

plane. For what the good man possesses, in his virtue and justice, whatever his circumstances, is, in the last analysis, the disposition to see God. For his virtue and justice, in opening his mind to the truth of reasonable order, and in firing his love toward the goodness and beauty of that truth, thereby dispose him to know the ground of that order, which is Truth itself, and to possess in love the source of that goodness and beauty, which is the Good which is at once Beauty and Truth. Perhaps philosophy can go so far, but certainly no further. For it cannot be any part of our merely natural knowledge of the world that the disposition to see God will actually be rewarded, purely through God's grace, by the Vision of God itself—much less that in some way a knowledge and love of God worthy of the name friendship can ever be ours in this life. Yet it is this good news which the gospel brings us, and so we above all can say with the Psalmist, even of the just who suffer :

‘Happy the people . . . who walk, O Lord, in the
light of Your face,
Who make Your justice the source of their bliss.’
(Ps. 88)

¹Possibly there is an allusion to the notion of the intrinsic goodness of justice in a sentence on p. 79: ‘I admit that there are persons in every society who have a passionate interest in justice, but are without hope for themselves in pursuing it.’ [i.e., are not pursuing it for the sake of any *consequences*.] But for all that is said here, this ‘passionate interest’ might be like a ‘passionate interest’ in butterflies, merely a personal taste or inclination, a quirk, not a love of what is, above all else, worthwhile in human life.

²*The Heythrop Journal* (Oct. 1970), pp. 365–387, esp. p. 367. I am very much indebted to this and other papers by Dr. Finnis, as well as to private conversation, for much of the argument of this paper, especially in the following pages.

³We are not speaking of divine beatitude here, nor of the possibility that any human happiness must be somewhat imperfect in this life.

⁴Cf. Gauthier & Jolif, *Commentary on N.E.*, at IV. 3.

The Eyes of Beatrice

by Richard Pearce

The Meeting

The details that Dante gives us of his meetings with the earthly Beatrice are so sketchy and the circumstances so ephemeral—they encounter each other as children once, she begins to greet him in the street some nine years later and then shortly after passes him by—that one can reasonably say that Dante never fully meets Beatrice until Canto XXX of the *Purgatorio*.¹ And it is neither the style of meeting nor the woman that Dante quite expected. He had gazed at a distance

on the earthly Beatrice in the Streets of Florence and at Mass and at banquets—though she had rarely looked at him; he had gazed on the heavenly Beatrice, too, in his mind's eye. But the actual encounter, the real meeting, with the heavenly Beatrice (and the heavenly is the revelation of the earthly, a manifestation of the truth) is a rude awakening. He has trembled through the reeking horrors of the *Inferno*, encouraged by Virgil's indomitable trust that it is by descent into the deepest cavern that they will reach the redeeming light and come to Beatrice; he has toiled up the mountain of the *Purgatorio*, lightened by the hope of meeting Beatrice; he has cast himself into the wall of fire that divides the last purgatorial terrace from the Earthly Paradise, urged on by Virgil: "Look now, my son, between Beatrice and thee is this wall" . . . and my sweet Father, to comfort me, kept talking of Beatrice as he went, saying: "I seem to see her eyes already" (XXVII 35f and 52ff.). But when the lady herself appears—and Dante has no need to hear her voice, nor see her face nor her eyes to recognise her: 'for through hidden virtue that came from her, my spirit felt old love's great power' (*Purg.* XXX 35ff.)—she rebukes him, or, at the very least, fails to welcome him. 'How is it that you *deign* to come here? Do you not know that here man is happy?' And lest he should think that he had made some mistake, that this was not the woman for whom he had endured so much, she assures him: 'Look at me well; I am, I am indeed Beatrice.' This *is* she who had previously comforted his frightened eyes (*Rime*; no. 30²), whose own eyes had said 'Peace we'll give to the heart and joy to you' (*R.* 32); this is the woman who, coming down from heaven, had 'visited the threshold of the dead' and had besought Virgil to lead Dante to her (*Purg.* XXX 139; cf. *Inf.* II 52ff.). It is not that Dante had projected his own romantic fancies onto her and that now, meeting the woman herself, he is disillusioned; Beatrice—the heavenly and the earthly—does have a genuine love for Dante, is leading him to salvation, but this necessarily obliges her to draw Dante's attention to his and humanity's short-comings.

Dante reels at the shock of such a true meeting and looks to Virgil for protection and reassurance—but Virgil has gone. Stripped of all props—and Virgil is the symbol of wisdom, learning, reason, poetry, those joint enterprises of the human and divine (but which can too easily disguise a man from himself and from others)—Dante is forced to encounter in his own naked humanity the revelation of God-in-humanity which is Beatrice. It is a meeting which has the same absoluteness as that described by Buber:

The relation to the Thou is direct. No system of ideas, no fore-knowledge, and no fancy intervene between I and Thou. The memory itself is transformed, as it plunges out of its isolation into the unity of the whole.³ No aim, no lust, and no anticipation intervene between I and Thou. Desire itself is transformed as it plunges

out of its dream into the appearance. Every means is an obstacle. Only when every means has collapsed does the meeting come about. (*I and Thou*; Edinburgh 1959; pp. 11 and 12).

Dante's meeting with Beatrice in the streets of Florence, that occasion when her greeting seemed to impart to him 'absolute blessedness' (*Vita III*), that experience which enabled him to declare 'My lady bears Love in her eyes, so that she ennobles all she looks at' (*R.* 35), was a revelation of what humanity is called to be; but her gaze—and her snub (whether it be given in Florence or close by Eden)—also laid bare a man's failure to realise what he was called to be. 'Wherever she goes everyone turns to her, and when she greets someone, she makes his heart tremble, so that, lowering his eyes, he turns all pale and sighs over all his faults' (*R.* 35). At one and the same time, Beatrice shows what is the case in heaven and on earth; her disclosure of the redeemed, heavenly humanity is a laying bare of and a judgment upon the fallen, earthly humanity. She walks through the streets of Florence and confronts Dante on the mountain of Purgatory with a similar effect to the Johannine Christ: her very being is a disclosure of the Truth. It is not until Dante has experienced for himself and in himself this harsher, purgative aspect of Beatrice that he can be said to have encountered her in her true being, and that she is fully the ikon of Love for him. And it is only when he has affirmed that this is indeed Beatrice that he can enter the Earthly Paradise and so move nearer to the final vision of God.

Transformations of the Image

The Image—or, better, Ikon—of Beatrice undergoes a number of transformations in the thought of Dante. While always remaining herself, that is to say the historically grounded Florentine girl who on several occasions smiled at her young admirer and who on one occasion deliberately ignored him—and it is essential that we do not allegorise the girl out of her flesh and blood, indeed nubile, existence—while always remaining this, she is also by turns a Sacrament of Redemption, Philosophy, the City of God, and Revelation or Wisdom. The transformation from one to the other is less problematic than might at first appear, though by the time Dante embarks on the *Commedia* he has decided that Virgil, and not Beatrice, is a more fitting symbol for Philosophy and the City. The transformations are a progression.

As the idealized beloved—and here Dante continues the troubadour tradition—Beatrice is seen as the sum of all virtues. A century and a half earlier, William of Poitou had written:

In her is all nobility
And worth and valour, birth and fame . . .
Let her but smile, the sick arise
And madmen have their wits restored;

Her frown is a death-dealing sword,
 A glance from her envertued eyes
 May cast a king down from the skies
 Or from a churl create a lord.

And Peire Vidal had even ventured to exclaim :

Fair Lady, I think I see God
 When I look at your fair person.

Dante, too, in his earlier descriptions of Beatrice uses these terms of enthusiastic praise and hyperbole and on occasion seems to worship the creature to the exclusion of the Creator. For a period Beatrice ceases to be human at all; instead she is 'a creature come down from heaven to earth to make the miraculous known' (R. 43), 'I believe she was a high being of heaven, come down on earth for our salvation . . . From her eyes she cast a light that seemed a spirit aflame, And I made so bold as to look into her face and saw an angel imaged there' (R. 45). But gradually Dante masters the poetic conventions and his own experience, and he shapes them into a sacramental theology of revelation and redemption. The dread lord Love, who strikes at Dante through the eyes and smile of Beatrice, ceases to be the pagan Love of the troubadour tradition and is eventually identified as none other than Christ. The uncertain identity of Love in the line 'Truly in her eyes must dwell the one who slays such as I am' (R. 59) gives way to the conviction that it is Christ who dwells in her eyes. *Purgatorio* XXXI recapitulates and reinterprets the past when Dante is instructed: "'See thou do not withhold thy gaze; we have set thee before the emeralds from which Love once shot his darts at thee.'" A thousand desires hotter than flame held my eyes on the shining eyes, which remained still fixed on the Griffin, and even like the sun in a mirror the two-fold beast shone within them, now with one, now with the other nature.' In Beatrice's eyes—in Beatrice herself—Dante sees the humanity and divinity of Christ reflected. *Reflected*. In mastering the poetic conventions and his own immature experience, Dante realizes that Beatrice does not radiate her own glory, her own virtue and nobility of character (unlike those ladies of the troubadour tradition). All that she is (all her perfections that is) she receives from another; she reflects a received glory. It is little wonder that, carried away by the transcendent beauty of Beatrice (a spiritual, moral beauty as much as that of physical form), he should speak of her as an angel, a symbol of the transcendent (to slightly misquote Rilke).

It is the angel motif which forms the bridge between Beatrice as Sacrament and Beatrice as Philosophy. Philosophy for Dante is, as it was for Aristotle, largely concerned with the attainment of the good life, the life of perfection and virtue and *eudaimonia* ('happiness'). These angelic perfections are reflections of the glory and virtue of God, directly intuited in the heavenly vision of God. The angels

mediate these perfections to the lower orders of creation: the vision of God is veiled for 'Human kind cannot bear very much reality'.⁴ The angels contemplate the pattern of all virtue and nobility, the pattern according to which God created all things, the pattern that is Wisdom—in Jewish thought the Torah, in Christian thought Christ the Word, in Gnostic thought Sophia. The angelic Beatrice is the Beatrice who radiates the virtues that she receives by direct intuition—'The divine goodness descends into her in the same way as into an angel that sees Him' (*R.* 61); she receives and manifests the qualities of philosophic perfection.

But Dante, true Christian that he is, sees that this is not enough. The redeemed humanity—that which Beatrice reveals—is not subordinate to the angels but is itself the pattern of all virtue that the angels contemplate. Dante therefore reasserts the *humanity* of Beatrice and exalts her beyond the angelic orders. 'All Intelligences on high gaze on her . . . she was in the mind of Him who set the universe in motion' (*R.* 61). She is not herself the Proto-type but she is the Ikon of Christ; Dante is careful to state that 'she receives this perfection from Him'—i.e. Love-Christ-God (*ibid.*). Beatrice is thus the living manifestation of the *true* philosophic life, the true life of virtue and perfection, the life of the redeemed man.

Such a life cannot be lived in isolation but must catch up into itself the lives of those around it. The necessary social dimension of Beatrice leads Dante to a vision of the redeemed society, the community that lives according to the Spirit, the City of God. As the *Politics* was the natural corollary of the *Ethics* for Aristotle, so for Dante the image of the City follows upon and complements that of Philosophy. Beatrice and Philosophy is/are the revelation of how things might (and in the heavenly society do) stand between men. Even before this conscious transformation of the Beatrician image into the City, Dante had felt, or rather *known*, that 'when in any way she appeared, just through the hope of receiving her marvellous greeting, I had no enemies left but was instead possessed by such a flame of charity that I was made to forgive all those who had injured me; and if at that moment someone had asked me a question about any matter in the world, my answer, with my face clothed in humility, would have been quite simply: Love' (*Vita* XI). Love, forgiveness, humility—these, together with trust in the redeeming God, are the virtues of the heavenly life, of life in the City of God.

Purification of the Image

The final transformation undergone by Beatrice is really the summation and purification of all that has gone before. Before we can speak of Beatrice as the ikon of Revelation—the aspect in which we find her primarily in the *Paradiso*—we must notice the shadow-side of these successive images. The beloved, Philosophy as the guide to the

divine life, and the City are ideals. What of the reality? Is Dante not perhaps a romantic and idealistic enthusiast? This was a genuine enough danger. But Dante is a man who gazes deeply and with his own eyes wide, wide open. The images are not denied their mundane qualities; Dante is no Neo-platonist—he does not abstract only those qualities which strike the mind as good and god-like. He affirms the unredeemed as well as the redeemed quality of the images.

Dante's ecstatic adoration of Beatrice—if it was ever such—was sharply checked by her reproaching him (both in Florence and in Canto XXX of the *Purgatorio*). Her eyes rebuke him; he is excluded, temporarily at least, from beatitude. She is not an image he can use or manipulate for his own self-satisfaction. Her gaze is a judgment on him. The withdrawal of her eyes and her presence by Death is a timely reminder of her mortality and the corruptibility of the image—'we have this treasure in earthen vessels' (2 Cor. 4.7)—but this is not felt by Dante so deeply as that 'snub', the deliberate and willed distancing of herself and her lover. If he is to find in Beatrice an ikon of revelation and redemption, then he must accept her judgment upon him. Though, at the same time, he is so far from forgetting the flesh and blood reality of the woman whom he contemplates that he asserts the need for her to gaze into her own eyes, to enter into judgment on herself. She must become what she is—and Dante tells her what she is, what she must become.⁵ The beloved must become that radiance which the lover alone sees in her. The qualities that Dante sees in the eyes of the earthly Beatrice both belong to her—for she has been redeemed—and yet transcend her present self—for she is still being redeemed. Always remembering that the qualities only belong to her as received from another.

Philosophy—the path leading to virtue, perfection and *eudaimonia*—proves a cold and somewhat heartless love for Dante. The Aristotelian list of virtues judges Dante's life no less severely than did the eyes of the earthly Beatrice. And such Philosophy does not, even so, lead to beatitude. After an initial enthusiasm, Dante realizes that Beatrice cannot be equated with Philosophy for she leads one so much further.

The Image of the City, too, falls short of its first promise. When Dante turns his attention to those political societies which he knew most intimately, Florence and Rome, he is confronted by anarchic corruption, by the reverse of the virtues and relationships proper to the City of God. He is particularly scandalised by the papacy's abandonment of many of its spiritual responsibilities, along with the Eternal City, for the political and other advantages of France; the court of the Vicar of Christ had wholly failed to be an example of the just society. Dante endeavours to call both cities back to the ideal. Without effect. The Avignon papacy continued; Florence exiled Dante. 'This murderous assassin and robber' he writes of Florence (*R.* 80), though

also: 'I'd gaze into those eyes . . . to revenge myself on her for fleeing from me as she does: and then with love I would make our peace' (*ibid.*). But the reality of the image as he encounters it, its shortcomings and distortions, obliges him to sever the original equation of Beatrice and the City.

He does not reject the images of Philosophy and the City but recognizes and affirms their limitations. In the *Commedia* Virgil is the symbol of the virtuous life, both individual and social; he represents the highest pagan insights into a just society and personal perfection, insights not unaided by divine inspiration. Dante, together with many early Church Fathers (e.g. Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origen), has a high regard for the classical achievement: it is no less a *preparatio evangelii* than was the history and religious experience of Israel. Virgil is a peculiarly appropriate representative of the City and Philosophy not only because he is the poet of Rome and of *pietas* but because he is a poet—he is guided by the divine Muse. Nonetheless, Virgil can lead Dante no further than Eden, the Earthly Paradise. 'I have brought you here by knowledge and by art' he tells Dante (*Purg.* XXVII 130). The images of Philosophy and the City can restore man to his reason—or, better, can restore Reason to its rightful overlordship over the life of man—and can thus lead him back to Eden, to that first unfallen state of man. But no further. Beatrice, on the other hand, is a new creation, *cosa nuova* (*R.* 33); she reveals a redeemed humanity which stands beyond and above that unfallen humanity of the first Adam. Entry into the *Paradiso*—the society of the redeemed—is not through knowledge nor art but solely by grace. Beatrice can lead Dante into the *Paradiso* because she so faithfully reflects the largesse of God; in her is seen that courtesy, generosity, humility and charity which created and defines redeemed humanity. And it is seen most clearly in her because she is wholly *herself*, a tangible human being (unlike 'Virgil', the symbol of images which are in a large measure abstractions); to state the obvious, the most fitting ikon of redeemed humanity cannot be other than a human person who has opened herself to the redeemed life. 'I have seen the hope of the blessed' Dante writes of Beatrice (*R.* 33). He might have said 'That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and touched with our hands, concerning the word of life . . . we proclaim to you' (I John 1. 1ff.).

Affirmation of the Image

The final transformation undergone by Beatrice follows, then, upon Dante's disillusionment with the images of Philosophy and the City—and is still more firmly grounded on the palpable humanity of Beatrice. She becomes the ikon of Revelation because she is none other than the historically particularized Florentine girl. 'Look well. I am, I am indeed Beatrice.' She is not an allegorical figure with no human

substance, nor even a poetic radiance that masks the woman herself. She is Beatrice, the person who, in the eyes of her lover at least, allows the largesse of God to shine through her. For Dante it is only she who discloses redeemed humanity, and in so doing discloses the unredeemed lives of those about her. Dante looks not only at her but at himself and at others, and draws the comparison. They, unlike her, do not allow the largesse of God to shine through nor in some cases to shine upon themselves. Dante's society, his immediate 'cities', functions upon and manifests the rejection of the redeemed life. Beatrice reveals redeemed and unredeemed humanity; Dante affirms this two-fold revelation—he tells us not only of the *Paradiso* but of the *Inferno*, too.

And here a reversal of images occurs. For as Beatrice's virtue unveils the society's lack of virtue, so the society's vices point beyond themselves to the missing virtues. Dante discovers that he is able to gaze on the depravity and anarchy of individuals and society and find, paradoxically, a 'reflection' of redeemed humanity. The perversions of love which have brought men to the *Inferno* are the counter-images of genuine love. Thus pride is the counter-image of humility; lechery the counter-image of chastity. The perversions reflect a lack of rationality. The inhabitants of the *Inferno* are those who have forfeited or abandoned the good of the intellect and who have thereby ceased to be fully human. The Fall is implicitly understood in Thomistic terms as a fall from Reason, a fall to a state which is less than truly human.⁶ The intimate relation of each virtue with its vice is a further echoing of Aristotle's *Ethics*: virtue is the mean or balance achieved by Reason; an excess or deficiency of a virtue is a vice.⁷ Beatrice is the measure and standard of all virtue, and is also the living witness that the mean is, by the grace of God, approachable here and now. The redeemed life can be, and is to be, sought for in this world.

It is significant that when Beatrice calls Dante back to Reason, sending Virgil as his guide, he is not brought directly to her. It seems that he cannot come to her except by passing through the *Inferno* and *Purgatorio*.⁸ It is the *Inferno* which most troubles him—and the reader. It is a path which bewilders him and his questions receive no answer, not even from Virgil, until well within the *Paradiso*. That Evil can itself be a revelation of the Good is something that can only be properly understood and handled far within the redeemed life; de Sade is an object lesson in the perversity of a philosophical approach.⁹ What is perhaps clearer to us is that knowledge of Beatrice does not lift Dante out of the human situation, does not protect him from the unwholesome realities about himself and fallen humanity but, to the contrary, directs his gaze at those realities in such a way that they are inescapable. A man is not redeemed, his eyes are not fully opened, until he has affirmed the power of evil and his own involvement. There can be no *Paradiso* without an acknowledgement of the *Inferno*

and *Purgatorio*. Even Beatrice had to look into her own eyes, had to become what she was for Dante.

Baudelaire's preoccupation with the salvific quality of the beloved and his acute description of the shadow-side of life has sometimes been cited as a parallel to Dante's poetic insight and achievement. But the parallel is superficial. True he can write of Mme. Sabatier that 'Son oeil nous revêt d'un habit de clarté' (*Que diras-tu ce soir*), and 'Ils marchent devant moi, ces Yeux pleins de lumières . . . Me sauvant de tout piège et de tout péché grave . . . Charmants Yeux . . . vous chantez le Réveil' (*Le Flambeau Vivant*). Yet when he has turned to and analysed *tout piège* and *tout péché grave*, his courage snaps, he despairs and looks back to the feminine not for salvation but for an ultimately illusory consolation. 'Vivre est un mal' he concludes: so

Laissez, laissez mon coeur s'enivrer d'un mensonge,
Plonger dans vos yeux comme dans un beau songe
Et sommeiller longtemps à l'ombre de vos cils.
(*Semper Eadem*)

It is the measure of Dante's achievement that he does not despair but that he affirms and trusts. Beatrice never consoles or protects but always directs Dante's eyes to what *is*, forces him to gaze on the Truth. She does not spare him pain. 'I shall not be gentle to anyone who looks into my eyes' (*R.* 60)—and yet she insists 'Look at me well.'

It is only when Dante has affirmed Beatrice's judgment on humanity and himself at the summit of the *Purgatorio* that she begins to speak gently to him and to unfold in words the truths he had seen and continues to see reflected through her eyes. The eyes reflect an intuited truth; her words endeavour to structure and explain that truth. But ultimately words must cease for the divine truth transcends vocabulary and grammar, even when these are aided by poetry; ultimately knowledge is through sight, through an unwearying contemplative gazing. 'What cannot be said can be shown' (Wittgenstein). The more nearly Dante comes to a full recognition of who Beatrice is—that is, her identity in the mind of God—the more luminous and brilliant her eyes become. Set free from the misapprehensions and misinterpretations of her lover, she is enabled to draw him still further into the vision of God. The *vision* of God; for, as Beatrice herself explains, 'the state of blessedness rests on the act of vision, not on that of love, which follows after' (*Par.* XXVIII 110f.).

It might be said that Dante only comes to the vision of God at the very close of the *Paradiso*, but a moment's thought will show this to be untrue. The vision is not in any way final and complete but 'the one sole appearance was transformed, I myself changing' (*Par.* XXXIII 109ff.); nor can it be said that Dante had no sight of God until that imagined moment in the *Paradiso*. The vision of God broke in upon Dante in the streets of Florence. As John Damascene said of the painted ikon: 'I saw the human form of God and my soul was saved.'¹⁰ The vision of God breaks in upon Dante in a still more

immediate manner: it is a human person. One might be tempted to say that Beatrice mediates the vision but in point of fact she is the vision. Dante is profoundly Christian and affirms the full reality of the Incarnation. God does have a human face, does have a human form, is imaged in man, most especially in him—or her—who is an *imago per conformitatem gratiae* (ST 1a. 99.4). Beatrice is the blessing-bearer, the God-bearer, another Theotokos. Dante gazes—awe-struck and fearful—at the divine life present in his own tightly circumscribed world. He gazes, and his world is judged. He gazes and sees humanity fallen and condemned; he gazes and sees humanity in-God-ed and redeemed. In Beatrice he encounters and sees the activity of God and the response of man. Whatever else he learns in the *Paradiso* can only be an unfolding and deepening (eternal, limitless, and direct, no doubt) of what was disclosed through the eyes of Beatrice.¹¹ As Dante allows the vision to change him, to redeem him, so the vision fills with light. ‘The one sole appearance was transformed, I myself changing’. It is not that Beatrice *is* God, but she is in her time and place and manner the vision of God.

Is this a mode of vision available only to the poet? If so, the experience, though interesting, is not accessible to most of us. But Dante—and the troubadours—were not just poets; they wrote out of their experience of being in love, an experience shared by many.

Fair Lady, I think I see God
When I look at your fair person.

Perhaps too few have dared take the vision seriously.

¹Cf. E. Gilson, *Dante and Philosophy*; New York 1963; p. 73—‘they at last speak for the first time.’

²The numbering and translation of the *Rime* follow Kenelm Foster and Patrick Boyde, *Dante's Lyric Poetry*; Oxford 1967.

³Cf. Dante's immersion in the waters of Lethe (*Purg.* XXXI), transforming the memory so that past sin is recalled only as cause for praising God's redemptive act, and marking the entry into the true Unity.

⁴T. S. Eliot, *Burnt Norton*. Cf. Rob van der Hart O.P., ‘The Descent of Christ into Hell’, *New Blackfriars*, April 1972; pp. 168f.

⁵Timothy Radcliffe OP has drawn my attention to ST 1a. 14.2 and in particular the statement that ‘redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa.’ Whilst it is only God who can fully achieve this, it could be said that the degree to which Beatrice achieves it is the degree to which she becomes what she is in the mind of God.

⁶ST 1a2ae 85.3.

⁷*Ethics* II vii.

⁸Cf. Brecht:— He who is defeated cannot escape Wisdom.
Hold on to yourself and sink. Be afraid.
But sink. At the bottom
The lesson awaits you.

⁹See, for example, Mario Praz, *The Romantic Agony*; Oxford 1951; pp. 102ff.

¹⁰Quoted in Campenhausen, *The Theological Problem of Images in the Early Church*, in *Tradition and Life in the Church*; London 1968; p. 193.

¹¹The mode of knowledge is necessarily different when God is known in his essence or as he is in himself: this directly intuited knowledge cannot be communicated through any created likeness. See ST 1a. 12.2, to which Herbert McCabe OP has kindly drawn my attention.