

ABSTRACTS FROM INQUIRY Vol. 10, No. 2

IDEOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE COLWYN WILLIAMSON, University of Alberta, Edmonton

The purpose of this article is to deal with certain problems stemming from the concept of *Ideology*. It begins by describing some aspects of the 'ordinary notion' of ideology, and goes on to criticize a standard (the economic determinist) interpretation of Marx's position. It then deals with a problem traditionally connected with ideology, the so-called Problem of Knowledge, and argues that it is a pseudoproblem. The article concludes by proposing a conception of *ideology as synecdoche* which, it is claimed, helps us to avoid some of the mistakes imbedded in the Problem of Knowledge and the economic determinist interpretation of Marxism.

INDETERMINACY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES RICHARD LICHTMAN, University of California, Berkeley

It is maintained that a principle of indeterminacy exists in the social sciences which bears some resemblance to the Heisenberg principle in the realm of physics. In the social sciences, however, the principle is grounded not on physical interference, but on the capacity of human beings to alter their behavior on the basis of changing conceptions of their social condition, and so the contention of writers like Nagel 'that no distinct principle of explanation is involved' must be rejected. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the causes of social indeterminacy, which suggests that the phenomenon is ineradicable.

UNDERSTANDING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HISTORY ROLF GRUNER, University of Durham

Understanding in its widest sense is the aim of all rational knowledge. A distinction can be made between *interpretation* (leading to the understanding of *meanings*) and *explanation* (leading to the understanding of *facts*). The view that in the social sciences facts and meanings are the same is criticized. In respect of the specific understanding of human and social facts *empathetic* and *rational* understanding are distinguished and some of the difficulties pointed out inherent in both, in particular with regard to *testability*. On the other hand, it is found that a purely behaviouristic approach, although possible, would not be completely satisfactory, so that in spite of all difficulties the social sciences (history included) cannot do without specific understanding, as a heuristic device as well as an aim.

CAN A SINGLE ACTION HAVE MANY DIFFERENT DESCRIPTIONS? ARTHUR B. CODY, San Jose State College, California

To say that a single human action can be given different descriptions is to imply that the contrast between action and description is intelligible. There are several ways in which such a contrast is easily understood, but those ways do not meet philosophers' needs. They have said that the descriptions are all true, thereby excluding that interpretation in which no more than one description could be true. They have emphasized the word 'different,' therefore that interpretation in which the descriptions are partial and consequently combinable into one larger description is excluded. The descriptions must be different and true while remaining descriptions of the same single action. How can we conceive of this sort of contrast between description and action? It is not a familiar one. Several attempts are made in this paper to provide a way of conceiving of the contrast. All fail. The conclusion is hesitantly drawn that we have no other way to conceive of different human actions than by descriptions which are different from one another and true.

OF WORDS AND TOOLS

SAMUEL PAGEE, Institute of Technology, Edmonton, Alberta

Further to Herman Tennessen's recent methodological criticisms of Linguistic philosophy, the present paper seeks to offer some theoretical criticisms. Two main claims of Linguistic philosophy are examined: (1) that the concept of 'use' satisfactorily explains how words and expressions are meaningful; and (2), that the correspondence theory of meaning has been successfully repudiated. After a brief exposition, the explanation is further specified as being analogical (words are like tools). Six objections (semantical, logical, and psychological) are suggested. It is concluded that not only is the explanation not satisfactory, but that some of the same problems of the older theory may also be implicit in the 'use' theory.

NON-ANALYTIC IMPLICATION

JOHN L. POLLOCK, State University of New York at Buffalo

Some ordinary language philosophers, including Stanley Cavell, have attacked certain tendencies of traditional philosophers as follows. E.g., when we say that something looks red to us, we imply that we think it isn't really red. Thus we are breaking a rule of language when we say that something looks red to us when we know it is red. And thus there is something logically wrong with the traditional attempt to say that what justifies us in thinking that something is red is its looking red to us. In this article it is maintained that the 'implication' invoked above is a contingent relation having to do with what makes a fact noteworthy, and that the existence of this implication does not show that there is anything logically wrong with the traditional positions being attacked.

Discussions:

CATEGORY MISTAKES AND CLASSIFICATION

ROBERT SHARPE, St. David's College, Lampeter

KAUFMAN ON ALIENATION

PAUL DIESING and PAUL PICCONE, State University of New York at Buffalo

It is claimed that Arnold S. Kaufman's article 'On Alienation' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1965, pp. 141–165) shows no understanding of the concept of alienation, and the authors undertake to contrast the concept as Hegel and Marx develop it and Fromm and Mills re-state it, with Kaufman's interpretations of Marx, Fromm, and Mills. They contrast the Marxist self-realization framework with Kaufman's want-satisfaction framework, and argue that in Marx alienation is necessarily concerned solely with labor, is unavoidable because a necessary stage of self-development, and has inseparable sociological and moral aspects. They claim that Kaufman's article shows no understanding of any of these points.

DIESING AND PICCONE ON KAUFMAN

ARNOLD S. KAUFMAN, University of Michigan

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SENSE DATA

BENSON MATES, University of California, Berkeley

Philosophers have given various reasons for denying the existence of sense data. A number of these reasons are examined in the present paper. The claim that 'no sufficient purpose is served by positing such objects' is deemed irrelevant to the issue; the complaint that 'we do not know what it would be like to find that there were no such objects' is found to be confusedly formulated, mistaken, and irrelevant; and the charge that there is something improper, extraordinary, or defective about the way in which philosophers have introduced the term 'sense datum' into their discourse is pronounced false.

THE LOGIC OF APPEARING

JOHN KNOX, Jr., Drew University, Madison, N.J.

It is argued that statements about the ways in which objects appear entail the existence of appearances; in other words, '*A* appears φ ' ('appears' used phenomenologically) entails ' $(\exists x) \varphi x$.' The argument turns on the proper analysis of comparative appearance statements, such as '*A* feels warmer (to someone) than *B*.' Here *A* and *B* are not being compared *directly* with respect to the complex character of feeling warm. One is not, in other words, saying that *A* feels warm more than does *B*—an ambiguous statement. Instead, one is saying that *A*'s feel or appearance, or way of feeling or appearing, is warmer than *B*'s. And in making this statement one asserts the existence of appearances. This result is then extended to cover statements of the form '*A* appears φ .' It is maintained that this generalized result serves to reinstate most of the traditional problems of perception.

UNCONSCIOUS INTENTIONS

FREDERICK A. SIEGLER, University of Washington

In this paper I investigate the notion of an unconscious intention as it is discussed and defended in Freud's *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. I am concerned with two issues: first, whether the evidence that Freud adduces supports his conclusion that there are unconscious intentions, and, second, whether the notion of an unconscious intention is coherent. I call into question some of Freud's arguments to support the notion, and I present a case for the incoherence of the notion. Finally, I suggest how one might begin to reconcile my argument for its incoherence with an argument for the existence of unconscious intentions.

SELF-DECEPTION

STANLEY PALUCH, University of Colorado

Is it possible for me to believe what I know not to be the case? It certainly does not seem possible for me, at the same time, to be aware of the fact that a given proposition is true and yet believe that the proposition is false. Models of self-deception which have the implication that this is possible are usually described as 'paradoxical.' However, many philosophers believe that there are genuine cases of self-deception which non-paradoxical models of self-deception mirror and elucidate. In the present article the author considers what he takes to be the leading contenders among non-paradoxical (or seemingly non-paradoxical) models of self-deception. He concludes from his analysis that it is not clear that any of these models mirror actual cases of self-deception and that it is not even obvious that there are actual cases of self-deception to be mirrored.

THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION, RULE-OPERATIONS, AND
ATMOSPHERE IN WITTGENSTEIN'S LANGUAGE-GAMES

K. W. RANKIN, Monash University

Wittgenstein argues that understanding a language consists of mastery of techniques for playing language-games rather than some sort of mental state or episode such as mental imagery, rule invocation, or atmosphere investing our experience of words. His elimination of the three mentalistic alternatives presupposes the peculiar distinction, or its virtual lack, between speaker and listener presupposed by his positive claim, instead of establishing the latter. This paper vindicates the episodic nature of certain types of understanding, and gives each of his three alternatives a suitably qualified role therein, by drawing the distinctions in a less biased way.

MILL ON LIBERTY

TED HONDERICH, University College, London

The traditional objection to Mill's principle governing the interference of state and society in the lives of individuals is that it excludes interference only in the case of actions that harm nobody at all. Interpretations of Mill's essay which escape this objection have been suggested by J. C. Rees and Richard Wollheim. In one case Mill is said to have been concerned with harm to established *interests*, in the other with harm which arises by way of the beliefs of those injured. The author of the present article proposes an alternative interpretation which better represents Mill's intention and escapes objections which may be raised against the principles expounded by Rees and Wollheim. Once again, however, Mill's principle emerges as seriously flawed.

THE THEATRE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE CRITICISM
OF IDEOLOGIES*Notes on Ionesco*

PAUL K. FEYERABEND, University of California, Berkeley

It is the thesis of the paper that the arts of the twentieth century have gone much further in the criticism of customary modes of thought than have both the sciences and the various critical philosophies which exist today. Moreover, they have not only developed an abstract principle of criticism, they have also studied the *psychological conditions* under which criticism can be expected to become effective. Some plays and the theoretical essays of Ionesco are analyzed as an example. It is pointed out that Ionesco resembles Bacon in that he believes in an unchangeable basis of humanity from which all ideologies proceed. An attempt is made to free Ionesco from these dogmatic elements, theoretically, as well as practically (i.e. as regards the performance of his plays) and to utilize to the full his contributions to a theatre that is free of prejudice, and fully critical.

Discussions:

ON NOT HAVING WHAT YOU ARE GIVEN

J. M. HINTON, Worcester College, Oxford

The statement, that these or those philosophers do not accept the distinction between what is, and what is not, 'given' in perception, has very little content; and should receive only a corresponding degree of emphasis.

A NOTE ON 'SCEPTICISM AND ABSURDITY'

PETER ZINKERNAGEL, University of Copenhagen

In 'Scepticism and Absurdity' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 7, No. 2) Ingemund Gullvåg concludes that recent attempts to counter scepticism have failed. It is suggested that where the attempts Gullvåg investigates are complex theories of a sociological and linguistic-psychological nature, we need only refer to a simple and inspectable fact of language to counter scepticism.

MORE ON UNDERSTANDING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

FRANK CUNNINGHAM, University of Toronto

A central mistake in Rolf Gruner's recent article on understanding in the social sciences is ferreted out, and consideration of it is used both to analyze Gruner's interpretation of understanding and to sketch a more adequate interpretation. The mistake is in distinguishing meanings and facts. The analysis suggests that Gruner was forced to see understanding both as a special kind of explanation and at the same time as no explanation. The sketch offers a distinction of three senses of 'understanding'—as identification of a certain kind of subject matter, as explanation of it, and as a subjective feeling consequent upon such explanation.

ALSTON AND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

V. M. HOPE, University of Edinburgh

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