

But Schlesinger's solution may only work in connection with this form of the problem of evil. For the premise in the above argument can be re-phrased as: a perfectly moral agent will, given the power, make a world which conforms to certain minimum standards. The question of whether our world conforms to these standards cannot be dismissed as being misconceived in principle. In favour of this re-formulation, it may be suggested that we would not regard a world in which creatures endure intense and unrelieved suffering as one which is consistent with the projects of a supremely perfect being, even allowing that in such a situation there is a sense in which 'the degree of perfectability of state of an individual ... would be precisely as short of being a maximum height as it is now' (p. 61).

In his chapter on the argument from design, Schlesinger fulfils the promise of the book to bring to bear new insights by offering a discussion of what has come to be termed 'the anthropic principle'. This principle holds that it was necessary for the basic physical constants of the universe to assume almost exactly the values that they have for the emergence of life in a way which is consistent with natural law to have been possible. Here Schlesinger draws some judicious conclusions concerning when events of low probability are to be explained. For instance he records Monod's charge that 'among all the events possible in the Universe the *a priori* probability of any particular one of them occurring is next to zero' (p. 132). In reply he says that 'Monod is, of course, absolutely right that given any one of infinitely many universes, some conjunction or other of physical magnitudes will have to obtain. However the prevailing conjunction is not merely one of indefinitely many; it is also an instance of an infinitesimally rare *kind* of universe: the kind that is capable of sustaining life' (p. 133). The author's grasp of the relevance of measures of probability is borne out also in the chapters on miracles and Pascal's Wager.

Schlesinger's book can be commended for its clarity and accessibility. These qualities are evident in the passages I have cited. In conjunction with the range of issues examined and the directness of the conclusions set forward, they make the book both pleasing and challenging.

MARK WYNN

**WISDOM IN THE Q-TRADITION: The aphoristic teaching of Jesus**  
by R.A. Piper, S.N.T.S. Monograph 61, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1989,  
Pp ix + 325. £30.00.

This monograph, like many others, is a revised version of a doctoral dissertation. It examines, in great detail, certain aphoristic sayings of Jesus. One is perhaps inclined to believe that such sayings belong to the periphery of Jesus' teaching—for after all, was that not mainly given in the form of parables? Dr. Piper does us a service in reminding us how large a part these sayings play in the tradition, and in suggesting that their importance has been obscured by the fact that scholarly attention has been largely focussed on the parables.

The first part of this study looks at seven collections of aphoristic sayings, the first five of which are found, in reasonably similar form, in both Matthew and Luke. These five collections are found in (1) Matthew 516

7:7–11/Luke 11:9–13; (ii) Matthew 6:25–33/Luke 12:22–31; (iii) Matthew 7:1–5/Luke 6:37–42 (iv) Matthew 7:16–20, 12:33–5/Luke 6:43–5; and (v) Matthew 10:26–33/Luke 12:2–9. Careful examination of these passages reveals that they all follow a similar structure; this suggests that the sayings have not been brought together at random, but that they have been consciously collected into units that conform to a general pattern. The collections appear to be addressed to Christian disciples, not to outsiders, and are concerned with issues such as the need for self-examination and the hypocrisy of judging others, and warnings against anxiety, especially regarding basic material needs, but including fear of persecution. These sayings are aphoristic, not prophetic: they appeal to general human experience, not to a word of revelation, in order to persuade their hearers. The fact that these collections of sayings occur in double-tradition material has important implications for the Q-hypothesis, since it seems that neither Matthew nor Luke can be considered to be the originator of the structure of argument: in some cases Matthew may seem more original, but elsewhere his version appears to be secondary; moreover, neither author shows signs of promulgating or deliberately preserving the structure of these aphoristic collections. This suggests, of course, that the collections derive from an early tradition used by both authors.

Two other possible collections are then considered, and found to have a similar structure. The first, Matthew 5:44–8/Luke 6:27–36, falls within the double tradition, but the sequence of saying varies: here Matthew's account conforms to the structure found elsewhere. The second is found in Luke alone (16:9–13), though echoes of the collection are found in scattered Matthaean sayings. The analysis of this passage in Luke is in many ways the most intriguing in the book; Dr Piper argues that the structure of this collection is parallel to that elsewhere, that Luke would not have composed it himself, being apparently indifferent to the pattern elsewhere, and that he therefore incorporated an already existing collection of sayings, presumably finding them in the same source as the other collections. The sayings are thus not, after all, the various attempts of early Christian preachers to expound the troublesome parable of the Unjust Steward—though presumably Luke decided to use it at this point because he saw some connection!

Dr. Piper looks next at isolated aphoristic sayings in the double tradition; some he defines as wisdom admonitions (imperatives supported by general statements), and the themes of these are very similar to those of the aphoristic collections. The detached aphoristic sentences, on the other hand, are more varied, but many of them continue tendencies discovered in the collections. A comparison with the tradition used by Mark suggests distinct differences between modes of argument (e.g. in the Beelzebub controversy). Of particular interest is the suggestion that the double-tradition sayings defend the validity of Jesus' authority rather than his uniqueness, and do so on general grounds, as God's representative, rather than on the basis of particular Christological claims.

Finally, Dr. Piper looks at the 'Sophia' sayings in the double tradition, and concludes that these function in a somewhat different way. He concludes with a suggestive comparison of the interests reflected in both the aphoristic material and the 'Sophia' logia with the distinctive themes of

Acts 6—7. The correspondences suggest the kind of circumstances which could give rise to the use of this kind of material.

The patient examination of evidence in this study supports the author's conclusion that both the collections of aphoristic sayings and the individual sayings found in the double tradition owe their formulation to a particular circle within the early Christian community. One important corollary to this is the fact that these conclusions provide indirect support for the Q-hypothesis, but this is an aspect which the author is content to mention, not explore: it would be interesting to pursue this with a supporter of the two-Gospel hypothesis! But the real question which is left unanswered at the end of the day is how material which derives from one circle in the church relates to the teaching of Jesus himself: it is a question raised on the last page, but left open, since it needs further investigation. But this is the most intriguing question of all, and it is hoped that Dr. Piper will decide to pursue it.

MORNA D. HOOKER

**ANGLO-CATHOLICISM: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS AMBIGUITY** by W.S.F. Pickering, *Routledge*, 1989. xiii + 286pp. £35.00

After 1945, Anglo-Catholicism, once a constant source of Anglican controversy, became largely accepted as one of three streams of Anglican 'tradition', the others being Anglican Evangelicalism and Anglican Liberalism. The ecumenical tendency to blur significant differences helped to soften the situation, while a widespread belief that Anglo-Catholicism was dying out at parish level also drained away the excitement that had once surrounded its existence. Vatican II isolated the movement even more, and it took the marginal issue of women's ordination to rouse the fighting spirit of a depressed minority. With the present Bishop of London constantly talking about issues of 'principle' it was time for some one to throw over the talk about 'comprehensiveness' and point out instead the confusions and complacencies which have grown up in the Anglo-Catholic milieu. Dr William Pickering, who recently retired from teaching sociology at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, has filled the gap with a full-length critique of what he says is a basically ambiguous movement, and someone is going to have to reply to his vigorous attack.

Dr Pickering divides his work into three parts. The first five chapters outline and discuss the history of the Anglo-Catholic movement. Then follow four chapters under the heading 'Ambiguities', here Pickering stresses the conflict between theory and practice: Anglo-Catholics (he says) advocate 'catholicism' but behave like an Anglican sect; they laud the apostolic succession but obey bishops only when they choose to do so; they are equally selective in their attitude to the authority of Rome. Pickering's touch is less certain in a chapter on 'ambiguity over sexuality' which raises the question of possible links between homosexuality and Anglo-Catholicism: 'might it not be possible', he suggests, 'that the adulation of (clerical) celibacy is seen as a legitimate rationalization of actual or latent homosexuality?'. The Anglican capacity for tolerance needs strengthening, not weakening.

In the final section of his book Pickering points out that many Anglo-