

Predecessors: the Cases of Plato and Aristotle', also presents interesting remarks concerning the way in which Plato and Aristotle define what it is to be a predecessor, but his analysis of Plato is weakened by his reliance mainly on apocryphal dialogues.

Many papers deal with testimonies that have little value for the knowledge of the Presocratics, but present an often-unexpected representation of them: for example J. Althoff's study of the Pseudo-Hippocratic correspondence, 'Das Bild Demokrits im kaiserzeitlichen Hippokrates-Briefroman', which draws a singular portrait of Democritus as an eccentric wiseman and physician, or Josephus' and Francesco Patrizi's fanciful chronological reconstructions that reflect their own conception of the relationship between philosophy and religion in the papers of A. Schwab ('Über Moses und Homer, Gotteserkenntnis und Altersbeweis: Frühgriechische Philosophen bei Josephus') and L. Deitz ('"Wie ein Tintenfisch!" – Francesco Patrizi da Cherso über Aristoteles und die Vorsokratiker'). These analyses provide a welcome new perspective on the history of reception of the Presocratics.

The last paper, 'Homo Mensura- oder Seins-Satz? Zur neueren Humanismuskritik und zu aktuellen fundamentalrhetorischen Ansätzen' by J. Knappe, contrasts sharply with the other studies: it vindicates not to be philological (a trait that characterises the other papers) and connects the opposition between humanism and anti-humanism in the twentieth century with the one between Protagoras, who, in his view, puts the human at the centre of his philosophy, and Parmenides, who focuses on being itself. Besides Martin Heidegger, who directly refers to Parmenides, most of the thinkers Knappe deals with, at least as far as he presents them, do not make use of those Presocratic thinkers in their philosophy, which makes this contribution ill-fitted for a volume on their reception.

This book contributes nicely to the renewal in the history of reception of the Presocratics, in particular thanks to the light it sheds on the rhetorical practices when dealing with the predecessors and on usually neglected kinds of reception. The variety of approaches and the difficulty to draw a line between a study of reception and of the Presocratics themselves reveals inherent challenges to this kind of investigation.

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## THE PERIPATETICS AND THE STOICS

WEISSER (S.) *Eradication ou modération des passions. Histoire de la controverse chez Cicéron, Sénèque et Philon d'Alexandrie.* (Philosophie hellénistique et romaine 15.) Pp. 428. Turnhout: Brepols, 2021. Paper, €95. ISBN: 978-2-503-59638-9.

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This book is about the ancient philosophical debate between Peripatetics and Stoics regarding whether emotions (or passions) should be merely moderated or completely avoided. To be more precise, it is about three moments in the ongoing ancient debate captured in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, in Seneca's *De ira* and elsewhere, and in the works of Philo of Alexandria.

W. opens by stressing the relative lack of scholarly attention to this ancient debate, despite it being very well known. Studies to date, she argues, have tended to offer a conceptual analysis of the dispute, reconstructing two monolithic philosophical positions opposed to one another (p. 12). This reflects a wider approach to ancient thought – especially noticeable in studies of Stoicism – where material is often taken out of its original context in order to try to reconstruct a unified theoretical system (e.g. the approach adopted by widely used collections of fragments by H. von Arnim and also by A.A. Long and D. Sedley). W. argues that, although this approach brings some benefits, it also has its limits. In particular, it obscures both the original polemical context in which much of the material is recorded and the way in which that polemical context developed over time. In order to rectify this, W. proposes a diachronic analysis that pays attention to the historical development of the polemic between Stoic and Peripatetic views. Unlike many previous discussions, W. makes clear that it is not her intention to try to reconstruct the views of the early protagonists in the dispute (which in practice means the early Stoics), but instead to pay attention to the contours of the later debate. She also cautions readers against straightforwardly using the common labels *apatheia* and *metriopatheia* to describe the two positions under discussion (p. 17), on which more shortly.

Although this is a fairly lengthy book, it is divided into just three chapters, dealing with Cicero, Seneca and then Philo. The opening chapter on Cicero is a substantial 160 pages. Despite having been told that this book is not concerned with trying to reconstruct the views of the early Stoa, the opening sections of the first chapter more or less do precisely that, namely set out the Stoic view about the emotions in a fairly systematic manner (pp. 19–65). Readers have to wait some 90 pages before they finally get to the dispute. What eventually follows is a detailed analysis of the debate in Cicero's text: the structure of the exchange and the key issues that arise. These include the separate but relevant issues of the structure of the soul and Stoic claims about the highest good.

One interesting point that W. makes is that the terms *apatheia* and *metriopatheia* are products of later polemics about the Stoic and Peripatetic positions rather than terms that the original protagonists would have used (p. 136). The term *metriopatheia* does not appear in Aristotle's texts and is only used by later writers to characterise his position. Similarly, the term *apatheia* is not well attested for the early Stoics, although it is used later by Epictetus. Thus, one might potentially say that the image of the emotionless Stoic sage was concocted by later critics and was not one that the early Stoics would have recognised. The point that W. takes from her close analysis of Cicero's text is that in this early discussion of the debate between Stoic and Peripatetic views, the Stoics were not presented as proponents of *apatheia*. Indeed, she notes that elsewhere, when Cicero contrasts the views of the early Stoics with that of the sceptic Pyrrho, he uses *apatheia* to characterise Pyrrho's view, not the Stoic position (p. 144; cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2.130). Similarly, she notes that, when Seneca uses the term *apatheia*, he does so to describe the view of Stilpo of Megara, explicitly contrasting it with his own Stoic view (p. 145; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 9.1–2). In both cases, the Stoic view is explicitly contrasted with *apatheia*, and it is only in later authors that the Stoic doctrine of avoiding harmful emotions is conflated with the idea of complete unfeelingness – what W. calls 'l'insensibilité radicale' (for one such example, see the report of Herodes Atticus in Aulus Gellius, *NA* 19.12.1–2). W. notes that this conflation often takes place within the context of consolatory literature – that is, works debating the relative merits of different philosophies as forms of consolation –, where it is part of a polemic against Stoicism that wants to present it as an inhumane and unfeeling philosophy (p. 178).

The second chapter moves on to Seneca. W. argues that Seneca's *De ira* is fundamentally a defence of the Stoic position and, as such, a contribution to an ongoing polemical

debate (p. 189). The topics that Seneca addresses are those that help him mount this defence: *propathia* or ‘first movements’; the physical dimension of emotional responses; the role of assent in the creation of emotions proper. But he also goes on the offensive, attacking the mere moderation of emotions as inadequate (p. 245). Seneca is both responding to previous polemics and adding his own.

The third chapter turns to Philo of Alexandria. One of the reasons why Philo is the third central figure in this study is that – unlike Cicero and Seneca – he explicitly makes use of the distinction between *apatheia* and *metriopatheia* (p. 265). However, for him these two terms do not automatically refer to Stoic and Peripatetic views, and they are not necessarily opposed to one another either. Instead, *metriopatheia* applies to the student who is making progress, while *apatheia* is reserved for the sage. For Philo, the perfect sage is Moses. All of this reflects the quite different multicultural context in which Philo was immersed in Alexandria. W. sets out how Philo developed his distinct position drawing on resources from Stoic, Peripatetic and also Platonic philosophy. A brief epilogue notes the continuation of the debate in late antiquity among the Church Fathers.

There is much that I have inevitably passed over due to limits of space. There is a good deal of methodological reflection and extensive engagement with the existing scholarly literature. Cicero’s potential sources are discussed at length, as is the question of Seneca’s orthodoxy as a Stoic. Philo’s remarks are assessed in the light of their role within a project of scriptural interpretation. Numerous other ancient thinkers are discussed along the way, such as the Cynic Teles and Philodemus of Gadara. The discussion is rich and detailed, and readers will no doubt find different aspects interesting depending on their own concerns and background. For me, I found the history of the use of the term *apatheia* very helpful and could see ways in which that might be fruitfully extended to include other authors.

In some respects the material could have been better organised. The first chapter in particular is perhaps too long and not tightly focused on its subject, containing all sorts of unexpected digressions. Even so, the book as a whole contains a wealth of useful discussion, and anyone interested in ancient theories of the emotions will find much to occupy them. It has prompted me to think again about a number of issues.

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## DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM

BOBZIEN (S.) *Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Essays in Ancient Philosophy*. Pp. xvi + 323. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Cased, £65, US\$85. ISBN: 978-0-19-886673-2.  
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This volume collects nine previously published papers: three on Aristotle; two on the Epicureans; three on the Stoics; and one (the opening chapter) on the broader Aristotelian tradition. The papers on Aristotle originally appeared in 2013–14; the remainder date to 1998–2006. With one significant exception (Chapter 8) described below, all papers appear in their original form with minor further editing, including the