about the qualities we want to uphold as we seek to inspire the next generation of law students, lawyers, faculty, and judges. Kloppenberg's biography makes it abundantly clear why Dorothy Wright Nelson is such a beloved mentor to many, one who serves as a shining example of the many ways in which mentorship matters in a profession, whether in practice or the academy, built on relationships and generosity.

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Wolfgang P. Müller, *Marriage Litigation in the Western Church, 1215–1517*

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The first chapter of Professor Müller's book contains a nice piece of archival detective work. Starting with a cryptic account of the receipts of the keeper of the seal of the archdeacon of Xanten (on the Lower Rhine) for the year 1516–1517 and an equally cryptic and incomplete register of cases heard before the official of the same archdeacon, Müller, on the basis of a few entries that coincide, reconstructs what most "cases" were probably like in this court (32–42). Müller then goes down the Rhine to Basel, and to another group of records, where he finds the same pattern of cases in sufficient quantity that he can count them. This pattern then is converted into the hypothetical case of Michael and Mary that appears in the introduction (1–3). The couple are cited *ex officio* before an ecclesiastical judge on the basis of local reports that they were committing fornication. Mary swears that they are married. (He promised to marry me and then had intercourse with me.) Michael admits the intercourse but denies the promise. Mary has no proof of the promise, or, at least, not sufficient proof. Michael is ordered to do public penance for the fornication. Mary is not, but she may not in conscience marry another since she has sworn that she is married to Michael. She may, however, at least in some places, recover damages for defloration, and child support if her relationship with Michael resulted in a child.

The first of Müller's main theses in this book is that the overwhelming majority of medieval marriage cases in Northern Europe (England, Northern

French-speaking areas, and Germany) were of this type, actions to enforce a marriage, not to obtain an annulment or a separation. He does not seem to be claiming—nor could he claim—that the overwhelming majority were of the type of the modal case that is featured in the Introduction. His claim, however, is that the overwhelming majority of marriage-enforcement cases in this geographical area were "penitential" not "judicial." By "judicial" he seems to mean following the long-form *ordo iudiciarius*, including the introduction of witnesses and/or written documents. His "penitential" cases lack these elements of the *ordo* but are not necessarily *ex officio* (brought nominally in the name of the judge against alleged offenders of church law). The high annual volume of cases found in Paris (1384–1387), Augsburg (1348–1352), and Regensburg (selected years from 1489 to 1515) all seem to have been instance cases (brought by a private party). The seeming dominance of the "judicial" in England is explained by an assertion that is not well supported at this level of generality that lesser ecclesiastical courts handled a large volume of cases similar to those found in the surviving records of the "Franco-German" courts.

The second main thesis is that marriage-enforcement cases are relatively infrequent in the records in Southern Europe. (Müller deals with Spain and Italy with some reference to the work of others on Southern France.) Much of the three chapters on Southern Europe is spent documenting that this is, in fact, the case, and showing what other kinds of marriage cases are found in this region. Müller's tentative explanation for the relative lack of marriage-enforcement cases is that people in this region found ways to resolve such disputes that did not involve the ecclesiastical courts or that such disputes were relatively infrequent because of the notarial tradition in the area.

An Appendix to the book (218–245) contains statistics about marriage cases in eight diocesan court registers. A large amount of work was involved in compiling these statistics, and they advance our understanding of marriage litigation in the Middle Ages considerably. They should, however, be used with caution. To take but one example, the Ely case called "Dalling/Savage" (no. 88) is classified as a simple contested enforcement action that the woman asserting the existence of the marriage lost (241). Later on the same page, the same case is classified as a double contested enforcement action that both women asserting the existence of the marriage lost. It is, in fact, a triple contested enforcement action that one of the women asserting the existence of the marriage won, and the other two necessarily lost (*Ely Register*, entry 34.12; entry 44.22).

The Bibliography (246–263) is comprehensive and includes everything cited in book. Absent is Beatrice Gottlieb's 1974 Columbia Ph.D. dissertation. Had Müller had it, he would have been able to expand his survey of the Northern French registers to include those of Troyes and Châlons-en-Champagne. Also absent is the 2014 volume of conference papers: *Les officialités dans l'Europe médiévale et moderne*. Had Müller had it, he might have modified some of his conclusions about both France and Spain.

There is much in this book that is valuable and interesting. It is regrettable that Müller chose to devote—or his publisher insisted that he devote—only 216 pages of text to a topic that calls for more discussion of its variety and nuance. That Müller is aware of this variety and nuance is indicated by a number of

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remarks that he makes in passing in the text, and, in one case, by an entire chapter (ch. 6, "Domestic Partnerships in Iberia"). This awareness, however, did not get translated into the bold generalizations, particularly the one about Northern Europe, that are a principal feature of the book.

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Yue Du, *State and Family in China: Filial Piety and Its Modern Reform*

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Yue Du's well-researched and insightful book, *State and Family in China: Filial Piety and Its Modern Reform*, bridges two disparate scholarly traditions: the Qing dynasty's (1644–1911) administrative rules underpinned by Confucian morality and "foreign-inspired reforms and revolutions" that led to China's transition from an empire to a party-state. (6) In this book, the author reconsiders *xiao* or filial piety, a time-honored Confucian virtue, in the Qing's legal system and its modern fate since the opening decades of the twentieth century. The author singles out filial piety, a defining feature of familial relations in imperial China, as the focal point of her research, because she notes that "[p]arent-child relations" underwent the "most dramatic changes in China's empire-to-nation transformation." (6) Du argues that the law in imperial China supported, without reservations, parental authority over minor as well as adult children, but the Republic of China (1912–1949) endeavored "to transform filial sons into citizens whose ultimate loyalty lay with the nation-state." (247) Ironically, while the Nationalist Party or Guomindang (GMD) disavowed filial piety's role as the cornerstone of the family, it still needed to resort to this very idea to erect the modern state's absolute authority over its citizens.

To highlight the political and ideological ramifications of filial piety in premodern and modern China, this book thus features two main parts. Part I underscores the centrality of the principle of filiality in the Qing's codified law and legal practices. The first chapter cogently shows that publicly punishing or executing unfilial sons and daughters was the Qing government's