It would be natural to ask, as some neo-republicans have, why republican ideas went into eclipse during this tumultuous period. The answer, of course, is that they didn't. Making due allowance for differences in terminology and emphasis, Constant, Tocqueville, and Mill—and later liberal thinkers such as T.H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse, J.A. Hobson, and John Dewey—were no less committed to non-domination, the rule of law, and accountable government than their republican forebears. Indeed, more progress was made toward realizing those ideals in "liberal" polities over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than in all preceding human history (which is not to deny that much work remains to be done).

What makes liberal political thought distinctive is the fact that it insists on the importance of carving out a domain of conduct—of liberty—in which we aren't responsible either to the state or to each other for what we do, even when our republican freedom is thereby compromised. In other words, liberals don't *reject* the value of republican freedom, but they do hold that it should be *balanced* against the enjoyment of a very different kind of freedom: freedom as non-responsibility, or market freedom as I call it for short. To make a very long story short, the early liberals arrived at this view in an effort to respond to the gradual but cumulatively decisive collapse of traditional social and political hierarchies in the wake of the American and French Revolutions. They argued that the rise of the modern democratic state has made political power both harder to control and harder to avoid, and that the overbearing weight of public opinion, amplified by the new organs of mass communication, threatened to stifle individual creativity and initiative: thus for example the famous worries that Tocqueville and Mill raise about the tyranny of the majority. The necessary response, they concluded, is to promote a flexible and entrepreneurial economy, a robust and pluralistic civil society, and an open and tolerant public sphere—even, again, when the associated freedoms of expression, association, and exchange tend to threaten or undermine the enjoyment of republican freedom.

Thus from a liberal point of view what was new about neo-republicanism is not the fact that it drew attention to the importance of non-domination, but rather the fact that—especially in Pettit's hands—it held that non-domination should take strict priority over other political values; that it is in this sense primary or sufficient. The most interesting moments in *The Well-Ordered Republic* when read from the standpoint of *Liberal Freedom* are those at which Lovett retreats—albeit cautiously and somewhat ambiguously—from this position. He argues, for example, that "republicans can with perfect consistency maintain both the claim that non-domination is a primary good, and also the claim that its value will be outweighed at the margin in this or that special case" (p. 77; the "special cases" that he mentions are parenting and political activism). He suggests that "even if markets inherently involve domination, their other advantages might in the end tell in their favor" (p. 104). He concedes that "if there are many things we should care about as public aims, then there will presumably be some situations in which the distinct values served … outweigh the value of freedom from domination, and thus the latter should give way to the former" (p. 151).

Taken at face value, these passages go a long way toward blurring the line between republicanism and liberalism, at least as I understand it. However, where Lovett considers the question of whether republican freedom might need to be balanced against other political values only in passing, suggesting that this is a minor concern from a republican point of view, liberals place that question at the very center of attention. This is not to deny the importance of the issues that Lovett does bring to the foreground. In *Liberal Freedom* I insist that a liberal polity must give priority to republican freedom in the limited but crucial sense that the limits of non-responsible conduct—of market freedom—must be defined by republican means, but I touch only briefly on the question of what this requires of us practically speaking. I can think of few better resources for thinking that question through than *The Well-Ordered Republic.* In that sense the two books complement each other nicely.

Response to Eric MacGilvray's Review of *The Well-Ordered Republic*

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— Frank Lovett

First, let me thank Professor MacGilvray for his thoughtful and generous review of *The Well-Ordered Republic.* I am struck by the fact that we both agree our two books stand in a generative rather than competitive relationship with one other, and yet disagree as to how this is so. Many people tend to regard liberalism and republicanism as opposed or even antagonistic political doctrines. MacGilvray and I agree that it is misleading to see things this way. Liberalism is an elastic idea that can mean different things to different people; when understood in a sufficiently capacious sense, it need not conflict with republicanism. Put another way, republicanism opposes not liberalism as such, but rather certain strands of liberal thought that have perhaps been dominant at various times.

MacGilvray places the origins of liberalism somewhat later than others would, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, around the time that the collapse of the old aristocratic social order and advent of the industrial revolution transformed social and political thought. He argues that these major changes led liberals to articulate the value of a private sphere free from social interference or regulation. But, he says, liberals did not reject republican

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freedom for all that: rather, they insisted on a need to balance the two values. From his point of view, the contemporary republican revival was simply about reasserting the priority of republican freedom.

I read the historical record somewhat differently. While I agree that liberals in the nineteenth century were responding to the dramatic social and economic changes mentioned, it is less clear to me that they retained any attachment to republican freedom. The freedom "of pursuing our own good in our own way," says J.S. Mill in *On Liberty*, is the "only freedom which deserves the name." Herbert Spencer was even more overt, asserting in *The Man versus the State* that "the liberty which a citizen enjoys is to be measured, not by the nature of the governmental machinery he lives under," but rather by "the relative paucity of the restraints it imposes," regardless of "whether this machinery is or is not one that he has shared in making." In such passages, I detect no trace of concern for republican freedom. Thus I am persuaded by Pettit's thesis that liberalism in the nineteenth century aimed not to counterbalance republican freedom, but to replace it—*precisely because* the rapidly changing social and economic conditions revealed republicanism to have radical implications. Bentham and Mill were perhaps too clever to say so explicitly, but William Paley was less guarded: referring to republican views, he says that "those definitions of liberty ought to be rejected, which, by making that essential to civil freedom which is unattainable in experience, inflame expectations … and disturb the public." And why would republicanism inflame expectations? Because if freedom really does mean having no master, then we should interrogate patriarchal family relations, wage labor capitalism, colonialism, and much else besides!

In short, if we embrace MacGilvray's broad and attractive understanding of the liberal tradition as a flexible framework for balancing republican freedom on the one hand with the value of a private sphere on the other, then we can certainly count republicanism as a strand in liberal political thought. But we should think of it as a strand fundamentally opposed to classical liberalism's attempt to elide the republican ideal of living in a free society of equal citizens, no one the master of any other.

Liberal Freedom: Pluralism, Polarization, and Politics.

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Edmund Cartwright designed and built the first power loom in 1786. The first weaving factory was built four years later in Manchester. Over the next few decades, textile factories rapidly displaced handloom shops because the machines could be operated by unskilled workers at lower wages. There is no question that the handloom weavers (some of whom went on to become the Luddites) were harmed by these developments, in the straightforward sense that they suffered material setbacks to their interests. Inflicting such harms, however, was no part of Cartwright's intentions, nor the intentions of the factory builders, the capital investors in those factories, the low-wage workers they employed, or textile consumers. Rather, the harms suffered by the displaced handloom weavers were simply an unintended byproduct of thousands of decentralized choices by individual market participants.

In his essay *On Liberty*, John Stuart Mill proposes the famous harm principle, according to which society has no business interfering with personal choices that harm no one else. The harm principle guarantees a wide range of freedom—freedom of expression, freedom of speech, freedom of association and lifestyle choice, and so on. Notice, however, that the principle would not protect the conduct of those whose choices harmed the handloom weavers: on Mill's argument, it remains an open question whether and to what extent the ordinary operations of the market economy ought to be subject to social regulation. Why permit the freedom to buy, sell, and trade when we know perfectly well that those activities will inevitably, if often unintentionally, generate collateral harms? What rules and boundaries should we place on the exercise of market freedom, and how and to what extent should we aim to mitigate the harms to which that freedom gives rise?

Some books are great because they invent entirely novel ideas or theories. Others are great because they take existing ideas or theories and build on or deepen them. And still others are great because they transform the way we think about familiar ideas or theories we thought we understood already. Eric MacGilvray's *Liberal Freedom: Pluralism, Polarization, and Politics* is great in the third of these ways. He recasts not just one, but two big ideas.

First, he wants to change how we think about markets. Many people, myself included, tend to think about markets in terms of the "perfect competition" model familiar from contemporary economic theory—that is, roughly, a trading environment in which participation is voluntary, everyone has complete information, and no one can unilaterally influence prices. Real-world markets are often viewed through the lens of this model: we consider the various ways in which reality departs from those ideal conditions, and the consequences such departures have. MacGilvray says we should instead think about markets in terms of the dilemma sketched here: the market sphere is a deliberately constructed but restricted domain in which we permit people to do as they please despite the collateral harms to which their actions might give rise. We tolerate such harms because the free market is so much more efficient and creative, for example, or because it allows

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