

Book Reviews

banned psychoanalysis as a Jewish science and there was no organized psychotherapy in a situation dominated by racial biology. In *Psychotherapy in the Third Reich*, Cocks recovered the history of the German institute for psychological research and psychotherapy, generally known as the Goering Institute after its chief, the psychotherapist Mathias Goering, a cousin of the infamous Hermann Goering. He dismantled these legends, and indicated how they arose in a postwar era of institutional reconstruction for psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, when practitioners were keen to claim a moral high ground and portray themselves as intrinsically allied to liberal and democratic tendencies and deny any evidence to the contrary. At the same time, he presented what remains the best documented and most judicious account of C G Jung's relations with German psychotherapy at this time. What Cocks accomplished was the relocation of the history of psychoanalysis within the institutional development of psychotherapy as a whole, and of the latter in its connections with medicine and psychology and within the wider social and political context of mid-twentieth-century Germany. Thus the history of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis become critical sites for addressing wider questions concerning how professions develop in relation to varying social and political conditions—critical, in Cocks' view, as by the nature of its subject matter, the psychological enterprise is the most permeable of all disciplines to social and political factors. Thus the cultural and historical study of psychology, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy may ultimately have more generality than the disciplines themselves.

Finally, in a study of the émigré psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut, Cocks demonstrates that in the essay 'Two analyses of Mr. Z.' that launched Kohut's popular brand of self psychology, Mr. Z. was a fiction, and the analyses in question were Kohut's of Ruth Eissler, and his own

subsequent self-analysis. In the foreword to this volume Peter Loewenberg argues that this revelation of the subjective source of Kohut's discoveries gives them a "greater validity and conviction" (p. xii). For this reviewer, it indicates rather that dissimulation and invented narratives are no less present in contemporary psychoanalysis than at its inception.

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John Forrester, *Dispatches from the Freud wars: psychoanalysis and its passions*, Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 309, £18.50 (0-674-53960-5).

John Forrester, *Truth games: lies, money, and psychoanalysis*, Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. xiii, 210, £15.50 (0-674-53962-1).

These two books present a series of eight wide-ranging but interconnected essays. Taken as an ensemble, they deal with the history of psychoanalysis, redefinitions of psychoanalysis and what it means to be a Freudian, psychoanalytic readings of contemporary cultural issues, discussions of the scientific status of psychoanalysis and an impassioned defence of psychoanalysis. They frequently shift between these various registers, and psychoanalysis appears interchangeably as a historical and a contemporary discourse. The essays are elegantly written, and open up a number of new perspectives on these issues, as well as putting forward new formulations of more familiar ones. If there is one central issue that stands out, it is that of reading. How is one to read Freud? How was Freud read, and misread? What effects did the reading

of Freud have on the constitution of the psychoanalytic movement?

Dispatches from the Freud wars commences with an essay on 'Justice, envy and psychoanalysis'. This takes up issues concerning the transformation wrought in conventional understandings of the relation between politics, the individual, morality and the emotions by psychoanalysis. It focuses on the role of envy in politics, and articulates the effect that psychoanalysis may have on political theory. 'Casualties of truth' takes up a reading of Freud's most extensive and significant correspondence, with Sándor Ferenczi. It focuses on Ferenczi's intertwined incestuous analyses and affairs with Gizella Pálos and her daughter, Elma Pálos. Forrester traces Freud's intimate involvement with this scenario, through his analysis of Elma Pálos and discussions with Ferenczi. This leads him to characterize Freud and Ferenczi's respective valuations of love and truth. Forrester concludes that the distinctiveness of psychoanalysis lies in its unconcern for ethical principles.

'Collector, naturalist, surrealist' takes up the significance of Freud's activity as a collector—not only of antiquities, but of objects in the wider sense of the word, such as dreams, slips and other so-called products of the unconscious, and the manner in which this was constitutive of psychoanalysis. It is in Freud's activity as a collector that Forrester locates Freud's connections to the tradition of Victorian scientific naturalism.

'Dream readers' takes up the question of how Freud created a science out of a self-analysis, and traces the effects of the autobiographical nature of *The interpretation of dreams* on its readers. Forrester argues that the significance of its autobiographical content was that it cultivated an identification with Freud and served the pedagogical and analytic purpose of making readers into Freudians. In Forrester's reading, *The interpretation of dreams* is a "transferral machine" that

helped constitute the psychoanalytic movement. Whilst there have been many studies of Freud as a writer, this is the first which links an analysis of Freud's writings with its micro-social context, or rather, with the manner in which it produced the social context of the psychoanalytic movement. This leads Forrester to argue that what differentiates psychoanalysis from other comparable movements is that one becomes a Freudian through reading. Consequently, he claims that the presence of psychoanalysis in humanities departments is entirely appropriate, as it is Freud's readers, rather than the institutions which police his legacy, who are the true Freudians.

'A whole climate of opinion' narrates the historiography of psychoanalysis, and indicates the manner in which histories of psychoanalysis, such as those by Ernest Jones and Henri Ellenberger, have been bound up with conceptions of what psychoanalysis is and should be. Forrester argues for the need for a history of psychoanalytic cultures and further research into the relation between psychoanalysis and medical institutions and practices at the turn of the century. These are recommendations which can be heartily endorsed.

'Dispatches from the Freud wars' contends with a selection of contemporary critiques of psychoanalysis, Stanley Fish, Adolf Grünbaum, Frederick Crews, and Frank Sulloway. Forrester critiques their outmoded conceptions of science, and the applicability of these conceptions to psychoanalysis. He correctly indicates the sterility of contemporary debates concerning the scientific status of psychoanalysis, and appropriately suggests that a more fruitful issue is adequately characterizing the discipline of psychoanalysis. Forrester's redefinition of psychoanalysis through the course of these books is critical to the task at hand. Robert Wallerstein recommended a decade ago that the plethora of versions of psychoanalysis should lead one to speak of psychoanalyses in the plural, rather than

Book Reviews

psychoanalysis in the singular. The version of psychoanalysis here defended is that which is articulated in the course of these essays. Taking up philosophical discussions of Freud, Forrester argues that psychoanalysis is continuous with ordinary, everyday explanations of behaviour. A question not raised is whether this continuity is simply an effect of the “transferential machine” of psychoanalytic writing and the manner in which it has inflected vernacular speech. In answer to Freud’s rhetorical question as to what else psychoanalysis could be except science, Forrester answers, popular culture. However, this raises the question of whether, through its very spread and absorption, psychoanalysis simply loses all determinate identity, through what Edward Sapir would have called linguistic drift.

At the beginning of the century, Freud and his followers claimed that critics who had not practised psychoanalysis were discounted from passing any comment on it. In a new twist to this, Forrester proposes that before one can criticize psychoanalysis, one has to “lie down on the couch”. This recommendation is problematic in many respects, not least because, in psychoanalysis, the patient’s testimony is deprived of any epistemological status. If experiencing psychoanalysis is the necessary qualification for commenting on it, should it not equally hold for other mind-affecting practices, such as past-life regression therapy, ECT or Prozac? As the history of psychoanalysis has shown, self-experience and testimony have simply led to a plethora of contradictory accounts, with no criteria to judge their relative validity. Furthermore, if psychoanalysis wishes to transform and colonize other disciplines, should it not also be held accountable in terms of their own criteria of validity?

Dispatches from the Freud wars ends with a fictional interview between Forrester and Freud, in which the latter deals with the posthumous criticisms of his work which have arisen after his death. Readers are

likely to find this either amusing or bizarre, according to their tastes.

Truth games commences with an essay of the same name which presents a history of lying, or rather, traces discussions of lying and its significance in philosophy, science, medicine (under the guise of the placebo effect) and the social sciences. The value of this approach is that it opens the way to situating the rise of such disciplines within the history of ethics. This is then used to situate the specificity of psychoanalysis, which according to Forrester is “the *only* science that does not find the prospect that the ‘object’ of its inquiry may intentionally deceive the scientific investigator subversive of its pretensions to truth” (p. 69). One would have hoped for more comparative discussion in support of such a statement. This background is utilized to trace the place of truth and lying in the creation of psychoanalysis, and the manner in which Freud conceived of their relation in a way that was distinct both from traditional morality and the epistemology of the natural sciences. Certain questions may be posed here. In his reading of Freud’s discussion of transference, Forrester argues that in 1895 Freud had already in some measure arrived at the view that there “are no indications of reality in the unconscious”, a formulation which is generally seen to arise in the aftermath of the collapse of the seduction theory in 1897, which is discussed at more length in *Freud’s women* (Forrester and Lisa Appignanesi, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992). If Forrester’s argument holds, it raises the question of how the seduction theory of 1896 was even possible.

Truth games closes with an essay on ‘Gift, money and debt’, which discusses the linkages between money and speech, metaphors of circulation, exchange, indebtedness and trust, through a reading of Freud’s case of the Rat Man and Lacan’s reading of Freud. Here, Forrester argues that trust “organises any reading of Freud which will do justice to his work . . . One

must give Freud the benefit of the doubt—and extend this seemingly temporary charitable act indefinitely” (p. 112). One may well ask whether such charity is to be considered the hallmark of any good reading, or, if not, why it is only Freud to whom it is due, as often appears to be the case.

In conclusion, anyone interested in the history of psychoanalysis and the cultural location of psychoanalysis today is likely to find these essays stimulating, engaging and inviting of dialogue.

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Howard I Kushner, *A cursing brain? The histories of Tourette syndrome*, Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. xiii, 303, illus., £18.50 (0-674-18022-4).

To come right to the point, Howard Kushner has written a masterful history of the disorder known as Tourette syndrome. It is a fine contribution to the history of medicine, a cautionary tale for anyone embarking on the history of a syndrome or a disease, and a very good read. And it is a book about far more than just the history of Tourette syndrome.

At the roots of this study is yet another version of the time-honoured tensions and conflicts between those who favour the somatic explanatory tradition and those who favour the psychological explanatory tradition. As has all too often been the case, each of these explanatory traditions can deteriorate into convictions and dogmatic assertions that either organic etiology or psychological etiology has been proven, without definitive evidence in either case. Both such outcomes are to be found in this one story. “The rise and fall of each

successive explanation for and treatment of Tourette syndrome has been as much a study of the power of beliefs of a professional faction as it has been a vindication of either rigorous scientific testing or carefully analyzed clinical results” (p. 219).

The syndrome under discussion first came to public medical attention in Paris in 1825 with the publication by Jean Marc Gaspard Itard of the case of the Marquise de Dampierre who would suddenly erupt in a startling fit of obscene shouts and curses. Then, in 1885, the Parisian neurologist Georges Gilles de la Tourette used this case as his first and prototypical example in describing the illness that he termed “maladie des tics”. And today Tourette’s syndrome is the common name for a set of behaviours that includes recurrent ticcing and involuntary shouting (sometimes cursing) as well as obsessive–compulsive actions.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, this ailment was claimed by the psychogenic explainers as surely an excellent example of their convictions, with the psychoanalysts taking a central role for several decades after 1920. The somatogenic explainers were never absent from the scene, from early theories that such disorders were post-infection sequelae (strengthened following the 1919 influenza epidemic) to a family of theories derived from modern neuroscience.

Throughout these years of argumentation, therapeutic interventions came and went. Psychological treatments were vigorously espoused, though, on balance, without much in the way of favourable results. A wide variety of somatic treatments did not fare much better, despite recurrent favourable reports, until haloperidol was shown to be an effective intervention for controlling the tics. Soon, though, it was being claimed that these results proved an organic etiology for the syndrome—once again, a priori beliefs took precedence over evidence. But more sober-minded investigators claimed only that “dopamine antagonists [such as haloperidol] . . . could, in many cases, control symptoms, albeit