

WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN

## Dependency Theory and the Soviet-East European Hierarchical Regional System: Initial Tests

Throughout the post-World War II period, the prevailing paradigm of international politics among Western scholars has assumed that the major task confronting the decisionmakers of all states is achieving security in an anarchic state system. It follows from this assumption that relations between relatively equal superpowers constitute, in Arnold Wolfers's phrase, "the relationship of major tension" in the postwar world. In the 1970s, however, there has been a revival among Western scholars of an alternative perspective on world politics: the theory of economic imperialism, or, as it is usually labeled in the 1970s, "dependency theory." It is a perspective which focuses on unequal relations between states. In that perspective, "the basic model of international politics [is] the imperialist system that was centered upon states of unequal economic development," where "the relationship of major tension was between the developed and underdeveloped economies."<sup>1</sup>

There is much to be said for recent dependency theory. (Granted immediately that, like the Leninist theory of imperialism from which it draws its intellectual inspiration, dependency theory has often produced a melange of unfalsifiable propositions and rhetorical bombast.) Dependency theory is, among other things, a theory of interstate behavior which has an identifiable core that contains important propositions about explanations of the foreign-policy behavior of states, conditions for national autonomy, and linkages between the international environment and economic or political development.<sup>2</sup>

Among dependency theorists there exists a general disposition to regard independence as intrinsically good (perhaps even the primary value for a state and its citizenry) and a corresponding tendency to regard imperialism and dependency with opprobrium. (This is not as trite as it may seem at first glance; there are several reasons for viewing dependence favorably.) Whereas traditional

1. James R. Kurth, "Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism," in Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., *Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974), p. 3.

2. For recent surveys of the literature see the essays by Karl Deutsch, Andrew Mack, and James Caporaso, in Rosen and Kurth, *Theories of Economic Imperialism*.

---

I am grateful to David Abernathy, Harold K. Jacobson, Jan Triska, Barbara Zimmerman, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments, and to the Rockefeller Foundation for financial assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, October 6-8, 1976, in St. Louis, Missouri.

approaches to international politics have been concerned primarily with relations among more or less equal states, dependency theory focuses on the inequality of states. Furthermore, dependency theorists adopt what is, in Kenneth Waltz's classic categorization, a second-image explanation of the foreign-policy behavior of states.<sup>3</sup> It is the socioeconomic system—capitalism—of the states in the international system, not the nature of man and not the security dilemma, which impels states to behave as they do. Economics provides the driving power that prompts the conduct of foreign policy of states. Moreover, the link between economics and politics is thought to be mutually reinforcing. Political domination by a large, developed, manufactured goods producing, metropolitan power results in economic dependence on the part of a small, underdeveloped, primary goods producing, small state. This domination is manifested in trade concentration, which in turn leads to political dependence and to the perpetuation of an asymmetrical relation between metropole and satellite that inhibits economic and political development in the satellite state. The result is that international relations among capitalist states—especially where some capitalist states are developed and others relatively undeveloped—create dependency relationships resulting in the exploitation of the undeveloped, primary goods exporting, smaller states and the thoroughgoing penetration of their economies and societies by multinational corporations and the like from the metropolitan power. Consequently, in such conditions, the lesser states not only are unable to pursue an independent foreign policy, but their leaders are unable “to exert substantial influence over basic discussions affecting their national economies; the issue of what to produce, how to produce, and for whom, are all shaped directly or indirectly by international structures and processes.”<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the best of the recent literature on dependency theory has been preoccupied with conceptual clarity and operationalism, which permeated the social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s. There have been several efforts at concept specification and, in several instances, index construction and relationship testing, making it possible to bring dependency theory out of the realm of dogma and into an arena where the canons of science obtain.

What the dependency theorists have not undertaken, however, is a systematic comparison of relations among states across socioeconomic systems. This is unfortunate, because the only way in which hypotheses linking the nature of the socioeconomic system of states and the character of relations between those states can be verified (or falsified) is by comparing relations between states that have, in this instance, capitalist socioeconomic systems and those that do not.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, there exists an international system—which is well known to readers of *Slavic Review*—whose constituent members have socialist, rather

3. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

4. Robert R. Kaufman, Harry I. Chernotsky, and Daniel S. Geller, “A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency,” *Comparative Politics*, 7, no. 3 (April 1975): 303.

5. There is, of course, a sense in which this form of comparison does not allow us to rule out the notion that capitalism, for example, fosters dependent relations. Were one to find that patterns of interaction that were believed to characterize relations among capitalist states are also found, or found in greater measure, to characterize relations among noncapitalist states, a limited construction of that finding would be that there are multiple causes for the occurrence of these relations, rather than that capitalism does not foster these relations. That having been said, it remains the case that, under the conditions specified, the predictive

than capitalist, socioeconomic systems. I have in mind, of course, the Soviet-East European regional system.<sup>6</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to take some preliminary steps in the direction of applying dependency theory to relations among socialist states.<sup>7</sup> My goals are threefold: First, I will test, or, in several instances, suggest how we might proceed to test, dependency theory.<sup>8</sup> This can be done by comparing interstate relations within the Soviet-East European regional system with those observed in the U.S.-Latin American context (defined here as the Organization of American States), that is, a comparison of a hierarchical regional system composed of socialist states with a hierarchical system composed of a developed capitalist state and a host of relatively undeveloped states to which dependency theorists often refer. (I also include several comparisons with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in which the majority of the members of the system are *developed* capitalist states.) Second, I will illustrate how readily available data about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be utilized to construct indicators whose relationships plausibly approximate important concepts. Third, I hope to suggest how some of the notions central to dependency theory facilitate the effort to systematize our understanding of Soviet-East European relations.

Specifically, I will focus on what seem to me and others<sup>9</sup> to be the key phenomena that dependency theorists associate with capitalist interstate relations: namely, the hypothesized association of capitalism with inequality, penetration, exploitation, and dependence. The following hypotheses, which should obtain if dependency theory has high explanatory power, are addressed:

role of socioeconomic structure would be much diminished. David Abernathy, the Stanford African scholar, has given the following example: Suppose we begin with the hypothesis that "Everyone dies under capitalism." When it turns out, as of course it does, that on examination everyone dies under feudalism and socialism as well, there might well still be a sense in which capitalism is a cause of death but I rather suspect we would find more interesting the search for other, more proximate, causes.

6. I refer here specifically to the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and, prior to 1961, Albania. For most practical purposes the system is defined organizationally by the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, though Mongolia, Cuba, and, as of June 1978, Vietnam, are now full members of Comecon.

7. To avoid reiteration of excessively cumbersome phraseology (to wit, "states, the socioeconomic systems of which are capitalist or socialist") I shall speak of "capitalist" or "socialist" states or international systems.

8. "Everybody" knows that area studies are always a couple of years behind trends in a discipline. In fact, however, some specialists in Communist studies have been consciously working in the area of dependency theory for some time. With respect to relations between states, see Kenneth Jowitt, "The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System: A Redefinition of Unity," *World Politics*, 23, no. 1 (October 1970): 38-60; an excellent study of internal Soviet relations framed against the backdrop of dependency theory is Grey Hodnett's seminal essay, "Technology and Social Change in Soviet Central Asia: The Politics of Cotton Growing," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf Tökés, *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's* (New York: The Free Press, 1974).

9. See especially James Caporaso, "Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Inequality, Dependence, Exploitation," in Rosen and Kurth, *Theories of Economic Imperialism*, pp. 91-93. I have borrowed heavily from Caporaso's essay though I have not adopted his position that imperialism is a multiplicative relationship involving inequality, dependence, and exploitation.

(1) Inequality among states is more marked in a regional system composed of developed and less-developed capitalist states than in a system made up of socialist states, and the degree of inequality should increase over time.

(2) The penetration of the polity and society of lesser states that are members of a capitalist international system is greater than that of states that are members of a socialist international system.

(3) Exploitation as a phenomenon which characterizes relations among states is an attribute of relations primarily between developed, diversified, manufactured goods producing, capitalist states and primary goods producing less-developed states, in which the latter are exploited by the former.

(4) Under capitalism, the lesser states (especially underdeveloped states) of a regional international system are more dependent on the international market than are their counterparts in a regional system of socialist states. This dependency is reflected in more highly concentrated trade relations with a few states, especially the dominant states of the regional international system.

A central concept in the writings of dependency theorists is that of inequality among states. Relations between the United States and France and relations between the Soviet Union and China are unequal. We also know that relations between the United States and Chile and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are unequal, and we feel intuitively that the latter pairs of relationships are more unequal than the former. There are two reasons why U.S.-Chilean relations and Soviet-Czechoslovak relations are unequal in greater degree than U.S.-French and Soviet-Chinese relations. First, the relative power, however made operational, of France and China vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, is greater than that of Chile and Czechoslovakia. The second reason, however, is equally important and somewhat less obvious. France and China benefit in their relations with the United States and the Soviet Union by the fact that they are direct participants in the overall international system, a system characterized by two or more great powers, a host of intermediate powers, and innumerable lesser states. The existence and behavior of the Soviet Union constrains U.S. behavior toward France and the existence and actions of the United States constrain the Soviet Union in its behavior toward China. By contrast, U.S.-Chilean relations and Soviet-Czechoslovak relations take place mainly within hierarchical regional systems, that is, within regional international systems composed of a single great power and a number of relatively small states. Within such systems, inequality in the relationship between a relatively great power and a lesser state is magnified by the structural characteristics of the system. The degree of inequality is a function of both the overall inequality of the system and of the permeability of the regional system's boundaries to influences from the dominant international system.

I have suggested elsewhere<sup>10</sup> how the boundaries of a hierarchical regional system can be defined. Scholars and policymakers alike employ several criteria in defining those borders. The boundaries may be defined geographically. Marked discontinuities in transnational flows—trade patterns, communications

10. William Zimmerman, "Hierarchical Regional Systems and the Politics of System Boundaries," *International Organization*, 26, no. 1 (Winter 1972): 18-36. The material in the next two paragraphs borrows heavily from this article.

flows, and so forth—may serve to set off the regional system from the general international system, as may common membership in formal international organizations. Boundaries may be established by behavioral criteria, most notably by styles of conflict management and resolution, which are specific to a group of states. The permeability of the system boundaries may be said to increase as discontinuities in transnational interchanges decline, or as the norms for the system become less differentiated from those of the dominant international system. Since the leverage which the regional hegemon has over a small state decreases as the regional system's boundaries become more permeable, independently inclined small states pursue, *inter alia*, policies designed to increase the permeability of the system.

Thus, for approximately fifteen years Rumanian elites have pursued policies with this evident intention. The Rumanian leadership has insisted that regional relations correspond to general international norms or, even better, to the *Soviet Union's* idealized characterization of general international relations: that peaceful coexistence should characterize relations among socialist states. In the Rumanian perspective, "respect for national independence and sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual benefit" are principles which ought to be of "universal character and validity." The Soviet Union, by contrast, has never departed from the position that relations within Eastern Europe are distinct from those between socialist and capitalist states and are to be governed by the higher principle of proletarian internationalism. The Rumanians have intensified their ties with non-Communist international organizations, including the Danube Commission, the European "group of nine" small states, the United Nations and its auxiliary conferences such as UNCTAD, the International Monetary Fund (the international organization whose formal decision-making structure is most open to charges of capitalist domination), and the conference of nonaligned states. In the latter case, the Rumanian leadership has asserted that "Romania started from the idea that the essential thing is not affiliation or non-affiliation with various systems of military alliance, but the position and action each state takes to support and put into practice the new principles governing international relations," and that "Romania . . . , although a socialist country, is still a developing country from the economic point of view."<sup>11</sup> Finally, with regard to transnational flows, the Rumanians have taken steps to reduce the discontinuities between the Soviet-East European regional system and the more general international system. Trade figures vividly bear this out and indicate how generally insular Eastern Europe has been. A comparison of East European trade within Comecon, as a fraction of the total trade turnover, for the years 1960 and 1972 (see table 1), shows two striking phenomena: the magnitude and constancy of intra-Comecon trade during that time period for all East European countries except Rumania, and Rumania's reorientation in trade.

In efforts to measure inequality in the Soviet-East European hierarchical regional system, we can take advantage of prior work by several scholars to devise measures of inequality. Assuming as a first approximation that gross

11. See Radio Free Europe, *Romanian Situation Report*, February 10, 1976, p. 7, citing *Scinteia*, September 24, 1975; and RFE, *Romanian Situation Report*, August 29, 1975, p. 2, for the second statement by Ceausescu, also reported in *Scinteia*, July 25, 1976.

Table 1. *East European Intra-Comecon Trade, 1960-72, as a Proportion of Total Trade* (in percent)

	1960	1972
<b>BULGARIA</b>		
Turnover	80	80
Imports	80	80
Exports	80	80
<b>CZECHOSLOVAKIA</b>		
Turnover	63	66
Imports	64	65
Exports	63	66
<b>GDR</b>		
Turnover	67	67
Imports	66	63
Exports	69	65
<b>HUNGARY</b>		
Turnover	62	64
Imports	64	63
Exports	61	65
<b>POLAND</b>		
Turnover	56	59
Imports	58	58
Exports	55	60
<b>RUMANIA</b>		
Turnover	67	46
Imports	68	45
Exports	66	47

Source: J. T. Crawford and John Haberstroh, "Survey of Economic Policy Issues in Eastern Europe," in *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 41.

national product adequately summarizes the power of a state, I employed a measure suggested by James Caporaso to compute the inequality of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states qua system.<sup>12</sup> That equation is

$$\text{Con} = \sqrt{\frac{n \sum P_i^2 - 1/N}{1 - 1/N}}, \tag{1}$$

where concentration is represented by Con,  $P_i$  stands for the proportion of GNP of each state in the total gross product of the regional system, and  $N$  represents the number of actors in the system. By inspection, it follows that the higher the concentration, or system inequality, the more nearly Con approaches unity. Using this measure, I have compared the inequality of the East European regional system over time with that of the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The results are summarized in table 2.

12. Caporaso, "Methodological Issues," p. 100. Caporaso draws in turn on James Lee Ray and J. David Singer, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System," *Sociological Methods and Research*, 1, no. 4 (May 1973): 404. For a similar approach, see James Lee Ray and Charles Gochman, "Capability Disparities in Latin America and Eastern Europe," paper delivered at the 1976 International Political Science Association meeting, August 15-21, 1976, in Edinburgh, Great Britain.

Table 2. *Measures of Interstate Inequality in Regional Systems*

International Organization	1957	1965	1972
OAS	.882 .891 <sup>a</sup>	.877	.867 .877 <sup>a</sup>
NATO	.618 .616 <sup>a</sup>	.615	.584 .485 <sup>a</sup>
WTO	.685 .678 <sup>b</sup>	.712	.717

<sup>a</sup> Inequality scores for the seven members with the largest GNP from each alliance.

<sup>b</sup> Includes Albania.

Sources: GNP figures are drawn from: Bruce Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-73* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).

Although these numbers should be treated with caution, they seem to indicate that the Soviet-East European system, although clearly hierarchically configured, is somewhat less unequal than the Organization of American States and somewhat more unequal than NATO. This is not an earthshaking conclusion. What is more interesting is that the figures also seem to suggest that inequality is decreasing over time in the regional systems made up of "capitalist" states not only in the system of (largely) developed states but also where there is a single highly developed power and a host of smaller developing states. On the other hand, the degree of inequality may be increasing somewhat in the socialist hierarchical regional system where, we are told with excessive regularity, "international relations of a new type" are emerging. If future research should confirm that inequality decreases over time in regional international systems of capitalist states, while under socialism "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer," dependency theory would be in grave trouble.

Applying the concept of the "penetrated system" to Soviet-East European relations long preceded the attention given to dependency theory in the 1970s. (My notion of a penetrated system corresponds to that of James Rosenau, that is, a system in which "non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively . . . in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support."<sup>13</sup>) Zbigniew Brzezinski has demonstrated superbly that the takeovers in East Europe at the end of World War II involved the creation of a Stalinist state system made up of little Soviet Unions.<sup>14</sup> During the years of high Stalinism, for its East European members, the bloc was a multiple sovereignty system in name only. Like the republics of the Soviet Union, the East European states were national in form and socialist in content; they were totally penetrated systems and little more than front organizations. As in the Soviet Union, controls

13. James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

14. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

were exerted primarily by the informal mechanisms of the party, the secret police, and above all by Stalin himself. The death of Stalin and the ramifications for East Europe of the Twentieth Party Congress produced important changes in the system of East European states and resulted in wide variation in degree of penetration. The Rumanians (and before them the Chinese and the Yugoslavs) have amply demonstrated that Stalinism as a state system had a fatal flaw. An international system composed of little Soviet Unions—hierarchical mobilization systems based on individual autarkic economies—contained within itself the seeds of its own decay. After Stalin died, the informal control mechanisms became ineffective, and it then became relatively easy for an autarkic, politically cohesive, mobilized Rumania to apply the Leninist model—which is ideally suited to resist penetration by an imperialist great power—to a strategy for countering the penetrative efforts of a socialist great power, the Soviet Union.

Given the attention that students of Soviet-East European relations have traditionally devoted to the phenomenon of penetration, it is surprising how few efforts there have been to compare systematically the penetration of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union and the penetration of Latin America, Canada, and Western Europe by the United States (including its multinationals). Indeed, it is surprising how little attention has been given to the assessment of evolving patterns of Soviet political, economic, and cultural penetration of Eastern Europe since 1956, much less to systematic comparison.

Considerations of space and time preclude either effort in this study. In particular, I have made no attempt to compare the penetration of Eastern Europe by the CPSU with the penetration of Latin America, Canada, and Western Europe by American multinationals. Instead, I have limited myself to the presentation of a few examples of what might be done. On a larger and comparative basis, examples such as these could give students of Communist affairs a more subtle appreciation of the current links between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and could shed more light on the general problems of the linkages between socioeconomic system and degree of penetration. I should stress, however, that I do not believe that there is a simple one-to-one relationship between the magnitude and scope of the penetration of a state's economic and political system and a state's ability to control its own destiny. The examples of Yugoslavia and Thailand—outside the scope of a paper focusing on Soviet-East European relations—amply illustrate the possibilities decisionmakers have to increase the permeability of a state's borders by plural influences and thereby to increase the state's national autonomy.<sup>15</sup>

One area of relevance for dependency theory is a comparative study of cultural penetration as a partial indicator of the presence of the hegemonic power over the lesser states. In the Soviet-East European context, for example, there are potentially comparable data: using the proportion of Russian translations as a percentage of total translations for various East European countries, and the proportion of translations (and Russian translations, specifically) of the overall production of books in Eastern Europe, it can be shown quite strikingly that Russian cultural presence has steadily diminished in Eastern Europe over the years (see tables 3 and 4; Yugoslavia is included for comparison).

15. This argument is most fully developed in my study on national-international linkages and Yugoslav political development, now nearing completion and, with respect to Thailand, by Samuel P. Huntington, "Trans-national Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics*, 25, no. 3 (April 1973): 364–65.



Table 3. *Russian-Language Books of the Total Number of Books Translated in East European Countries (in percent)*

	Albania	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	GDR	Hungary	Poland	Rumania	Yugoslavia
1954	...	66	64	...	59	70	...	7
1955	...	69	52	...	48	57	47	21
1956	...	63	47	...	40	47	53	23
1957	...	63	31	...	16	30	32	10
1958	57	50	24	...	27	22	43	10
1959	44	49	26	...	25	20	44	10
1960	61	54	26	...	30	23	44	10
1961	48	57	24	...	23	26	49	13
1962	39	51	24	...	30	27	37	9
1963	34	53	23	...	22	23	34	13
1964	58	46	16	...	20	23	24	13
1965	26	43	16	...	16	23	11	...
1966	16	37	11	...	13	25	9	11 <sup>a</sup>
1967	26	33	12	...	15	23	8	11
1968	19	34	15	...	13	20	8	12
1969	25	37	8	...	10	19	5	8
1970	28	39	9	...	11	21	10	13
1971	17	36	13	41	10	19	5	12
1972	7	44	18	73	11	17	10	8
1973	10	44	24	42	11	16	6	7

<sup>a</sup> 1965-66 combined.

Sources: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbooks*, various years.

Table 4. *Publication of Books and Translated Works, East European Countries, 1954-73 (in percent of total)*

	Albania	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland	Rumania	Yugoslavia
			<u>Translated Work as % of Total Book Production</u>				
1954	...	24.8	29.7	...	...	...	14.9
1955	...	17.4	33.5	12.9	14.8	12.6	14.4
1959	14.1	17.8	17.1	5.9	10.4	...	16.8
1964	16.3	18.3	19.8	16.1	8.8	12.7	20.3
1969	...	16.0	17.6	19.8	8.7	10.2	11.6
1973	...	10.2	16.7	14.2	8.9	...	14.6
			<u>Translated Russian Work as % of Total Book Production</u>				
1954	...	16.9	19.1	...	...	...	1.09
1955	...	12.1	17.5	6.6	8.5	5.9	0.8
1959	6.2	8.7	4.4	1.4	2.0	...	1.7
1964	9.4	8.4	3.3	3.2	2.0	2.9	2.5
1969	...	6.2	1.4	1.9	1.6	0.53	0.98
1973	...	4.5	4.0	1.5	1.4	...	1.0

Sources: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1976*.

Table 5. *Observed and Expected Frequency of Translated Russian and English Works, 1973*

	Russian Observed	Russian Expected <sup>b</sup>	English Observed	English Expected <sup>c</sup>	Totals (Expected or Observed)
TOTAL <sup>a</sup>	3,006	3,006	17,879	17,879	20,885
Albania	8	4	18	22	26
Bulgaria	182	31	30	181	212
Czechoslovakia	349	76	176	449	525
GDR	745	150	297	892	1,042
Hungary	120	34	118	204	238
Poland	160	56	226	330	386
Rumania	53	20	85	118	138
Yugoslavia	106	59	307	354	413
Rest of World (excluding USSR)	1,283	2,576	16,622	15,329	17,905

<sup>a</sup> The USSR translates a large number of books from Russian into other languages. Soviet published translations are excluded from the table. The figures given by the United Nations for total works translated from Russian and English in the world during 1973 are 5,113 (from Russian) and 18,350 (from English).

<sup>b</sup> Expected frequency = individual country's total translation  $\times$  3,006/20,885.

<sup>c</sup> Expected frequency = individual country's total translation  $\times$  17,879/20,885.

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1976.

Similarly one could show that, after all these years, there is still a continued Soviet presence in East European cultural matters. Table 5 compares a randomly determined expected frequency with which East European states publish translations of Russian and English books with the *observed* pattern of translation. Obviously, the next step would be to compare expected and observed frequencies with those for English translations in Latin America and Western Europe.<sup>16</sup>

An important indicator of the penetration of one state by another is the impact of the latter on the formal constitution of the former. This is also a promising area for comparison. The American role, both direct and indirect, in the writing of the constitutions of Latin American states, Japan, and other countries could be compared with the Soviet role in East European constitutions. Even within Eastern Europe, important nuances can be discerned, as vividly illustrated by the exciting dialogue in Poland in the winter of 1975-76 over the phraseology of the new constitution. The most interesting dimension of this dialogue for our purposes was the formulation which referred to the Soviet Union. At one end of a continuum of allegiance to the USSR, the 1971 Bulgarian constitution refers to "developing and strengthening friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries," and the 1974 East German constitution affirms that the GDR is "forever

16. The extent to which this section, in particular, is exploratory should be emphasized. Other measures might well be employed. In a larger study other media data could be employed to advantage. For television, see Jeremy Turnstall, *The Media Are American* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); and Tapio Varis, "Global Traffic in Television," *Journal of Communication*, 24, no. 1 (Winter 1974): 102-9.

and irrevocably allied with the USSR . . . [and] is an inseparable component of the socialist community of states." At the other end of the continuum, there is *no* reference to the USSR by name in the 1965 Rumanian constitution, which declares that Rumania "maintains and develops relations of friendship and fraternal collaboration with the socialist countries." Against this backdrop, Polish elites with an aspiration to weaken Poland's link with the USSR understandably opposed the announced intent to write into the constitution a clause which referred to Poland's "unshakable fraternal bond with the Soviet Union,"<sup>17</sup> and it is apparent from the formulation adopted that their protests had some impact. The final text "simply states that 'Poland strengthens its friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.'"<sup>18</sup>

A recent study by Valerie Bunce and John Echols—on social service expenditures and investment by the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, and Rumania—can be cited as a third illustration of what might be done on a comparative basis. Utilizing widely available budgetary data, Bunce and Echols documented the reemergence of domestic priorities in Eastern Europe by examining social service expenditures and investment outlays over the 1950–72 period. They found that there was a "shifting degree of subordination of the budgets of Eastern European states" to the USSR. In comparison with the pattern observed in the 1950s, "the correlations between the Soviet pattern of social expenditures and that of the Eastern European states was much reduced in the 1960s and very early 1970s, especially in the Brezhnev period."<sup>19</sup>

These sketchy outlines of attempts to contrast the penetration of polity and society within regional systems permit no conclusions about whether penetration is more characteristic of relations among capitalist states than among socialist states, as one would expect logically from most formulations of dependency theory. Even this brief survey, however, suggests that, although penetration is decreasing over time in the Soviet-East European system, penetration of the polities and societies of lesser states has been such an overriding theme in Soviet-East European relations as to render suspect the argument that penetration of weaker states in an international system has causal roots in the capitalist nature of the socioeconomic system of the dominant state or states of that international system.

Operationalizing the notion of exploitation poses much more acute problems than are posed, for example, in the case of inequality. Unfortunately for thoroughgoing empiricists, the concept of exploitation is invariably linked to perceptions and frames of reference. In Yugoslavia, Albanian nationalists in Kosovo—who have a standard of living that is much higher than that of their compatriots in Albania—consider themselves to be exploited because Kosovo is discernibly less developed than other regions in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile in Croatia, Croatian nationalists are also exercised and bitter; their frame of reference is Western Europe—if Croatia were not held back by the Yugoslav south and by Serbian-dominated banks, export and import companies, and the federal government,

17. Radio Free Europe, *Polish Situation Report*, January 30, 1976, p. 5.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 6; see also RFE, *Polish Situation Report*, February 20, 1976.

19. Valerie Bunce and John Echols, "Aggregate Data in the Study of Policy Change in Communist Systems," paper presented at AAASS annual meeting, October 8–11, 1975, in Atlanta, Georgia.

Croatia could be at the same level as Sweden in a decade. An analogous situation is found in the Soviet Union: for Albanians substitute Uzbeks, for Croatians read Lithuanians.

Globally, since the discourse over exploitation has been more substantive than eristic, the focus has been on competing claims for the advantages of trade, and for the terms of trade. The *advantages* of trade are generally endorsed by economists and others from developed states while the asymmetrical effects of the *terms* of trade are more often noted by dependency theorists.

The prevailing view of dependency theorists is that there is a long-term continuing tendency for the prices of primary goods to decline vis-à-vis the prices of manufactured goods. Consequently, in the long run, the Marxist pauperization thesis obtains on an international scale. The developed, diversified manufacturing states develop even further on the backs of monoculturally oriented, raw material and primary goods producing, less-developed countries. It is further argued that policies of the advanced countries compound that trend: "Some of the blame . . . [for exploitation] must be placed on the political forces shaping the commercial policy of the advanced countries. Among the components of this commercial policy are domestic agricultural protectionism in most of the advanced countries, [and] tariff systems that discriminate against semi-processed and manufactured goods, and increase protection against the labor-intensive exports of less developed nations."<sup>20</sup>

Students of Soviet-East European relations have something to say about exploitation—even in terms used by dependency theorists. Paul Marer has done the most thorough examination of the early post-World War II period. There can be no question that in those years the Soviet Union used its preeminent political and military position to exploit its East European clients economically, paying particular attention to disadvantaging what became the German Democratic Republic. Marer draws a careful, but necessarily partial, balance sheet, which does "not include uranium shipped by Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the maintenance of Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania . . . [nor the costs] of unfavorable prices on commercial exports during the early postwar years, except on Polish coal." On that basis, he concludes that "the size of . . . [the net] flow of resources from East Europe to the USSR [was] of the same order of magnitude as the flow of resources from the United States to West Europe" under the Marshall Plan.<sup>21</sup>

The story of exploitation in more recent relations between the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe is, however, much more intricate. Fortunately, it has been treated by a number of Western economists, particularly Marer and Edward Hewett. The consensus of Western economists is that, at a minimum, it was an open question as to who was exploiting whom during the years 1956–73. Most Western economists have, in fact, been generally inclined to give some credence to Soviet claims that the USSR, an exporter chiefly of primary goods, was being exploited economically in return for political gains which were re-

20. Caporaso, "Methodological Issues," p. 100.

21. Paul Marer, "Soviet Economic Policy in Eastern Europe," in *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 144.

flected in bloc loyalty and cohesion. The best evidence for this has been provided by Hewett, who found that trading with Comecon resulted in a loss for the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> As is evident from other contexts and from the manifestation of the free-rider problem in alliances (that is, that expenditures per capita on a "public good"—defense—decrease as the size of the state member of alliance diminishes) in the WTO<sup>23</sup> and in NATO, the great and the powerful can be exploited by the weak.<sup>24</sup>

The fact that the terms of trade affected the Soviet Union adversely in those years might tempt one to conclude that the advantages that redound to states which manufacture processed goods, rather than primary products, are truly extraordinary. It might be argued that even the Soviet Union, with all its non-economic resources, cannot avoid the exploitative consequences of the terms of trade. If the strongest power of the second world is in an asymmetrical relationship vis-à-vis the weaker socialist states, consider the lot of the weaker third world states in their trading relationship with the behemoth of the first world. Indeed, both Janos Horvath and Marer have *verged* on such an argument.<sup>25</sup> Marer observed that the findings that "Soviet export and import decisions . . . result in a large net transfer of resources" to the East European members of Comecon

bear at least a superficial analogy to the controversial Prebisch-Singer thesis . . . Prebisch and Singer argue that trade between rich and poor countries tends to redistribute income from the exporters of primary products to the exporters of manufactures via deteriorating terms of trade for the producers of primary products. The findings here are consistent with the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, although, we hasten to add, they should not be invoked in support of it because the terms of trade between the Soviet Union and East Europe are the outcome of a combination of factors, only one of which is the relationship between the prices of primary products and manufactures on the world market.<sup>26</sup>

After the 1973 OPEC oil price increase and the ensuing rise in virtually all commodity prices, however, it suddenly became difficult to feel sorry for the unfortunate countries whose major export products were such primary goods as oil, coal, chromium, vanadium (not to mention wheat) so desperately needed by the "exploitative" exporters of manufactured goods. Since 1973, in Soviet-East European trading patterns, as in trading patterns globally, there has been a dramatic reversal in the terms of trade, to the benefit of the exporters of primary goods, which, in the Soviet-East European context, primarily means to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Given Eastern Europe's (except Rumania's)

22. Edward Hewett, *Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

23. Harvey Starr, "A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact After Czechoslovakia," *International Organization*, 28, no. 5 (Summer 1974): 521-32.

24. On the exploitation of the powerful in the Comecon and OAS contexts, see Zimmerman, "Hierarchical Regional Systems."

25. Janos Horvath, "The Cost of Soviet Aid," *Problems of Communism*, 21, no. 3 (May-June 1972): 76-77; and Marer, "Soviet Economic Policy."

26. Marer, "Soviet Economic Policy," p. 150. In the version of Marer's paper which appears in the Rosen and Kurth volume, this passage does not appear.

Table 6. *East European Oil Imports from the Soviet Union, 1971 (in percent)*

Country	Oil Imports
Bulgaria	76
Czechoslovakia	92
GDR	89
Hungary	89
Poland	100
Rumania	0

Source: John M. Kramer, "The Energy Gap in Eastern Europe," *Survey*, 21, no. 1/2 (Winter-Spring 1975): 69.

dependence on the USSR for oil imports (as summarized in table 6), it is possible that in the next few years we will conclude that the USSR has taken advantage of its position as an exporter of primary goods to exploit its developed East European allies. Such an occurrence—exploitation by a primary goods exporting, socialist state—would challenge the explanatory capacities of the most nimble of dependency theorists. Central in this regard will be our interpretation of the role of East European investment in the USSR: for the 1976–80 Five-Year plans, this investment will amount to approximately nine billion rubles; it became a substantial factor only after the global jump in commodity prices. In return for their investment, the East European states have generally gotten a rather good deal, thus making the term "exploitation" premature at the least. Nevertheless, the challenge to dependency theory posed by burgeoning East European investment in the USSR lies in its suggestion of a difference between interstate relations in capitalist and socialist hierarchical regional systems, given the global shift in the terms of trade: under capitalism, the multinational corporations of the industrial goods exporting regional hegemon invest in the peripheral states; under socialism, the manufactured goods exporting peripheral states invest in the primary goods exporting hegemon.

It is not the dependence of the manufactured goods producing states on the primary goods exporting states that has exercised dependency theorists; rather, dependency theorists have presumed that exporters of primary goods were dependent on states which exported manufactured goods. A second dimension of the concern with trade dependence relates to the concentration of trade. It is assumed that dependent states have high partner concentration and high commodity concentration, while the dominant developed states are more diversified in their trading patterns. In a regional system, one might use several straightforward measures to obtain a sense of foreign trade dependence. For example, trade as a proportion of GNP could provide a guide to a state's overall vulnerability to the international market. Similarly, the proportion of Ruritania's trade with the metropole as a fraction of Ruritania's GNP could provide an approximation of Ruritania's dependence on that single country. The dominant power's reciprocal dependence on Ruritania could likewise be computed. Table 7 summarizes the total trade as a proportion of GNP for the six largest Latin American countries, the United States, the six East European states, and the USSR. Even allowing for differences in distance, it appears that the East European states are more

Table 7. *East European and Latin American Trade Dependencies, 1973* (in percent)

Country	Total Trade/GNP	Trade with Regional Hegemon/GNP
United States	9.0	
Argentina	14.1	2.1
Brazil	17.5	4.5
Chile	22.4	3.1
Colombia	20.9	7.8
Mexico	11.8	7.6
Venezuela	31.0	15.1
USSR	5.1	
Bulgaria	37.6	20.3
Czechoslovakia	23.5	7.9
GDR	28.0	10.6
Hungary	33.4	11.8
Poland	18.9	6.3
Rumania	15.9	3.9

Sources: Total trade and trade with regional hegemon are derived from United Nations, *Yearbook of Trade Statistics, 1974*; GNP from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade*.

dependent on trade than are the large Latin American countries; the East European countries are certainly more dependent on trade with the Soviet Union than are the large Latin American states on trade with the United States.

It might be objected, of course, that this finding is not surprising, since, in general, trade/GNP ratios increase as does GNP per capita, and these data, therefore, may merely reflect the greater development of the East European states. That objection proves less troublesome when one compares the trade/GNP ratios of the East European states with those of representative developed NATO states (see table 8). The incubus of Stalinist autarkic economic policies notwithstanding, the East European states engage in almost as much trade as a fraction of GNP as do the large NATO countries (other than the United States) though nowhere nearly as proportionately as do the Benelux states.

Table 8. *Trade/GNP Ratios, WTO and NATO Countries, 1973*

WTO	Total Trade/GNP	NATO	Total Trade/GNP
Bulgaria	37.6	Belgium & Luxembourg	88.0
Czechoslovakia	23.5	Canada	37.6
GDR	28.0	FRG	26.3
Hungary	33.4	Italy	32.0
Poland	18.9	Netherlands	73.0
Rumania	15.9	United Kingdom	33.9

Source: As for table 7.



Table 9. *Trade Concentration of Selected Countries*

WTO	
Soviet Union	.209
Bulgaria	.519
Czechoslovakia	.369
GDR	.441
Hungary	.383
Poland	.368
Rumania	.320
OAS	
United States	.258
Argentina	.234
Brazil	.260
Chile	.290
Colombia	.408
Mexico	.693
Venezuela	.463
NATO	
United States	
Canada	.672
Belgium & Luxembourg	.354
France	.270
FRG	.234
Italy	.260
Netherlands	.232
United Kingdom	.240

*Note:* The formula used for this table and all other trade concentration figures in the text is a modified Gini index

$$SC = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^n \left\{ \frac{E_{ij}}{TE_i} \right\}^2}, \quad (2)$$

where SC = state concentration of trade,  $E_{ij}$  = the exports of  $i$  to  $j$ , and  $TE_i$  = the total exports of  $i$ . I have called this state concentration, rather than geographic concentration (as Caporaso does), in order to avoid the impression that the measure taps the regional concentration of a state's trade, since it does not. The main trading partners of most East European states are other East European states (including the USSR), but this is not the case for Rumania, where a more politically and geographically diversified pattern is noted.

*Source:* United Nations, *Yearbook of Trade Statistics*, 1974.

Another almost equally straightforward measure could be derived to compute the extent to which a state's trade is concentrated on a few states (see table 9). (Space considerations preclude an evaluation of *commodity* concentration. Usually, as Hirschman argued a generation ago, commodity and geographic concentration co-vary substantially.<sup>27</sup>) My calculations were for the East Euro-

27. For such a study, see Donna Bahry and Cal Clark, "A Dependence Theory of Soviet-East European Relations: Theory and Empirical Testing," paper presented at the Confer-

pean states, the largest Latin American states, and for the largest members of NATO; Canada and Mexico have the highest trade concentrations of any of the listed states, including Bulgaria.

The East European states all have higher coefficients of state trade concentration than do Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. All the East European states, except Rumania, have higher coefficients of concentration than do the largest West European states. Although Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela have relatively high coefficients, the image of trade-concentrating Latin America needs to be tempered somewhat, since Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have coefficients of state concentration which are essentially similar to the diversified manufacturing states of the first world. By this index, Argentina actually has a concentration of trade equal to or lower than the FRG, the United States, Great Britain, and France. (With two exceptions, the source for all trade concentration figures in the text is the 1974 U.N. *Yearbook of Trade Statistics*. The 1957 Cuban index is derived from data in the 1958 *Yearbook*; the Mongolian index was derived by using the proportions of trade reported by Comecon and equating the figures the U.N. derives for imports to, for example, the USSR from Mongolia as Mongolia's exports to the Soviet Union.)

To add to the picture, I have examined the trade concentration of two non-East European members of Comecon—Cuba and Mongolia. Using the same measure of trade concentration, a more precise statement can now be made about the consequences for Cuba of replacing a proximate capitalist superpower as its dominant trading partner with a distant socialist superpower: whereas in 1958 Cuba had a trade concentration coefficient (.675) essentially the same as that of Canada and Mexico, one effect of the reorientation in trade has been to bring the Cuban trade coefficient more in line with that associated with the Soviet Union's East European allies—.387. This, ironically, is roughly similar to the concentration coefficients for its neighboring "banana republic" Central American states, Costa Rica (.377) and Guatemala (.372), whose main trading partner is the United States. Mongolia, it turns out, has a trade concentration (.743) far in excess of even Mexico or Canada. All told, the results are somewhat mixed. With the relatively developed states of Eastern Europe in mind, however, it would appear that, at the least, the linkages between capitalist-dominated regional system, underdevelopment, and high trade concentration predicted by dependency theory are rather tenuous.

An examination of Soviet-East European relations and a comparison of Soviet-East European relations with United States-Latin American relations, against a backdrop of the four concepts central to dependency theory, do not lend credence to dependency theorists' focus on the causal role of capitalism. To the extent that conditions which dependency theorists have ascribed to relationships between developed and less-developed capitalist states are actually observed, this preliminary inquiry suggests that they are to be found as often, or to an even greater degree, in the Soviet-East European regional system as in asymmetrically configured systems of capitalist states. This in turn provides fuel for the

---

ence on Integration in Eastern Europe and East-West Trade, October 28–31, 1976, in Bloomington, Indiana.

fires of those who are disposed to seek international systemic explanations for the phenomena which dependency theory would explain by reference to domestic political or socioeconomic structure.

There is, however, one way in which variables internal to the states participating in asymmetrically configured systems have played a major role. This is in the attempt to explain which small states will decrease their dependency on the regional hegemon and which will tend to acquiesce in, or even attempt to increase, the existing dependency relationships. In the past, within the U.S.-Latin American and Soviet-East European hierarchical regional systems,<sup>28</sup> the countries that show characteristics typically associated with the internal structures of either the USSR or the United States have been the ones that are least likely to pursue policies which harmonize with the policies of the regional hegemon. Within the Soviet-East European hierarchical system, such states have pursued several strategies designed to increase independence from the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has, with varying intensity, resisted these efforts. What needs to be monitored with great care over the next several years is whether the relationship between domestic structure and foreign policy continues to hold in Soviet-East European relations. Reasons for caution in prediction include the new global economic order, the aftermath of Helsinki, and uncertainty as to whether changes in foreign policy—which in the past have had significant portent—will have the same implications in the late 1970s.

If the implications are similar, we may have witnessed some changes in Polish foreign policy during the Gierek era which have not been fully appreciated. By previous standards there has been a stunning rearrangement in Polish trade patterns in the 1970s, the only precedent for which was the Rumanian reorientation in the 1960s, which was part of Rumania's efforts gradually to reduce its dependence on the USSR. "Comecon accounted for 63.3 percent of Poland's total trade in 1970; by 1974, that figure had dropped to 47 percent. The percentage representing the developed capitalist countries in 1970 trade figures was 27 percent; in 1974, their share was 44.3 percent . . . whereas Poland's 1970 import figures were divided between Comecon (65.9 percent) and the Western countries (25.8 percent), the Western countries were the leaders in 1974, with 50.8 percent, as opposed to 42.3 percent for Comecon."<sup>29</sup> Beyond that, in 1975 Poland allowed "the full examination of its records and the resources of its copper industry by American specialists"<sup>30</sup> in order to obtain a two hundred and forty million dollar loan from the Chase Manhattan Bank to further the development of its copper industry. This step was consistent with a policy of pluralizing the penetration of the system in order to increase freedom of maneuver. A third example concerns Polish efforts to render ambiguous the doctrinal boundaries setting off Soviet-East European relations from those of relations with other Communist parties. Malcolm Browne reports an interview with a member of the Polish Central Committee, who declared, in words faintly echoing the 1968 Czechoslovak Action Program, that "we Polish Communists have an

28. Zimmerman, "Hierarchical Regional Systems."

29. Thomas E. Heneghan, "Polish Trade and Polish Trends, Economic and Political Considerations," Radio Free Europe, *Research*, November 13, 1975, p. 18.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

ambition to play an important role in Europe, creating a model of socialism acceptable to everyone, including comrades in both directions."<sup>31</sup>

The reason for caution in interpreting these events is that the energy crisis has altered some of the rules of the game for Soviet-East European relations. In the 1970s, the USSR has been encouraging the East European states to become less dependent on it as a source of raw materials, urging them instead to seek other additional sources of supply. Undoubtedly, there are individuals in Moscow who prefer to reduce still further the energy dependence of the East European states on the Soviet Union even if it results in greater independence in other domains, either because the gas or oil can be used domestically or because it can be exported to Western Europe for hard currency. Others, by contrast, would opt for the other alternative—for political solidarity, alliance cohesion, and sales in inconvertible currency rather than for hard currency and possible upheaval in Eastern Europe. Each Soviet faction can find allies within East European elites. We may witness the kind of transnational coalition formation of which Kent N. Brown has written.<sup>32</sup> There are reasons why elites in relatively small states may not seek to lessen dependence on the regional hegemon: changes in dependency relations may weaken the power base of key domestic groups; economic dependence can be considered a form of subsidy for a political alliance; it can mean security of market or security of supplies, or it can constitute a form of protectionism. There are worse things for some elites, a fact dependency theorists have often ignored. What dependency theory has grasped, in a rather primitive way however, is that considerations such as these have generally not prevailed among elites seeking to achieve a basic legitimacy among the citizens of a state.

It remains to be seen whether the past will be prologue in Eastern Europe or whether we will increasingly witness countries which, in the past, have been noted for their interest in acquiring a relatively autonomous status vis-à-vis the USSR, seeking to become more dependent on the USSR only to be rebuffed by Moscow, or, at a minimum, being granted access to guaranteed Soviet markets only after hard bargaining. Thus far the evidence does not suggest a reversal in the previously observed generalization linking internal elite-mass relations with a propensity to enhance autonomy from the Soviet Union.<sup>33</sup> Ironically, the resolution of the issue will depend in large measure on the willingness of Western states to allow East European states, especially Poland, to become increasingly dependent on the West. This, in turn, will be linked intimately with the rate of economic recovery among capitalist industrialized states.

31. *New York Times*, August 10, 1976.

32. Kent N. Brown, "Coalition Politics and Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe," paper presented at AAASS annual meeting, October 6-8, 1976, in St. Louis, Missouri.

33. William Zimmerman, "The Energy Crisis, Western 'Stagflation' and the Evolution of Soviet-East European Relations," paper presented at the Conference on the Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., September 24-26, 1978.