

LANGUAGE, VALUES, AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES IN INTER-AMERICAN RESEARCH

- Glauert, Earl T., and Langley, Lester D., eds. *The United States and Latin America*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1971. Pp. 204. \$2.95.
- Connell-Smith, Gordon. *The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. Pp. 302. \$16.75.
- Gurtov, Melvin. *The United States Against the Third World: Antinationalism and Intervention*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. Pp. 260. \$9.80.
- Arbaiza, Norman D. *Mars Moves South: The Future Wars of South America*. Jericho, New York: Exposition Press, 1974. Pp. 87. \$6.00.
- Rice, E.B. *Extension in the Andes: An Evaluation of Official U.S. Assistance to Agricultural Extension Services in Central and South America*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974. Pp. 552.
- Paddock, William and Elizabeth. *We Don't Know How: An Independent Audit of What They Call Success In Foreign Assistance*. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1973. Pp. 331. \$4.95.
- Silvert, Kalman H. *The Relevance of Latin American Domestic Politics to North American Foreign Policy*. Washington Square, N.Y.: N.Y.U. Ibero-American Language and Area Center, 1974. Pp. 29.
- Commission on United States-Latin American Relations. *The Americas in a Changing World*. New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1974. Pp. 54.
- Cotler, Julio, and Fagen, Richard R., eds. *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974. Pp. 417. \$17.80.

Language, like other tools of power, has both useful and dangerous properties. It can serve to clarify or to confuse. Students of inter-American relations have long been aware of the delusive and even deceptive language used by government officials throughout the hemisphere. Without necessarily accepting journalist I. F. Stone's melancholy dictum, "Every government is run by liars and nothing they say should be believed," inter-Americanists have become accustomed to discounting official slogans and rhetorical flourishes of many kinds.¹

Unfortunately, social scientists (in which category, for purposes of this discussion, I shall arbitrarily include historians) have not been uniformly clearer in their own use of language than have the politicians whose actions they seek to analyze and/or influence. A reasonably precise social science vocabulary can be of great value in clarifying major political issues; an imprecise vocabulary can only confuse matters further. In one form or another, all the titles reviewed in this essay

raise questions about the relationship between political language, political behavior, and the language of social science in inter-American affairs.

In their brief collection of readings and documents on the history of U.S. policy toward Latin America, Glauert and Langley provide some vintage examples of doubtful rhetoric on both the governmental and scholarly levels. From President Polk's war message of 1846 to John Foster Dulles's strictures on the "evil purpose of the Kremlin" in Guatemala in 1954, official U.S. statements, like those of other governments, have abounded with both linguistic imprecision and verbal camouflage. Polk, having ordered U.S. troops into a disputed boundary area between the United States and Mexico, greeted the Mexican response with the unequivocal statement, "Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil." He then proceeded, with an air of injured innocence, to call for a war which resulted in U.S. annexation of much of northern Mexico. Dulles, dismissing the "disputes" between the Guatemalan government and the United Fruit Company as "relatively unimportant," insisted that the "overriding" issue was "the endangering by international communism of the peace and security of this hemisphere." Not surprisingly, he omitted mention of the role of the CIA in the Guatemalan coup which had just taken place.²

From the vantage point of 1975, the "fourth of July" rhetoric of historian Samuel Flagg Bemis may sound amusingly antique. Early twentieth-century U.S. intervention in the Caribbean, according to Bemis, was "essentially a protective imperialism, designed to protect, first the security of the Continental Republic, next the security of the entire New World, against intervention by the imperialistic powers of the Old World. It was, if you will, an imperialism against imperialism. It did not last long and it was not really bad." Less antique, and to be taken more seriously, is historian Edwin Lieuwen's 1968 recommendation to a Senate subcommittee to the effect that "except where a clear threat of Castro-Communist subversion is apparent . . . internal security assistance should be provided only to representative governments."³

How, precisely, does Lieuwen define "Castro-Communist subversion"? To whom is it a threat, and why? And, last but not least, how is the U.S. government to judge, for purposes of providing military hardware, which of its colleague governments in the hemisphere is truly "representative"? It is at precisely this point of interaction between social science and government policy that such imprecision, particularly when coming from a distinguished scholar, gives one pause. In presenting the above extracts, Glauert and Langley do not explicitly focus on political or social science language as an issue. Nonetheless, their material well lends itself to an analysis of the relationship between language and political behavior.

What is available and implicit in the Glauert and Langley reader is made explicit in Gordon Connell-Smith's excellent new survey of the history of inter-American relations. Focusing on what he calls the "self-image" of the United States, he takes direct issue with Bemis, J. Lloyd Mecham, and other historians who have been "unable to dissociate themselves" from that self-image. Quoting R. W. Van Alstyne's comment that "American foreign policy has a vocabulary all

its own, consciously—even ostentatiously—side-stepping the use of terms that would even hint at aggression or imperial domination,” Connell-Smith notes that the vocabulary of U.S. Latin American policy has been specifically tailored to suggest both benevolent intentions and treatment of Latin America by the United States “on a basis of equality.” He makes a particular point of attacking the myth, cultivated by politicians and scholars alike, that U.S. behavior toward Latin America has been qualitatively different from that displayed by European powers, including Soviet Russia, toward their colonies and satellites.⁴

In one respect, Connell-Smith’s treatment of the problem of U.S. intentions seems somewhat ambiguous. All powers, he writes, “protest the virtue of their motives in dealing with others; usually the great majority of their peoples believe their leaders and—perhaps to a greater degree than critics would concede—political leaders are inclined to believe their own virtuous protestations.”⁵ Good intentions need not be regarded as something to be “conceded”. Indeed, Connell-Smith’s own evidence suggests that the good intentions of U.S. policy-makers are among the most dangerous elements in inter-American relations, for it is precisely those good intentions which cause the policy-makers to be, in Jacques Maritain’s telling phrase, “unrestrained by conscience” in their use of power. It is also the policy-makers’ faith in their own good intentions which accounts for what Connell-Smith refers to as the irreconcilability of the United States self-image with the “image of her that prevails south of the Rio Grande.”⁶

One of the most contentious terms in the inter-American vocabulary has been “intervention.” While Connell-Smith traces it through the broad historical sweep of hemispheric relations, Melvin Gurtov treats it within the broad geographic context of postwar U.S. relations with the countries of the Third World. Gurtov argues that as a result of official definitions of the requirements of U.S. survival, intervention against “radical” and especially “revolutionary” nationalisms has been a constant, transcending all regional boundaries. Gurtov does not appear to challenge the professed good intentions of U.S. policy-makers. Treating intervention as part of a coherent and sincerely held ideological approach, he thus appears to grant the policy-makers what Connell-Smith would call their “virtuous protestations.” He argues instead that while intervention is often a highly effective tool in achieving short-run U.S. policy aims, in the long run it is bound to be counterproductive to the “national interest” even as defined by the policy-makers themselves.⁷

While Gurtov’s approach to the question of U.S. intentions seems clear, as does his concept of the broad ideological unity of U.S. policy toward the Third World, certain difficulties arise from his use of the term “intervention,” which he defines as the “calculated and partisan use of national power—military, economic, political—to influence the domestic politics of another state.”⁸ As Connell-Smith points out, it is not really possible in practice to separate the internal and external affairs of any nation.⁹ Thus to build an historical case which distinguishes clearly between the two is to leave room for some highly debatable policy prescriptions. For example, Gurtov suggests in his conclusion: “Where a request for intervention is made by a government whose credentials are nowhere questioned, or by a revolutionary movement whose claims to represent nationalist sentiment

are not in doubt; where that request is channeled through and action is authorized by the United Nations; and where the purpose of the intervention is to weaken or remove a clearly foreign presence—in such circumstances, American involvement would be morally, politically, and legally defensible.”¹⁰ His purpose, apparently, is to leave room for intervention on the side of the “good guys.” With only the barest minimum of rhetorical improvisation, however, his criteria could easily be accommodated to fit the 1950 U.S. military action in Korea, an “intervention” that scholars are increasingly coming to question, and one for which Gurtov himself seems to have scant sympathy. Again, the danger of semantic imprecision is evident; phrases such as “nowhere questioned,” “not in doubt,” and “clearly foreign presence” provide precisely the kinds of loopholes through which government officials, both idealists and others, have learned to jump with alacrity.

Beyond this, Gurtov is on shaky ground in suggesting that the Dominican intervention of 1965 “may become the kind of model to which other administrations will turn should new ‘Cubas’ arise in Latin America.”¹¹ While the motives behind the intervention have remained generally intact, it seems highly unlikely that such a bald operation will again take place in the near future. Already U.S. policy shows signs of becoming far more subtle, both in regard to relations with the Latin American military and in regard to the relationship between the U.S. government and U.S.-based multinational corporations. The latter subject in particular is one that Gurtov does not treat in any systematic fashion.¹²

Indeed, as we move into the final quarter of the century, many signs suggest that an increasingly complex corporate-government relationship, involving apparent conflict as well as cooperation, will become the mainspring of the U.S. Latin American policy. Not all inter-Americanists, to be sure, postulate continued U.S. corporate and governmental concern with the Latin American economies. Norman Arbaiza’s projections for future South American intrahemispheric conflict are based explicitly upon the premise that as economic empire becomes decreasingly profitable, the United States will tend to leave South America pretty much on its own, thus precipitating a struggle for power within the region. After reviewing the major geographic, strategic, economic, and cultural variables in the area, Arbaiza suggests that the main struggle will be between two coalitions, consisting of Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador on one side and Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru on the other. He does not venture to predict which side will win, or whether there will be any clear-cut victors.¹³

Arbaiza makes some telling specific points, stressing for example the attractiveness to some governments of militarism as a means of technological modernization.¹⁴ Even so, his major premise seems highly dubious. Granted, U.S. taxpayers are less easily swayed these days by the Cold War rhetoric long used to justify U.S. military expenditures in the hemisphere. Granted also that in the wake of the so-called “energy crisis” there has been increased talk in many industrial nations of becoming maximally self-sufficient in raw materials. Granted, finally, that at the moment the best markets for the products of industrial countries are in other industrial countries.¹⁵

None of these points, however, necessarily leads to the conclusion that U.S. economic interest in Latin America will wane. Military grants may decrease,

but military sales will probably remain an important positive factor in the U.S. balance of payments. Self-sufficiency in raw materials, while desirable, may not be so easily achieved as Arbaiza implies. Moreover, while South America may become less important as a source of raw materials, it already shows signs of becoming more important as a source of cheap industrial labor, as witness the recent expansion of U.S. branch-plant manufacturing there. The A.F.L.-C.I.O. has indicated strong concern over this "exporting of American jobs," but there is no reason to suspect that it will be fully successful in undercutting the trend. As to the relatively low purchasing power in South America for U.S.-made goods, historical experience suggests, if anything, that U.S. efforts to develop industrial markets there will increase rather than decrease.¹⁶ Finally, Arbaiza completely ignores what Connell-Smith has called the U.S. "self-image," which postulates an abiding commitment to the technological development of the "less advanced" nations. Events in Indochina have dealt a partial blow to that self-image, but the long-term effects will probably be more military than economic. Indeed, the political need to refurbish the U.S. self-image may well dictate increased compensatory economic "assistance" efforts elsewhere, and this is precisely where both the U.S. government and the multinational corporations see their services as invaluable.¹⁷

One of the most frequently expressed themes in U.S. politics, after all, is the disinclination to "bug out," no matter how overwhelming the evidence of failure. This disinclination is precisely the theme of E. B. Rice's study of U.S. agricultural extension programs in twelve Central and South American countries. Rice, a former U.S. AID official involved in policy evaluation, admits to a number of glaring failures in U.S. extension work over the last thirty years. U.S. officials, for example, mistakenly assumed that local bureaucracies would respond positively to successful pilot projects. They were almost uniformly unsuccessful in securing adequate, long-term local budgetary support for projects which U.S. experts deemed essential. In some cases U.S. extension officials were inflexible in attempting to apply their (not always accurate) versions of U.S. models to Latin American situations.¹⁸

Rice is frequently quite blunt in his evaluation of U.S. programs. "It is obvious," he writes, "in all the study districts except Puno that the extension service is not only irrelevant to progress in many villages, but that progressive villages characterized by the absence of an extension presence are in the majority. . . . In conclusion, the village level studies show that the attention of the extension service was not *sufficient* for progress, was not *necessary* for progress, and to the majority of progressive villages, was not even offered."

Nonetheless, Rice retains hope for a useful U.S. presence in the future. His hope rests upon a semantic distinction between "effectiveness" and "significance." Apparently, while U.S. efforts were generally insignificant, they were nonetheless at least partially effective. "Had the study focused exclusively on the significance issue," he writes, "it might have ended up condemning the entire extension process instead of the peculiar organizational form adopted in the study area."¹⁹ Where good intentions remain, can significance ultimately be out of reach?

No, says Rice. Yes, respond William and Elizabeth Paddock, and their joint critique of U.S. foreign assistance efforts in Latin America is devastating in its implications. One of Connell-Smith's chief complaints about U.S. historians is their "marked disinclination to draw the general conclusions to which their own often searching criticisms of particular policies so clearly point."²⁰ While the criticism can fairly be applied to Rice, it cannot be applied to the Paddocks. Their evidence is overwhelming (and occasionally hilarious), their evaluation succinct, and their conclusion forthright and unambiguous. Development "professionals," they write, "do not know how to carry out an effective economic development program, either a big one or a small one. *No one knows how*—not the U.S. government, not the Rockefeller Foundation, not the international banks and agencies, not the missionaries. I [they write in the first person singular] don't know how. You don't know how. No one knows how." Equally important, the Paddocks point out that feedback channels in the U.S. serve to obscure rather than clarify this fact. "Those who give the money," they note, "are thousands of miles removed from where it is spent. No channel is provided whereby they can get unbiased opinions about their projects in the field in place of the usual fulsome reports of 'great success'. . . . The result: We do not know that we do not know how. We have no knowledge of our own ignorance."²¹

For the Paddocks, the lesson is clear. The U.S. should give up foreign aid "until we first learn how to make it achieve its goals." To do this, they argue, the U.S. should "first use our own country as a laboratory." "To make hillside farming in Honduras profitable, let us first learn how to solve the problems of subsistence farming in Appalachia. . . . To serve the medical needs of Ecuadorian Indians, let us first learn how to provide medical care to the Indians in Arizona. . . . To eliminate the electrical power shortage in Rio de Janeiro, let us first learn how to do this in northeast United States."²² As indicated, the Paddocks have no more use for "multilateral" aid programs than for unilateral ones. The "development" record of the international agencies, they note, has been as dismal as that of the U.S. government. Those who advocate channelling more U.S. aid money through such agencies ignore the fact that there is "no evidence that these agencies can be depended on to administer the additional money any more effectively than in the past." To the Paddocks, "multilateralism" is nothing more than a device to relieve the U.S. government of responsibility for "aid" failures.²³ This is a blunt, excellent book, and will be useful to anyone concerned with the gap between rhetoric and reality in U.S. foreign relations.

Unfortunately, the Paddocks' uncompromising realism is still at something of a premium in the United States. Like Lieuwen, Kalman Silvert is one of the most deservedly respected scholars working in the inter-American field. However, even he seems to find it difficult to dissociate himself fully from what Connell-Smith calls the U.S. "self-image." Thus in presenting his paper to the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, Silvert links his policy recommendations to that most traditional, elusive, and ambiguous of linguistic formulae, the supposed "special relationship" between the U.S. and Latin America. Attempting to provide what Stuart Chase would have called "semantic referents" for the phrase, Silvert suggests that it has "something to do with" such common

ideals as “Republicanism,” “egalitarian democracy,” “public welfare,” a professed distaste for “class and racial barriers,” and, “until recent years,” a “dominant ideological commitment” to capitalism as a “market economy of private participants.”²⁴

Silvert’s referents, however, are no more precise than the phrase they are supposed to explicate. Neither, unfortunately, are his policy prescriptions. “I should like my government,” he writes, “to apply moral suasion against and, if necessary, to adopt a policy only of cool and sharply limited diplomatic interchange with all states which commit atrocities *as an intrinsic and institutionalized part of the governmental process.*” To lend greater specificity to this recommendation, Silvert adds: “I think a legitimate case can be made that both Brazil and Chile have employed torture and political killing as consciously adopted policy.”²⁵ The sentiment is admirable. But how does one define “moral suasion”? And, assuming that it can be defined, is it better exercised through “cool and sharply limited diplomatic interchange” or through more positive forms of involvement?

Consider the following colloquy between two U.S. Senators and an AID official in charge of the U.S. police training program in Brazil:

Senator Aiken [Repub., Vermont]: I would like to ask him an easy one. Do you think the situation [with respect to police use of torture in Brazil] has been better than it would have been had we had no program?

Mr. [Theodore D.] Brown [Chief Public Safety Adviser, USAID]: I am certain of that, Senator.

Senator Aiken: I said that is an easy one.

Senator Church [Dem., Idaho]: He knocked that one out of the ball park.²⁶

Without ascribing motives to Senators Aiken and Church, I would suggest that once one grants to the U.S. government the right or responsibility of exercising something as nebulous as “moral suasion,” their argument in favor of police training programs is as defensible as Silvert’s argument for “cool and sharply limited diplomatic interchange.”²⁷ There also remains the equally difficult question of *how* U.S. government officials, and indeed *which* officials, are to decide *which* Latin American governments are committing atrocities “as . . . part of the governmental process.”

Silvert’s other chief recommendation concerns “socialist regimes” in the hemisphere. “We now know,” he writes, “that socialism is not automatically totalitarian.” Thus the U.S. government should not necessarily treat socialists the way it treats totalitarians. So far so good. On the other hand, he adds: “I do not agree with the mounting opinion that the United States government should not concern itself with the fate of American investors overseas, abandoning them to the vagaries of politics on the argument that the risk of expropriation was well known to them before they ventured forth. Rather, equity-seeking mechanisms of many sorts should be established, ranging from a reinforcement of present private international law to specialized courts of arbitration to appropriate and economically feasible insurance schemes internationally underwritten, if possible.” Here Silvert appends a revealing sentence: “Technical detail is not within

my competence, so I shall cease offering further suggestions."²⁸ Again, imprecise language opens the door to highly debatable policy prescriptions. *By which* international agencies are the insurance schemes to be underwritten, and using *whose* money? These are not questions of technical detail. They are profoundly political questions, and for a social scientist to follow the policy-makers' penchant for defining political questions as "technical" ones is profoundly disturbing. Finally, leaving aside the recent history of OPIC (the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation), what is one to make of a proposal for publicly funded corporate insurance schemes that purport to build upon a "common ideological commitment" to a "market economy of private participants"²⁹

Not having been privy to the deliberations of the commission to which Silvert presented his paper, I do not know to what extent his contribution influenced the commission's report. In some respects the language of the report differs from that employed by Silvert, as for instance in its rejection of "the paternalism conveyed by the rhetoric of 'special relationships.'" In the same sentence, however, the report suggests that the U.S. remain "sensitive to the unique qualities of inter-American relations."³⁰ Many of the commission's recommendations seem to run parallel to Silvert's. Regarding "moral suasion," for example, the U.S. "should press for the investigation of reported violations of human rights by appropriate international commissions, and it should take the findings of those groups into account in deciding on the substance and tone of its bilateral and multilateral relations."³¹ What constitutes a credible source in the reporting of such violations? And, following the Paddocks' argument, will the U.S. government begin by inviting the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit Detroit and Boston? Or Wounded Knee, South Dakota?

Fortunately, the commission does not adopt a stance of uniform moral rigidity. It recommends, for example, that the U.S. take the initiative in moving toward a normalization of relations with Cuba, including an ending of the trade embargo and repeal of the 1964 OAS resolutions. Some critics will object that the commission's motivation does *not* seem high-minded, since the report argues that the trade embargo serves "as much to deny American manufacturers a chance to compete for exports as it does to deprive the Cuban regime of supplies."³² But it is precisely this retreat from self-righteousness which makes the commission's recommendation most salutary. Indeed, U.S. trade with Cuba is more likely to reflect the voluntarism of the free market than U.S. trade with virtually any other Latin American country, since Cuba is least likely to be pressured into purchasing what it does not wish to buy.

In general, however, the commission's recommendations are in line with the traditional U.S. self-image. Either oblivious to or unimpressed by the Paddocks' findings, the commission calls for continued U.S. "aid" to the poorer countries of the area, targeted toward "projects within countries which will better the lot of the poorest segments of the population." The report also accepts the traditional assumption that the U.S. can "enhance Latin America's development prospects by encouraging the flow of technology southward."³³

The report is most ambiguous in dealing with U.S. government policy toward U.S. investors in the area. Eschewing the automatic application of gov-

ernmental sanctions in expropriation disputes, the commission suggests that "relationships between United States investors and Latin American countries are best conducted on a direct basis, with minimal U.S. government involvement." At the same time, the report adds: "It is not enough to assert that 'international law' protects foreign investors, nor can we realistically urge U.S. or other foreign companies to accept without any diplomatic recourse, the application of host country laws and practices to their companies when those practices contradict prevailing international norms."³⁴ Leaving aside the question of who sets "prevailing international norms," the commission's stance is reminiscent of Mr. Dooley's 1901 paraphrase of Theodore Roosevelt's position on corporate-government relations: "Th' thrusts . . . are heejous monstheres built up be th' inlightened intherprise iv th' men that have done so much to advance progress in our beloved counthry. . . . On wan hand I wud stamp thim undher fut; on th' other hand not so fast." The commission's ambivalence may not be entirely unrelated to the fact that a number of commission members are themselves corporate executives. On th' other hand, the inclusion of a number of academics is also significant.³⁵ Overall, the commission's outlook might be characterized as highly idealistic, highly low profile.

Nonetheless, despite the disappointing performance of a commission in which academics were reasonably well represented, there have been recent indications of the possibility of major advances in inter-American social science. In this respect the collection of papers and commentaries from the 1972 Lima conference, edited by Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen, is one of the most significant publications to emerge in years. The dialogue is sharp, the disagreements pointed, and the issues raised highly significant. As Cotler and Fagen note in their introduction, two major paradigms of inter-American relations emerged in the discussions. One was a "dependency" paradigm "emphasizing the structural relationships of imperialist domination within which all other inter-American relationships must be located and understood." The other they refer to as a "liberal" paradigm in which "asymmetries in power and resources, mechanisms for the redress of those asymmetries, and multiplicity of influences on policy" assumed the foreground.³⁶ Bearing out Connell-Smith's observations as to the gap between the U.S. self-image and the Latin American image of the U.S., most (though not all) U.S. participants seemed to favor the "liberal" paradigm, while the Latin Americans tended to argue in terms of the "dependency" paradigm.

A number of Latin American participants, including Aníbal Quijano Obregón and Luciano Martins, focused their attention on the emerging political and economic independence of the multinationals, a phenomenon to which Martins wryly refers as the "most recent ultimate stage of capitalism." If the U.S. government can act independently of the multinationals, they argue, so are the multinationals building a capacity to act independently of the U.S. government.³⁷ For this very reason, Latin American social scientists are also paying increasing attention to the relationship between the multinationals and domestic entrepreneurial groups within Latin America. Olga Pellicer de Brody cites data indicating that despite Mexican government claims that foreign investment is "secondary and complementary" to domestic Mexican investment, a majority of the largest firms

producing capital goods in Mexico are under foreign control. In his commentary on Pellicer's paper, Edelberto Torres Rivas suggests that "the groups most closely associated with international investors today form the nucleus of the [Mexican] ruling class." Paradoxically, the domestic political power of these groups grows as their economic power declines. Octavio Ianni suggests that the "most-favored-ally" policy of the U.S. government also tends to weaken the independence of the Latin Americans by playing them off against each other.³⁸

Among the U.S. participants, Ernest R. May, Christopher Mitchell, and Abraham Lowenthal seem to favor what Cotler and Fagen call the "liberal" paradigm. Following the "bureaucratic politics" model set forth in Graham Allison's analyses of the Cuban missile crisis, they stress conflict and disunity within the U.S. policy-making process. Parenthetically, it should be noted that none of these participants identified his preferred paradigm as "liberal", and Lowenthal explicitly criticizes what he calls the "liberal perspective" for its depiction of the U.S. government as a "unitary, rational actor."³⁹ What Cotler and Fagen call the "liberal" paradigm might perhaps be more accurately described as a "marketplace" paradigm, bearing in mind that people do not always behave rationally in the marketplace, and that a marketplace setting may also be characterized by "asymmetries in power and resources." In keeping with the rejection of the "unitary, rational actor" explanation of U.S. policy, May suggests a "flow chart" of the policy-making process, whereby one can trace the impact of various factors upon a problem as it works its way through the policy-making labyrinth. Defending the broad applicability of his model, May suggests that it can accommodate a variety of perspectives, including one specifically Marxist.⁴⁰ His use of language, however, suggests a political animus, not in the model itself but rather in his application of it.

At this point in the discussion I make no apology for introducing a personal note. The case study on which May focuses his analysis concerns U.S.-Argentine relations in the late wartime and early postwar eras. He cites my study of the Good Neighbor Policy as the "best example" of the "New Left" paradigm, "in which the nation figures as a self-preoccupied unitary actor."⁴¹ I find May's notion of internal "self-preoccupation" a confused linguistic construct of dubious validity. It is no more possible in practice to separate what May calls "internal political and economic interests" from "external political interests" than it is to separate domestic and foreign policy into airtight, self-contained compartments. Certainly my own analysis does not rest upon any such distinction. I also find disturbing his use of imprecise and arbitrary political language for purposes of social science disputation. To label is not to confront; indeed, it can often function as a means of evasion. May finds it convenient to label me "New Left." That is not a label that I apply to my own book; nor do I have any more use than does he for the "unitary actor" paradigm that he attributes to me. If he will reread my own treatment of the events he describes, he will find that it details much of the complex and often bitter infighting that took place within U.S. government circles.⁴²

Nonetheless, despite our mutual rejection of "unitary actor" explanations,

my perspective is quite different from his. In commenting on Mitchell's paper, Jorge Graciarena observes that an excessive preoccupation with the policy-making behavior of individuals or groups can cause one to lose track of the broad goals that the policy-making system is supposed to achieve.⁴³ One is then left with no criteria for determining which individual or group conflicts are of primary policy-level significance and which are either of secondary importance or tactical in nature. Professor May's preoccupation seems to have led him into precisely this *cul-de-sac*. Thus in treating post-1944 U.S. policy he arbitrarily focuses upon the behavior of such individuals as James F. Byrnes, George C. Marshall, Spruille Braden, and George Messersmith, and the time frame upon which he concentrates is the period from late 1945 to early 1947. The evidence presented in my own study suggests that the primary issues for U.S. policy-makers were control of Argentine nationalism and the maintenance of inter-American unity for purposes of prosecuting the Cold War against Soviet Russia. My main characters, accordingly, are Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller, and I suggest that the basic direction of U.S. policy was confirmed by the end of the San Francisco conference, before Byrnes ever became secretary of state. The infighting that occurred afterward was of course dramatic and involved the highly significant task of making the already agreed-upon policy acceptable to the U.S. public. In terms of basic policy direction, however, the events subsequent to the San Francisco conference were anticlimactic.⁴⁴

"Self-preoccupation" theory notwithstanding, it is apparently my stress upon undercutting Argentine nationalism and maintaining Cold War unity which has prompted May to label me "New Left." I would suggest that one need not be "New Left" to appreciate the significance of these themes, or, for that matter, to appreciate the policy perspective and political importance of Arthur Vandenberg as well as the combination of policy perspective and personal ambition underlying the behavior of Nelson Rockefeller. The larger issue in dispute here does not really seem to involve what kind of model one is to adopt as a heuristic device. As May suggests: "'Bureaucratic politics' is not an alternative macropolitical theory. It is rather a body of micro-level findings, apparently verifiable empirically, that larger theories of imperialism or *dependencia* should not ignore."⁴⁵ I agree. My own analysis of U.S. Argentine policy would fit very nicely into May's "flow chart." The question is rather what kind of information or "micro-level findings" one feeds through the model, and here I suspect the crucial problem is the degree to which one dissociates one's self from what Connell-Smith calls the U.S. "self-image."

In this regard one of the most important issues to emerge from the Lima conference is raised in Fagen's commentary on Luigi Einaudi's paper. Speaking to Einaudi's suggestion that academics "inject themselves into policy debates," Fagen raises the crucial questions: In what fashion, and to what purpose? He suggests two avenues through which social scientists can usefully involve themselves. One is by means of what he calls "documented denunciation" of the "worst excesses of the exercise of North American power." The other is through "the structured exploration of the possible," which implies "prying into every corner and crevice of the policy-making process and the configurations of power

to clarify what kinds of change *are* possible given existing or foreseeable short-run realities in the United States." He himself suggests, among other examples, the liquidation of OPIC, "leaving capitalistic enterprises to run the risks that supposedly entitle them to profits."⁴⁶

Can such activities as Fagen proposes be undertaken without sacrificing the intellectual rigorousness and open-mindedness upon which social science presumably depends? And do such activities imply a preference for one explanatory model over another? The answer to the first question, I suggest, is that in many respects, as indicated by the material contained in the works here reviewed, we already have an advocacy-oriented social science, which might become intellectually *more* rigorous if the advocacy orientation were brought into the open instead of remaining camouflaged behind imprecise language and labelling. Such openness need not make social science more partisan; it would probably make it more independent. As regards the second question, I suggest that the differences between explanatory models or paradigms, whether labelled "dependency," "liberal," "marketplace," or whatever, are ultimately not differences over analytical tools so much as they are differences over values and goals, however implicit those values and goals might be. Following the logic implicit in the arguments of Connell-Smith and the Paddocks, social scientists might find it useful to examine their own methodology for hidden values and goals, with a view to allowing these to become as openly debatable as methodology itself.

In line with this suggestion, inter-Americanists might also consider the admission into the social science debate of a value system and goal orientation looking not toward the increase of U.S. government "good works," or merely toward the decrease of the worst of the "bad works" but toward the reduction of U.S. government works, period. A "structured exploration of the possible" in this case would involve investigations geared not only to the dismantling of direct U.S. government power in Latin America, but geared as well to the dismantling of such "domestic" U.S. legislation as enables multinational corporations and other private agencies to exert their own power abroad. Such an approach would have implications for both "dependency" and "marketplace" paradigms; presumably it could be undertaken through the use of any number of heuristic devices, including May's "flow chart." It would have obvious implications in terms of the U.S. "self-image," and in terms of the vocabulary of U.S. Latin American policy. Most important, it might assist social scientists in probing further into the language of government policy-makers, the better to clarify outstanding contemporary issues. For if the Paddocks are correct in arguing that good intentions notwithstanding, the U.S. government does not know how to solve Latin America's problems, either unilaterally or "multilaterally," social scientists might profitably lend a helping hand in assisting the U.S. government to get out of Latin America's way, so that Latin Americans themselves might have a chance to grapple with their own pressing problems.

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NOTES

1. Stone is quoted in *Newsweek*, 19 November 1973, p.139B. For a classic and still useful analysis of the dangers of imprecise political language, see Stuart Chase, *The Tyranny of Words* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938).
2. Glauert and Langley, eds., *U.S. and Latin America*, pp. 35, 141, 144.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 182.
4. Connell-Smith, *U.S. and Latin America*, pp. xii-xiii, 9-12, and passim. See in particular Connell-Smith's comments on efforts by U.S. academics and policy-makers to deny any comparison between the 1965 U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic and Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia in 1968. *Ibid.*, pp. 270-71.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
6. *Ibid.*, p. xiv. A "disposition to virtue," Maritain has observed, may be even more dangerous than a "disposition to vice," in that a "disposition to virtue" may be "unrestrained by conscience."
7. Gurtov, *U.S. Against the Third World*, pp. 4-9, 201, 210ff.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
9. Connell-Smith, p. 275, n. 17.
10. Gurtov, pp. 214-15.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
12. Both these subjects are taken up at length in Cotler and Fagen, eds., *Latin America and the United States*, to be discussed *infra*. On the military relationship see in particular the article by John Saxe-Fernández and commentary by Alfred Stepan. The role of the multinationals is discussed throughout the book.
13. Arbaiza, *Mars Moves South*, pp. 3-9, 77-83.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
15. These arguments are advanced *ibid.*, pp. 5-8.
16. For discussion of the Hartke-Burke Bill, supported by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and opposed by the corporate membership of the Council of the Americas, see the article by Luciano Martins in Cotler and Fagen, pp. 375-78.
17. On this point, see the report of the Commission on the U.S.-Latin American Relations, discussed *infra*.
18. Rice, *Extension in the Andes*, pp. 83, 94-100, 117-22.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 244-45, 428.
20. Connell-Smith, p. xiii.
21. Paddock and Paddock, *We Don't Know How*, pp. 299-300. One of the Paddocks' better stories, which also serves as a side comment on the role of some social scientists in the "aid" business, concerns the AID mission director in predominantly agricultural Guatemala, who told them bluntly: "I don't know a cow from a bunny rabbit. . . . I'm a political economist." *Ibid.*, p. 12.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 303-4.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 289-95.
24. Silvert, *Relevance of Latin American Domestic Politics*, pp. 27-28. Also see Chase, *Appendix*.
25. Silvert, p. 20 (italics in original).
26. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Policies and Programs in Brazil*, 92nd Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1971), p. 21.
27. The U.S. AID police training program has, in fact, recently been ended. It could be revived at any time, however, in another form.
28. Silvert, pp. 23-25.
29. See the Luciano Martins article in Cotler and Fagen for a lengthy discussion of OPIC as it relates to the larger issues of hemispheric relations.
30. Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations, *The Americas*, p. 2.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.

33. Ibid., pp. 44, 49-50.
34. Ibid., p. 46.
35. For Mr. Dooley's comment, see Finley Peter Dunne, *Mr. Dooley at his Best* (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1938), pp. 104-5. The commission membership included four attorneys (one of whom is also a corporate vice-president and a former U.S. attorney general), five corporation executives (four chairmen and a vice-president), three bankers, eiott academics (four social scientists, three university presidents and one chancellor), a former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, a museum director, and a former U.S. attorney general now serving as a distinguished fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
36. Cotler and Fagen, pp. 6-7.
37. Ibid., pp. 79, 370ff. Martins's comment is on p. 368.
38. Ibid., pp. 327-28, 342, 49.
39. Ibid., pp. 129-63, 176-204, and 212-35. The works by Allison to which they refer are *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), and "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in *American Political Science Review* 43, no.3 (1969): 689-718. Lowenthal's criticism of the "liberal perspective," which he also applies to the "radical perspective," is in Cotler and Fagen, pp. 225ff.
40. Ibid., pp. 160, 163.
41. Ibid., pp. 135ff, esp. 138-39. The reference is to David Green, *The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971).
42. See *ibid.*, esp. pp. 215-34, 237-54. While linking his "New Left" paradigm to the notion of a "self-preoccupied unitary actor," May also charges that the "conventional unitary actor explanation supposes that Argentina acted in response to what was done by the United States." See Cotler and Fagen, pp. 138, 163. According to May's own logic, the Argentine government should have been as "self-preoccupied" as was the U.S. government. Apparently, however, May's version of the "New Left" paradigm is one in which only the U.S. is "self-preoccupied." Apart from the arbitrary nature of this notion of "self-preoccupation," May's analysis seems peculiarly contradictory in view of his acknowledgment of my contention that U.S. policy-makers were extremely concerned about Argentine economic and political independence. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
43. Cotler and Fagen, p. 209.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-55, and Green, pp. 215-22 and 244-54.
45. Cotler and Fagen, p. 163.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 264, 260.