

THE ENDLESS SEARCH FOR
THE CHILE THAT NEVER WAS:
A CRITICAL REACTION TO THREE
NORTH AMERICAN VIEWS

STRUGGLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: POLITICS AND RURAL LABOR IN CHILE, 1919–1973. By BRIAN LOVEMAN. (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1976. Pp. 439. \$12.50.)

THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ALLENDE. By MARKOS J. MAMALAKIS. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976. Pp. 390. \$20.00.)

THE MILITARY IN CHILEAN HISTORY: ESSAYS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 1810–1973. By FREDERICK M. NUNN. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976. Pp. 343. \$15.00.)

In view of the tumultuous events of the recent past in Chile, it is hardly surprising that current literature on that country's development reflects widely varied reconstructions of its realities. These interpretations are heavily influenced, in many cases, by consciously or unconsciously held values and ideological commitments.¹ In particular, efforts to analyze the rise and fall of Salvador Allende and the regime that has replaced his often carry the heavy freight of the strong ideological commitments of their authors. How does one avoid this pitfall? The task has never been easy: of late it has become so difficult that one must suspect that even the fabled Witch of Salamanca would approach it reluctantly. But even she should be willing to admit that her magical powers might not be equal to the task of dealing with the mind-twisting ideological jungle that has engulfed attempts to unveil the real Chile.

These remarks are intended to serve as a caveat: like many other Chileans, this reviewer has a natural inclination to be captivated by magic and poetry—perhaps that explains why I, too, occasionally find myself longing for a Chile that never was. While being unable to claim either the witch's power or a natural objectivity, I have nevertheless accepted the challenge of reviewing three attempts by North American scholars to capture that elusive and fascinating entity, Chile. Partly in accepting this opportunity, I hoped, in hindsight, to gain a somewhat better understanding of the sometimes pathetic dreams of which Chilean political mythology has been fabricated.

Of the three books reviewed here, only two common characteristics emerge. First, departing from a general trend set in 1973, the authors have tried to explore their subjects in a comprehensive fashion. In an historical perspective, the reader is presented with analysis going back to early postindependence days—an ambitious undertaking not free of problems, theoretical as well as methodological. The second major feature, is that each author has chosen for

study subjects that are very important to an understanding of key institutions, structures, and processes that have deeply affected Chilean patterns of development. Beyond these rather simple areas of agreement, there are important differences among these works in terms of areas of professional concern, disciplinary approaches, ideological preferences, and the degree of craftsmanship.

Brian Loveman focuses upon rural mobilization and land reform. While there is an impressive amount of literature dealing with the rural area and labor in Chile during the period of the agrarian reform itself (1961 and after), very little is known about the rise and evolution of the "agrarian question," particularly in the early 1900s. Loveman's book is a good attempt to fill a void that has existed in the literature with regard to the initial stages of the peasant movement in the early 1920s and its development through the critical 1940s. Moreover, and in a larger context, his interpretations of the events that took place in the countryside throughout the diverse experiments in agrarian reform up to the downfall of Allende are quite provocative.

The central thesis is controversial and merits special attention. In his words:

It is clear that what destroyed Chilean formal democracy was not the military coup of September 1973. As this study has demonstrated, Chile's formal democracy, as it developed from 1932 until 1964, rested largely upon the trade-off between traditional elites, the middle-class political parties, and Marxist political and labor organizations that allowed repression of rural labor to be the cornerstone of Chilean political economy. (P. 333)

He argues that "challenges to the system of rural property were also challenges to the very foundations of the Chilean polity" (p. xxv). Both overall system stability and the structures of formal democracy are seen by Loveman as based upon the domination and exploitation of the rural labor force by the owners of large rural estates. Whether one considers that the forceful way Loveman has chosen to express his basic contention is a case of overkill or not, it remains that, as developed in the book, the thesis raises important and largely unexplored issues and problems.

Starting from the assumption that in a cross-cultural perspective "the 'agrarian question' is integrally linked to the broader relationships between property, property systems, and politics" (p. 3), Loveman adopts an analytical framework based on what he terms the "political meaning of property." This concept, by stressing the importance of the ability of those who have the authority to decide how critical resources (land or capital) may, may not, or will be used (p. 5), avoids the typical and most serious limitations affecting most of the prevalent and orthodox Marxian-based approaches. The analytical framework developed by Loveman proves to be sufficiently comprehensive to encompass both the traditional concerns for property questions per se (i.e., the prerogatives of individual proprietors and the distribution of the prerogatives of proprietorship) and the usually ignored questions of the relationships between rural proprietors and laborers and their relevant environments (i.e., linkages among rural proprietors or laborers, and the linkages between rural proprietors or

laborers, urban interests, and national or regional governmental institutions) (pp. 9–21).

In the context of this general framework, Loveman brings into focus some interesting questions. For one thing, he has been able to break away from a long-standing tradition in North American academic circles that has systematically ignored the critical role played by both legislation governing rural labor and the specialized bureaucracies responsible for its implementation—and, quite often, for its inception and drafting. His discussion of the evolution and implementation of labor legislation affecting rural unions is most illuminating (pp. 69–188). What flows from Loveman's analysis is interesting in that it shows how, in relation to Chilean populism, the symbolic use of politics was central for the maintenance of a modicum of systematic equilibrium by helping to defuse potential unrest among traditionally marginal groups of society. In this sense, labor legislation resembles very closely the situation in the social security area. For weakly articulated groups, the passage of legislation was not *the* primary political question, although it served important symbolic functions; the dominant policy dimension was to be found in the implementation phase.²

In other words, the interested groups (individuals) had to have the resources to engage effectively in all types of pressure-politics tactics if they wanted their rights recognized in actual practice. From this perspective, legal formalism can hardly be defined as either a naive intellectual shortcoming or an example of the "bureaupathology" typical to underdeveloped societies, as some analysts have termed it.³ It should come as no surprise, in consequence, that the Chilean political Right (the most consistent advocate for the maintenance of the status quo in the rural areas) always has considered control over the bureaucratic apparatus dealing with agricultural matters a strategic political goal. The progressive loss of control and access to the "agricultural bureaucracy" were naturally to inflame further the expected opposition to agrarian reform attempts by Frei and Allende. The significance of this important question has not escaped some analysts interested in bureaucratic politics and its impact on national political processes.⁴

The conflict between *campesino* unions and governmental policymakers during the Popular Unity government is another area lucidly described and analyzed by Loveman. The conflictive issues surrounding effective campesino decision-making influence (or impact) on fundamental questions of rural policy (i.e., the redefinition and redistribution of rural property in the transition to socialism) are presented in ways that clearly emphasize both the complexities of the problems involved and the internal unresolved dilemmas affecting the political efficacy of the governmental coalition (pp. 284–301). Along these lines, and as noted by Loveman, the Popular Unity, as the Christian Democrats before, was unable to "overcome a long Chilean tradition of bureaucratic centralism and of glorification of the people, or the campesinos, in the abstract accompanied by a profound distrust of *effective* popular participation in decision-making" (p. 296, emphasis in the original).

Some limitations affecting Loveman's book have their roots in his failure to show a grasp of both the significant role played by the organization of agricul-

tural production and the importance of income derived from agriculture for the propertied classes as key factors affecting the outcomes of rural struggles. For example, it can be shown that landowners who enjoyed a diversified economic base tended to respond to agrarian reform attempts or rural labor problems quite differently from those whose income derived primarily from agriculture. On this particular question, one could follow Paige's provocative lead to gain a more satisfactory explanation of the experience of the Sindicato Profesional de la Industria Ganadera y Frigorífico de Magallanes, discussed by Loveman as a deviant case of rural unionism (p. 113).⁵

Another criticism must be leveled at Loveman's tendency to see the major source of political conflict at large as primarily a question of defense of the rural elite's power base—the *hacienda* system. The implicit assumptions on which such a conception rests would surely be disputed by some analysts. They would contend, with differences in emphasis, that defining large landowners and capitalists as if they were distinctive classes (or class segments) somehow coexisting together under a sort of "holy alliance," would distort a basic and important fact: that they are inseparable elements of a single dominant class. In other words, the landowner's political and economic power base was not built exclusively on rural property. Precisely because the dominant class in Chile was a diversified elite, its interests extended beyond the rural domain to include government, banking, finance, and industry as well.⁶ The point is important in that it provides a plausible explanation for the ways in which the propertied classes were to cope with sociopolitical challenges affecting their base of economic power. Conciliation among groups with contradictory interests and the maintenance of a formal political democracy were possible only in the context of a system that was to protect the diversified economic foundations on which the dominant groups in Chilean society based their power and position of privilege. Attempts by Allende to effect radical transformations of these foundations were to produce violent opposition and conflict and, eventually, the destruction of the system itself.⁷

A final point of criticism, related to the previous discussion, is Loveman's failure to analyze from a developmental perspective the crucial importance of the qualitative transformations experienced by the Chilean political system. A more careful analysis of Chilean political development would have helped to clarify some of the salient features and problems of the peculiar type of sociopolitical pluralism prevalent in Chile since the late 1920s, and would be essential for understanding of social deadlock, political immobilism, and the systemic instability emerging from the clash between progressive political mobilization and demands and a stagnant economic system under severe stress to support a sophisticated institutional arrangement. The critical point is that by the time the peasantry became mobilized, the political system was already experiencing important qualitative transformations: confrontation was gradually substituted for conciliation as the prevalent style of politics. Limitations affecting the available "economic space" for the accommodation of new groups were to precipitate, among other problems, the perception that politics had become a zero-sum-game where gain by any group was seen as necessarily implying a loss for all

others.⁸ It must be remembered that by 1960 the Chilean population was no more than 34 percent rural; it may be that the mobilization of the peasantry was the straw that broke the camel's back. Many marginal urban groups were clamoring for a place at the table and programs such as Frei's Promoción Popular were indicative of the responses to this.

In other words, the argument can be made that the peasantry was invited to share the benefits of economic development at a time when full participation would have meant either exclusion or a severe curtailment of benefits received by other groups already accommodated. Both alternatives were to prove impossible to accept in the context of a tradition stressing co-optation (not exclusion) and an almost sacred reverence for the so-called *conquistas sociales adquiridas*.⁹ From this perspective it would be a mistake to assume with Loveman that the mobilization of the peasantry was *the* determining factor explaining the system's instability and breakdown. The rise and fall of Chilean formal democracy must be accounted for in a far more complex fashion. The argument as presented gives the impression that in this respect Loveman has confused effects with causes—an unfortunate shortcoming in a book that otherwise is an excellent addition to the literature dealing with the agrarian question in Chile.

Markos J. Mamalakis, in his turn, has attempted to analyze the complexities of Chilean economic development in a major tour de force ranging from early post-Independence to the Allende period. From what is claimed to be a unique perspective, Mamalakis has defined economic development as the "integrated, continuous and substantial transformation in production distribution and capital formation" (p. 345). These economic features and their interactions are subjected to an in-depth examination from the vantage point of what, in Mamalakis' view, is an expansion of orthodox economic theory (p. 345). I will concentrate on some of the major shortcomings affecting Mamalakis' work, which suffers from what might be termed the defects of its virtues.

Mamalakis' presentation shares shortcomings with some other economists who analyze development from perspectives that have three distinctive characteristics: first, a strong tendency to evaluate economic phenomena in an ahistorical manner; second, a strong belief that complex economic questions can (or should) be analyzed in isolation from social and political variables; and third, that development, as a general phenomenon (supposedly represented in an ideal model of mature capitalist societies) is both desirable and attainable—provided proper capitalist economic values and techniques are applied. These features limit the theoretical strength of Mamalakis' formulations in important ways. The question can be posed as to whether Chilean underdevelopment can be viewed both as a set of temporal, pathological characteristics to be overcome with time provided certain required steps are taken into effect, and as susceptible of being analytically apprehended through a narrowly conceived economic theory. An increasing number of specialists on problems of economic development would answer negatively. At a minimum, the realization that "underdevelopment is part and parcel of the historical process of global development of the international system, and therefore, that underdevelopment and development are simply two faces of one single universal process" has raised serious

questions in regard to the role of noneconomic forces in the development process.¹⁰

In fact, the last ten years have seen the evolution, especially in Latin America, of an intellectual tradition that has addressed the analysis of the transformation of these societies by focusing on the related problems of development, underdevelopment, dependency, denationalization, marginality, and the rise of a "technocratic" style of politics, from a multidisciplinary approach that is more suited to the exploration of inextricably linked economic, social, and political variables.¹¹ The prevalent paucity of existing theory—recognized by Mamalakis—to organize the facts and identify the patterns characteristic to Chilean economic development suggests the need for cumulating, comparing, and contrasting diverse theoretical approaches and findings. It is difficult, then, to understand Mamalakis' failure to bring into his analysis some of the theoretical contributions made by people working in the tradition mentioned above, for, at a minimum, it would have provided a broader relevance to his work. The problem is further compounded by his tendency to take issue with a wide variety of specialists and to give the reader opinions on various problems without also providing some elaboration of them. Thus, for example, in one paragraph he discards in a single stroke the social, economic, and political power and significance of the Chilean rural population. He lumps together the work of individual scholars like McBride and the organized efforts of "the structuralists, the Alliance for Progress, the Christian Democrats, [and] the Marxist groups" and sees them as futile (p. 128).

In his attempt to cover Chilean economic development, Mamalakis generally avoids any discussion of the alternative strategies for development used by the different dominant political coalitions throughout the country's history. Consequently, he also usually ignores the role of the international economic system in shaping these politics. This is not the place to elaborate on their impact; however, it should be pointed out that these various strategies affected the nature and orientation of the state, influenced the relationship between state and the civil society, and affected the evolving composition of the dominant coalition exercising political control. The dramatic differences among the strategies of development advanced by Frei (reformism in a populist context), Allende (socialist in orientation), and Pinochet (dependent neocapitalism) are too striking to be ignored as Mamalakis, somehow manages to do.¹²

In the absence of a concrete historical framework, the analysis is unable to account for the effects of sociopolitical phenomena on economic factors and vice versa. A clearer awareness of these complexities could have prevented the tendency for Mamalakis to criticize a wide number of actors for failing to behave in ways functional to national development (see, for example, pp. 22–23, 39, 43–45, 51, 61, 67–68, 83–85, 93 and 99). He shows little understanding of the complexities of the Chilean national experience. There has never been a broad acceptance of an all-encompassing and commonly agreed upon definition of national interest, to which reference could be made to guide the actions of dominant groups in society. Such criticism ignores either the various actors' self-perceived interests or the concrete historical constraints within which they were forced to

act. Mamalakis' criticisms are the more intriguing in that he recognizes that Chilean development has been affected by the attempts of "each sector to receive a maximum share of the aggregate resource surplus" (p. 46). It should not be a surprise that the most articulate groups in society will try to secure a larger share of available resources in each sector, regardless of the global implications of such a strategy. Along these lines, and as aptly put by MacEoin: "It is easy for the outside observer to moralize about the stupidity and shortsightedness of Chilean rulers. He must, however, recognize that those who monopolized power were willing cooperators in a system which worked well for them."¹³

The apparent lack of sensitivity to the historical context of sociopolitical questions is further compounded by ambiguities of language and style. At various points in the book, the reader is confronted with odd statements on some important issues. For example, in one of the most interesting chapters, dealing with the "agricultural paradox," we are told that there "is barely any evidence as yet that the sweeping and *irreversible* land-ownership changes of the 1966–73 period are shaping a new labor-land relationship" (p. 135, my emphasis). In another section, and along the same lines, it is contended that "industrial socialism can survive in Chile, but in order to succeed it must fully take account of and adjust to the nation's idiosyncratic intersectoral relationships" (p. 166). Moreover, at a later point, the book reviews "all these largely *irreversible ownership transfers* aimed at wiping out the control of Chile's riches by a few private individuals" (p. 211, my italics), while emphasizing the fact that "Allende's and CORFO's reliance on foreign savings . . . demonstrates that in the foreseeable future the structural causes for continued denationalization and partial, unfavorable international distribution will continue unabated" (p. 228). These statements, coupled with isolated and unelaborated references to post-1973 situations (see pp. 169–70, 172–73, 191, 196, 201, 203, 235–36, and 314, for examples) are confusing at the very least. Even discounting obvious editorial shortcomings, the fact remains that an implicit assumption flows from the book that one cannot be sure even Mamalakis would explicitly support—namely, that important policy areas (i.e., income and wealth distribution, education and services in general, relative importance of the state-owned industrial sector, etc.) did not experience important and substantial transformations after the 1973 coup d'état.

Along different lines, Mamalakis' work reflects a somewhat limited understanding of the power of administrative processes and institutional routines. This leads him to minimize the role and importance of the bureaucratic dimension of national politics and policies. The early emergence of a state apparatus with an independent base of economic power was to play a key role in shaping important aspects of social, economic, and political institutions, structures, and processes. Thus, in the context of coalition politics, by definition unstable in its nature and operation, the bureaucratic arena became the natural center providing a temporary stability for specific policy processes. In the long run this was to generate a permanent contradiction between trends towards the bureaucratization of Chilean society and the privatization of state activities by groups representing private (national and international) interests. The atomization of the state administrative apparatus, differentials in levels of professionalization, and

scope of formal authority were to accentuate further problems of effective control and coordination of public agencies, programs, and activities.

In practice, and as painfully discovered over time by all those trying to secure other than incremental changes (i.e., Frei and Allende), bureaucratic power and inertia were to become important obstacles to the attainment of key governmental goals and policies. To assume, as Mamalakis does, that nominal control over the whole government machinery by a politically loyal, "elite privileged class of bureaucrats and technocrats" (p. 241) was automatically to secure real political control over the state bureaucracy is, at a minimum, naive. For neither Allende nor any of his predecessors ever had the power (either *de facto* or *de jure*) effectively to control an increasingly complex apparatus that long had operated with only a marginal concern for questions of either economic and/or technical rationality and efficiency.¹⁴ This complex of factors needs to be taken into account in order to grasp the meaning of the consistent failures to "rationalize" the public sector. I, for one, am more conservative in my evaluation of the reform attempts and achievements made by both Frei and Allende along these lines (pp. 118–19, 199–200, 276). In a more concrete sense, Mamalakis' evaluation of Allende's reforms in the social security system is questionable in that the few changes introduced in the period were rather incremental in nature, hence, hardly the type of dramatic and intensive changes required to reverse the systematic bias in favor of the middle sectors and against the working class.¹⁵

Finally, I would like to add that despite my sense of frustration at Mamalakis' failure to grasp some basic considerations in his exploration of Chilean economic development, his book has value for those interested in a work with both a wealth of relevant information (not readily available to most U.S. students of Chilean economics) and a controversial point of view.

Few would dispute that our knowledge about the Chilean armed forces is scanty, imperfect, and strongly colored by ideological and/or personal values and orientations. Any additional contribution to our understanding of such a critical political actor should, in consequence, be welcomed. I am not sure about Frederick Nunn's book. One must be extremely disappointed by his failure either to answer, or even raise, some important questions critical to the comprehension of the significance of the ideology, goals, and operations of the Chilean armed forces.

The central subject of Nunn's analysis is the "relations of the Chilean armed forces with the state, nation, and society," and "the significance of Chile's confrontation with Marxism in its manifestation as a legitimately and constitutionally conceived expression of that state, nation, and society" (p. xii). His analysis is plagued with problems from the very beginning. Lack of conceptual rigor is unquestionably a major source of confusion. Key concepts like state, nation, society, and Marxism (each of which has several but somewhat precise meanings) are used (or abused) in ways that make them virtually meaningless. This lack of explicit definition, together with an absence of consistent use of critical concepts, has imposed severe limitations on Nunn's attempts to explore satisfactorily the complex and controversial subject he has chosen. Some few examples should suffice to illustrate the point.

The notion of state, for instance, is used to denote different meanings at different times. In some cases, the concept is used as if it were a synonym for political system, political regime, system of government, or a group of elected officials exercising governmental functions (pp. 24, 71, 79, 83–84, and 95). The same type of confusion is found in his use of terms like aristocracy, oligarchy, ruling class, and big families (pp. 89, 95, 97, and 98). While discussing major breakthroughs of the 1910–31 decades, he stresses the importance of the emergent “changing political groups that have influenced politics and government” (p. 182). In this context he has chosen to use the concept of “‘nonaristocrats’ in place of the more widely used but vaguer term ‘middle sectors’” (p. 182). The perplexing problem is that while Nunn fails to provide a basic definition of his newly adopted term, he uses the rejected concept of “middle sectors” (or class) in the following line of the same paragraph and then consistently throughout the book (see, pp. 95, 182, 215, 219 and 301–3, for example.)

Nunn misuses the concept of Marxism. At this point, and using a fairly common Chilean expression of the early 1970s, I would suggest that Nunn has committed a sin of ideologism—namely conveying (usually implicitly) the notion that Marxism is something more than an ideology or a concrete politico-ideological philosophy inspiring either currents of thought or political parties and movements. The suggestion is often made that in Chile, under Allende, Marxism was an historically concrete form encompassing both state and society—an idea that is hardly supported by historical data. To be more critical, Nunn seems to be of two minds about the importance of the Marxist variable in explaining contemporary problems affecting the relationships between the armed forces and the state, nation, and society.¹⁶ Thus, while initially agreeing with traditional views regarding the critical impact of Marxian-based ideas and movements in most key Chilean political institutions, structures, and processes (the armed forces included, cf. pp. 106, 150, 199–200, 206, 209, 253–54), towards the end of the book he tends to disregard its impact in both politicizing (or antagonizing) the armed forces and precipitating the coup in 1973 (cf. pp. xii, 150, 258, 266, 268, 297–98, 303, 306). In fact, he goes so far as to suggest that he cannot be sure “that in the event of economic collapse and political stalemate the military would not have overthrown an Alessandri or a Tomic” (p. 302).

In Nunn’s erratic analysis, the usefulness of the Marxian variable for explanatory purposes gradually withers away (cf. p. 255). Moreover, and even assuming a biased reading on my part, the question remains how one can approach the subject as suggested by Nunn while failing to explore in any systematic fashion the different tensions and contradictions within the Marxist movement. This failure has led Nunn to accept a most questionable viewpoint, namely, that the Marxist movement in Chile can be historically envisioned as having a unified rationality and being able, when in positions of political influence or power, to exercise control over state and society in monolithic terms—a clearly untenable position. The internal divisions and tensions between the Communist and socialist parties, and the myriad ultra-left groups revolving around them, were to prevent a unified conception about either the peaceful road to socialism or, more specifically, a strategy for dealing with the armed forces. Both were to prove fatal for the socialist experiment.¹⁷

Nunn fails to show much understanding of the historical constraints upon actors, institutions, or processes. Chilean presidents of the “parliamentary republic” period, for example, are treated as pathetic political figures, for they were not “as dynamic or forceful as the pre-1891 chief executives” (p. 87) and failed, consequently, to provide the required leadership for coping with Chile’s problems (p. 118). Given the degree of the shift of the locus of power from the executive towards the congress, one must doubt that any president, no matter how dynamic, could have exercised real national leadership during this period. This basic misunderstanding about the nature of the parliamentary period is further reinforced by Nunn’s conception that ministerial survival was somehow related to the administrative talents possessed by the respective “minister” (p. 93). We know, in fact, that coalition politics before and after the “parliamentary republic” hardly considered administrative qualifications over partisan or political loyalty as prerequisites for ministerial appointment or survival. Similarly, Nunn’s conception of the “Portalian state” (p. 108) runs against all accepted interpretations about the role of depersonalization of both state and politics.

There are some other important examples of his contradictory perceptions of Chilean figures and/or historical landmarks. Thus, the reader is presented with contrasting images of Balmaceda (pp. 76–77, and 154), and Ibáñez (pp. 154–61 and 164), or of the importance of the so-called Socialist Republic. The latter, initially described as the “most ludicrous episode of [the] period” (1931–32), later emerges as a critical landmark in Chilean political development (cf. pp. 185–86, 206–17). Such sloppiness is unfortunately not an isolated incident, and debilitating examples of this sort can easily be found throughout the work. As an example, by no means an extreme one, Nunn gives the following separate but related statements: “Various writers have posited that the age of liberal democracy . . . may have ended for Brazil . . . and Peru . . . because of military assumption of political leadership. May this also obtain for Chile because of what happened in 1973?” (p. xiv); and “Because of Allende’s experience, the Chilean political system can no longer be considered an effective deterrent to military participation in politics” (p. 257; for other examples see pp. 79, 84, 96, 104, 119, 177, 179, 182, 188, 236, 256, 296–97, 301, and 303).

Nunn raises serious questions regarding the biased and subjective analyses made by Chilean scholars (e.g., pp. 17 and 26), yet his own work painfully demonstrates that those shortcomings are hard to overcome. Two final issues should bring the point closer to home. In a larger context, some of the problems raised above are reflected in Nunn’s treatment of both the nature of the present regime and the influence of United States policies and programs in the development of Chilean militarism. Regarding the latter, it is extremely difficult to understand Nunn’s failure to explore the impact of U.S. military assistance and aid programs—conceived and developed as major instruments of U.S. foreign policy and influence—on the Chilean armed forces. The uninformed reader would be confused about the reality if he were to contrast the attention paid by Nunn to the role and impact that Korner and Prussianization had upon the professionalization of the Chilean army in the late 1800s (pp. 72–79, *passim*) and the scanty and innocuous lines reserved for the discussion of U.S. military technical advice and aid (pp. 249, 251–52, 268, 276 and 296).

The impressive amount of literature dealing with this sensitive issue in inter-American relations and the provocative theoretical implications of an hypothesis emphasizing the importance of denationalization processes affecting the armed forces whose national allegiances tend to become structured through an increasing dependence on equipment, technical assistance, and ideological sustenance from the metropolitan center cannot possibly be ignored in a serious study of the Chilean military.¹⁸ One must expect at least some elaboration as to why the author has considered that in the specific case of Chile the problem has a minimum impact, if that is his position. This is particularly true if one considers the obvious U.S. attempts to influence the political orientation of the Chilean armed forces against what was perceived as a common threat: the rise and development of a Marxian-controlled state and society.

Finally, Nunn has attempted to assess the nature and ideological orientation of the Chilean junta. His discussion of the subject, however, is of little help in understanding the complexities involved in what amounts to the most dramatic attempt ever to reshape Chilean society within the framework of a state espousing a model of organic solidarity. The interpretation provided by Nunn is vague, inconclusive, and strange: "There is no such thing as a rightist or a leftist golpe or regime if the military is professionalized to the degree that the armed forces in . . . Chile have been. In such cases, as fatuous as it may sound, a military golpe is a military golpe and the ensuing regime is a military regime. . . . The policies of a military regime are those based on a professional ethos" (p. 295).

In this general context, the Chilean armed forces are envisioned as serving the "interests of Chile *as interpreted by the armed forces*" (p. 297, his emphasis). Moreover, and reinforcing the nonideological stance of the regime, Nunn goes on to argue that the golpe was neither rightist, leftist, nor, for that matter, centrist! (pp. 301–3), for it is clear that the junta members "are ideal examples of that breed of Chilean whose sociopolitical ideas may be influenced by their family origins or their friendships with civilians, but *whose actions are based on the military ethos*" (p. 303, my emphasis). It seems that Nunn asks the reader to assume that this undefined professional or military ethos has evolved from a strictly organizational (bureaucratic) ideology. This peculiar conception of the emergent bureaucratic-authoritarian state prevents him from grasping some of the most salient ideological features of a regime that emphasizes the relative autonomy of a technocratic state seen as the impartial and permanent guardian of a vaguely defined national interest or common good. To assume that a narrowly based, organizational, military ideology (or ethos) has been sufficient to sustain a major attempt to effect a radical transformation at a societal level is, at a minimum, an oversimplification of the problem.

My initial expectations of gaining a better understanding of some critical issues and problems characteristic of Chilean development have been partially met. Overall, however, it is hard to avoid a feeling of frustration. In dealing with Chilean contemporary problems, there seems to be an irresistible temptation to allow one's feelings about recent events to dominate one's analysis. After point-

ing out the shortcomings (and strengths) of these volumes, I must wonder how my biases and viewpoints have influenced (maybe unfairly) my treatment of these authors' works. Perhaps we should all remember, when approaching the task of dissecting the Chilean experience, that even the great Neruda used to say: "Yo sé poco: yo sé muy poco . . ."

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NOTES

1. On this subject, see the book review by Arturo and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Visions of Chile," *LARR* 10, no. 3 (Fall 1975):155–75.
2. The important point is that it questions the widely shared assumption that bureaucracies are instrumental in nature and that the implementation phase of the policymaking process is essentially a technical question—and hence, nonpolitical in character. Whether one accepts (as many North American scholars seem to) or not the existence of a dichotomy between politics and administration in the context of Third World countries, the fact remains that interest groups (or classes) will exercise political pressure wherever political power to affect policy outcomes is placed. Involvement of bureaucracies in public policy becomes unavoidable and, in consequence, central to the understanding of questions of national politics. See, J. I. Tapia Videla and Luis Quiros Varela, *El subsistema político de la seguridad social en Chile*, Serie Documentos de Trabajo, Instituto de Ciencia Política (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1974); Osvaldo Sunkel, "Change and Frustration in Chile," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 116–44; and Charles J. Parrish, "Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Development: Some Considerations Based on The Chilean Case," in Clarence E. Thurber and Lawrence S. Graham, eds., *Development Administration in Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1973), pp. 229–59.
3. In evaluating questions of legal formalism, there is a long-standing tradition in North American circles that adopts either a cynical attitude toward the matter or one of perplexity. In literature dealing with comparative politics and/or administration, legal formalism has been traditionally considered an index of underdevelopment—political or administrative. Far too often, as one may expect, these scholars seem to ignore the complexities of a phenomenon with important sociopolitical functions even in the context of the so-called postindustrial societies. See, among others, Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964); J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal or Real?" *Journal of Politics* 21, no. 2 (1959): 258–75; and my article, "Understanding Organizations and Environments: A Comparative Perspective," *Public Administration Review* 36, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1976):631–36.
4. As Loveman has aptly put it: "Given the quasicorporate nature of relationships between interest groups and Chilean bureaucracies, loss of access to the top levels of administrative decision making was a serious loss to the landowners" (p. 326). On the general question of the "privatization" of state functions and activities in Chile, see, Constantine Menges, "Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile: A Preliminary Analysis," *Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (1966):343–65; Robert L. Ayres, "Economic Stagnation and the Emergence of the Political Ideology of Chilean Underdevelopment," *World Politics* 25 (1972):41, 43–44, 51–52; and the excellent study by Peter S. Cleaves, *Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
5. Jeffery M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: The Free Press, 1975). Chapter 1, "A Theory of Rural Class Conflict," is most illuminating and theoretically provocative, pp. 1–71.

6. See Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Ratcliff, "Research Methods for the Analysis of the Internal Structure of Dominant Classes: The Case of Landlords and Capitalists in Chile," *LARR* 10, no. 3 (Fall 1975):5–61; Norbert Lechner, *La democracia en Chile* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Signos S.L. R., 1970); Genaro Arriagada, *La oligarquía patronal en Chile* (Santiago: Ediciones Nueva Universidad, 1970); Markos Mamalakis, *Growth and Structure*, esp. pp. 125–28; Anibal Pinto Santa Cruz, *Chile: Un caso de desarrollo frustrado* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria S.A., 1962), pp. 36–40; and, in Hernán Godoy, ed., *Estructura social de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria S.A., 1971), the articles by Alberto Edwards Vives, "Elementos de gobierno existentes en Chile a principios del siglo XIX" (pp. 170–79), Claudio Véliz, "La mesa de tres patas" (pp. 232–40), Anibal Pinto Santa Cruz, "Crítica de una tesis tradicional" (pp. 459–75), and Osvaldo Sunkel, "Cambio social y frustración en Chile" (pp. 522–42).
7. In this sense, Mamalakis has suggested that "the shaking of the foundations of rural and agricultural areas may have been so bloodless and complete partly because for many landowners it meant simply a loss of capital, not of an irreplaceable land-based mode of life and a land creating a unique flow of utility," *Growth and Structure*, p. 135. Along similar lines, see, "Introducción" in Federico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos E., and Henry A. Landberger, eds., *Chile 1970–1973: Lecciones de una experiencia* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos S.A., 1977) pp. 15–29, esp. p. 16.
8. Gil et al., *Chile*, pp. 16–17.
9. The peculiar brand of Chilean pluralism was characterized by social deadlock and political immobilism. In the area of social security and labor legislation, the prevalent style of pressure politics used to advance groups' interests led to a situation in which each major social group had elements within it that were actively working for the maintenance of the status quo because it gave them positions of relative advantage vis-à-vis their peers. At the national level, the combination of a rigid social structure and the mechanics of pluralism were to create a social deadlock no one dared to (or could) break for fear of either losing the advantages already accumulated or opening a Pandora's box in the political arena. Social deadlock inevitably led to political immobilism and to the reinforcement of the tendency (and necessity) for compromise. Within this framework, any social group with some capacity to articulate its interests, was given de facto veto power vis-à-vis other groups. From this perspective, it is hardly a surprise that policies espoused by either reformists like Frei or radicals like Allende were, in the final analysis, to reinforce the very features on which the social security and labor systems had operated in the past—usually against the interests of the lower class. Quite often, politico-administrative inertia proved to be more tempting and secure than innovation in areas considered to be politically sensitive and explosive. See J. I. Tapia-Videla and Charles J. Parrish, *Clases sociales y la política de la seguridad social en Chile* (Santiago: INSORA, 1970); Hernán Troncoso Rojas, *Gobierno popular y participación popular* (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1965); Ayres, "Economic Stagnation," pp. 50–57, and Raúl Atria B., "Agentes Políticos en Chile," in Ramon Downey A., ed., *Los actores de la realidad chilena* (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico S.A., 1974) pp. 207–32.
10. Osvaldo Sunkel, "Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin America," *Dependence and Underdevelopment in the New World and the Old* 22, no. 1 (March 1973): 135–36.
11. See Franz Hinkelammert, *El subdesarrollo latinoamericano: un caso de desarrollo capitalista* (Santiago: Ediciones Nueva Universidad, 1970); Orlando Caputo and Roberto Pizarro, *Imperialismo, dependencia y relaciones económicas internacionales* (Santiago: CESO, 1969); Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina: ensayo de interpretación sociológica* (México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1969); and Helio Jaguaribe, A. Ferrer, M.S. Wionczek, and T. Dos Santos, *La dependencia político-económica de América Latina* (México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1969).
12. Some of these striking differences are to be found in the scope of state activities considered to be legitimate, the relationship between state and society, and more critically, the composition of the dominant coalition exercising power—inclusion or ex-

- clusion of the working class, for example, has important sociopolitical implications. On these general questions, see the series of articles in James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), and those in Gil et al., *Chile*.
13. Gary MacEoin, *No Peaceful Way: Chile's Struggle for Dignity* (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1974) p. 55. In a more general sense, it has been noted that quite often dominant social classes have developed over time clientelistic relationships with powerful external actors. In the context of this relationship, national interest tends to be defined in terms of values manipulated by and shared with the external "patrons." See, Kenneth M. Coleman, "Self-Delusion in U.S. Foreign Policy: Conceptual Obstacles to Understanding Latin America" (Erie, Penn.: Northwestern Pennsylvania Institute for Latin American Studies, 1977), Monograph No. 3.
 14. In this particular area, the Chilean experience is similar to that found in the more developed countries in Latin America (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico). For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon in Latin America see Tapia-Videla, "Understanding Organizations," pp. 632–33.
 15. The Popular Unity's failure to cope with these problems is dramatically illustrated by the fact that by mid-1971 attempts to ensure social justice in the area were sacrificed to a strategy trying to secure the widening of the political base of support—by definition, requiring the maintenance of the status quo! In a more restricted sense, the example provided by the handling of the proposed Ministerio de la Familia by the government should suffice—internal divisions and contradictions were to place leadership over the governmental project into the hands of the opposition.
 16. In fact, the initial framework of analysis is subject to serious questioning by Nunn himself when he proposes the analysis of military thought on national issues in a contextual vacuum. If this approach to comparative history is correct, one wonders why he even bothered to elaborate relationships of disputable theoretical value or significance (e.g., the military establishment interacting with state, nation, and society). Moreover, Nunn goes on to add that "those factors utilized in assessing Chilean civil-military relations from independence until 1970 were of little significance, if any, by 1973"; see pp. 192–94 and 306, respectively.
 17. Nunn's failure is more puzzling in that whether one reviews literature produced in quarters of the Left, Right, or Center there is one striking consensus: internal deadlock among the parties of the governmental coalition was to have disastrous effects on the viability of the *segunda via al socialismo*. See the articles found in Gil et al., *Chile* and in Francisco Orrego V., *Chile: The Balanced View* (Santiago: Editora Gabriela Mistral, 1975).
 18. See Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974); Horacio L. Veneroni, *Estados Unidos y las fuerzas armadas de América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Periferia, 1971); Jo Ann Fagot Aviel, "The United States Military and the New Latin American Military," in *Latin America and the United States: Past, Present, and Future* (Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies, 1972), 1: 79–93; Helio Jaguaribe, *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); and Jeffrey Stein, "Grad School for Juntas," *The Nation* 224, no. 20 (21 May 1977): 621–24.