

Educating for Democracy

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Proper educational planning requires us to take account of future needs and emerging aspirations in full knowledge of the fact that the world our children will inhabit is going to be partly determined by the kind of world for which we educate. Obviously, if literacy standards are low and we need to develop a more literate society, then we must educate for it. It should be equally obvious that if our democratic way of life needs strengthening, then we must educate for that as well. Since many countries of the region aspire to an extension of democratic forms of life, it is as well to ask, in general terms, what kinds of educational practices would help to sustain more flourishing democracies. This question is addressed by providing theoretical grounds for practical ways of reforming the curriculum and thinking about the social basis of teaching and learning.¹

The guiding ideals of democracy

All societies need guiding ideals. By guiding ideals, I mean ones that help to shape and direct conduct. Such ideals are inherent in a society's strivings and realized through them. As emblematic of its guiding ideals, a society's efforts and successes are not merely particular labours and accomplishments. They are signs of a world that lies down the path of its continuing efforts. Such a world progressively embodies a society's guiding ideals, however incomplete or imperfect that embodiment may be.²

It is important to acknowledge that the manifestations of a society's ideals will be partial and flawed. No society embodies its ideals to the full. Let it be said that a democratic society is one in which there is equal access to education. Any society that aims to be democratic must therefore not only subscribe to this condition in principle, but have equality of access as a guiding ideal. So long as a society is genuinely attempting to move in that direction, it can be said to have such a guiding ideal. As with *de jure* standards and principles and those that operate *de facto*, we may speak of

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ideals as either guiding or manifest. In what follows I will be making some general claims about the guiding ideals of democratic societies, and it should be understood that actual societies may aim to be in various ways democratic, while to some degree failing to meet those standards in fact.

The claim that ideals play a part in fashioning society sometimes is viewed with scepticism. Since it would defeat my purpose to spend much time rebutting this view, I will confine myself to one member of a family of arguments that may be taken to stand for the rest. Insofar as democratic societies run market economies, it might be argued, following the assertion made by Adam Smith (1981: 456), that the greater good of society is an unintended consequence of individual self-interest and the invisible hand operating in the marketplace. This makes social ideals a result of self-interest and economic forces and renders all talk about the collaborative fashioning of common values so much window-dressing. Wantonly or not, this line of argument conflates democracy with a market economy. While it remains to be seen whether democratic social forms inevitably accompany the development of a market economy, the two would still be conceptually distinct even if they turned out to be coextensive. The suggestion that all public values derive from or supervene upon the efficient functioning of the market is an unrelieved capitalism, not democracy. The market economy may provide an economic base for democracy, but a society cannot claim to operate democratically unless its political and social directions are continually informed by ideals that are not first and foremost economic.

The manner in which a society's guiding ideals are fashioned and adapted varies with its political and social arrangements. In some societies, such matters remain the preserve of elders, priests, oligarchs, autocrats or political elites. In democratic societies, however, we find a more diffuse arrangement. Democratic societies are not controlled by the unquestionable dictates of political, military or religious leaders. To the extent to which a society is genuinely democratic, it places a premium on the deliberations and decisions of individuals and groups that have unfettered access to information and freedom of expression and exchange. Therefore democratic societies must enable individuals and all kinds of groups with different interests and outlooks to fruitfully engage with each other in dealing with social issues and problems. This is the democratic means of maintaining social coherence and adapting the society to change and circumstance. It is the process through which the guiding ideals of a democratic society become manifest.

In presenting his general conception of democracy, John Dewey (1966: 81–88) singled out two criteria for special mention that may fairly be said to form the guiding ideals of any society that aims to be democratic. They pertain to the community of interests and the creative freedom of open interaction. The first has to do with the extent to which a society gives expression to a wide range of mutually interpenetrating interests and aims to maximize the satisfaction of those interests rather than catering to a narrow range of economic or other interests, or to the interests of the few. The second concerns the degree of free interplay and cooperation between groups, whereby the possibilities of socially cohesive development are enlarged. According to Dewey (1966: 87), these two traits are the hallmarks of the democratically constituted society, and I will follow him in this for the purposes of the present discussion. Given that they are definitive, as Dewey maintains, they become essential desiderata

for any society that aims to be democratic, and provide a yardstick for determining the extent to which such a society has succeeded in its aims. This is tantamount to saying that they must be embodied in its guiding ideals.

Since they are of such importance, allow me to elaborate further on these two leading democratic ideals. A democratic society is not authoritarian and hierarchical, with social policy and direction made on high and decisions commanded down the line. Instead, all manner of individuals and social groups are actively involved in shaping the society and share responsibility for decisions and actions that lead to its growth and development. These efforts would not be coherent or sustainable unless people were bound together by what Dewey (1966: 87) called 'mutually interpenetrating' interests. In order to function effectively, democratic societies need a good deal of connective tissue. Without the social ligaments provided by mutually interpenetrating interests, we could not expect individuals and groups to act in ways that reflect and enhance the interests of others.

The mutuality of interests that characterizes a democratic way of life is easily seen when we contrast democracy with other forms of governance. For example, the interests of a subject people governed by an imperial power need not coincide with those of its rulers, who may ruthlessly pursue their own interests in almost total disregard for the interests of the ruled. Similarly, the ruling elite in an oligarchy may serve their own interests to the neglect and detriment of the interests of those who make up the bulk of society. Such cases not only contrast with the mutuality of interests for which democracy strives, but also help to highlight the fact that democratic ways of life tend to maximize the satisfaction of interests. Wherever the interests of a foreign power ride roughshod over those of a subject population, or an oligarch sacrifices the interests of the many in order to satisfy his own, there is a great deficit in the ledger of interests. This is usually accompanied by repression and disdain on the part of the rulers and docility or rebellion upon that of the ruled. The effective operation of a democratic society, by contrast, depends upon reciprocity of relations. It places different groups under an obligation to show respect for each other's interests and to adjust to one another accordingly. This is an arrangement that tends to maximize the satisfaction of interests.

The general drift of Dewey's second ideal is once again easily discerned by comparing democratic societies with alternatives. In an authoritarian society, such as one ruled by a fascist dictator or one run by a despotic military regime, freedom of association and assembly are strictly controlled, and any form of association that is seen as in any way threatening the absolute power of the government will be suppressed. This goes along with the curtailment of open debate and exchange of ideas leading to bans on unauthorized public meetings and control of the media. At the same time, the orchestration of massive public assemblies and the formation of official associations of many kinds are characteristically used as tools of state control. Again, in hierarchical societies, such as those divided along racial lines or marked by rigid caste or class structures, economic and social life tend to run in parallel formation. Relations of dominance and subservience exist between members of the different strata and strictly delimit relations between them. The boundaries set up by race, caste and class form impediments to a democratic way of life, which includes association on equitable terms among its ideals. The contrast with democracy is even

more vividly revealed in the use of surveillance, intimidation and physical force to restrict and regulate forms of association and limit communication and the free flow of ideas in authoritarian societies.

It should come as no surprise that Dewey's two founding ideals of democracy are closely intertwined. The growth of mutual interests is a concomitant of fuller and freer interaction; and greater respect for differing interests can be expected from relations that are established on equitable terms. Dewey was well aware of the intimate connections between these two ideals, and of their connection, in turn, with the democratic ideal of liberty. In the sense of positive freedom, or what Dewey calls the 'liberation of powers', liberty is a significant outcome of his two leading ideals. I will end this part of the discussion by examining a passage where he connects all three ideals under the banner of democracy.

A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. The more numerous and varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests. (Dewey 1966: 87)

Dewey's democracy is social as well as political. It is a way of life and not just a form of government. On his conception, democracy is an inclusive form of society in which open communication and reciprocity extend participation in matters of interest to people of all kinds. Thus democracy establishes spheres of mutual interest and association that reduce social divisions, enlarge the circle of human contact, and facilitate the widespread mutual adjustment of individuals to one another. The greater the involvement and ready participation of people in all kinds of affairs, the larger the stake that they have in all that concerns them, and the varied approaches, skills and abilities that are thus brought into play are great liberators of human potential. Such liberty, as Dewey (1981: 329) elsewhere says, 'is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which takes place only in rich and manifold association with others'. When put into action, Dewey's two fundamental guiding ideals of democracy provide the means by which to stimulate personal motivation and provide opportunity for the development of our powers. Life in a free society is not to be conceived only in negative terms – as involving the absence of various barriers and restrictions – but in terms of a life in which we can realize our full potential. That is the ultimate meaning of the free society, which is so often held up as the promise of democracy. To make this more than a mere lofty ideal, however, a society needs to include Dewey's two principles among its guiding ideals.

This analysis leads to the second part of my talk. I have provided a sketch of democracy's guiding ideals in order to ask what kinds of educational practices might help to develop and sustain democratic ways of life. My next task is to see what follows from these general remarks about the personal qualities that we need to

develop if we are to nurture democracy through the way we approach teaching and learning in schools.

Democratic dispositions³

If we are serious about educating for democracy then we need to move beyond thinking of it simply as teaching students about such things as forms of elected representative government. For it is clear that democratic ways of life are far more dependent upon the kinds of regard that people have for one another and their readiness to engage with each other in ways that reflect democratic ideals. Unless a society nurtures these dispositions, it is in danger of possessing only the trappings of democracy. It is all too easy for a society to boast of its parliamentary democracy while many of its people are downtrodden or exploited. We are all familiar with such things as the tyranny of the sweatshop and the oppression of minorities in nominally democratic states. People who are exploited in their workplaces or whose ethnic communities suffer serious discrimination are not living in a democratic society in any meaningful sense. That they have the opportunity to periodically cast their ballot is not meaningful if their working conditions are tyrannical or their communities are unable to live in the wider society on equitable terms. These are not just matters for legislation and the instrumentalities of the state. They are also very much a matter of attitude and outlook.

The dispositions that underlie and support democratic ways of life are in need of fuller treatment than I can give them here. Yet even a rough and ready inspection makes it clear that the following are among the traits that would help to develop a robust community of interest and a capacity for free interplay and cooperation:

- an inquiring and open-minded outlook;
- willingness to look at things from other people's points of view and to consider their interests;
- a disposition to respond to differences and disagreements with others on the basis of reason rather than resorting to abuse or force;
- a tendency to be actively involved in matters of community concern;
- an inclination to think for oneself and to take responsibility for one's decisions and actions.

The development of an open-minded and inquiring outlook offers protection against intellectual rigidity and social prejudice, two of the most destructive enemies of free and equitable interplay between diverse individuals or groups. People who bring an inquiring attitude to social affairs are also more likely to think things through, and therefore to be less easily manipulated by those with vested interests who may be none too scrupulous about the means of persuasion that they employ. When people are susceptible to such things as media manipulation and political propaganda it is all the more difficult to establish a genuine community of interests.

Unless we are willing to see things from another's point of view we are likely to have little or no insight into how they are affected by our decisions and actions, but will see things only in terms of our own interests. This is detrimental to the devel-

opment of a community of interests, which requires each party to take the interests of the others into account. Mutual adjustment to one another becomes a matter of dominance and subservience, of stronger and weaker, if it does not proceed on an equitable basis; and this requires a willingness to see things from another's viewpoint and to consider their interests in matters of common concern.

We hardly need to be reminded of the frequency with which people stoop to verbal abuse or physical violence when faced with a conflict of outlooks or interests. This is true in all kinds of contexts, whether it is bullying in the schoolyard, domestic violence, harassment in the workplace, or a slanging match on the floor of parliament. Although it is often viewed with polite scorn by the general public, the last of these ironically tramples upon one of the most fundamental ideals of democratic life. The parliament of a democracy, of all places, should be a model of reasoned discussion and debate, allowing for open and searching interchange so as to arrive at policy and legislation that can maximize the satisfaction of interests. The adversarial nature of existing democratic political systems is partly to blame for this, of course, but the tendency for people to stoop to abuse or even physical violence in dealing with conflict cannot be entirely blamed on divisive social arrangements and institutions. Such behaviour is common among children from a very young age, and we need to do what we can to remedy it from the early school years. In educating for democracy, we must draw a connection between the way that we want students to relate to one another today and the way they will need to relate to each other tomorrow if they are to enjoy a more democratic way of life. Democracy involves full and free interplay in the satisfaction of our mutually interpenetrating interests, and this requires us to relate to each other on the basis of reason, rather than resorting to the use of force or abuse. Therefore we need to do all we can to strengthen the disposition of students to be reasonable in the ways that they respond to one another.

One of the most difficult challenges for a democratic society is the tendency for people to believe that they are more or less powerless to influence events going on about them and not to take an active role in community life. This inactivity weakens the community of interests, sacrifices many opportunities for social exchange, and makes it easier for those who would serve their own interests to do just that by exercising undue influence on policy and decisions that affect the general interest. While no doubt there are many reasons why people leave it to others to become actively involved in matters of social concern, we need to take steps to improve the situation if we are to promote more deeply democratic societies. One way of addressing the problem is to provide young people with the kind of education that develops a tendency to become more actively involved in their communities. We must do what we can to promote active citizenship in the coming generations while they are still at school.

Finally, people who are not inclined to think for themselves are less ready to take responsibility for their own decisions and actions and are therefore more in need of being told what to do. This means that they are ill prepared to take an active part in dealing with all kinds of problems and issues that affect their interests and less able to establish equitable relations in many areas of their lives. In Dewey's terms, they will not enjoy the liberation of their powers to the same extent as their better prepared peers. Consequently they will be deprived of many of the fruits of a demo-

cratic way of life. This applies not only to participation in the economy, but to the whole array of social and personal accomplishments that depend upon being willing and able to take one's share of responsibility for whatever is done in cooperation with others.

This completes the second leg of our journey. Having identified a range of dispositions that are needed for a democratic way of life to flourish, it remains for me to suggest how they may be developed through school education. I will do this by way of a general discussion of how they relate to the curriculum and associated approaches to teaching and learning. Today I will focus on the twin topics of the intellectual dispositions strengthened by an inquiry-based approach to teaching and learning and the social dispositions developed through ample opportunity for teacher-guided collaboration between students.

Intellectual dispositions and inquiry-based learning

I will start by discussing the development of an inquiring outlook and a tendency for students to think for themselves – rather than to be the passive and unthinking recipients of whatever is dished up to them – through the way that we approach the curriculum and teach in our schools. While many things could be said about this, I will concentrate upon engaging students in inquiry as the mode of learning that is best suited to developing these democratic dispositions. Before coming to that, however, I first need to dispel a common myth about teaching and learning.

There is a widespread view in the general public, all too often exploited by politicians of a particular stamp and echoed by certain sections of the media, that teaching and learning is all a matter of 'teaching that' and 'learning that'. It appears to escape attention that this narrow factualism does not accord with everyday experience or with a great deal of the teaching and learning that occurs in school. Aside from supplying students with cut-and-dried intellectual content, teachers require their students to produce both critical and creative work. They teach them how to express themselves clearly in speech and writing, for example, and how to analyse a poem or use brushes and paints. They show them how to do things and train their skills. They demonstrate and coach.

This point has – or should have – application across the curriculum. Learning to engage in science is not the same thing as memorizing scientific results. One can learn to repeat scientific facts and theories without gaining any understanding of scientific research. For that one needs the guided experience of such things as laboratory work and organized field trips. The same applies to the arts. It is one thing for students to learn what others have said about a novel or to learn a poem by heart, and quite another to engage in critical appreciation or to learn how to make effective use of metaphor and simile. Technological subjects are obviously no different. While there is a good deal of theory to be learnt about electronic circuitry, for example, learning to use that knowledge to create an electronic device requires demonstration, cooperative interchange and practical experience. The point hardly needs to be made for physical education. Learning to improve one's swimming stroke is not a matter of learning a set of theoretical statements.⁴

I have emphasized the importance of 'learning how' across the curriculum because learning the art of inquiry is a matter of learning how to do things. In learning to inquire in some field, students are learning to use methods, tools and procedures that have been found to be effective in making headway of one kind or another. Of course students cannot learn to do such things without learning appropriate facts. One cannot learn chemistry without learning a considerable body of chemical fact. But learning how to do chemistry cannot be reduced to learning such things as the periodic table and a vast number of chemical formulae. It involves using such facts to test for – as well as to hypothesize, explain and reason about – chemical properties and events.

Learning to inquire in any part of the curriculum is learning how to think in that domain. For the thinking that is central to the various disciplines that underlie the curriculum is inquiry of one kind or another. So a curriculum that is based on inquiry is one that is centred on thinking. Whether it is learning how to test a hypothesis in science, learning how to construct a narrative in history or learning how to create a poem in literary studies, students are learning how to think. They are learning how to think scientifically, historically or poetically.

There is nothing more essential for developing inquiring minds than learning to think in such ways. Otherwise students are left with the dry, desiccated products of scientific, historical and other inquiries from which we have extracted the modes of thought that produced the knowledge and understanding in the first place. If in the name of education we spend all our time trying to cram this residue into students' heads we shouldn't complain when they don't seem to be bothered to think about it. We haven't given them any means of thinking about the subject matter that we teach.

There is a world of difference in outcome to be expected from an education that emphasizes the memorization of knowledge and one that treats such knowledge as material with which to think. When inquiry has been a guiding light of their education, students can be expected to emerge from it with an inquiring outlook and a capacity for independent thought and judgement. For there is nothing more likely to develop an inquiring attitude than habitually learning by engaging in inquiry, and there is nothing like learning to inquire for developing a capacity to think for oneself.⁵

An inquiring citizenry rather than an unquestioning one is a prerequisite for a robust democracy, and this requires a population that has been taught how to think rather than one that has been constantly told what to think. So if we are to educate for a more deeply democratic society, we must abandon the model of education in which students are presented with so much information that they are asked to unquestioningly acquire. We must replace it with one in which students learn how to inquire, and where the information with which they are presented is material with which to think. Only then will the students that graduate from our schools be ready to think for themselves and to assume a measured responsibility for their own decisions and actions.

A society in which people let others do their thinking for them is one in which opinions and judgements of all kinds are settled on the basis of power and authority. In cases requiring special expertise that may be entirely appropriate, but it is the kiss

of death when it comes to everyday problems and issues in a democratic society. If people are not ready, willing and able to take an active role in resolving the issues that concern them, then they will inevitably have to wear the decisions that others make in their stead. Even supposing that they are fortunate enough to have their interests protected by a benign paternalism, this only goes to show the incompatibility between a democratic way of life and one in which a populace does not have a responsible share in resolving issues that concern the common weal.

Insofar as education can remedy this matter, inquiry-based learning is surely the key. In many nominally democratic societies, those few who have developed an inquiring mind have done so in spite of their education rather than because of it. If we are to extend and deepen our democracies, we must turn this around.

Social dispositions and collaborative learning

I now turn to the cluster of social dispositions that promote the development of reciprocal relations and an inclusive community of interests. As we saw earlier, the social inclinations that promote a democratic way of life include being willing to see what things look like from another person's point of view, being prepared to consider other people's interests and more generally to be reasonable in your dealings with others, and being ready to be actively involved in community life. Both from an educational perspective and in terms of what is required for democratic citizenship, these social dispositions need to be conjoined with the intellectual ones discussed in the previous section. In looking at how a democratic social outlook may be encouraged through education, I will therefore try to show how we can achieve a synthesis of these social and intellectual dispositions. If we can do this successfully in school, we will have gone a long way towards producing democratic citizens.

Classrooms may no longer be places where it is generally forbidden for students to talk to one another. Yet to recommend, as I am about to do, that discussion among students should be placed at the centre of classroom activity is likely to sound educationally novel, if not outlandish. This is because the traditional educational relationship is between a teacher who has a well-grounded knowledge of the subject matter that is to be taught and the students who are presumed to be ignorant of it. Therefore the students need to pay attention to the teacher and try to assimilate the knowledge passed on to them through the teacher's instruction. In such a classroom, it is generally a distraction if students interact with one another, and if a student is going to communicate with anyone it should be with the teacher. In the classrooms of my youth, which were fully under the sway of this model of knowledge transfer, talking to another student was a misdemeanour, and punishments were inflicted. Many of those teachers ruled their classrooms like martinets inducting students into the army, rather than preparing them for life in a democracy.

When we move away from the closed questions and settled knowledge of the traditional classroom to the open questions and search for knowledge of the more inquiring one, we go from a classroom that stresses basic comprehension and memorization to one in which inquiry, conceptual exploration and reasoning come into play. Once we make this transition, the teacher is no longer confined to convey-

ing textbook versions of the results of inquiries carried out by physicists, historians, economists and so forth, and becomes more occupied with assisting students to learn to think about the subject matter that is being taught. It is then that it becomes educationally desirable for students to engage with one another.

Let us see why this is so by considering a common feature of various kinds of inquiry. When in scientific inquiry we try to explain what we have observed – to explain the evidence before us or the facts of the case – there must be alternative possible explanations.⁶ When human conduct stimulates moral inquiry, it is usually because that conduct is controversial, which is to say that there are different points of view as to how it should be judged. When in business or professional life we inquire in order to develop some significant idea or proposal, we need advice and criticism. In all these cases we need each other. I may suggest one explanation while you offer another that had not occurred to me. That gives both of us something to think about. If you and I have different opinions about the probity of certain conduct, then we are both in need of justification and our views are subject to each other's reservations. When I make a proposal, I rely upon others who are reasonably well-placed for constructive criticism, in order that my suggestion may be tested and improved.

This reliance upon others applies equally to the classroom. Intellectually, if we want students to avoid the habit of going with their own first thoughts, to become used to considering a range of possibilities, and to be on the lookout for better alternatives, then we could not do better than to have them learn to explore issues, problems and ideas together. What better way to develop an inquiring and open-minded attitude to the problems and issues that life will present? If we want them to become used to giving reasons for what they think, to expect the same of others, and to make productive use of criticism, then we could not go past giving them plenty of practice in the give-and-take of reason with their peers. How better to encourage them to think for themselves and to learn to take responsibility for their decisions and actions?

I hope it is equally obvious that collaborative inquiry is made to order when it comes to endowing students with the social dispositions that support a democratic way of life. Through engaging in collaborative inquiry, students can be taught to listen to other people with whom they may not agree. They can be taught to hear each other out and to develop a broader outlook in their own thinking. This means that as our children grow up they will become used to considering other people's points of view, and not to think that those who disagree with them about matters of value and conduct must be either ignorant or vicious. It means that they will be more accustomed to taking other people's interests and concerns into account in deciding what to do and become a great deal more reasonable in handling their differences and disagreements. By developing their readiness to engage with one another in this manner, we are also paving the way for active engagement in community life. With the exception of sports, traditional schooling looks like an education designed for people to become inured to working under an authority who keeps them employed on their individually assigned tasks and not to learn how to connect with one another and take collective responsibility for their own conduct. It is difficult to know to what extent the failure to engage students with each other has discouraged shared initiative and active citizenship in later life. But if we want to build the social dispositions

of democracy in the coming generation then we couldn't do better than make ample provision for collaborative inquiry in their education.

Concluding remarks

A brief philosophical discussion of the educational implications of democracy cannot be other than a broad-brush affair. It cannot hope to make explicit the educational connotations of the many and varied conceptions of democracy that have a place in the patchwork quilt of extant democratic societies, much less provide tailor-made practical recommendations to drive the always difficult process of educational reform in them. It can, however, appeal to overarching democratic ideals and show how they might manifest themselves in education.

For all its generality, such an account is useful in helping us to gain our philosophical bearings. It can make us aware of discrepancies between our current educational practices and those that are better suited to ideals we may profess. This is certainly true of the ideals with which I have been concerned today. So far as I am aware, education that centres on collaborative and inquiry-based learning has a patchy existence in the education systems of our so-called democracies. When judged in terms of democratic ideals, normal educational practice often seems more fitting to an autocratic and authoritarian society than to a democratic way of life. If nothing else, therefore, it shows that we have a task before us if we are to transform the way that we go about teaching and learning to better reflect the style of education implicit in those ideals. At the end of the day, unless we are prepared to work out how to give concrete reality to such reforms, we can hardly claim to be serious about creating more deeply democratic societies.

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Notes

1. This paper was originally prepared for and presented at the 6th National Social Science Congress of the Philippine Social Science Council, Quezon City, on May 8, 2008.
2. Guiding ideals are not ones to which mere lip service may be paid. Professed ideals are guiding ideals only to the extent that they genuinely inform and are reflected in conduct.
3. While I will be focusing on dispositions, this is not meant to downplay the importance of knowledge and skills. It is of course vital for educators to identify the knowledge and skills that students will need if they are to engage in a richly democratic way of life. Further discussion of these matters in relation to Dewey can be found in Cam (2000).
4. For application of the distinction between 'learning that' and 'learning how' to education, see Ryle (1970).
5. See Lipman (2002) for an extended account of the educational significance of inquiry-based learning.
6. If there is only one live possibility, then that is the answer, and we no longer need to search for an explanation. It is important to note that this is not the same thing as having been able to come up with only one explanation. In that case, inquiry demands that we test it out so far as we can, knowing that there may be other possibilities which we have not been able to identify.

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