inmate a cell assignment status code indicating this restriction. However, if inmates are racially restricted, they are not automatically exempt from a racially integrated cell for the duration of their sentence; these determinations are periodically re-evaluated. In short, racial restrictions are not simply passed out to any inmate with the desire to have a same-race cellmate; they are tightly restricted and must be justified to the court. Furthermore, racially restricted inmates may be integrated in general (e.g., within an integrated cellblock or dormitory) but not within an integrated cell based on their most recent classification. Inmates eligible to be integrated are assigned a cell assignment code indicating their integration eligibility.

Some of the factors that the prison system may take into account when assigning an inmate to a cell include but are not limited to the inmate's health status (e.g., HIV, tuberculosis, hepatitis, bottom bunk restriction, etc.), criminal sophistication, violent or passive tendencies, homosexual tendencies, disruptive group affiliation, and current institutional adjustment problems. These are objective criteria, and race is not included in these criteria. Inmates may not request and are not allowed to be celled with a particular inmate for any reason.

Once inmates are classified on these criteria, they are assigned to the "first available cell" through a random process in which race has no part. For instance, in the Texas prison system, many older prison units are constructed along a "telephone pole" design in which the prison has a central thoroughfare with cellblocks or "tanks" radiating from the sides. Newer prison units have a slightly different scheme and are organized into a several-building "free layout," with each building containing a panopticon-style cellblock called a "pod." Typically, within any cellblock there are three tiers on either side in older units, and three circular tiers in newer units (or pods). After an inmate has been evaluated by the classification committee, the inmate is typically placed in the first available cell of the top tier. If the rational objective criteria are not met with that cell, the inmate is then placed in the "next available," cell progressing down tiers and through different cellblocks if needed. The race of the inmate already in the cell does not matter; housing decisions are random and based on the rational objective criteria.

Save for extreme and persistent violence, cell changes are tightly restricted and must be formally approved.<sup>18</sup> Threats of racial violence and sometimes actual racial violence do not automatically justify a racial restriction or a segregated cell. As Judge Hughes stated in his 1996 post-judgment opinion on *Lamar*:

The court is wary of being seen to test the resolve of inmates who announce that their hate will make them violently disposed to other races if they are locked together. No amount of violence, large or small, to prove one's eligibility for a single-race cell will be rewarded by the state or by this court . . . an inmate who proves that he is both a bigot and violent will face consequences much worse than an undesirable cellmate (*Lamar v. Coffield* 1996:630–31).

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<sup>18</sup> The criteria for separating an inmate involved in a violent confrontation with a cellmate are unclear. Our indication is that this is done on a case-by-case basis, so it is difficult to generalize to all inmates and unit classification judgments. Our research suggests that separation of cellmates is a last resort when all other possible remedies have failed.

## The Number of Racially Integrated Double Cells over Time

Of particular importance in this study are data on the growth of double cells over time and the number of inmates in those double cells—both racially integrated and not racially integrated. Since double-cell data were not systematically collected until late 1991, these data have limitations. First, data for this study were collected from 1991 to 1999 only. Second, double-cell data were not broken down by particular racial group, area in prison, or individual prison unit.<sup>19</sup> The Texas prison system does not collect this data with such specificity. Essentially, data exist only on the number of double cells, how many were integrated, and how many were not.

Despite the limitations in double-cell data, there is some indication of the racial composition of the double cells in an aggregate fashion. The *Lamar* decree stipulated that the racial composition of double cells, and each prison unit, must reflect the overall racial composition of the entire prison system. In short, no prison unit can be out of proportion with the total TDCJ-ID racial composition, and no housing area (double cells) can be either.<sup>20</sup> In this way, double-cell integration reflects the racial proportions of the entire prison system, which must be reflected at the individual prison unit level and in the double-cell population.

To shed some light on the number of inmates racially integrated, Table 1 presents data on the prison population and double-cell integration from 1990 through 1999. Of particular importance in Table 1 are the yearly racial proportions, changes in double cells over time, and the number of double cells integrated. Over the decade of the 1990s, black inmates constituted the highest proportion of inmates in the TDCJ-ID, followed by white and Hispanic inmates. The prison system added approximately 10,000 double cells over the decade and by year's end 1999 had integrated just over 60% (55% average from 1990 to

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<sup>19</sup> We do know that the individual prison units collect data on the monthly proportion of black, white, and Hispanic inmates. However, these data are not based on the proportion integrated in double cells or not but rather on whether the compositions reflect the aggregate TDCJ-ID population. Individual unit double-cell data by race were not collected and were not required per the court.

<sup>20</sup> We thank an anonymous reviewer for this perspective. In general, the implication is that if one racial group commands a larger proportion of the prison population, then by numbers it could mean that the lower number racial groups are completely desegregated, while the larger proportion racial group has some members who are not. The prison system does not collect such fine-tuned data for us to examine this phenomenon—yet we do know that blacks command the greatest proportion of all inmates in Texas (approximately 50% from 1990 to 1999), and it is likely that in sheer numbers, more blacks than whites or Hispanics are integrated. However, proportionate to their numbers, integration is equal. In the end, we know that a certain number of double cells are integrated. We also know that some are not integrated. The prison system cannot use race to meet proportion quotas. Thus, integrating cells is random, based on rational objective criteria, and proportionate by race.

1999). In sum, by the end of 1999, almost 24,000 double cells were capable of holding 48,000 inmates. Since more than 60% of double cells were racially integrated at year's end 1999, about 30,000 offenders were racially integrated in double cells, and 18,000 were not racially integrated but were still in double cells.

Because of the racial imbalance in the Texas prison system, it is likely that more black inmates are integrated in double cells than are white or Hispanic inmates. Again, data were not collected on the racial composition of double cells integrated over time—we only know that they must approximate the overall proportion of the total prison population. Therefore, approximately equal proportions of each racial group are integrated in double cells despite numerical differences.<sup>21</sup> This is not done by a racial quota system but rather by a random celling process based on objective criteria as explained above.

## Data and Measures

### Institutional Violence Data

In this study, the contact hypothesis was tested with ten years of inmate-on-inmate assault data for the years 1990 through 1999. These data were collected at the incident level—no individual inmate data were available. Assault data were tracked on an Incident Data Form (IDF), a form devised by the TDCJ-ID in an effort to comply with the *Lamar* court's mandate to track racial and nonracial incidents following desegregation. The IDF contained critical information to this study, including whether the incident was interracial or intraracial, if the incident occurred between cell partners, if the incident was racially motivated, and the location of the incident (in-cell, dining hall, etc.).

The types of incidents tracked on the IDF were those that occurred between two or more inmates and were reported and/or discovered. Not all incidents in the TDCJ-ID were tracked on the IDF. For instance, the IDF was not developed to record inmate-on-staff, staff-on-inmate, or single-inmate incidents (e.g., inmate tattooing). As with any official data, it was assumed that not all incidents were reported or discovered, so it is likely that the numbers of incidents tracked on the IDF were conservative in respect to all incidents. However, the fact that the incidents were reported and/or discovered was some evidence that they were serious enough to be so. In terms of the quality and quantity of

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<sup>21</sup> This would be a selection threat *by race* if the inmates not selected for integration in double cells differed from those who were selected. For instance, if only those integrated preferred to be integrated and those inmates that did not, were not integrated, it would be a selection threat. However, cell integration is random, and this protects from a selection bias by race. If there is any selection threat, it is based on objective criteria such as criminal sophistication or gang membership. There is no evidence supporting the assertion that inmates not wanting integration were the ones not integrated.



incidents, these were incidents that most concerned prison administrators.

Not shown in tabular form, a total of 35,579 incidents were recorded on the IDF in all areas of the Texas prison system from 1990 through 1999. In the aggregate, 55% of all incidents were intraracial (same race) and 45% were interracial (different race).

## Contact Measures

### *Desegregation*

This article examines interracial contact and outcomes. We defined *contact* as desegregation in both intensity (that it was in a double cell) and exposure (the number of inmates integrated or double cells integrated). Because desegregation is a central theme in this article, it justifies some attention. There is considerable debate about what desegregation is; there is also considerable debate about how to measure it (Gorard & Taylor 2000). We start here by defining what we mean by “desegregation” and, implicitly, what this article is and is not about.

Desegregation has numerous dimensions: exposure, evenness, concentration, centralization, clustering (see Massey & Denton 1988), and, we might add, intensity.<sup>22</sup> We are concerned with only two in this article: intensity and exposure. Among all the dimensions there are different conceptions, and most are relatively unclear theoretically and methodologically (Massey, White, & Phua 1996). Yet despite the ambiguity with the dimensions of desegregation, it would needlessly complicate this article to devote a lengthy discussion to all of them. Rather, we focus on these two dimensions.

### *Intensity*

We address intensity of desegregation by proxy in this article. There is no definitive way to calculate intensity. However, the fact that offenders of different races had to stay in a double cell, for a consistent and large portion of time (e.g., 10 p.m.–6 a.m.), speaks for itself. Because assaults among cell partners, rather than assaults among the general nondouble-celled population of inmates, were the focus of this study, self-segregation and avoidance were limited, if not nonexistent.<sup>23</sup> However one might mea-

<sup>22</sup> Intensity is generally encompassed within concentration but is addressed in the literature in terms of space or the density of people in a particular space (Gorard & Taylor 2000). This may relate to our purposes, but we see intensity as the degree of contact—for instance, the degree of contact in a cell compared to that in a recreation yard. In this way, intensity encompasses the density perspective.

<sup>23</sup> Our argument here is that cell integration is much more intense than some sort of general integration, such as in a recreation yard or a dining hall. Individuals can and will self-segregate in these nonspecific areas, especially in prisons (Carroll 1988 [1974]). There is no avoidance or self-segregation in a double cell.

sure intensity, desegregation in a prison cell is as intense as it can get. It is forced, and there is no avoiding it for at least six to eight hours every day.

### *Exposure*

Exposure is somewhat different, but it is coupled with intensity. Exposure is generally the extent to which majority and minority members interact with each other (Gorard & Taylor 2000). We viewed exposure in two ways. First, exposure related to increases in the number of inmates (or double cells) integrated. This measure of exposure was operationalized as the rate of desegregated cells per 1,000 double cells in the entire population. Measured in this way, exposure to desegregation increased as more inmates were integrated. Second, exposure related to intensity and was viewed as *forced interaction*, in which inmates had to interact to some degree when locked in their cell. For this aspect of exposure there was no empirical measure, but we speculated that being locked in a cell for up to ten hours per day suggested a high degree of interaction. Since we focused on desegregation in double cells, a measure that tapped more double cells being integrated relative to the total number of double cells was appropriate to demonstrate increases and decreases in desegregation—and implicitly, intensity and exposure.

### **Outcome Measures**

Outcome measures in this study were behaviors—specifically, inmate-on-inmate assaults. We used data on the number of integrated and nonintegrated double cells and inmate assault data to calculate the rates of inmate violence from 1990 through 1999.

#### *Outcome 1: Interracial Assaults.*

Because data obtained from the Texas prison system are at the incident level, our analysis is situated in terms of the level of inmate-on-inmate assaults over the ten years this study spans. We focused on the rate of violence between inmates in double cells. One group of inmates was racially integrated (Integrated), while the other group was not (Not Integrated).<sup>24</sup> From these data, we examined whether integration resulted in a reduction or increase in interracial violence among cell partners over time, and whether those who were integrated were more or less likely to be

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<sup>24</sup> Since we wanted to know whether cell integration resulted in violence among cell partners, we limited the analysis to incidents among cell partners only. This includes incidents both in the cell and outside the cell. However, data not in tabular form showed that of all incidents among cell partners, 70% occurred within the cell.

involved in inmate assaults with their cell partners than those who were not integrated.<sup>25</sup>

Out of the entire number of incidents (35,579), 18% (6,459) involved cell partners, both integrated and not integrated, over the decade. There were 3,077 (48%) assaults between inmates not integrated but housed in a double cell, and 3,382 (52%) assaults between inmates racially integrated in a double cell. To examine the level of interracial assaults over time, we constructed a database of the rates of violence among integrated cell partners and a separate rate for nonintegrated cell partners in each year. For example, we calculated the rate of assaults among integrated offenders by taking the raw number of interracial incidents in each year, divided by the total number of offenders in integrated double cells in each year, and multiplied by 1,000.<sup>26</sup>

### *Outcome 2: Racially Motivated Assaults*

The mere fact that an inmate-on-inmate assault was interracial does not necessarily mean that the motivation for the assault was race-based (Toch 1992). If an assault happened to involve members of two different races but race was not the motivating factor, this would lend some indirect support for the equal status contact hypothesis. In the data provided by the Texas prison system was an indicator of whether the assault was racially motivated.<sup>27</sup> Armed with this information, we examined whether there was a reduction or increase in racially motivated violence over time as more inmates were integrated.

Out of the entire number of incidents (35,579), 4.7% (1,691) were racially motivated. There were 1,358 racially motivated incidents between inmates who were not integrated cell partners, and 333 that occurred between integrated cell partners. We constructed a database of rates to examine the level of racially moti-

<sup>25</sup> We realized that going from complete segregation of double cells to integration of double cells would implicate the "opportunity" for assaults not occurring during segregation. This was unavoidable. The important question is whether interracial violence among cell partners was disproportionate compared to intraracial violence among cell partners.

<sup>26</sup> To control for population differences, we used rates that enabled a direct comparison of violence levels. In other words, using raw incidents was influenced by the number of offenders in the population and whether that number decreased or increased over time.

<sup>27</sup> The determination of an incident to be "racially motivated" is comprehensive and not simply a label automatically attached to interracial incidents. The TDCJ-ID uses a six-step process to evaluate interracial incidents as to their potential for being racially motivated. These processes include examining the *circumstances* surrounding the incident; the *context*; any and all *statements* made by involved inmates before, during, or after the incident; *informant* information; and finally, if the involved inmates have a *history* of race-related violence or a *pattern* of interracial incidents (e.g., at least three interracial incidents in the past two years). Initial determinations of racial motivation are made by front-line correctional officers. Once made, these determinations are re-evaluated a second time by a Unit Major and a third time by an inmate Counsel Substitute, and they can be changed during these re-evaluations.

vated assaults between racially integrated cell partners. For example, we calculated the rate of racially motivated assaults among integrated cell partners by taking the raw number of racially motivated incidents among integrated cell partners in each year, divided by the total number of offenders in integrated double cells in each year, and multiplied by 1,000. Because we assumed that same-race cell partners could not commit a racially motivated attack against their own race, we could not do any meaningful comparison of rates to those of another population. However, it is important to determine how many interracial assaults were actually racially motivated and if this changed (increased or decreased) as more inmates were integrated in cells.

### **Equal Status Inmate Contact and Hypotheses**

With the contact and outcome measures specified, we now turn to our hypotheses about the outcomes following prisoner desegregation. Although previous research on the contact hypothesis has generally examined increases or decreases in prejudice following contact, we frame our hypotheses about prison desegregation and outcomes in terms of an increase or decrease in inmate assaults. In line with the predictions of the contact hypothesis, we formulated the following:

1. The rate of assaults among inmates racially integrated in double cells should be less than or equal to the rate of assaults among inmates housed in double cells but not racially integrated.
2. The rate of racially motivated assaults among inmates racially integrated in double cells should remain stable or decrease as more inmates are desegregated over time.

We suggest through these hypotheses that interracial contact should result in a stable or decreasing rate of interracial assaults over time in the presence of one or more of the following conditions that are thought to promote positive interracial group contact: equal status contact, institutional support, and contact under cooperative conditions (Allport 1954). We suggest these same findings for the rate of racially motivated assaults.

## **Results**

### **Levels of Desegregation and Interracial Exposure**

To begin the analysis, we present data on the level of desegregation over time. To address whether desegregation resulted in increased racial violence, we first examined whether desegregation increased or decreased over time. Table 2 presents data on the rate of desegregated and segregated double cells in the Texas prison system.

**Table 2: Level of Desegregation in the Texas Prison System**

Year	Total Double Cells	Double Cells Integrated	Double Cells Segregated	Rate of Integrated Double Cells	Rate of Segregated Double Cells
1990	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1991	12,168	3,234	8,934	266	734
1992	12,461	5,454	7,007	438	562
1993	16,799	8,844	7,955	526	474
1994	18,877	10,516	8,361	557	443
1995	22,154	12,581	9,573	568	432
1996	24,373	14,419	9,954	592	408
1997	24,099	14,557	9,542	604	396
1998	23,977	15,028	8,949	627	373
1999	23,831	14,805	9,026	621	379

NOTE: Rate is per 1,000 total double cells

Table 2 shows that over the decade, the level of desegregation increased from 266 per 1,000 double cells in 1991 to 621 per 1,000 double cells in 1999 (a 133% increase). Since 1993, there have been more desegregated cells than segregated cells, and the number of desegregated cells has steadily increased over the decade. Table 2 is important in two ways. First, the results presented in Table 2 indicate that the Texas prison system has continually increased the number and percentage of integrated double cells (see Table 1). Second, we can address whether the increase in integrated cells resulted in an increase or decrease in violence among desegregated inmates compared to those not desegregated. We turn to this question next.

#### *Outcome 1 Analysis: Rate of Violence among Integrated and Nonintegrated Cell Partners*

In keeping with the contact hypothesis, our first hypothesis, in simple form, is that the rate of assaults among integrated inmates should be less than or equal to the rate of assaults among nonintegrated inmates.

To review, we calculated the rate of violence among integrated cell partners as the number of interracial cell partner incidents per year divided by the number of offenders (rather than cells) in integrated double cells per year and multiplied by 1,000. We calculated the rate of violence among nonintegrated cell partners as the number of intraracial cell partner incidents per year divided by the number of offenders in nonintegrated

double cells per year and multiplied by 1,000.<sup>28</sup> Table 3 presents the results of the data analysis. Figure 1 is a graphical portrayal of the rate data in Table 3.

**Figure 1: Rate of Assaults among Cell Partners**




Table 3 shows that as more cells became integrated over time, the proportion of total integrated cell partner assaults increased. However, because of population changes over the decade, proportions did not control for these differences, and it follows that as more offenders were integrated than not (starting in 1993), there would be more raw incidents. A better indicator of change in inmate assaults with increased desegregation was the rate of incidents within each population.

Over the long term, while the level of integration increased from a rate of 266 to 621 per 1,000 total double cells, the rate of interracial violence among integrated cell partners was lower relative to the rate among offenders not integrated, especially after 1992. Indeed, the rate of integrated cell partner violence never surpassed the rate of nonintegrated cell partner violence, with the exception of 1992 (4 incidents per 1,000 difference). Thus, *between* integrated and nonintegrated cell partners, violence was lower through the decade of the 1990s for those racially integrated in double cells. *Within* the integrated inmate population,

<sup>28</sup> For example, we calculated the rate of integrated cell partner incidents per 1,000 integrated inmates in 1993 by taking 258 divided by 17,688 (8,844 double cells x 2 inmates per cell) and multiplied by 1,000.

**Table 3: Rate of Incidents among Cell Partners**

Year	Incidents among Cell Partners	Integrated Incidents	Non-Integrated Incidents	Percent of Total Cell Partner Incidents		Rate of Incidents per 1,000 in Each Population*	
				Integrated	Not Integrated	Integrated	Not Integrated
1990	261	45	216	17%	83%	NA	NA
1991	411	136	275	33%	67%	7	15
1992	527	255	272	48%	52%	23	19
1993	533	258	275	48%	52%	15	17
1994	501	283	218	56%	44%	13	13
1995	747	406	341	54%	46%	16	18
1996	864	488	376	56%	44%	17	19
1997	860	493	367	57%	43%	17	19
1998	855	498	357	58%	42%	17	20
1999	900	520	380	58%	42%	18	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,459</b>	<b>3,382</b>	<b>3,077</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>48%</b>		

NOTE: 1990 data are not presented because double celled population data were not collected. Large scale integration did not begin until late 1991.

\*Population for integrated is the number of inmates integrated in double cells. Population for nonintegrated is the number of inmates not racially integrated but in double cells. This is based on yearly double celled populations, not averages over the entire decade.

violence levels remained essentially stable, with no large increases in the rate of assaults over the decade, even with increases in the rate of desegregated double cells.<sup>29</sup> In addition, despite the fact that the rate of integrated cell partner incidents did trend up in 1992, the fact that intraracial incidents followed the same pattern throughout the decade suggests that the increases were not attributable to desegregation per se but to some other factor affecting both populations (see Figure 1).

Assuming equal status contact within integrated cells, we can affirm the first hypothesis that the rate of integrated cell partner violence was less than the rate of violence among nonintegrated cell partners over the long term. Thus, we find support for the contact hypothesis that interracial contact via desegregation did not result in increased violence. Rather, all other things being equal, and in the presence of equal status contact, desegregation did not precipitate violence disproportionate to that of segregated inmates in double cells. In fact, violence was lower.<sup>30</sup> In

<sup>29</sup> Although integrated and nonintegrated violence levels increased at about 1 incident per 1,000 inmates per year, this increase for all practical purposes is insignificant.

<sup>30</sup> It must be remembered that nonintegrated inmates did not necessarily represent inmates with a documented racial reason for a single-race cell. Cell integration is done randomly. Our research, including several interviews with prison officials and on-site prison visits, uncovered that very few inmates get a single-race double cell because of a hate or dislike for another race or because of previous race-related problems (see Trulson 2002). Again, the court tightly controls the criteria for racial restrictions, and even they are periodically re-evaluated. Thus, those inmates in a single-race cell did not represent the "worst risks" for integration.

addition, because observed increases in the rate of assaults occurred in both populations at the same time, desegregation by itself does not appear to explain the nominal increases in the integrated assault rate because the same increases occurred among nonintegrated cell partners.<sup>31</sup> In short, desegregation did not result in more violence than segregation, and any increases in violence within both populations were likely due to some other factor, not desegregation.

The contact hypothesis sets out conditions thought to explain the outcomes among integrated inmates. We reserve the bulk of this discussion for a later section of this article; however, it is important to address the apparent outlier in assaults among the integrated population in 1992. In 1992, there was a rate of 23 interracial cell partner incidents per 1,000 inmates, the highest rate ever in this population of offenders, a rate three times higher than the previous year and 4 incidents per 1,000 inmates higher than in the population of nonintegrated offenders in double cells. The question is: What happened to cause such a large increase in incidents and a corresponding drop the following year?

The most plausible explanation for the abrupt increase in the rate of incidents in 1992 relates to a change in prison classification procedures. The Texas prison system began integrating offenders in late 1991, and the most intense efforts at integration occurred in the following year (see Moody & Marvell 1996, on the timing of policy implementation). In short, the prison system revamped its entire classification process as a means to comply with the mandates of the *Lamar* decision. The pressure from the *Lamar* court forced prison administrators into a total reclassification of inmates for integrated cell eligibility based on the newly instituted rational objective criteria.<sup>32</sup> It is certain that the virtual overnight implementation of this new classification plan, coupled with the “first-time” desegregation of thousands of inmates, contributed to organizational instability (see Engel & Rothman 1983, on judicial intervention disruption, and Sturm 1993), including classification errors and oversights that contributed to the higher rates of assaults (Fair 1991). This finding is not different from that reported in the correctional literature on judicial intervention and organizational change, finding short-term increases in violence and disorder after significant policy implementation via the courts (Crouch & Marquart 1989, 1990; Engel

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<sup>31</sup> We cannot confirm, however, that there were not two different factors affecting each population—for example, desegregation to explain the rate increase for those desegregated, and another factor to explain the increase for those not integrated. The data did not allow such a multivariate task to be accomplished.

<sup>32</sup> Reclassification for *Lamar* was also coupled with another court decision at the same time affecting Texas prisons and requiring a retooling of classification procedures to minimize danger among inmates. This court decision was *Ruiz v. Estelle* (1980) (see Crouch & Marquart 1989; Feeley & Rubin 2000).



& Rothman 1983; Sturm 1993; Trulson 2002). On a related note, it is likely that the increase can also be attributed to an “urgency for compliance.” In short, the TDCJ implemented desegregation without having established a clear and workable classification procedure.<sup>33</sup>

*Outcome 2 Analysis: Rate of Racially Motivated Violence among Integrated Inmates*

Just because different race inmates have an interracial conflict does not mean that the conflict was perpetrated because of race. A review of the literature on racial violence in prisons suggests that much of what is considered racially motivated is, rather, interracial and assumed to be motivated because of race (Toch 1992). Because the Texas prison system makes an indication for every interracial incident as to the motivation (race-motivated or not), we can examine this perspective.<sup>34</sup> A finding that many interracial incidents were not actually racially motivated would lend some support for the equal status contact hypothesis. A finding that the rate of racially motivated incidents decreased over the decade as more offenders were integrated would also lend some support for the contact hypothesis.

Table 4 breaks down racially motivated incidents by whether they occurred among integrated cell partners or not. Figure 2 is a graphical depiction of the rates of racially motivated assaults over the decade. Table 4 reveals that there were 1,358 racially motivated incidents among all offenders, excluding integrated cell partners. Most important, there were 333 racially motivated incidents among integrated cell partners, representing 10% of all interracial cell partner incidents ( $333/3,382 = 10\%$ ). Therefore, 10% of all interracial cell partner incidents were actually motivated because of race. Furthermore, of all racially motivated inci-

<sup>33</sup> These factors were the most plausible based upon our research. However, factors that related to the corresponding drop in the rate of incidents, for both integrated and nonintegrated inmates, can also be traced to the increased use of administrative segregation for the chronic minority. Related to the last point, the TDCJ also embarked on a prison-building binge in 1992 through 1995. This not only allowed more space for administrative segregation but also reduced overcrowding and allowed Texas prison administrators to disperse inmates systemwide (e.g., gang members) instead of clustering or concentrating them. Currently, however, the Texas prison system has built several “supermax” facilities to concentrate the worst of those in administrative segregation.

<sup>34</sup> As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, it could be the case that most interracial incidents are not coded as “racially motivated” initially and that upon further investigation inmates also offer statements and circumstances that reflect this same indication. We thank the reviewer for this perspective. Because it is impossible for us to know the details of every assault and how various prison personnel initially code them, it is difficult to know the “typical” process of assigning a racially motivated label. Erring on the conservative side, it is likely that when an incident is labeled as racially motivated, there must be some substantial evidence. Thus, these are not quick face value determinations. This lends support to the validity of this measure and makes the racially motivated label more valid in our view.

**Figure 2: Rate of Racially Motivated Assaults among Integrated Cell Partners**



dents in the Texas prison system ( $1,358 + 333 = 1,691$ ), the 333 represents 20% of all racially motivated incidents systemwide.

Does integrating more offenders in cells over time result in a higher rate of racially motivated incidents? Data in Table 4 show that as integration increased (see Tables 1 and 2), the rate of racially motivated attacks among integrated cell partners decreased.<sup>35</sup> Thus, very few incidents were found to be racially motivated overall in the entire prison system, even less were among integrated cell partners, and finally, more desegregation did not equal increases in the rate of racially motivated violence over the long term.<sup>36</sup>

From the results of the data analysis, we affirm hypothesis number two, which states that the rate of racially motivated assaults among inmates racially integrated in double cells should

<sup>35</sup> This is again with the exception of 1991 to 1992. We attributed the one-year increase in the rate of racially motivated incidents to classification oversights. This is the same finding as for interracial incident increases. There is some evidence for disorder (e.g., increasing numbers of assaults) based simply on general administrative changes (see Irwin 1980).

<sup>36</sup> To get the rates in the last column of Table 4, take the number of double cells integrated in any particular year and multiply this by 2. For example, 1991 had 3,234 double cells integrated, which multiplied by 2 equals 6,468 inmates in those double cells. To get the rate per 1,000 inmates, take the number of racially motivated incidents in any given year divided by the number of inmates in double cells for any given year and multiplied by 1,000.

**Table 4: Racially Motivated Incidents among Integrated Cell Partners**

Year	Number of Racially Motivated Incidents among Inmates in the Entire Texas Prison System (excluding integrated double cell inmates)	Number of Racially Motivated Incidents among Integrated Cell Partners	Percent of Racially Motivated Incidents among Integrated Cell Partners	Rate of Racially Motivated Incidents per 1,000 Inmates in Integrated Double Cells
1991	301	22	7%	3
1992	148	56	27%	5
1993	128	35	21%	2
1994	99	36	27%	2
1995	96	47	33%	2
1996	85	39	31%	1
1997	67	35	34%	1
1998	48	31	39%	1
1999	62	28	31%	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,358</b>	<b>333</b>		

NOTE: Calculations not done for 1990 because double cell population data were not collected until late 1991.

decrease as more inmates are desegregated over time in accordance with the equal status contact hypothesis.<sup>37</sup>

### Summary

We found that equal status contact via desegregation did not result in more violence compared to violence among inmates who were segregated. We found additional support for the contact hypothesis in that the rate of racially motivated assaults among integrated cell partners decreased as integration increased. A number of prison scholars have suggested that racial integration in prison settings would lead to catastrophic levels of interracial and racially motivated violence (see Irwin 1980; Jacobs 1982). This prediction did not materialize. In light of the find-

<sup>37</sup> Our gut feeling is that the actual number of racially motivated incidents is low despite that reported by the TDCJ. We do not suggest that the data are altered, but we believe there are plausible reasons for this. First, racial motivation tags are not taken lightly and are comprehensively reviewed by the TDCJ. Our interviews with prison officials of all ranks suggested that many interracial incidents take place because of day-to-day arguments over television channels, theft, place in a chow line, and commissary, not because of racial hatred. We also have inmate interview evidence of this occurrence. Second, these are reported/discovered incidents. It is possible that through fear of retaliation, or to avoid more punitive consequences, incidents that are discovered are not followed up by both the victim and perpetrator as racially motivated. Finally, our research failed to find "institutional pressure" to label racially motivated incidents as interracial despite this argument. In fact, the TDCJ did not want integration in the first place. More racially motivated incidents would bolster the argument against integration.

ings of the data analysis, we now address the conditions for successful interracial contact and outcomes.

### Conditions for Successful Interracial Contact in Prisons

The contact hypothesis suggests that certain factors condition or promote positive interracial group outcomes. These factors are equal status, support by institutional authorities, and contact under cooperative conditions (Allport 1954). We examine each of these factors below.

It was argued that in the Texas prison system, and in prisons generally, putting offenders in double cells promotes equal status more so than does any other method in the prison environment. Again, this is the essential component of the contact hypothesis—we are essentially making a case that equal status contact is present. Although we do not have any empirical measure of “equal status” per se, our formulation of equal status is reasonable. Putting two inmates in a double cell for a significant portion of the day, without influence from outside the cell and with no opportunity for self-segregation and avoidance, limits status differences. We realize that this argument would be different if this article examined interracial contact within the general prison environment—where inmates have the opportunity to avoid contact, while also being directly influenced by their peer group—yet this study focused on contact and outcomes among integrated and nonintegrated cell partners. In this way, equal status was obtained during the time inmates were confined to their cells.

Furthermore, we believe that the prison classification system in Texas helps “equalize” status among cellmates. Classification enhances equal status above and beyond putting offenders of different races in a double cell by putting the “right” offenders in double cells. This is not a selection bias; rather, it is good prison classification. Selection bias would play a role if prison authorities used race or race-related factors (specific dislike/hatred/prejudice for another race) in assigning inmates to an integrated or nonintegrated double cell. Using race as a selection criterion for a double cell is discrimination and is what the *Lamar* suit originally prohibited. Prison authorities may only use rational objective criteria and not race or race-related factors unless they are justified under security, control, and rehabilitation. In this way, the classification of offenders based on rational objective criteria has promoted equal status in categories such as criminal sophistication, active and passive tendencies, health status, prior institutional adjustment, and other institutionally relevant factors.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>38</sup> It could be argued that prison authorities use these objective criteria as a subterfuge for racially integrating only the “best risks.” We do not have any solid evidence to refute or support this claim.

Even if it is only speculation, equal status is achieved by limiting status discrepancies to two inmates in a double cell, and status differences are also minimized by attention to classification criteria that arguably match the most compatible inmates.

Second, interracial relations are said to be greatly enhanced in the presence of “institutional support” (law/custom/local atmosphere) (Allport 1954). Clearly, the courts support desegregation. Yet institutional support is also taken to mean that the prison administration supports the efforts of the courts to desegregate the prison system. There is much evidence to suggest at the early stages of *Lamar* (1977–1990) that the Texas prison system did not support desegregation (see Trulson 2002). However, in the latter stages, especially in late 1991, the prison system gave in to court pressure.

Some evidence for this idea of institutional support comes from the fact that the Texas prison system significantly increased the number and percentage of integrated inmates over the decade studied, thus facilitating compliance with the court. There is also anecdotal evidence for this claim. For example, just before accepting the court’s mandate on desegregation in late 1991, the assistant general counsel for the prison system stated publicly that administrators were “committed to making this [desegregation] work . . . inmates may write their mothers about how miserable they are, but those who try to sabotage this [desegregation] are going to have to pay. . . . We have lots of ways of dealing with insubordination, loss of good time, loss of classification status, and miserable work assignments” (Fair 1991:A-3). In terms of greatly enhancing positive interracial contact, it is likely that absent support from Texas administrators, despite the court’s backing, that integration would not have been as successful in terms of outcomes even if accomplished in numbers (Trulson 2002). In this way, institutional support was a key condition in prison desegregation that greatly enhanced positive interracial outcomes as found in this study.

Finally, the contact hypothesis suggests that “cooperative conditions” will also greatly enhance relations among different racial groups. Our reading of the contact hypothesis does not uncover a universal definition of “cooperative conditions.” In one way, it might translate into “favorable conditions,” with only inmates wanting or indifferent to integration being integrated (Robinson & Preston 1976:922). In another way, it might mean that inmates are allowed to pick their own different-race cell partners. This does not happen in Texas prisons. We viewed cooperative conditions in a few different ways. First, while inmates were not allowed to pick their own cellmates, the classification procedure by the prison administration likely paired the inmates who were most compatible based on objective criteria. Thus, prison authorities did not put a passive inmate of 100 pounds with an aggress-

sive 300-pound sex offender. Prison authorities likely did not place a gang member of one race with a gang member of an opposite race. In the end, cooperative conditions meant making integration as favorable as it could be for the inmates, despite the fact that it was forced.

In a related perspective, while prison administrators made efforts at placing compatible inmates together, there were likely some inmates that no amount of classification by rational objective criteria would equal success in a double cell. Prison administrators also demonstrated cooperative conditions by removing predatory inmates from the general prison environment and from double cells. These types of inmates were effectively taken out of the integration equation and represented those inmates single-celled and administratively separated from the larger prison population. We labeled these inmates the “irreducible 10%,” or those persistently troublesome inmates for whom no amount of classification would equal success (Trulson 2002). Thus, in addition to compatible classification, when authorities removed the small minority of the most persistent and chronic rule violators, those left were a majority of offenders who could be successful whether they were integrated or not, despite any preference otherwise. Indeed, the leftover inmates were what Allport considered “ordinary,” with a normal degree of prejudice, an assumption of the contact hypothesis (see Allport 1954:281). In this way, the contact hypothesis seems to “work” for ordinary inmates. Whether it works for the “irreducibles” cannot be sufficiently tested, as these inmates, out of security concerns, cannot be housed with other inmates. Thus, some evidence for cooperative conditions comes in the form of the increased use of administrative segregation and the development of “supermax” units to concentrate chronic violators, a practice that has grown popular in the Texas prison system since the late 1980s (Crouch & Marquart 1989)<sup>39</sup> and in other

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<sup>39</sup> We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that “the segregation of the most racist and violent might complement the contact hypothesis by creating and maintaining an atmosphere in the general population that makes it possible for the contact to reduce racial animus. On the other hand, it may be that the use of administrative segregation means that those available for integrated celling are the most amenable to reductions in hostility.” We agree and make a few important comments. First, we believe that the segregation of the most racist and violent does have an impact in the prison setting for reducing fear of attack and for removing the chronic minority. Second, the irreducible 10% as we label them are in the minority. The far majority of inmates in Texas prisons (95%) are not in administrative segregation or supermax-type facilities. Of course, prison authorities cannot govern the prison as a racial experiment, and we will never know the impact had these inmates been left in the general prison setting. However, the equal status contact hypothesis has been proposed to “work” among a group of “ordinary” people with ordinary prejudices (Allport 1954:281). It was not proposed to explain or alleviate deep-seated prejudice. We argue thus that the irreducibles are not “ordinary.”

prison systems across the United States (Camp & Camp 1998).<sup>40</sup>

In addition, cooperative conditions can be viewed as a common goal among inmates in that they must accept forced integration, whether they like it or not. Robinson and Preston (1976) noted that common goals contributed to positive outcomes in their study of faculty desegregation. In the prison setting, common goals as a subcategory of cooperative conditions link to the perspective that in a batch living environment, inmates must make do under the circumstances and survive. As Sykes (1958) argued, prisoners must cope with the pains of imprisonment *together*—it is better to defy the staff than to kill each other. Indeed, there is evidence that inmates in the Texas prison system do not overtly object to being racially integrated, and many prefer integration to segregation, even though it is forced (Hemmens & Marquart 1999). An unintended consequence, however, is that inmates have created a “reactive subsystem” by being forcibly desegregated, an “us against them” mentality regarding the administration and staff as the “enemy”—displacing violence onto them (Young 1970:297). There is evidence of violence displacement from inmates to staff in the Texas prison system at about the same time as desegregation commenced (Crouch & Marquart 1989; Trulson 2002; see Appendix A on staff assault rates in the 1990s). However, whether violence was solely attributable to desegregation is questionable.

Ultimately, there is evidence for each factor of the contact hypothesis following interracial contact among Texas prisoners. Of all three, we feel that equal status is the most relevant, but institutional support and cooperative conditions likely enhanced the findings of this study. Inasmuch as is the case, we conclude that inmate desegregation in the *presence* of equal status, institutional support, and cooperative conditions, as we have speculated, has not resulted in disproportionate inmate-on-inmate assaults over time, both interracial and racially motivated assaults.

## Discussion

The goal of this study was to determine what happens when different-race inmates were assigned to a double cell. Simply, we wanted to understand the consequences of desegregation in prisons. To do this, desegregation was framed in the equal status contact hypothesis, which claims that racial “prejudice may be reduced by equal status contact” among different racial groups (Allport 1954:281). To test the contact hypothesis, we examined outcome data among two groups of offenders, one group that

<sup>40</sup> Refer to Camp and Camp (1998) on the number of inmates placed in administrative, punitive segregation and other single-celled custodies—the most chronic and persistent rule breakers. Nationwide, the figure is at 10%.

was integrated in double cells and the other group that was not integrated, but still housed in double cells. Importantly, we focused on desegregation in cells as opposed to open desegregation such as in a recreation yard or a cellblock because self-segregation and avoidance weaken contact and make it virtually nonexistent. In addition, unlike most tests of the contact hypothesis, instead of examining prejudice as an outcome variable, we examined behavior. We proposed that actions are a better measure of interracial relations following contact than a self-professed attitude, especially a one-time attitude. Our major findings can be summarized as follows: the rate of assaults among desegregated inmates was less than or at least equal to the rate of assaults among inmates who were not desegregated. Integration did not result in disproportionate violence; rather, over the long term, the rate of violence between inmates segregated by race in double cells surpassed the rate among those racially integrated.

We are hesitant to make sweeping generalizations to the wider society or to even offer specific conclusions to other prison systems on the outcomes of integration based on the findings of this study. Simply, this study cannot address all of the questions related to desegregation and outcomes in a prison setting or any other setting in which there is interracial contact. Nor does this study present evidence or claim that all prison systems are alike, even within particular prison systems. Despite our inability to cover every issue, we feel that our findings offer a contribution to the literature and should generate discussion about interracial contact and outcomes in any setting. In this way, this study has both benefits and limitations.

First, the findings herein are probably more applicable for prison administrators, all of whom are constitutionally prohibited from racially segregating prisoners outside of legitimate penological interests (Henderson et al. 2000). On the one hand then, these findings can help prison administrators understand the consequences of desegregation in prisons in an overall fashion. On the other hand, there are peculiarities to Texas prisons that are not inherent in all prison systems, especially those outside of the South. Issues such as political and economic support of the prison system, history of race relations on the outside, inmate racial compositions, staff racial compositions, history of institutional litigation, and population growth trends are all important considerations in generalizing to all prison systems (Jacobs 1983a). For example, prison systems with more disproportionate racial populations by geography alone might find even accomplishing large-scale racial desegregation next to impossible (for examples of geographic segregation, consider Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia). Still other systems lacking the financial or facility resources to remove problem populations to more restrictive settings such as adminis-



trative segregation or separate concentration units might find an increase in fear among inmates and higher rates of violence attributed to the chronic minority (Crouch & Marquart 1989). Still further, the geographic segregation of work staff, in some prison systems predominantly white and rural while supervising large populations of minority and inner-city inmates, might provide an indirect effect on race relations all around (see Jacobs 1983b). Thus, any test of the contact hypothesis or findings about desegregation in other prison systems must embrace these areas and make them more context-specific. In defense of the applicability of these findings to other prison systems, however, the evidence uncovered herein seems to mesh with the small but growing body of research on inmate desegregation and outcomes in other prison systems (Hemmens & Marquart 1999; Henderson et al. 2000; Slate, Johnson, & Hemmens 1999).

Second, as others have maintained, there are limits to examining the outcomes of interracial contact in institutional settings (Ellison & Powers 1994). While we clearly feel that the best way to test the contact hypothesis is in an institutional setting under laboratory-like conditions, the downfall is that there are limitations in applying the findings to the “real world.” Testing the contact hypothesis in an institutional setting like a prison allows variables such as contact, equal status, institutional support, and cooperative conditions to be more easily formulated and verified, whether empirically or through speculation, although these are “ideal” conditions, rarely if ever present in the free society (Ellison & Powers 1994).

The question then remains of whether the lessons of racial integration in prisons can apply in the free world. Moskos and Butler (1996) gave some insight into the prospect of applying institutional findings about race relations from the military to the general society and suggested that any success with interracial relations is likely the result of a “by-product of some other purpose, and not as its manifest goal” (Moskos & Butler 1996:120). We agree. The prison and its inmates are not representative of the general public. Notwithstanding the fact that prison inmates are not free, prisons contain “disproportionate numbers of the least mature, least stable, and most violent individuals in American society” (Jacobs 1982:120). The manifest goal of prisons is not to establish and maintain successful race relations. While the findings in this study do point to the fact that the Texas prison system has kept racial violence to levels at or below nonracial violence, this was and is still not their main goal. Rather, this result was likely a by-product of good classification, which sought to control violence among all inmates, of all races, in all custodies—not just between different racial groups. Yet in terms of equal status contact as we have formulated it, the racial integration of the least mature, least stable, and most violent individuals in American so-

ciety has not unleashed a racial Armageddon that some had predicted would happen (Jacobs 1982). Thus, there may be some applicability of the findings to the ordinary populace if they can be accomplished among the worst examples, under some of the least favorable conditions (e.g., forced, in cells).

In light of this discussion, research on the contact hypothesis is centered between the lesser of two evils. On the one hand, testing the contact hypothesis outside of institutions or laboratories has serious drawbacks in terms of contact. Having different-race friends or a high interracial composition in a neighborhood is really not contact, and evidence suggests that individuals self-segregate and avoid contact if they are not forced into it—or they have only casual contact. We have also suggested that there were limitations to outcome measures based on attitudes. Rather than attitudes and prejudice, which characterize most tests of the contact hypothesis, our measure of actual behavior following interracial contact is more concrete. In our study, inmates either avoided conflict or they did not—regardless of what they thought or felt at any particular survey time. We have also examined whether conflict was racially motivated, rather than just a conflict between two people who happened to each be of a different race.

On the other hand, while a test of the contact hypothesis in an institutional setting can approximate measures of equal status contact, institutional support, and cooperative conditions more fully, an institutional test of the contact hypothesis is more difficult to generalize to the real world. Thus, the conflict rests on the ability to measure the tenets of the contact hypothesis rigorously in the real world versus the ability to apply “artificial” results from a test in an institutional setting. This is not a conflict that this study, or any thus far, has been able to resolve.

Despite any limitation with the institutional focus of this study, we feel that the ability to test the contact hypothesis with a relatively rigorous indicator of contact overrides concerns about generalizability. Contact, desegregation in this study, was forced and intense. Inmates could not avoid it while they were in their cell. Contact in this study, then, in both exposure and intensity, has not been not matched in any study to our knowledge (see Sherif et al. 1961).

What has not been addressed sufficiently in this article are individual differences between different-race inmates or racial groups in relation to the outcomes. We were simply limited by the nature and specificity of data collected by the Texas prison system and could not examine several relevant perspectives. For example, is equal status contact *perceived* to be the same between different races in prison, and do outcomes differ based on these perceived differences (see Sigelman & Welch 1993)? Attitudinal data would be required to answer this question. We also lacked

specific individual data on those inmates integrated and those not integrated in double cells. Although our indication is that inmates probably do not differ substantially, regardless of whether they are integrated or not, this information could shed light on the outcomes, especially if the two populations do in fact differ on relevant variables. In addition, more detailed data on the free-world and institutional backgrounds of inmates would have proved useful. Data on the racial proportions of inmates by custody and in double cells over time would also have provided more detail in this study, specifically which racial combinations produce the most violence. Again, the present study cannot address all of the issues with desegregation in prisons but provides a useful starting point with a unique data set. Indeed, as more prison systems volunteer or are forced to integrate their offenders as Texas is mandated to do, data able to address those limitations just mentioned might become more readily available (see Henderson et al. 2000).

## Conclusions

American society continually strives to minimize social distance among racial groups. Historically, efforts at racial desegregation have been through legal means, yet the fact remains that different races will come into contact to varying degrees regardless of social policy. In some contexts, contact will be less intense and voluntary, while in others, such as a prison setting, interracial contact will be more intense, lengthy, and to a degree, forced. However, we do not suggest that if desegregation can “work” in a prison setting it can work anywhere. Prisons are abnormal environments awash in “mind-altering” social-psychological dynamics that can bend and twist human behavior as well as distort an individual’s judgment to such an extent that it defies all individual expectations (Haney & Zimbardo 1998:710). While it is unclear if the lessons and consequences borne out of a prison setting can apply to free citizens, the findings of this study provide insight to both the correctional and sociological literature on race relations, desegregation, and violence, and should generate discussion about contact and outcomes among different racial groups in any setting.

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### Appendix A: Staff Assault Rate per 1,000 Inmates

