

UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN MEXICO: Implications for Regime Authoritarianism*

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AUTONOMY AND POLITICS

Until recently, the Córdoba Reform of 1918 was the symbolic landmark in twentieth-century Latin American higher education. Achieving a pioneering victory in Argentina, the Reform soon became influential throughout much of the region, and university autonomy from government emerged as its most cherished legacy. Despite frequent violations, the principle of autonomy often promoted a substantial degree of university self-rule and even sanctuary for free expression. In 1968—fifty years after the Reform's genesis—the Mexican government's brutal repression of university students seemed to symbolize a secular change. Many observers feel that events of the last decade have reduced autonomy to little more than a cherished memory. Autonomy has indeed suffered a tragic fate in Cuba, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, among the more important nations. But what about Mexico? This article argues that the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) remains substantially autonomous.¹ This is, admittedly, a relative statement; no public university is completely independent of government control. However, UNAM seems to enjoy considerable self-rule and is notably autonomous in cross-national perspective.

Our findings place Mexico largely outside the mainstream regional pattern of government-university relations. Perhaps nowhere is the universal trend toward greater government control of universities stronger than in Latin America. Its contemporary authoritarian regimes, unlike more traditional ones, are not content with universities that simply reflect society, these regimes are bent on reshaping significant features of society. Most regard their autonomous universities as institutional examples par excellence of economic irrelevance, administrative inefficiency, political divisiveness, and social deviance. Defying Charles Anderson's classic description of reconciliatory regimes that accommodate diverse actors, they assume a good deal of direct control.² Thus, this article's contribution to the study of regional educational politics may lie less in illustrating the predominant pattern than in establishing an important exception to it. Simultaneously, however, the case is suggestive of contemporary government-university patterns in the relatively free nations, such as Venezuela, as well as of

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earlier twentieth-century patterns in the majority of Latin American nations. To date, the only aspect of the politics of Latin American higher education receiving serious scholarly attention has been student activism.

As control over UNAM is shown to deviate from the clear regional trend, some important questions are raised about the nature of Mexican politics. While lively debate had centered previously on whether the Mexican regime was basically democratic or authoritarian, greater agreement emerged in the aftermath of the events of 1968. The interpretation now prevalent—with all due apologies for grouping together independent scholarly assessments—depicts an authoritarian regime with considerable control over the societal forces vital to national development.³ This interpretation clearly owes much to Juan Linz's broader theoretical definition of authoritarianism.⁴ Linz helped disabuse comparative politics of the democratic-totalitarian dichotomy, which had provided poor ideal types for most nations. But while authoritarianism is a far better ideal type than democracy for the study of Mexican politics, it is sufficiently broad that its application to Mexico is not necessarily very meaningful. While the general applicability of Linz's definition to all Iberic-Latin (and many other) societies can properly be viewed with enthusiasm,⁵ it also presents certain dangers. In fact, the Mexican regime often is categorized very much within the same overall framework as other major Latin American regimes. James Malloy writes:

The recent experience of Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, and the discovery that behind the façade, Mexico is really an authoritarian system, have led many to suggest that the region is generating a "new path" to development which, if it is to be understood, demands the fashioning of new conceptual approaches to the analysis not only of these regimes but of the region as a whole. . . . Others have pointed out an overreaching similarity in structure and organizational principles.⁶

And Robert Kaufman, while himself discussing certain distinctive features of the Mexican case, comments in the most recent volume on Mexican authoritarianism in these rather dire tones:

For "South Americanists" who seek to understand patterns of political and economic change in such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, many of the essays appearing in this volume on Mexico will contain a striking, if depressing, ring of familiarity. Virtually every contributor, for example, either assumes or argues explicitly that Mexico is fundamentally authoritarian.⁷

Obviously, scholars generally have recognized differences in kind and degree within the overall category of authoritarianism, usually pointing out that the Mexican regime is less repressive and less exclusionary.⁸ Despite recognition of such differences, however, the prevalent interpretation of Mexican politics emphasizes strong regime control over policymaking. While Linz's definition allows for some degree of sectoral independence, it stresses that government leadership is relatively free from the constraints commonly associated with pluralism, mobilization, and ideology in democratic regimes;⁹ Mexicanists have made the notion of independent regime power central to their analysis. Susan

Purcell presents this repeatedly endorsed viewpoint, corroborated by her own excellent case study: "Instead of responding to and reflecting demands, pressures, and initiatives that originate at lower levels, the executive in an authoritarian regime shapes and manipulates demands emanating from below while enjoying substantial leeway in the determination of the goals that the regime will pursue."¹⁰ Whatever other differences there are between Mexican and South American authoritarianism, it is this central notion of the regime as the powerful, independent variable in policymaking that our findings will question.

In addition to any links we may make between general characterizations of Mexican regime control and control over higher education, some scholars have specifically cited the control of higher education in support of their authoritarian thesis, while others have noted the regime's special propensity to direct social forces associated with the "left" and therefore with the universities.¹¹ Thus, higher education is certainly *one* valid policy field within which to evaluate Mexican authoritarianism.

Apart from its broader theoretical significance, the question of who controls higher education is intrinsically significant for our basic understanding of state-societal relations. The vital role that higher education plays in society has recently gained dramatic recognition virtually throughout the world, and in some cases has led to substantial increases in government control.¹² Within Mexico, this issue centers largely on UNAM, the nation's principal educational institution. Its sprawling system is a major influence on the lives of its more than 250,000 students, the workplace of many of the nation's most prestigious intellectuals, the major political recruitment link to the highest reaches of government, the nation's principal research center, and the target of nearly half the federal higher education budget.¹³ Control over such resources is a most coveted prize. Beyond material factors, UNAM plays a significant role in shaping national values: "The National University has been without a doubt the major refuge and laboratory of national thought"; both Octavio Paz and Carlos Fuentes have underscored the special importance of an independent university in a society with otherwise limited civic freedoms.¹⁴

By virtue of its tradition, prestige, size, and overall importance, UNAM is clearly the *national* university among the nation's thirty-three public universities (two in the federal district and one in almost every state). A fuller analysis of the government's role in higher education would have to go beyond UNAM, especially since governments often seek control over higher education by creating new institutions that bypass the traditional universities. Suffice it to say here that UNAM remains the indisputably preeminent institution in Mexican higher education: politically, economically, and socially, it is *the* educational institution to control. The points at which the provincial public universities must be excepted from findings on UNAM will be indicated below; in addition, the government's greater control over technical institutes of higher education provides a useful heuristic contrast to UNAM's autonomy. The government does not control the private universities, and the vibrancy of the independent private sector already reveals a major limit to government control of higher education, a limit which is absent in many Latin American and most European nations.

Unfortunately, literature in comparative education provides no established method for measuring autonomy, defined here broadly and simply as institutional self-rule. There are no proven, well-honed tools. Even if we reasonably gauge UNAM's autonomy from the government, we do not know exactly how that compares with other cases. Still, if close comparisons between UNAM and, say, the University of Paris or the University of California remain problematic, a *very wide gap* can be exposed between UNAM and many other major Latin American universities.

Admittedly, it is difficult to research the subtle, informal, indirect methods of Mexican government control. But after pointing out those that can be identified, it will be argued that even if one then assumes further hidden control, it would still be decidedly limited by *observable* university strength—and limited in cross-national perspective. There is also an excellent test for these conclusions: Who wins? If the government patently does not get what it wants, then its control is significantly circumscribed.

Virtually all definitions of university autonomy deal with administrative (or administrative/academic) and financial matters: administrative autonomy focuses on control over personnel and academic policy; financial autonomy on control over economic resources. We shall concentrate here on those areas deemed particularly important and vulnerable by most Mexican observers. On the administrative side, free appointment of personnel is "without doubt the most delicate point in the life and autonomy of the university."¹⁵ The single most critical appointment involves the rector (chief executive); equally important, though far less vulnerable to government interference, is student selection. On the financial side, either power to determine who pays or possible government control via funding could be chosen, but the former has been seen as the greater problem area by Mexican *universitarios*. It has been shown elsewhere that control via funding is remarkably limited;¹⁶ therefore, the focus here will be on the salient struggle over who pays.

It could be demonstrated that academic freedom is generally strong, that academic policy is set by UNAM itself, or even that physical assaults on territorial autonomy are relatively rare (though brutal).¹⁷ For example, it is clear to even the government's harshest critics that the University itself, far more than the government, determines course and curriculum policies. But the very consensus on this question makes it less interesting to probe. Also, the pay-off is limited in comparative terms since many governments delegate some such academic autonomy to their public universities, though contemporary Latin America provides certain striking exceptions. University authority to appoint its own top officials, by contrast, is unusual. The basic approach, then, is to explore those crucial areas in which government involvement is most commonly feared. Control over admissions is included here because it is at once typical of University control in Mexico and increasingly atypical in cross-national perspective. Despite inherent dangers of case-study inference, if the government does not control personnel selection or who pays, then it is reasonable to contend that its overall control of UNAM is relatively limited. If the government is in control,

that should be manifest at least in (1) selection of the University's rector and students, and (2) implementation of the government's tuition-loan policy.

PERSONNEL SELECTION

At the base of the personnel pyramid, students enter UNAM under a nearly open admissions policy and freely choose their careers of study. The consequent problems, which profoundly disturb the government, follow a broad international pattern: overenrollments given the job markets, underemployment, career maldistributions (e.g., too many lawyers, not enough engineers), and painfully high drop-out rates. It is remarkable that the Mexican government, which reluctantly foots the bill, has done so little to control admissions. Continental European countries historically allowed open admissions for students who passed their secondary school exit exams. But as the aforesaid problems grew, many of these countries imposed stringent changes. One procedure is *numerus clausus*, limits on enrollments in given careers. German students who qualify for these careers may nonetheless have to wait years to enter them if quotas are full; Sweden has frozen enrollments at existing universities, funneling students only to occupationally understaffed fields; and the Netherlands has seriously restricted university entrance.¹⁸ Apparently, the Mediterranean nations have not gone nearly so far. Expectedly, East European governments set concrete numerical career distributions.

Government control over admissions has also increased in certain major Latin American nations. Some, like Brazil, traditionally have had relatively demanding university entrance tests and even *numerus clausus*; others, like Argentina, have been more open. Now both types have merged towards greater government control. At the extremes there have been purges and even imposed decreases in overall enrollments. More commonly, governments have regulated career selection by insisting on certain distributions, by abolishing specific careers, and by forcibly instituting new curricula. Mexico's government-run Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN) has tougher entrance requirements than the public universities, though less stringent ones than the private universities.

Admissions remain largely uncontrolled in UNAM (and Mexico's other public universities). Only UNAM, not the government, sets even minimal requirements, and these are specific to the University or faculty, not to a nationally controlled system. Examinations are not sufficiently rigorous to form an effective barrier. Besides, far more than half of UNAM's university-level students enter directly (free pass) from UNAM's three-year preparatory level.¹⁹ The sole major attempt to control the admissions process was taken by UNAM itself (1962) when it declared that provincial students would not be admitted if their own universities offered their career of study. But the policy has been enforced only in medicine, and only medicine has any limits on total enrollments. Not only does the government not establish *numerus clausus*, it does not even reward and punish "favorable" and "unfavorable" career distributions with differential subsidies.²⁰

The appointment of professors and directors in Mexico has been typical of traditional patterns in most of Europe and Latin America. There is a combination of open competition and peer or even student (Latin America) decision, but with the one important exception that a further role is played by high-level University, in lieu of ministerial, authority. European ministries generally fix the number, rank, salaries, etc. of available faculty slots and must formally approve all appointments; professors are civil servants. Still greater intervention occurs in the spreading South American pattern of government appointment and purges. UNAM does not suffer such serious restrictions, although the selection of its professors and directors does depend in part on the top-level UNAM authorities who figure prominently in the appointment process. As in most of the world, there is far greater concern for university autonomy at the top than at the middle levels.

The single greatest danger to autonomy at the professorial and director levels stems from very substantial personnel overlap with the public sector; impressive information is available on the extent of this in certain divisions of UNAM.²¹ Sycophancy is a real danger as universitarios at all levels may aspire to government jobs via the venerable Mexican co-optation process. Such interpenetration occurs in many nations where full-time teaching is exceptional. Italian professors commonly serve simultaneously in the public bureaucracy and the national legislature.²² Universitarios in these nations often regard overlap ambivalently in terms of autonomy: it may act as a source both of protection from unsympathetic government action and of interference in university affairs.

That UNAM chooses its own rector is one of the most difficult aspects of autonomy to determine. Indeed, the issue requires more qualifications than any other nonfinancial issue fundamental to UNAM's autonomy. The rector's position as UNAM's most powerful figure points to the necessity of a sound scholarly assessment, including a number of admittedly ambiguous factors. The argument here is that while the government probably involves itself more in this appointment than in any other, its power is quite limited *compared to UNAM's power and compared to government power in other nations*.

Most university executives world-wide are appointed by government ministries or independent governing boards, not by intra-university bodies. Influenced by the Napoleonic model of universities integrated into overall government educational policy, many newly independent Latin American nations concentrated considerable authority in ministerial hands.²³ Where the Córdoba Reform firmly took hold, universities gained more power, but rector selection came hard. Many regimes, like the Chilean (1927), granted the university only the right to submit a list to the president for his choice. When the Venezuelan university received otherwise substantial autonomy (1946), the government retained authority over rector-selection. Some West European university bodies have been left to elect their rectors, but that may be due to the notoriously weak role of rectors there. In fact, in most of the centralized West European systems it is the minister or his director for higher education who is really the administrative executive of the university. In East Europe, the U.S., and England, the rectorship has been more important—and more externally-appointed. If "Mexico

is the future of East Europe" in university governance, then all East European nations, save Yugoslavia, must change from their present practice of direct ministerial involvement.

While the U.S. and England have succumbed less to government power, they have fashioned governing boards with considerable extra-university lay or business influence. And as Latin American political regimes have changed and the rectorship has become more powerful, the trend is unambiguous: military juntas directly appoint the rectors. Chile has taken the procedure to an apparently unprecedented point by actually installing its military officers. The executive directors of Mexico's technical institutes are appointed by the minister, and serve as his subordinates. Against this comparative backdrop, Mexican procedures in the public universities loom as remarkably, albeit not fully, autonomous.

For the first twenty years of its post-Revolutionary existence (1910–29), the National University yielded to presidential authority over rector selection. With the grant of limited and full autonomy in 1929 and 1933, respectively, the University's council first won the right to choose among three presidentially proposed candidates and then to appoint its rector without any outside interference. Unfortunately, the University failed to exercise its new power responsibly, as factions often could not agree on one acceptable rector. Anarchy prevailed. Thus a governing board (*junta*) was created (1944), its members elected by the University's council. The board was to be a more efficient body than the council, somewhat above the incessant, internal University struggles. Would rector selection henceforth become a nonautonomous process? Two key issues are whether the board's personnel are selected by the University itself and whether the board is a vehicle for government control in the selection of the rector.

There is little doubt that the change from council to governing board selection symbolized a formal loss of institutional autonomy. Coupled with the re-establishment of UNAM as an official university (a decentralized agency of the State), the 1944 law was a clear retreat from the 1933 experiment in full autonomy. In sacrificing ephemeral full autonomy for reduced but substantial autonomy, the University made a perhaps typically Mexican pragmatic political calculation. Some universitarios scorned the adoption of a gringo-style board, unfaithful to the cherished Latin American principle of cogovernment by professors and students. But today, Mexico's "tainted" procedure is far more autonomous than that of other major nations of the region.

There is room for a good deal of skepticism about the nature of University representation on the board. First, it is "undemocratic" in that universitarios, both professors and students, no longer directly elect their chief executive. Nor are there assurances that board members will themselves be true universitarios. Formal requirements are vague. Only if requisites and practices were tightened to insure service of active UNAM personnel would the possibility of indirect government representation on the board notably diminish. While board members are selected *by* the University (council), they are not necessarily selected *from* the University. There has, in fact, been considerable overlap of personnel

between the board and the government; in some provincial universities the governor or his delegate is represented on, or even presides over, the board.²⁴ There is no such representation at UNAM.

Though defenders of Mexican autonomy would prefer to see pure academicians on the board, they generally have found the political-academic hybrids to possess enviable academic credentials.²⁵ The board "traditionally has been composed of many of Mexico's most esteemed scholars."²⁶ Gastón García Cantú, one of the government's most caustic critics, declares that the governing board is "formed by distinguished *universitarios*."²⁷ No parallel statement could be made for the extra-university representation on U.S. or English boards. Though Mexico's board shows some elements of a corporatist relationship, as opposed to the more independent University-government relationship of the 1933–44 period, many Mexican scholars believe that University autonomy ultimately is stronger for the change. García Cantú, again articulating the opinion of most observers, asserts that the board protects the University from the kind of debilitating chaos that renders it vulnerable to external pressure.²⁸

More central to our argument, board authority is still a far cry from direct ministerial appointment, characteristic of public universities elsewhere. Further, the Mexican board is University-created. In the U.S., for example, governors or legislators generally appoint many board members for state universities, while lay authorities impose their choices for the boards of private universities. As Mexico's private universities basically follow the U.S. private model, their boards, while free from government control, are not autonomously selected.

A number of observers have noted the contrast between U.S. "top-down" and (previously) typical Latin American "bottom-up" appointments.²⁹ Five years after UNAM's council named the first (fifteen-member) board, it began to replace one member annually. The council also replaces vacancies due to mandatory age retirements or death, while the board fills those caused by resignations. And the council is "without doubt the most representative governing organ of the University," comprised principally of professors and students.³⁰ Its sense of community consciousness having grown during the events of 1968, the council diligently used its appointive powers to decrease indirect extra-university influences.³¹ Council appointment does not rule out government penetration but it does give UNAM a great advantage over universities with externally appointed boards.

Even if the board itself is a comparatively autonomous body for appointing university chief executives, the question remains: Is it a vehicle for government intervention? The board's 1944 usurpation of appointive authority from the University council led immediately to charges that it would become such a vehicle. The issue has been less salient than many had expected; perhaps this reflects, at least to some extent, the integrity of the board's actions. But doubt still exists and the issue merits serious scrutiny. Admittedly, it is a difficult matter to judge; ultimately we seek to establish parameters, not exact degrees, of government interference.

While some of Mexico's public universities have managed quite well with council selection, others have fared poorly, and just over half the total have

switched to governing boards. What is clear from the testimony of many provincial rectors is that no university body can blithely elect a rector antipathetic to the governor on whom he relies for subsidies and respect.³² The general feeling is that governing boards tend to understand this better than councils of professors and students. Such "understanding" constitutes, of course, a limit on full university autonomy, but it is a limit faced by public universities worldwide. In states like Puebla and Guerrero, where student representation is unusually great, rector selection by councils has often imperiled autonomy.

The relevant point concerning UNAM and the national government is that the rector should not be an enemy of the president. UNAM's rector during the 1968 crisis refused the board's reappointment in 1970 because he "thought it necessary to have a new rector who could establish or already enjoy better, much better, relations with the public sector."³³ Experts such as Pablo Latapí believe that the rector cannot be antipresident, but that the president probably can exercise only a "very indirect influence" over selection.³⁴ It is reflective of the closed nature of Mexican politics, and of the great importance and sensitivity of this question, that the person justly considered the most distinguished scholar on Mexican higher education could have only a reasoned guess as to the degree of interference.

As the extremes of direct selection by the president and selection of an antipresident rector are rejected, the notion of very indirect presidential influence gains credibility. The small size of the governing board could make it fertile soil for presidential pressures on just one or a few members. It might be difficult, although certainly possible, to influence surreptitiously a legislative council comprised of many hostile elements, but a single phone call could change one critical swing vote on a fifteen-member board. We know, however, that since the board decides by simple majority vote, even if the president can tip the balance, *he can hardly impose whomever he wants*. Furthermore, the designee must have given at least ten years of academic service to UNAM; he cannot be a merely political figure.³⁵ The president also operates within UNAM-set parameters if he presses for the continuation in office of a given rector. An ex-member of the board recalls that, shortly before the end of the Miguel Alemán administration, a minister courteously called every board member "in the name of the President of the Republic," requesting the reelection of the rector, "just for the remaining months of the *sexenio*."³⁶ In truth, Alemán's request was aimed basically at allowing the president and rector jointly to inaugurate University City, on which they had worked together.

Thus, the evidence sustaining the notion of presidential control in the selection process refers to either a marginal role in a major decision (swinging a board vote in the selection of a new rector), or a major role in a marginal decision (requesting extension of a given rector's term). Presidential influence lies in throwing extra weight behind a given qualified candidate. Obviously, such influence again belies full appointive autonomy. A "marginal" swing vote is, in a real sense, *the* decision-making vote. Still, I would argue that UNAM itself is playing a much more powerful decision-making role than the government in such circumstances, restricting government action within limited parameters.

Pushing a strong minority choice over the top is a far cry from externally imposing a candidate from scratch. UNAM's relative autonomy looms greater when placed on a cross-national spectrum: more nations, even democratic ones, incline toward external imposition than toward internal choice.

There is evidence of greater presidential power to depose rectors than to select them. In these cases (1945, 1948, 1965) there is a crucial lack of presidential support for rectors already in the midst of serious internal University problems.³⁷ The government may well manipulate these problems to depose rectors it does not like. What is clear is that presidents are prone to push the panic button when rectors fail to maintain order. Whereas governments elsewhere in the region insist on academic policy control, the Mexican insists mostly on certain bounds of social control; UNAM's rector generally can pursue his own course *provided* he maintains order.

Most experts believe that the stability of UNAM's leadership suffers more from internal politics than from government interference. A good example is Pablo González Casanova's resignation in 1972. The rector was besieged by University worker demands which he found dangerous to UNAM's existence . . . and insoluble. Often, political cliques within UNAM vie for power, indirectly making more fertile soil for government favoritism. Without internal dissension, the government's ax seems far less wieldy. In 1968, in the midst of the greatest University-government conflict in Mexican history, the government waged an unprecedented, virulent campaign against the rector who dared to march with his students. UNAM stood united behind him and the governing board unanimously refused his resignation.

In discussing incidents of presidential interference, we have considered more substantial evidence than can be found elsewhere, given the prevalence of a priori assumption over systematic research, but all accounts fall far short of portraying unilateral imposition on a dependent institution. Establishing limits on the evidence suggesting government interference cannot disprove the possibility of further subtle interference. One way to establish limits on even subtle control is to identify a definite broad range of University action. We have specific accounts describing how UNAM autonomously operates. The testimony offered could not be taken, by itself, as peremptory evidence, though it is presented by distinguished scholar participants. However, the considerable descriptive detail provided in some cases is most persuasive, and even if we suppose that particular events eluded the observer's eye or restrained the writer's hand, we can still establish considerable University authority.

Eight permanent appointments have been made since 1945. One of the original and most venerable board members, historian Jesús Silva Herzog, gives us some account of the first five.³⁸ Unafraid to report sinister government roles in the downfalls of rectors, he suggests none in rector designation. He recalls, for example, the board's choice of Ignacio Chávez in 1961:

On February 12, 1961, the second and final term of Dr. Nabor Carrillo came to a close. A few weeks earlier three candidates threw their hats into the ring: Ignacio Chávez, Agustín García López and Efrén del Pozo, who had been the University's secretary general

for eight years. On January 19th the Governing Board convened in order to select the new rector. In the first session, that lasted around three hours, none of the candidates had enough votes: Efrén del Pozo, four votes, Agustín García López, only one, and Ignacio Chávez, seven. The law requires eight votes minimum to be named rector. The Governing Board declared itself in Permanent Session and set the next day to continue deliberations. That night I convinced Roberto Casas Alatríste to vote for Chávez. He told me he would do so and he kept his word. In the next meeting Dr. Ignacio Chávez obtained the necessary votes and was named rector.³⁹

We have written testimony of autonomous selection processes even following fresh on the heels of government-supported rector downfalls. Silva Herzog vividly recalls the *intra-board* deliberations in 1948.⁴⁰ Ex-rectors Fernández MacGregor and Barros Sierra (miffed and downright hostile, respectively, toward the government's role in their departures), have provided specific accounts of the transactions leading to the appointments of their successors (1945, 1970).⁴¹ Actually, Barros Sierra successfully finished his first term and, before he decided that retirement would better serve the University, the governing board unanimously reelected him.⁴² When his distinguished successor fell two years later, board members conducted extensive polling in UNAM's faculties, assemblies, etc.⁴³ Readers will note a stark contrast to common U.S. procedures, which are centered largely outside the campus community.

To support these written accounts I have accumulated reliable, up-to-date testimony on the dynamics of rector selection—all confirming that the presidential role is very limited. Some interviewees have been involved directly in the process; others have been very close to it. A representative sample includes such widely esteemed figures as Leopoldo Zea, Fernando Salmerón, Daniel Ruiz Fernández, Pablo González Casanova, and Enrique González Casanova.⁴⁴ All are distinguished scholars, critics of the government, and staunch defenders of university autonomy. The first three have been directors of important units of UNAM, working closely with the rector; the fourth was himself a rector; the last, his brother, has been a prominent UNAM administrator for many years. Zea and Pablo González Casanova have earned considerable esteem in the international intellectual community.

All believe that the board independently selects the rector; if there is presidential interference it is exceptional, partial, or indirect. Enrique González Casanova feels close enough to the people and process over the last three decades to declare categorically, "the government has not named a single rector, even indirectly." Further, he believes that no nomination to a directorship of a faculty, division, institute, etc. of UNAM has been tampered with successfully, even where the personnel have been distinctly antigovernment. Ruiz echoes the declaration for the last two decades. Zea concludes that UNAM itself "names its personnel including the rector and directors and, therefore, is a real exception to our national norms of government involvement." Salmerón basically concurs, with the qualification that individual government officials may try to influence decisions "but rarely and always very limitedly."

Surely, there is temptation to opt for a more Machiavellian scenario in this secretive political system pervaded by cynicism. And the following factors should be appreciated: (1) the situation is different in a number of provincial universities where the government holds greater appointive authority or the university's own role is less definitely established; (2) more direct personal testimony has been accumulated on the 1961–76 period than on the 1944–60 period; (3) the situation may change with any given case; (4) there is some degree of corporatist interaction in personnel interpenetration; (5) the governing board could not with impunity select a rector so antigovernment as to obviate a decent working relationship with that government; (6) depending on the situation, the president could exert influence, even if only on one particular board member, possibly to tip the balance among competing, qualified, and respected candidates; and (7) the president has played a role in the reelection and downfall of certain rectors.

In sum, there is reason for concern about UNAM's autonomy in regard to rector selection, but definite limits to government interference can be established. Not fully independent, the process is nonetheless relatively autonomous. Even allowing for considerable variation, uncertainty, and skepticism involving a subtle government hand, relative autonomy is certain. The two secure pillars supporting this assessment are the demonstrably great role of UNAM, itself making the lion's share of the appointment decisions and the typicality of greater extra-university supremacy in other nations. Ministerial appointment, with only varying university consultation, has become the rule in most of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and even some of Western Europe. It is the procedure in Mexico's government-run National Polytechnic Institute, but not its National University. In those fewer international cases where governing boards exist to name top university authorities, the boards themselves are generally comprised of nonuniversity personnel who are externally appointed. Even equally shared government-university power in rector selection apparently would be impressive in comparative perspective; that UNAM's role is greater than the government's therefore seems remarkable.

TUITION AND SELF-FINANCING

Turning from administrative to financial autonomy, the focus shifts to control over who pays and an analysis of the government's failure to impose greater University-self-financing in general and greater tuition in particular. It is not the purpose here to assess the desirability of such policies in Mexico. Equity ramifications will be ignored in favor of concentrating on political ones, which are more central to the question of who controls UNAM.⁴⁵ Perhaps the government's motivation, but certainly its unmitigated failure, is hard to reconcile with the prevalent characterization of a strong authoritarian regime unresponsive to demands it does not itself create and exercising fundamental control over areas vital to national development. More specifically, the main conclusion is that UNAM itself, not the government, determines who pays.

University self-financing has been an ill-fated concept referring to a num-

ber of different policies, the common factor being that the government's financial burden is reduced. To the extent that a university appeals successfully to outside sources, such as private enterprise or alumni, it diminishes its dependence on government subsidies. But, as in Latin America generally, such outside income has been relatively insignificant in Mexico. Recommendations aimed at augmenting the University's capacity to generate its own funds have not fared any better. These would include the sale and contracting of its professional services, the creation of viable *patronatos* ("financial boards"), and tuition. No program for self-financing has gotten very far.

The Díaz Ordaz administration (1964–70) pushed for a self-financing program emphasizing strong *patronatos*; Echeverría's emphasized tuition-loan plans. The advantage of *patronatos* is that they would relieve the government's financial burden while not turning the University's fate over to external financiers; but the University's weak financial base renders the idea unrealistic. Tuition-loan plans are more realistic and would curb government costs, but would also introduce external financiers. Tuition plans generally call for the student to pay what he can during his years of study, later making up either the balance or a sum determined by the lucrativeness of his subsequent employment. Loans could be supplied by a specially created fund, probably with major banking and possibly with some government participation; they could be given to students directly or via the University. (Details vary considerably according to specific plan.) Both advocates and opponents of self-financing take the tuition idea much more seriously than the *patronato* idea.

I support the view of most independent Mexican scholars that the government's primary motivation is fiscal (whether, progressively, to meet other educational needs, or, conservatively, to curb expenditures).⁴⁶ Greater than 40 percent of the government's expenditures for higher education, nearly 9 percent of its entire education budget, goes to an institution which the government regards with at best mixed emotions.⁴⁷ If only for this, the government strongly desires greater University self-financing. It may conceivably hope to derive more control from reduced financing, although conventional wisdom correlates lesser funding with lesser control.⁴⁸ Thus, the Mexican government may be pursuing a policy that would diminish its control. In any case, motivation is difficult to assay and is not central to our analysis. The results of the effort are central. *The government has wanted greater self-financing and has been unable to get it.*

Government officials declare that subsidies for higher education can continue to rise only at the expense of other government responsibilities, especially in grade-school education. It is a position widely endorsed by independent analysts.⁴⁹ Treasury officials sometimes deny that the federal government has any responsibility to university education. That is an extreme position; a more common one is that there is substantially less responsibility to higher than to grade-school education. Government officials in Treasury, the Presidency, and Education readily point to figures on increasing university population and costs, increasing percentages of the education budget absorbed by higher education, and lack of continued growth in the overall education budget as a percentage of the total federal budget. While some of their measures are exaggerated, their

own perception is quite clear: alternative financial sources must be found. In sum, the government wants to relieve itself of the spiraling costs of higher education.

Accordingly, UNAM's principal political argument against the tuition-loan policy is that the government is trying to evade its responsibility. Once this responsibility is diluted the government could respond to requests for funds by telling universities: "Look to your other sources."⁵⁰ There is a two-fold fear that reduced government financing would also mean greater control. One is that the government would choose which university policies merit financial support and then deny any further obligation to the institution for its other policies. The second and more salient fear, deeply rooted in the antipathy of many Mexican universitarios toward private enterprise, is that the new funding or lending agencies would insidiously pervert the University's purposes. UNAM has led the fight against self-financing.

As presidential candidates, both Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría "campaigned" in favor of substantially greater University self-financing. Echeverría ridiculed the idea of virtually free university education and declared, "let he who can pay pay something, let he who cannot not, and let he who needs it receive a subsidy."⁵¹ Within a year after assuming office, he established CONAFE (Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo), comprised mainly of representatives of private enterprise and government. CONAFE's purpose was to seek non-governmental sources of funding, principally for rural and university education, and to study, advocate, and aid in the establishment of tuition plans. Most notable was its role in the tuition plan of the 1973-created UAM (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana).

While the government mustered full internal backing for the general concept of self-financing, it was less united on specific tuition plans. The Treasury was strongly in favor, but some officials in Education would express reservations or even opposition. Nevertheless, the Echeverría government clearly tried to move in the tuition-loan direction; Latapí wrote of its desire to impose such a program "at whatever pace possible."⁵² The director of the Office of Human Resources of the Bank of Mexico and associate director of CONAFE affirmed that there had been a "government campaign" in which he was an active participant.⁵³ The usual appeals of a Mexican government campaign were there. Díaz Ordaz started out by euphemistically labeling tuition-loans a policy of *seguro educacional*, grouping it with social welfare programs for which there is unassailable popular support. Not only would such revolutionary goals as "equality" and "democracy" be fostered, but Mexico's "dependency" would be reduced. According to the Treasury minister, "the reform includes the tuition-loan among its fundamental goals, since the lack of technical and scientific personnel aggravates national dependency."⁵⁴ The single biggest push came late in 1975 with the organization in Mexico of the Sixth Pan American Congress on Educational Loans. Key roles were played by CONAFE, the Bank, and ANUIES (Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Institutos de la Enseñanza Superior)—in recent years increasingly involved with the government. Critics immediately identified the congress as a major government offensive and their articles in *Excelsior*, then

Mexico's finest newspaper, bitterly attacked tuition plans as "mercantilistic," "antieducation," "antidemocratic," and "authoritarian."⁵⁵

Frequently criticized for talking more about its reforms than fighting for them, the Echeverría administration did not go all out to impose its tuition plan. President Echeverría spoke in less specific terms than candidate Echeverría had, and his Education minister more often argued for "greater diversification" than for any concrete program. While the government's advocacy of greater self-financing has been constant, its campaign for tuition has been more sporadic. But even its cautious forays perhaps have been too ambitious, for they have galvanized a vigorous, and successful opposition. The Mexican government thus far has been unable or unwilling to incur the necessary political costs of policy implementation.⁵⁶

Tuition remains taboo in UNAM. It is also taboo in the technical institutes, but there the government retains much greater control over what it funds; for example, there are proportionately many more engineers than lawyers. The recently-opened UAM does exact a tuition of about \$400/year (U.S.), as compared to \$16/year in UNAM. UAM's tuition suggests the government's ability to implement its desired policies through the creation of new institutions, but also underscores its inability to impose policies on the far more important National University.

The government's failure is starker than the tuition issue alone reveals. Even when measured by the results of its broad self-financing policies—which it categorically and strongly advocates—the government has failed dismally. Under Díaz Ordaz, higher education came to absorb a slightly *greater* share of the government's total educational expenditures, despite the terrible repression surrounding the 1968 Massacre at Tlatelolco. Under Echeverría, this share rose still more, as table 1 shows.⁵⁷

Since table 1 depicts the *nationwide* failure of the government's program, more specifically focused data are needed to depict the government's failure

TABLE 1 Higher Education's Share of the Federal Education Budget

	Year	Percentage
President Díaz Ordaz	1965	15.6
	1966	15.2
	1967	15.8
	1968	16.5
	1969	14.4
	1970	16.4
President Echeverría	1971	16.9
	1972	18.1
	1973	19.7
	1974	23.1
	1975	21.4

Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, *Cuenta Pública*, 1965–1975.

with UNAM. Table 2 shows that UNAM's shares of the federal and federal education budgets have *grown* substantially. Even its share of the higher education budget has remained surprisingly steady, given the advent of many new institutions. The decline under Echeverría was mostly a corrective to the unusually high percentage reached under Díaz Ordaz (although it is likely to continue falling as the state universities expand). In other words, against its wishes, the federal government has increased its subsidies to UNAM not only in absolute terms but relative to other expenditures except those for other public universities—which, except for UAM, also escape the self-financing policy.

TABLE 2 Percentage of Federal Funds to UNAM

	López Mateos		Díaz Ordaz		Echeverría	
	1959	1964	1965	1970	1971	1975
Federal Budget	.7	.9	.7	1.1	1.3	1.4
Education	6.7	7.0	6.6	7.7	8.1	8.7
Higher Education	*	42.3	42.0	46.8	48.2	41.3

Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, *Cuenta Pública*, 1959–1975.


*Higher education computed differently before 1962

There has, in fact, been a sure, almost steady *increase* in the percentage of UNAM's government-derived income over the last three decades! And it grew substantially (90.8 percent to 94.7 percent) during Echeverría's tenure (1971–76). Figure 1 represents the trend of the last three administrations. One hears a good deal about efforts in a few states, but only the University of Aguascalientes has managed to draw a major share of its income from nongovernment sources; between 1959 and 1975, nongovernment contributions to state university income dipped from only 10 percent to 9 percent.⁵⁸ Only in the private universities is there substantial tuition.⁵⁹

Why the absence of university self-financing if the government wants it? Detailed analysis is not necessary; all supporters of tuition arrive at the same fundamental conclusion: "The University is a powder flask; there would be a revolution." An ex-rector of a state university predicted a potential reaction "ten times stronger" than that elicited by Echeverría's controversial housing law (1976); the Ministry's subsecretary for Planning may have believed that greater financial priority *should* be redistributed to grade-school education, "but then we'd have to give more to the army also."⁶⁰

If purely economic criteria might suggest greater possibilities to impose tuition on students at UNAM than on their peers at the poorer provincial universities, political criteria suggest a different logic. In some small universities, where the issue has not become salient, rectors may offer no opinion; UNAM's rector must oppose tuition.⁶¹ His students would not permit otherwise: their numbers, physical concentration, political consciousness, and relative affluence make them a potent force to be reckoned with by University administration and

FIGURE 1 Share of UNAM's Income from the Federal Government, 1959-1975



Source: Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Institutos de la Educación Superior.

government alike. Their major weapon is the ability to create social disorder. In 1948 their successful protests against a bid for a *minimal* tuition raise toppled the rector and established a precedent: notwithstanding inflation, annual tuition has increased only \$2 (U.S.) in the ensuing three decades. In the University of Nuevo León, Mexico's third biggest and second richest public university, the 1968 "Plan Elizondo" for students to pay a greater share of their educational costs led to tumultuous protests that vanquished the plan.

Could the government ultimately impose its will? Almost definitely—if it were willing to pay the price. But the ultimate authority test is a rigid one by which to gauge who actually controls. As long as the University can inflict unacceptable damage and the government accepts policy defeat as the lesser of two evils, then considerable autonomy may result. Such is the case for tuition just as it is for admissions and career choices, as well as short courses, departmentalization, syphoning off preparatory education from UNAM control, or a host of other issues on which the University "wins" and the government "loses."

If students are the major opposition group to self-financing, they enjoy overwhelming support throughout UNAM—and in the powerful middle sectors generally. The vast majority of UNAM's professors, including many of the nation's most prestigious intellectuals, join in believing that free higher education is intimately tied to "democratization." As Rodolfo Stavenhagen laments, many falsely believe that "free education is the Revolution—what their grandfathers fought for."⁶² And, free higher education is an established privilege for the middle sectors. The university community itself decides who finances its institution: the government.

IMPLICATIONS

The central research concern here has been to investigate who controls UNAM. The conclusion is clear, if qualified: UNAM is relatively autonomous from government control. This assessment rests on analysis of the most sensitive areas of UNAM's rule, with reference to generally greater government power over such areas in other nations. While the evidence on control over student admissions and who pays is more clear-cut, even rector selection emerges as a substantially autonomous process. Although the Mexican government clearly possesses ultimate coercive power, as Tlatelolco bears timeless witness, it also pays a great price for its use; while it clearly sets certain boundaries to autonomy, these boundaries are much less restrictive than in most major Latin American nations. That the government does not set far narrower limits to UNAM's autonomy suggests a reconciliation model of government-UNAM relations within which the government places higher priority on social tranquility and political support than on control, at least given the potential costs of control to its own legitimacy and to powerful sectors with which the government itself ultimately is integrated.

Undoubtedly, some subtle control exerted through personal ties, informal pressures, or indirect threats has escaped our analysis. It could be argued that the Mexican government inevitably finds a way to get its way. But, in fact, it has *not* been getting its way with UNAM on many vital issues. Rectors have often

acted as anything but government subordinates. More clearly, the government is dissatisfied with UNAM's performance and yet UNAM itself continues to determine policies such as admissions, manpower, and tuition. Many other public universities in Latin America have lost considerable control in these areas. Nor can UNAM's self-rule in such areas be dismissed as mere campus sanctuary status, since its policies have manifest political and economic impacts beyond the campus. Besides, other Latin American authoritarian regimes do not grant the same degree of sanctuary status.

The government can and does bypass UNAM by creating other institutions (such as the UAM) over which it generally exercises greater control.⁶³ But most governments that confront considerable university autonomy have done likewise. Governments in England, Venezuela, and Mexico need new institutions largely *because* they cannot adequately control their autonomous universities. Further, our data show that UNAM has maintained its relative position within the educational sector. Insofar as the government controls other institutions of higher education, as it does those in the technical sector, it is significant that it does not so control by far the biggest and most important institution. Generally, the government interferes in UNAM only with trepidation and restraint.

Apart from its central findings on state-university relations, this study also raises more complex and disturbing questions about recent literature on Mexican authoritarianism. The best and the brightest of the literature could not prepare us for the substantial autonomy of an institution so vital to the shape of national development. Why? At least two major possibilities present themselves. Probably each has some validity; obviously, partisans of the authoritarian thesis would emphasize the first.

1. *The politics of higher education are atypical.* Unquestionably, higher education is "atypical" in the sense that it is a policy field that is less likely than many others to be controlled by a given regime. As García Cantú observes for Mexico: "It can be said that the Mexican government . . . has formulas or modes to deal with the problems of the peasants, workers, . . . military . . . [and] clergy . . . but that it has not known how to deal with . . . the University."⁶⁴ One problem with the atypicality explanation, however, is that it is less valid cross-nationally today than it was in the recent past. The torch of autonomy, ignited at Córdoba, might have been a guiding light in the Latin American university's path for half a century. No longer. If there is a most apparent exception to pervasive government control in authoritarian Latin America it probably is the Church.

Moving from cross-national observations concerning higher education to cross-policy observations within Mexico, a second problem arises: higher education may not be so distinct from other policy areas involving Mexico's middle and elite sectors. While recent works have established patterns of authoritarian government control in such fields as labor, agriculture, and electoral politics, there is nonetheless evidence of considerable commercial, banking, and industrial power independent of the government.⁶⁵ Thus, no single policy field can be taken as "typical" of Mexican politics. There are many reasons why the govern-

ment might allow more latitude to the relatively affluent, educated sectors represented in the University than to less privileged sectors. If regime control over mass sectors sustains the authoritarian over the democratic model, the comparative autonomy of more elitist sectors may sustain neither model, an especially important point for those scholars who believe that elites generally make policy. In sum, the authoritarian label may be more appropriately applied to certain policy areas than to the Mexican political system overall. An accumulation of evidence of this kind on the autonomy of relatively privileged sectors could lead to reassessments of the nature of Mexican authoritarianism.

2. *Mexican authoritarianism differs from what recent literature proclaims.* One of the strengths of recent works on Mexican authoritarianism has been to blast away lingering misconceptions about democratic evolution. But in its zeal, perhaps spurred by the harsh policies of Díaz Ordaz and then by a scholarly urge to contribute to broader theoretical frameworks on Latin American authoritarianism and corporatism, it went too far. Simultaneously, these theoretical frameworks have embraced the Mexican case far too readily. Clearly, Mexico is “authoritarian,” but excessive application of this catch-all label may by now mislead as much as illuminate.

Indeed, finding that government-UNAM relations approximate a reconciliation model of regime accommodation, this article provides evidence against the central notion of an authoritative regime role in policymaking. In this regard, it may offer further evidence for the usefulness of subtypes such as inclusive authoritarianism, but it may also suggest that these subtypes would have to depart significantly from the traditional definitional emphasis on regime strength. Alternatively, if the reconciliation model generally suits Mexican policymaking involving privileged sectors, while the authoritarian model suits those involving mass sectors, then the Mexican regime may possibly be better characterized as a hybrid between authoritarian and reconciliation models than as a very diluted subtype of the authoritarian model. Of course, any such substantial conceptual revisions presuppose our belief that the regime’s role in policymaking is in fact significantly less authoritative than we have thought. This is not to question that the Mexican regime does indeed initiate, shape, and implement policy much more authoritatively than the literature of the early sixties imagined—but it probably does this far less than contemporary literature proclaims and far less than do other major Latin American nations.⁶⁶

As a final note, these reflections on Mexico may permit some tentative speculations on the concept of authoritarianism itself. First, the concept may be so broad that it blurs fundamental regime differences by defining their similarities at levels too general to have sufficient analytical power. A number of scholars, including Linz, have explicitly or implicitly recognized this problem and begun to establish subtypes based on such factors as genesis or composition of the regime, social bases of support, repressiveness, and ideology. Additionally, our findings indicate that, within the broad authoritarian category, the degree of control can vary significantly across regimes and across policy areas. This poses a central question of whether control over policy areas can provide another basis for useful subtypes of regime authoritarianism.⁶⁷ This question, in turn, reminds

us that the concept of authoritarianism should be used not just as a proximate description of a wide variety of political systems, but as a heuristic tool for probing the essential features of particular regimes.

Case studies alone cannot, of course, provide definitive assessments of such general issues as the nature of Mexican authoritarianism or the appropriate uses of the authoritarian ideal type. Instead, they should raise interesting questions, perhaps shaking a skeptical stick at conventional wisdom or overzealous generalization. The National University of Mexico provides an important example of substantial institutional autonomy from the government. Whether general theoretical statements should be altered, or else simply made to recognize a very important qualification, remains more open to scholarly judgment.

NOTES

1. A more elaborate study, going beyond UNAM and investigating more inclusively the components of autonomy and government control, will appear in Daniel Levy, *Government and University in Mexico* (forthcoming). Descriptive material on Mexican higher education is found in Thomas Noel Osborn, *Higher Education in Mexico* (El Paso: Texan Western Press, 1976) and Richard King et al., *The Provincial Universities of Mexico: An Analysis of Growth and Development* (New York: Praeger, 1971). See also Larissa Lomnitz, "Conflict and Mediation in a Latin American University," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 19, no. 3 (1977):315–38.
2. Charles Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governance of Restless Nations* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1967), pp. 104–14. See, for example, Galo Gómez O., *Chile de hoy: educación, cultura y ciencia* (México: Casa de Chile, 1976); Jerry Haar, *Higher Education in Brazil* (New York: Praeger, 1977); I.A.U. Secretariat, "Higher Education in Peru," *Bulletin of the International Association of Universities* 21, no. 4 (1973):1–19.
3. Among the best works of this general persuasion are: José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, eds., *Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977); Susan Kaufman Purcell, *The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Evelyn Stevens, *Protest and Response in Mexico* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974); Kenneth Johnson, *Mexican Democracy: A Critical View* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971); Roger Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964).
4. See his recent elaboration, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Handbook of Political Science* 3, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 264 and passim, pp. 175–411.
5. Howard J. Wiarda, "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations," in *The New Corporatism*, ed. Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 9–10n.
6. James Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*, ed. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 3–4.
7. Robert R. Kaufman, "Mexico and Latin American Authoritarianism," in Reyna and Weinert, *Authoritarianism*, p. 193.
8. See, for example, Evelyn Stevens, "Protest Movement in an Authoritarian Regime: The Mexican Case," *Comparative Politics* 7, no. 3 (1975): 381; Purcell, *Mexican Profit-Sharing*, p. 8.
9. Linz, "Totalitarian," pp. 272–73, 264.
10. Purcell, *Mexican Profit-Sharing*, p. 4.

11. On higher education, see Guy Benveniste, *Bureaucracy and National Planning* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 70–75, and Purcell, *Mexican Profit-Sharing*, pp. 130–31; on the left, Johnson, *Mexican Democracy*, pp. 145–56.
12. John Van de Graaff, Burton Clark, Dorotea Furth, Dietrich Goldschmidt, Donald Wheeler, *Academic Power: Patterns of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education* (New York: Praeger, 1978).
13. In 1975 UNAM had 123,000 students at the *licenciado* (or undergraduate) level, or 28 percent of the national total (data from the Ministry of Education's *Informe de labores 1974–75* [México: SEP, 1975], p. 214). On funds see table 2. On recruitment: Roderic Ai Camp, "Education and Political Recruitment in Mexico: The Alemán Generation," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 18, no. 3 (1976):295–322.
14. This quote is from Raúl Carrancá, *La universidad mexicana* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1969), pp. 89–90; Paz, *Posdata* (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1970), pp. 30–31; Fuentes, *Casa con dos puertas* (Editorial Joaquín Mortiz, 1970), p. 178.
15. Octavio Derisi, *Naturaleza y vida de la universidad* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1969), pp. 201–2.
16. Daniel Levy, "Limits on Government's Financial Control of the University: Mexico," a working paper published by the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, New Haven, 1977. To outline the findings: UNAM internally draws up its budget requests; it must negotiate these with the government, a necessity common to nearly all public universities, which detracts from their autonomy; bargaining, even with corporatist overtones, is better than unilateral government imposition, however, and UNAM negotiates directly with the president; UNAM receives one lump sum rather than targeted piecemeal grants for ongoing costs; research and construction allocations are more variable and controlled; there is very little accountability for how funds are spent; annual inflation-controlled subsidies have never declined since 1961; even adjusted for student population growth, subsidies have grown almost linearly, in sharp contrast to the situation in the Mexican government's own National Polytechnic Institute. While some of these facets of relative financial autonomy are common to public universities elsewhere, others emphatically are not.
17. Flagrant abuses are more common in *some* provincial universities. An interesting case of curriculum autonomy is the preponderance of theoretical Marxist economics in UNAM, in contrast to the more applied economics in the IPN, and the more free enterprise economics in the private universities. See Richard A. LaBarge and T. Noel Osborn, "The Status of Professional Economics Programs in Mexican Universities," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 31, no. 1 (1977):9–13.
18. Roger Geiger, "European Universities—The Unfinished Revolution," *Comparative Education Review*, Spring 1978.
19. The Mexican university's strength is augmented by its incorporation, apparently unique in Latin America, of (a major proportion of) upper secondary education. Elsewhere, this educational level, generally comprising the last three years before higher education, is not part of the university itself. The government has failed in its attempt to transfer authority over this level to its own public school system.
20. Levy, "Limits," pp. 18–22. There are ad hoc rewards, but not statistically significant correlations between the career choice and subsidy variables.
21. See Roderic Ai Camp, "The National School of Economics and Public Life in Mexico," *LARR* 10, no. 3 (1975):137–51.
22. Burton R. Clark, *Academic Power in Italy* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1977), p. 82.
23. Of course, even ministerial authority need not imply the absence of consultation with university officials.
24. Alfonso López Bello, *Análisis comparativo de las leyes orgánicas de las universidades mexicanas* (México: SEP, 1974), pp. 255–57. The board exists in half the state universities, but in 70 percent of these cases it is elected by the university council.
25. Leonel Pereznieto Castro, *Algunas consideraciones acerca de la reforma universitaria en la UNAM* (México: UNAM, 1976), p. 73.
26. Diego Valadés, *La Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (México: UNAM, 1974), p. 50.

27. Gastón García Cantú, written response, received 3 February 1976.
28. Javier Barros Sierra, *Conversaciones con Gastón García Cantú* (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), pp. 45–47; P rezni eto, *Algunas consideraciones*, p. 73.
29. See, for example, Seminar on Higher Education in the Americas, “Las universidades de los Estados Unidos y las de América Latina: análisis comparativo de algunos aspectos,” in *Acotaciones a problemas fundamentales de la educación superior en las américas*, ed. Ana Herzfeld and Barbara Ashton Waggoner (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1971), p. 22.
30. López Bello, *Análisis comparativo*, p. 46.
31. Barros Sierra, *Conversaciones*, p. 116.
32. Interviews with Carlos Herrera Ordóñez, 21 January 1976, in Pachuca, Carlos Celis Salazar, 10 February 1976, in Cuernavaca, and Guillermo Ortiz Garduño, 1 April 1976, in Mexico City. Rector selection in the state universities follows one of three equally common patterns: council selection, board selection, and either direct government selection or government-council collaboration.
33. Barros Sierra, *Conversaciones*, p. 182.
34. Interview, 10 November 1975, Mexico City.
35. The board’s selection of Barros Sierra (1966) drew the strongest University reaction in recent years, due to the designee’s unusually scanty UNAM affiliation. (Rarely would the University have a more loyal leader.) The selection of González Casanova (1970) tipped the balance back toward the academic side of the ledger.
36. Jesús Silva Herzog, *Una historia de la universidad de México y sus problemas* (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1974), p. 117. In another instance, the government may have pressed for the reelection of Rector Ignacio Chávez in 1965.
37. See, for example, Genaro Fernández Mac Gregor, *El río de mi sangre* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1969), pp. 384–97, 427–35; Silva Herzog, *Una historia*, p. 96; Silva Herzog, *Una vida en la vida de México* (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), pp. 326–27.
38. Silva Herzog, *Una historia*, pp. 93–99, 121, 139–40; *Mis últimas andanzas* (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1973), pp. 122, 127–28.
39. Silva Herzog, *Una historia*, p. 139.
40. Silva Herzog, *Una vida*, p. 328.
41. Fernández Mac Gregor, *El río*, p. 384; Barros Sierra, *Conversaciones*, pp. 180–87.
42. Barros Sierra, *Conversaciones*, pp. 201–2.
43. Valadés, *La Universidad*, p. 49.
44. Interviews conducted on 6 April, 31 March, 6 April, 20 April, and 23 March, 1976, respectively, all in Mexico City. Zea was the director of the Faculty of Philosophy, and is one of Mexico’s most respected authors; Salmerón, director of the Institute for Philosophic Studies when interviewed, had been rector of the University of Veracruz (and presently is rector of the Autonomous Metropolitan University—Iztapalapa); Ruiz Fernández is UNAM’s planning director; Pablo González Casanova is one of Mexico’s foremost social scientists; Henrique González Casanova is president of UNAM’s Commission on New Methods and Programs.
45. I make a fuller analysis in “The Political Struggle over Tuition in Mexico,” *Revista del Centro de Estudios Educativos* (forthcoming).
46. I refer, for example, to scholars in the Centro de Estudios Educativos, as manifested in many issues of their aforementioned *Revista del Centro de Estudios Educativos*.
47. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, *Cuenta Pública*, 1975.
48. See, for example, Barbara Burn, *Higher Education in Nine Countries* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).
49. Again see almost any issue of their *Revista*.
50. Interview with Manuel Pérez Rocha, 26 November 1975, Mexico City.
51. Quoted by Pablo Latapí, *Universidad y cambio social* (México: 1975), p. 19.
52. Latapí, *Universidad*, p. 22.
53. Interview with Oscar Méndez Nápoles, 8 January 1976, Mexico City.
54. Quoted by Pérez Rocha, “Universidades manipuladas,” *Excelsior*, 7 November 1975.

55. For example, see the *Excelsior* articles of 14 November 1975: Pérez Rocha, "Vías para aumentar la autonomía"; Armando Labra, "¿Agencia bancaria o educación popular?" Froylan López Narváez, "Crédito educativo."
56. If the government's failure appears most striking when compared to its own goals and strong image, it also contrasts, but more ambiguously, with cross-national experience. As enrollments and costs have risen, many governments have insisted that students assume part of the financial burden. Even such a traditional no-tuition fortress as the City University of New York has had changes imposed upon it. The Chilean junta has dramatically redirected the financial burden to the student, though not nearly to the absolute extent originally projected. The absence of tuition in the Argentine and Brazilian cases may be due to potential student opposition, the recency of government preoccupation, or, in Brazil, the fact that about half the enrollment is accounted for by the tuition-paying private sector.
57. Data for the Echeverría administration covers the first five years.
58. Aguascalientes drew 36 percent of its 1975 income from nongovernment sources. In contrast, the Technological Institute of Monterrey, Mexico's most famous private educational institution, draws about 97 percent of its income from nongovernment sources, two-thirds from tuition alone. See the Ministry's *Las universidades estatales de México 1970–1975* (México: SEP, 1975), pp. 3–4; ANUIES, *La educación superior en México 1966* (México: ANUIES, 1966), apéndice A.
59. Despite all these data, a prudent guess is that some trend toward university self-financing will finally develop. Mexico probably cannot continue to escape cross-national patterns in higher education to the extent it presently does. Ever-growing enrollments and costs make the government's financial responsibility increasingly burdensome. If greater regime insistence on partial relief is likely, it will have occurred considerably later than the regime had wanted. We would still have to explain the regime's unusually protracted acquiescence to university pressure.
60. Interview with Roger Díaz de Cossio, 27 February 1976, Mexico City.
61. The present rector recently reaffirmed his opposition to tuition even in the midst of worker strikes which would increase UNAM's operating costs. "No habrá aumento," *El Día*, 20 January 1977.
62. Interviewed 13 January 1976, Mexico City.
63. For a brief discussion on Mexico, see Daniel Levy, "Government Efforts to Cope with Giantism," *London Times*, Higher Education Supplement, 20 January 1978.
64. Barros Sierra, *Conversaciones*, p. 95.
65. Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexican Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1963), pp. 154–93; John F. H. Purcell and Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Mexican Business and Public Policy," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism*, pp. 191–226; Daniel Cosío Villegas, *El sistema político mexicano* (México: Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz, 1973), p. 72.
66. Recent analysis of the Echeverría administration suggests that the regime's and even the president's power has been exaggerated. See the Purcells' illuminating comparative analysis of five attempted government reforms, "El estado y la empresa privada," *Nueva Política* 1, no. 2 (1976):229–50; Yoram Shapira, "Mexico: The Impact of the 1968 Student Protest on Echeverría's Reformism," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 19, no. 4 (1977):570.
67. The criterion of differential regime control over policy is distinct from, though obviously related to, the criterion of policy content or output. Problems with categorizing regimes according to policy output are summarized in Karen Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America," *LARR* 13, no. 2 (1978):39–54.