

War and insecurity: legacies of Northern and Southern state formation

ROLAND DANNREUTHER*

Abstract. Much of the post-Cold War discourse about contemporary warfare posits a binary opposition between a 'democratic peace' in the North and the prevalence of virulent 'new wars' in the South. This article seeks to qualify these accounts by bringing out the deeper historical and sociological legacies of state formation critical for understanding the emergence of an internal peace amongst developed countries and the continuing insecurity and multiple civil wars in many poorer developing regions. It is argued that two features of Southern state formation – the external imposition of states and the enforced norm against territorial aggrandisement – have significantly constrained the development of many developing states, making it more difficult for them to forge strong, synergistic states whose security concerns are externally- rather than internally-oriented. The article argues that there is, though, much variation in how Southern states have responded to these historical legacies of state formation. The article concludes with a four-fold taxonomy to replace the simple North-South bifurcation, differentiating between developed, globalising, praetorian and failed states and identifying the differing potential for, and incidence of, violent conflict, insecurity, and war within these four types of state.

Introduction

The Cold War presented a bipolar confrontation between East and West where the prospect of large-scale conventional war, with the threat of escalation to a nuclear level, was an ever-present possibility. With the end of the Cold War, this bipolar security structure has increasingly been replaced by an analytical framework emphasising a North-South division based on certain binary oppositions. In place of a relatively balanced and interdependent military struggle, the dominant post-Cold War discourse has emphasised the opposition between a purported 'zone of peace' in the developed, industrialised world and 'zones of turmoil' and pervasive conflicts and wars in the poorer developing world.¹ Similarly, while during the Cold War both

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¹ See, for example, Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003); and James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', *International Organization*, 46:2 (1992), pp. 467–91.

sides were seen as preparing for a traditional, if potentially nuclear, interstate Great Power war, the post-Cold War literature has emphasised the post-Westphalian and 'humane' waging of wars by the developed countries as against the brutality, lack of discrimination and disregard for basic humanitarian principles of the wars fought in many parts of the developing world.² A contrast is thus made between Northern countries who enjoy the fruits of a 'democratic peace', and the countries of the South where wars increasingly involve brutal civil conflicts described by some as radically 'new wars', shorn of classical warfare's traditional Clausewitzian moorings.³ It is the empirical evidence of civilians and non-combatants in the South being the principal victims of these wars which has been particularly influential in contributing to the increasingly popular post-Cold War paradigm of human security.⁴

Understanding the phenomenon of the 'new wars' and the new post-Cold War context for violent conflict has engendered a lively debate. One influential set of explanations has focused on how conflict based on ideological difference, which essentially defined the Cold War East-West confrontation, has been replaced by conflict driven by issues of communal identity, whether these be ethnic, national, religious or even civilisational.⁵ The post-Cold War bloody wars of secession in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union have strengthened the so-called 'ancient hatreds' explanation for the brutality of these conflicts and the resurgence of ethnic and cultural difference with the undermining of communist ideology.⁶ A second popular interpretation has placed greater emphasis on the dynamics of globalisation as the critical causal factor behind the 'new wars' and the resurgence of identity-based conflicts. On this analysis, it is globalisation which has primarily led to a complementary process of fragmentation, whether these be of states, identities or cultures.⁷ It is also the 'negative' side of globalisation, such as the international trade in small arms, drugs, and valuable minerals, such as diamonds, oil and timber, which is seen to fuel civil wars and perpetuate a powerful and self-sustaining war economy.⁸ A third interpretation focuses more specifically on the problems of governance and institutional capacity and notes that the majority of these conflicts have occurred within states which have 'collapsed' or simply 'failed' to provide the institutions and practices which can provide security to their citizens. The 'failed state' phenomenon

² Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Civil Wars: From LA to Bosnia* (New York: Vintage, 1994); Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (New York: Henry Holt, 1998).

³ Good surveys of this can be found in Colin Gray, *Post-Modern War: The New Politics of Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1997); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); and Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

⁴ This can be seen in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, '“We the Peoples”: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice', *International Relations*, 18:1 (2004), pp. 9–23; Astri Suhrke, 'Human Security and the Interest of States', *Security Dialogue*, 30:3 (1999), pp. 256–76; and United National Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁵ See, for example, Roger Brubaker and David D. Laitin, 'Ethnic and Nationalist Violence', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24 (1998); Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations?' *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (1993), pp. 22–49.

⁶ Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

⁷ This is notable in Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001); and Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

⁸ Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Michael Renner, *The Anatomy of Resource Wars* (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 2002).

has been an increasing concern for researchers and international policymakers in seeking to understand contemporary conflict.⁹

These various explanations of the perceived new realities of contemporary warfare have been equally challenged and critiqued. A number of commentators have noted that there is nothing necessarily 'new' about the 'new wars' and that historical parallels can be found with warfare in late medieval or early modern Europe or with many colonial or imperial wars.¹⁰ The notion that the 'new wars' can simply be understood as a consequence of the complex phenomenon of globalisation, or that such wars are driven purely by greed or economic motives, has similarly been criticised for an excessively simplistic and deterministic understanding of the complex roots and sources of many the wars fought in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.¹¹ More fundamentally, the very idea of a clear cultural or geographical separation between North and South, and between a 'zone of peace' and a 'zone of war', has been challenged. The violent conflicts which broke out in the former Yugoslavia, in a country and region commonly perceived to be in the heart of Europe, suggests that the 'North' is not immune to endemic instability and war. Conversely, the relatively peaceful nature of interstate relations in Latin America, normally considered as an integral part of the South, questions whether the 'democratic peace' is necessarily confined to the North.

This article aims to contribute to these debates by developing some critical qualifications or modifications to the literature on the 'new wars' and the focus placed on the role of shifting identities, the problem of failed states, and the challenges posed by globalisation. The first qualification is that such explanations for understanding contemporary warfare remain limited and partial if they are not incorporated into a broader historical and sociological narrative and framework. This is not to dismiss or to reject the insights provided by rationalist and/or individualistic accounts but to argue that these are incomplete without some sense of the deeper historical structures and path dependencies which continue to influence contemporary trajectories of collective violence.¹² There is also no misguided ambition to ignore the inevitably complex and multiple causes for every particular war, or to pass over the sheer element of chance and contingency, but rather to ensure that deeper structural factors, drawn from complex historical processes and legacies, are not themselves ignored or overlooked. What the argument seeks to do is to provide a reasonably parsimonious model, which highlights the historical legacies of state formation as significant causal mechanisms which help to explain the differing

⁹ See, in particular, the findings of the State Failure Task Force: Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko and Alan N. Unger, *State Failure Task Report* (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 1995); Daniel C. Esty et al., *State Failure Task Report: Phase II Findings* (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 1998); and I. William Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

¹⁰ Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics*, 54:1 (2001), pp. 99–118; and Münkler, *The New Wars*, ch. 2.

¹¹ Mats Berdal, 'How "New" are the "New Wars"?' *Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War*, *Global Governance*, 9 (2003), pp. 477–502.

¹² For an excellent overview of the issues relating to the methods and methodologies within historical sociology, see James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Roland Dannreuther and James Kennedy, 'Historical Sociology in Sociology; British Decline and US Hegemony with Lessons for International Relations', *International Politics*, 44:4 (2007); and Michael Mann, 'In Praise of Macro-Sociology: A Reply to Goldthorpe', *British Journal of Sociology*, 45:1, pp. 37–54.

forms of contemporary insecurities and conflicts. As with all such interpretive models, they only reveal the broad patterns of change and continuity and not the finer empirical details and exceptions.

The second qualification is that, though the argument does depend on an analytical distinction between the North and South, this does not presuppose a homogenous and undifferentiated South and a monolithic North. Rather, what the South refers to in this article is simply those states whose processes of state formation were, in some way or other, constrained, determined or dictated by external pressures and forces, primarily those of the expansionist European imperial powers. This does not qualify the clear reality that there is enormous variation in the South and that, as a term describing contemporary international politics, the 'South' is problematic. As such, there is a conscious attempt in this article to avoid overly simplistic or deterministic accounts of the legacies of the past, which is a particular danger of historical sociological or structuralist approaches. It is argued that, while it is critical to incorporate the historical legacies of state formation, these legacies can be very different for differing countries and regions and that there can be varying degrees of success and failure in overcoming the negative or constraining impact of these legacies. Agency and contingency still have significant roles to play.

The third qualification is to move away from viewing the 'new wars' as isolated phenomena, which can only be compared and contrasted to the 'democratic peace' in the North. Rather, there is a need to view them as part of a broader pattern or continuum of insecurity and violent contestation. The fact that a country in sub-Saharan Africa or in the Middle East or in Asia is not engaged in a civil war does not mean that it is peaceful or stable; there are often deep sources of internal and external insecurities which need to be identified and recognised.

These are the main general qualifications that this article seeks to provide to contribute to the literature on contemporary warfare and international security. The more concrete argument can be summarised as follows:

- The popularity of the 'democratic peace' argument should not obscure the fact that interstate war played a critical and highly significant role in the process of state formation in Europe. War was certainly only one of a complex set of factors which contributed to the development of the modern European state system. But, the constant threat of large-scale warfare and conquest provided a significant contribution to the emergence of strong states, representative political institutions and a countervailing civil society. In addition, it led to a dominant conception of security as externally-oriented towards the threats posed by other states.
- It was also this experience of war, and the growing costs of such wars, which significantly contributed to the development of an internal peace, which includes a normative consensus against territorial aggrandisement.
- Southern state formation has been distinctively different. Although there is considerable variation in the conditions and processes of state formation amongst developing states, what they do have in common is a legacy of external imposition and the need to operate in a regional and international system significantly constrained and controlled by external powers. The consequence is that there is an inherited legacy which has contributed to states which are often weak and artificial, where state-civil relations tend towards clientelism and lack synergy, and where there is only partial or limited integration into regional and global economic processes.

- The variation in the South is found both in the differing pre-modern legacies which influenced modern state formation and in the differing strategies adopted in the subsequent processes of development. This variation, it is argued, provides significant insights into the differing conditions of insecurity, conflict and war found in the developing world. This article concludes by developing a four-fold taxonomy to replace the simple North–South bifurcation, differentiating between developed, globalising, praetorian and failed states. The nature and the potential threat of violent conflict and warfare differ significantly between these four different types of state.

The article starts with an analysis of the role that war and interstate conflict has historically played in the evolution of the modern state in its European context. How this historical experience has led to the so-called ‘democratic peace’, where war is increasingly inconceivable between developed liberal states, is then discussed. The second, third and fourth sections provides a contrast with the very different legacies of state formation which developed in those countries colonised or dominated through European imperial expansion. The final section develops a classification of four different ‘ideal-types’ of state, based on differing levels of statehood, governance capacities and degree of global economic integration, with their respective implications for insecurity, conflict and war-proneness.

State formation and Northern security

War, the threat of large-scale conflict and the prospect of defeat and even annihilation, has traditionally been seen as the central security concerns for states. Theories of realism and neo-realism rest on the basic assumption that such security fears define interstate relations.¹³ The work of Charles Tilly and other historical sociologists, such as Michael Mann and John Hall, have deepened this analysis by noting how the threat of war has not only traditionally defined relations between states but has been one critical dimension of the particular historical process of state formation and the emergence of the modern European state.¹⁴ Tilly’s argument that ‘wars make states’ asserts that it was the preparation and waging of wars which was critical to the process of consolidation of national states in Europe. The metaphor that he uses of ‘organized crime’ to describe the twin processes of state-making and war-making highlights the degree of coercion and arbitrariness behind the centralisation of power in the nascent state, its ambitions of territorial control and extension, and the erosion of local autonomy and difference.¹⁵ Moreover, it was the essentially Hobbesian war-dominated strategic environment within which these nascent states found themselves which was highly significant for this expansion of state power. It was not just a question of state-makers subduing internal challenges to state power.

¹³ For classic expressions, see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

¹⁴ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States A.D. 990–1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); John A. Hall, *Powers and Liberties: the Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); and Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

¹⁵ Charles Tilly, ‘War-Making and State-Making as Organised Crime’, in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

It was also about state elites acting against external regional and global bids for domination and hegemony, which was in the interest of both state and society and which thus tended to bring the two closer together.

It was this process of a convergence of interests between state rulers and other social forces, based on a common perception of external threats and enemies, which is a central feature of the narrative of European state formation. First, the external context provided a significant contribution to the defining and promotion of new homogeneous national identities which gradually supplanted the earlier overlapping sub-national and supra-national identities which characterised pre-modern and feudal societies.¹⁶ The process was certainly slow and proved to be only partially successful, as the continued strength of regional sub-nationalisms and ethnic identities in Western Europe demonstrates.¹⁷ But, as Eugen Weber has highlighted, it was the construction of the threat of German hegemony, and the actual personal experiences of preparing and fighting wars, which finally turned deeply provincial 'peasants into Frenchmen'.¹⁸ Similarly, in Great Britain, it was the construction of a common Catholic enemy against the dominant Protestant inheritance, which contributed most to the definition of a British national identity and which explains its limited appeal to the Irish.¹⁹ Yet, whatever difficulties faced in these projects of nation-state consolidation, their most significant achievement was in granting a certain legitimacy and natural givenness to states which had, in practice, often been arbitrarily forged through war and violence. The resulting concept of the nation-state was an expression of this confidence in the internal legitimacy and strength of the modern European state.

A second outcome of this competitive militaristic environment was the ways in which it contributed to the development not only of consolidated national states but also of a synergistic and mutually advantageous relationship between state-makers and other groups and forces within society. One aspect of this was how the demands of war-making in the early European period, particularly in the context of continual technological advances and changes in the scale of warfare, required the mobilisation of ever-increasing resources.²⁰ The only way to ensure the availability of such resources was to increase levels of taxation and to develop the bureaucratic bodies necessary to administer and obtain these taxes. Over time, the military needs of the state paradoxically strengthened the civilian elements of society since it was from these groups that the state needed to extract the resources necessary for war-making. The bankers and capitalists who were critical to the funding of wars were highly mobile and could always move their assets, relocating to where the conditions were more favourable to their profit-making activities. Overall, the effect is described by

¹⁶ For example, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

¹⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995).

¹⁸ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972).

¹⁹ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

²⁰ Samuel Finer, 'State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military', in C. Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Tilly as a process whereby ‘agents of states bargained with civilian groups that controlled the resources necessary for effective war-making, and in bargaining gave the civilian groups enforceable claims on the state’.²¹ The resulting compact between state and civil society served to limit the despotic power of the state and to lay the foundations for increasing civil and political liberties. The necessity of the state to engage with and to penetrate society also led to an overall increase in the power of the state, since the synergistic cooperation between state and society increased what Mann has termed the ‘infrastructural’ power of the state.²²

The third consequence of this competitive interstate system was its influence on economic development and capitalist expansion. There was, as had already been noted, the constant demand to increase levels of taxation to fund warring activities and to promote innovation to increase the efficiency and lethality of the projection of the use of force. Gautam Sen has illustrated how the state-driven demands for war-making capabilities was critically important in the economic development of Europe and was a key factor in the process towards capitalist industrialisation.²³ Even the social reforms of the nineteenth century, which contributed to the emergence of the welfare state, find their roots in Bismarck’s Prussia and the perceived need for such reforms to mobilise human resources for fighting wars.²⁴ On a more global scale, it was the political and economic dynamism of the European states which led to imperial expansion and the export of the competitive inter-European economic and political systems to the rest of the world.²⁵ The consequence of this was the embedding of a structural division between a rich industrialised core and a weak developing periphery but within the context of global trading and economic system which many analysts view to be as globalised, if not more so, than the late twentieth-century economy. Certainly, for the countries at the core, global economic interdependence has generally been perceived in a positive and beneficial light and as an integral part of expansion of state power.

To summarise the argument so far, it is that interstate war played an important role in European state formation and was a significant influence on the emergence of well-defined and internally legitimate national states, in the formation of mutually beneficial relationship between the state and civil society, and in the evolution of a globally interconnected economy. War was certainly not the only influence or explanation for the birth of the modern state system in Europe and various other factors – such as geography, culture, the particular form of European feudalism – all played their part in this complex historical development.²⁶ It is also the case that the state is a contested concept and that alternative accounts of the nature and forming of the modern state, in particular ones which emphasise that the idea of the state emerges from the complex revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in

²¹ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, p. 206.

²² Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 11, pp. 58–60.

²³ Gautam Sen, *The Military Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry* (London: Pinter, 1984).

²⁴ This is argued in Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 235; and Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. II, pp. 44–54.

²⁵ Hedley Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’ in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 117–26.

²⁶ For an entertaining overview of fifteen differing but plausible explanations for the shift from the premodern to the modern state, see Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword and Book: the Structure of Human History* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1988), pp. 154–71.

early modern European history, would question the centrality or particular causal significance of the link between war and state formation.²⁷

Few would argue, however, that there is no link, even if conservative political philosophers like Michael Oakeshott disapprove of how the 'visions' of the 'grandiose constructions' of the state especially 'intrude when a state is at war, and all the more decisively when the war is thought of as a crusade'.²⁸ But, what is important for the purposes of this argument is the recognition that interstate war was itself a significant, if far from sufficient, causal variable for the evolution of European state formation and that it contributed, at least in part, to the conceptualisation of security as being primarily defined in terms of *external* threats. Furthermore, that this externalisation of threat perception was, itself, based on the gradual, if inevitably incomplete, development of states which were perceived to be internally legitimate, representing relatively homogeneous national societies and where there was societal agreement over basic values and a synergistic and peaceful accommodation between the state and its citizens.

When one considers the contemporary reality of an internal peace in Europe, it is important to keep in mind this legacy of a highly competitive and war-prone historical past. The influential 'democratic peace' theory tends to skirt over this longer-term historical evolution. The theory's main starting point is that the achievement of the internal liberal peace within states has itself expanded internationally and instituted pacific relations between states with like-minded liberal institutions and practices.²⁹ It is the domestic norms of conflict resolution through compromise, negotiation and respect for the rule of law, which have become externalised so as to define the international relations and mutual engagement between liberal democratic states. As a consequence, democratic states are now structurally constrained, through mutual respect for their common political values, from active consideration of the resort to open warfare. This mutual respect has also led, as constructivists have argued, to common and shared identities, such as the European and trans-Atlantic political and security communities, which are also key elements in their generally pacific mutual relations.³⁰

The democratic peace argument does present a powerful and plausible thesis. But its central tenets are at least challenged by the fact that the conditions for the emergence of this domestic liberal order were themselves forged in the context of a competitive and violence-prone interstate order. This historical addiction to war-fighting, which was hardly extinguished during the Cold War with its massive

²⁷ For discussion of the state as a contested concept, see William Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1974), ch. 1; and Bob Jessop, *The Capitalist State* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983). For the richest account of how the concept of the state emerges from complex competing early modern ideological movements, see Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, vol. 2: Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

²⁸ Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991 [1962]), p. 453.

²⁹ For general overviews of the theory, see Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³⁰ Colin H. Kahl, 'Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace', *Security Studies*, 8 (1998/9), pp. 94–144; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument', *European Journal of International Relations*, 1:4 (1995), pp. 491–517.

arms build-ups and preparations for World War III, suggests that more materialistic and self-interested reasons for the decline in the number and severity of wars need to be incorporated. One of these is that the normative consensus against large-scale warfare in Europe might also have something to do with the changing nature of the wars being fought. In particular, during the twentieth century, it has been increasingly recognised that large-scale warfare has lost its political instrumentality. The 'total' wars of the twentieth century demonstrated that, when whole societies were mobilised to fight for their country's cause, it became increasingly difficult to fight such wars for limited political objectives. The rapid technological advances which simultaneously increased the destructiveness of war, and which culminated in the development of nuclear weapons, only added to the perceived lack of political instrumentality of modern large-scale warfare. For the military historian, Martin van Creveld, it was the existence of nuclear weapons, rather than any liberal conversion, which dramatically reversed the earlier four-century increase in the scale of warfare, resulting in the post-1945 reduction of interstate war and the level of casualties.³¹

In reality, it is probably a mix of ideational, normative, material and self-interested factors which have contributed to the internal peace in Europe and other developed regions. However, the historical legacy of constant preparation for interstate war has not been completely overcome. The Cold War itself involved states in both East and West preparing for a highly destructive large-scale war. As many commentators have noted, the threat of Soviet aggression played a not insignificant part in the development of the European and trans-Atlantic security communities.³² At a broader regional level, the developing countries which are currently seeking to join the developed world, such as China, India and Russia are far more ambiguously committed to the norms of the liberal peace, and their strategic thinking certainly include classical war-fighting scenarios. In addition, liberal democracies have not lost their appetite for fighting wars with dissident or abusive states in the South, though these 'wars' are normally called 'interventions' or more euphemistically 'humanitarian interventions'. This, in itself, tends to weaken the argument for the essentially pacific intentions of the liberal state.³³

State formation and Southern security

Despite these qualifications to the 'democratic peace' theory, the reality of a internal peace in Europe and other developed regions is an important and historically progressive development. Whether it is due to democracy or nuclear weapons, the decline in the perceived threat of large-scale interstate conflict is a key feature of the contemporary security environment. Along with the increasing costs and lack of political instrumentality of large-scale warfare, the countervailing benefits of economic interdependence have also significantly contributed to this development.

³¹ Martin Van Creveld, *On Future War* (London: Brassey's, 1991).

³² See the arguments in Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, 'Politics and Peace', *International Security*, 20 (1995), pp. 123–46; and Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, 19 (1994), pp. 5–49.

³³ For more critical accounts, see David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', *International Security*, 19 (1992), pp. 5–49; Dan Reiter and Allan Stamm, 'Democracy, War Initiation and Victory', *American Political Science Review*, 92 (1998), pp. 377–90.

This has meant that the decline of interstate conflict, though not so marked as between liberal democratic states, has also spread to other parts of the world which include more authoritarian states. For example, there is strong evidence that a key factor behind the economic and political transitions in the former Soviet Union and China was driven by an elite perception that their relative power was being undermined by excessive military costs and the failure to integrate their economies with the wider world.³⁴ This led in both cases to a fundamental shift away from defining their strategic posture in terms of military war-fighting capabilities to one based on export-oriented economic growth.

What this historically-informed analysis does not explain, however, is the prevalence of smaller-scale but often brutal *intrastate* conflicts which particularly characterises the security predicament in many parts of the South. The argument of this section is that, again, a historically and sociologically informed understanding of the particular trajectories of state formation in the South, and how these have differed from the European or classical model, is critical to an understanding of the continued prevalence of these intrastate wars. The core of the argument is that the process of state formation in the South has contributed to security being primarily defined in terms of *internal* threats, where state elites are generally more concerned about the threats from within their own societies than from the threat of *external* aggression. In a similar fashion, social forces within the state often fear the predations of the state in which they live rather than the aggressive ambitions of neighbours. For both state elites and their citizens, the fear is of civil unrest, repression and internal rather than of the external threat of interstate conflict.³⁵

Two general aspects of the state formation process in the South can be seen as having most significantly contributed to this internally-oriented conceptualisation of security. The first is the simple fact that, for the majority of the states in the South, the process of state formation has been more an externally imposed than an internally generated development. At the extreme, the borders of many developing states were simply arbitrarily drawn through colonial *diktat*. For those political entities which managed to preserve a longer historical continuity, the process of state formation was nevertheless strongly constrained by external imperial pressures. The implications of this was that there emerged only a limited dynamic generating the processes of internal national consolidation and legitimisation which the wars and struggles in Europe provided to the nascent European states. In the South, the state has often been perceived as an external given, normally coercively and arbitrarily defined, and which lacks significant internal legitimacy. The process of decolonisation tended to exacerbate rather than resolve this problem since it was the colonial state, for all its arbitrariness and coercive origins, which was confirmed by the United Nations as the frame of reference for claims to national self-determination and political independence.³⁶

³⁴ William C. Wohlforth and S. G. Brooks, 'Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas', *International Security*, 25:3 (2000/1), pp. 5–53.

³⁵ For similar analyses, see Mohammed Ayoub, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Praeger, 1995); and Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

³⁶ For an excellent reflection on this, see Robert H. Jackson, 'The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations', in J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

This willingness to accept the territorial *status quo* bequeathed by colonial administrators was driven by a second major distinguishing feature of Southern state formation – the enforced norm against territorial aggrandisement. It is a feature of a majority of Southern states that they have not generally faced the same degree of existential threats to their very survival that marked the experience of European states and that most interstate disputes have been over more secondary and minor issues.³⁷ There are exceptions to this, such as in Korea, Vietnam and Israel where the East–West confrontation became superimposed on an historically-defined struggle for national unification. However, the relative absence of interstate conflicts in the South can be seen in the fact that the borders of Africa are generally older and more durable than those of Europe, particularly when these are compared with the continually shifting and malleable borders in East Central Europe. Similarly, in the Middle East, when one excludes the Israel/Palestine question, the borders have remained remarkably stable. In considerable part, this reality can be linked directly to the Northern resolve to promote and enforce in the South the norm against the acquisition of territory by force.

Historically, Northern interest in upholding this norm can be seen to have gone through two stages. The first stage, principally in the nineteenth century and at the height of European imperial expansion, was when European imperial powers sought to ensure that jealousies over their respective colonial or dependent possessions should not be permitted to undermine the European balance of power. The second stage was when territorial aggrandisement was viewed, in particular after the experience of World War 1, as the principal cause of large-scale warfare and when the prohibition against the acquisition of territory by force became institutionalised as an international norm.³⁸ Ian Lustik has illustrated how this norm against territorial aggrandisement, in both its nineteenth and twentieth century manifestations, has continually frustrated Arab regional leaders and states seeking to gain a regional hegemonic dominance. Whether it was Muhammad Ali's drive to expand Egyptian power against the Ottoman Empire, or Gamal abd-al Nasser's similar ambitions in the 1950s and 1960s, or Saddam Hussein's more recent expansionist moves, these have all been thwarted by Northern intervention.³⁹

Statehood and civil society: the interconnected challenges

These two distinctive aspects of state formation in the South – the external imposition of states and the enforced norm against territorial aggrandisement – have left significant legacies for the evolution and development of most developing countries. The argument pursued in this section is that these historical legacies have made it more difficult for Southern states to forge strong, synergistic states whose security concerns are externally- rather than internally-oriented. More difficult does not mean impossible. Nor does it imply a deterministic analysis where the Southern states are

³⁷ This is argued in John Herbst, 'War and the State in Africa', *International Security*, 14:4 (1990), pp. 117–39; and Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, 'Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization', *Review of International Studies*, 19:4 (1993), pp. 321–48.

³⁸ Mark W. Zacher, 'The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force', *International Organisation*, 55:2 (2001), pp. 215–50.

³⁹ Ian S. Lustick, 'The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical Perspective', *International Organization*, 51:4 (1997), pp. 653–83.

passive actors under imperial or Northern hegemony, and which denies the existence of powerful indigenous traditions of national identity and civil society which have successfully resisted Northern impositions. But, what is argued is that the historical processes of state formation in the South, which continues to exert a legacy of insecurity and conflict for most developing states, has had significant effects and consequences. Three dimensions of this are particularly salient for this analysis: the legacy contributing to state fragility; the tendency towards weak civil societies; and the difficulties of integration into global economic processes.

The first general consequence or legacy of the Southern state formation process can be seen to be the tendency towards fragile, weak and artificial states. It should be stressed that this is a tendency rather than a deterministic inevitability and that there is much variation in the South. At its extreme, though, there is the phenomenon of the so-called 'quasi-state', meaning a state which has been accorded judicial sovereignty but which lacks certain essential features of internal sovereignty, such as effective control of all of the territory of the state or a centralised monopoly over the legitimate use of force.⁴⁰ Such states are to be found particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but can also be found elsewhere. The sources of their problems lie frequently in the arbitrariness of their creation, cutting across ethnic, tribal and religious communities, their failure to constitute viable economic entities, and their subsequent lack of political support and legitimacy. The conservative norms of non-intervention has helped to preserve what would otherwise be considered bankrupt or failed states, such as the Congo, Lebanon and Afghanistan. The externally guaranteed stability of the territorial *status quo* has effectively supported the durability and even proliferation of such weak and clearly artificial states, which would probably never have survived in a European context.

The quasi-state phenomenon is, though, an extreme manifestation. For many Southern states, European imperial dominance failed to destroy a strong sense of pre-existing national identity and a pre-colonial indigenous culture. However, the legacy of a colonially-imposed but conservative state order has also been a major source of frustration and delegitimation. In China, the legacy of the perceived historical injustices of the European imperial powers, the sense of territorial loss and dismemberment, has fed into a revisionist national sentiment.⁴¹ In the Arab and Muslim world, the perception that the existing states are artificial colonial creations, established expressly to undermine Arab and Muslim unity, has continually weakened the legitimacy of these states, strengthened irredentist ambitions and sustained strong anti-Western sentiment. The perverse logic that this has promoted amongst Arab leaders has been a regional competition for more extreme anti-Zionist Arab or Muslim credentials, which has arguably tended to be less related to the existential fear of Israeli aggression than to threats to regime legitimacy from internal sources of contestation.⁴²

⁴⁰ Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', *World Politics*, 35:1 (1982), pp. 1–24.

⁴¹ This is argued in Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

⁴² Fuad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: A Study of Ideology in Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).

Finally, there are exceptions amongst states in the South who have faced genuine existential threats to their survival – such as Israel, South Korea or China – and who have consequently also developed relatively stronger states and a greater synergy between state and society.⁴³ The developmental successes of East Asia are at least partly due to the continuing strengths and vitality of the region's statehood traditions.

The second dimension can be termed the problem of weak civil societies. For the majority of Southern states, which have not been compelled by external pressure to foster national consolidation, the closely linked consequence of weak states has been the failure to develop a strong civil society which can curb and bring to account the despotic actions of the state. As was noted above, it was the threat and preparation for war in early modern Europe, in the context of a highly competitive interstate system, which was the critical factor behind the strengthening of civilian power, as state-makers had to offer incentives, such as extending civil and political liberties, to ensure the timely appropriation, through taxation, of the resources required for war-fighting. In the historical evolution of the state in the South, the origins of the state as an alien and externally-imposed entity has instead left a legacy of the state as an instrument of social coercion whose main purpose is to provide privileged access to the country's material resources.⁴⁴ Instead of a convergence of interests between state and society, which strengthens the infrastructural and penetrative power of the state, the struggle for political power has tended to become a zero-sum conflict where differing social groups seek to gain the strategic prize of the state's coercive apparatus and the power and wealth that this guarantees. Whichever social group manages to manoeuvre into a position of dominance, then treats the state as an instrument for personal and particularist enrichment and for forcibly subduing the claims of other social groups. The consequence of this is a dominant political class which is continually aware of its precarious hold on power, its lack of legitimacy in relation to other excluded and potentially powerful social groups, and its dependence on coercion for sustaining its capacity to rule. For the general population, the sense of exclusion and the perceived alien nature of the state promotes various strategies to avoid or escape from its seemingly arbitrary and despotic embrace. As one commentator on Africa has argued, one of the most distinctive features of the politics of the region has been the 'art of living in a reasonably peaceful way without the state'.⁴⁵

This failure of societal integration, and the sense of alienation between state elites and other social forces, is particularly marked in those states in the South which rely primarily on external rents – whether these be from the export of valuable natural resources, from tourism and remittances, or from the generosity of external donors – for the financing of the activities of the state. The concept of the 'rentier' state was first developed in the context of the oil-wealthy Middle Eastern states but has been fruitfully extended to other parts of the developing world, including Africa and Russia.⁴⁶ Its main utility as a model is in providing a political explanation for the

⁴³ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, pp. 269–77.

⁴⁴ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*; Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

⁴⁵ J. Lonsdale, 'States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey', *African Studies Review*, 24 (1981), p. 201.

⁴⁶ For origins, see Hazem Behlawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), *The Rentier State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987); and Hussein Mahdavy, 'The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in

seeming paradox of how the majority of resource-rich developing countries have signally failed to develop at the same rate and intensity as resource-poor countries at a similar stage of development.⁴⁷ The rentier state is one, if extreme, manifestation of the alienation and weakness of a civil society, where political power, following the colonial traditions of indirect rule, is secured through the top-down co-option of local elites in complex neo-patrimonial networks of patron-client relations. The key political objective of such a neopatrimonial systems is the material rewarding of loyal elites rather than securing the broader developmental interests of the country as a whole. Where resources are secured from outside the state and there is no powerful need to extract resources directly from society, there is similarly no powerful pressure to develop more democratic and accountable systems of power.⁴⁸ In such states as well, the role of the military, generally bloated and resourced at an excessive level in relation to any potential external threat, is a vital instrument of internal control and a guarantee against internal challenges to central state power. It is not surprising that many of these states are essentially 'praetorian' or 'mukhabarat' (secret service) states, where the military and secret services are either *de facto* in control of the state or are intimately fused within the main structures of political power.⁴⁹

There is, though, significant variations in the nature and degree of the clientelistic political systems in the South. As with the extreme of the 'quasi-state', so there is also the extreme breakdown of state-society relations which is manifest in the 'failed' or 'collapsed' state. In this case, the state resembles a 'shadow state', to use William Reno's term, which is just one social force amongst others competing in open conflict to gain control of the resources of the state.⁵⁰ Chris Allen has provided a highly textured analysis of how the 'new wars' in Africa, with their extremes of brutality, targeting of civilians, ethnic massacres and warlordism, is itself part of a broader continuum in the degeneration of clientelistic and neopatrimonial systems. He argues that 'spoils politics' defines the politics of many African states, where the 'primary goal of those competing for political office/power is self-enrichment'.⁵¹ Such 'spoil politics' systems, have, Allen argues, internal and externally-driven pressures, such as excessive corruption and economic decline, which can lead eventually to a more extreme version, which he calls 'terminal politics', where there is an intensification

Rentier States: The Case of Iran', in M. A. Cook (ed.), *Studies in Economic History of the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. For extension beyond the Middle East, see Younkyoo Kim, *The Resource Curse in a Post-Communist Regime: Russia in Comparative Perspective* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003)); and Douglas A. Yates, *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996).

⁴⁷ J. D. Sachs and A. M. Warner, 'Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth', in G. M. Meier and J. E. Rauch (eds.), *Leading Issues in Economic Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael L. Ross, 'The Political Economy of the Resource Curse', *World Politics*, 51:2 (1999), pp. 297–322.

⁴⁸ Michael L. Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?', *World Politics*, 53:3 (2001), pp. 325–61.

⁴⁹ J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Keith Krause, 'Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: the Middle Eastern Case', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:3 (1996), pp. 319–54; and Elizabeth Picard, 'Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State', in A. Dawisha and W. Zartman (eds.), *Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State* (London: Croom Helm, 1988).

⁵⁰ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

⁵¹ Chris Allen, 'Understanding African Politics', *Review of African Political Economy*, 65 (1995), pp. 301–20; and Chris Allen, 'Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse', *Review of African Political Economy*, 81 (1999), pp. 367–84. See also P. Chabal and J. P. Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument* (Oxford: Currey, 1999).

and acceleration of violent conflict and state collapse. Terminal politics is characterised by the political elites now willing to retain power 'at all costs, including the perpetuation of endemic violence and civil war, combined with an acute fear of democratic reforms, and opposition even to a sharing of power'.⁵²

'Terminal politics' is, certainly, an extreme manifestation of state collapse driven by the corruption and criminalisation of the neo-patrimonial state. But, it is linked to broader systems of 'spoils politics', though representing the deviant case rather than the norm. A much larger category of Southern states are those which have developed more stable authoritarian and/or bureaucratic political systems, where a significant degree of centralisation of power has occurred and where there is some effective regulation of neo-patrimonial structures and a mitigation of the worst features of clientelistic competition. Such states can also be particularly stable, even if lacking legitimacy. The stereotypical 'rentier' state often fits into this category where regimes in control of oil-rich states wealth have generally demonstrated a considerable durability, as can be seen in the remarkable longevity of the ruling regimes of most Middle Eastern states.⁵³ As a succession of US administrations found to their frustration, Saddam Hussein of Iraq remained firmly in power despite losing two major wars and suffering over a decade of a crippling sanctions regime and it was only a full-scale invasion which finally dislodged him from power. The Iraqi state might have been effectively at war with its own population, as the massacres of Kurds or Shi'a demonstrated, but its structures of power, even if narrowly based and lacking in essential legitimacy, were powerfully resistant to internal subversion. The US-UK occupation of Iraq finally broke this resistance but, with the growth of the internal insurgency, faced the danger of the formerly Praetorian state being transformed into a failed state.

Despite their potential stability, such praetorian, rentier or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes generally lack the mutually enforcing interactions between state and society which generate the infrastructural power necessary for broad-based state development. In practice, the political and economic rule of such states remain fragmented, indirect, and beset with inefficiencies and corruption. However, there are also examples of Southern states where clientelist systems have been counter-balanced by the growth of an independent capitalist market, where accountability, private property and contractual rights are increasingly embedded. The most frequently cited examples are those of East and South-East Asia, such as South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. In one of the most authoritative accounts provided by Peter Evans, the key factor behind the East Asian success in economic transformation is their ability to generate the requisite state-society synergy, or what Evans defines as 'embedded autonomy'. This vital quality of embedded autonomy is present, in Evans' account, when states possess a well-developed Weberian bureaucracy that is relatively immune from manipulation by rent-seeking social forces and where state elites are intimately enmeshed into civil society networks.⁵⁴ This reflects Ernest Gellner's insight that the best test and indicator of civil society is

⁵² Allen, 'Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse', pp. 376–82.

⁵³ Benjamin Smith, 'Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999', *American Journal of Political Science*, 48:2 (2004), pp. 232–46.

⁵⁴ Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Peter Evans (ed.), *State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development* (Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies, University of California, 1997).

found in the behaviour and attitudes of state elites and the degree to which such elites have internalised values which constrain them from seeking material self-advantage and which lead them to promote the broader social, economic and political goals of society as a whole.⁵⁵

Integration and the challenges of globalisation

The colonial legacies of fragile states and weak civil societies are, in this way, also critical factors behind the difficulties that Southern states face in responding to the economic and political demands of globalisation. It is not accidental that it is in East Asia, where strong states have emerged with a synergistic interaction between state and society, that the most successful engagement with the global economy is evident. In other states in the South, where neopatrimonial and clientelistic political systems are more powerfully embedded, globalisation is seen as potentially more destabilising, threatening to undercut the social and political bargains upon which the political *status quo* has been constructed. The resistance to globalisation is, however, also driven by the historical memory of Southern state formation and the South's forcible incorporation into the European-dominated global economy and the subsequent obstacles placed in the way of autonomous Southern industrialisation. It is this historically-defined context which contributes to the pervasive claims that globalisation is a negative force for Southern states and that it is the unleashing of such neoliberal global forces which have weakened the post-Cold War Southern state and provided the conditions for the emergence of the 'new wars'.⁵⁶

Globalisation is, though, an inherently slippery and contested concept and such definitional and conceptual problems have tended to weaken the analytical strength of the thesis linking globalisation to post-Cold War civil wars.⁵⁷ Some greater clarity is, though, possible if two distinctions or disjunctures in the phenomenon of globalisation are established. The first is drawn from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye who make the distinction between 'thick' and 'thin' globalisation (or globalism as is their preferred term).⁵⁸ Thick globalisation is what most commentators mean when referring to globalisation, highlighting the intensive networks of global economic, social, political and cultural relations. A classic example of thin globalisation, as cited by Keohane and Nye, is the ancient Silk Road, which provided an important but limited economic and cultural link between Europe and Asia. When examining contemporary globalisation, the most intensive 'thick' globalisation is primarily found between the triad of developed, industrialised countries – the United States, Europe and Japan. A number of developing countries, such as China, or countries in South-East Asia and Latin America, are moving towards thickening their global economic interdependence but are still far away from matching the levels of interdependence found among the 'triad'. For other states and regions in the

⁵⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), p. 212.

⁵⁶ See, for example, Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*.

⁵⁷ Berdal, 'How "New" are the "New Wars"?', pp. 479–83.

⁵⁸ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 'Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (and So What?)', *Foreign Policy*, 118 (2000), pp. 104–19.

South, the reality is a much thinner manifestation of globalisation, limited very often to the exploitation of fixed mineral resources, such as oil. In the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and Russia, Foreign Direct Investment is almost non-existent once investment from the oil multinationals and other international extractive firms is excluded.

The second distinction is between 'positive' and 'negative' manifestations of globalisation. 'Positive' globalisation refers to the production, exchange and distribution of goods and services which are legal, legitimate and part of everyday international trade. 'Negative' globalisation refers to the shadow economy in the trade of prohibited or proscribed goods – such as drugs, light arms and unconventional weapons, human trafficking, money laundering, illicit diamonds and timber – where the main actors are global networks of transnational organised criminals and terrorists.⁵⁹ As Phil Williams has argued, transnational criminal organisations often locate their operational bases in weak or failed states, where they can co-opt the political leadership and can be assured a safe sanctuary from which to penetrate their target states in the developed world.⁶⁰ The same is also true for international terrorists, such as al-Qaeda. It was not accidental that it was Afghanistan, the archetypal post-Cold War failed state, that became the centre for both international drug production and international terrorism. It is particularly here, in the linkage between negative globalisation and failed states, that the connection between globalisation and violent civil conflict can be most clearly identified. The prevalence of resource-based conflicts is also critically dependent on the regional and global economic linkages which assure that the warring factions can sell the resources under their control to international markets.

State formation and international security

The main argument of this article is that the different legacies of state formation in the North and South remain important for understanding contemporary international security. But, as the different forms of Southern engagement with globalisation has shown, the article has resisted the simple bifurcation between North and South and argued, in particular, that Southern states have responded in very different ways to adapt to or overcome the historical legacy of Northern domination and imposed state formation. There is, in particular, considerable variation amongst Southern states in their relative strength and weakness, in the degree of synergy between state and civil society, and the ways in which these states have adapted to or resisted incorporation into global economic structures. There is similarly a far from homogeneous North.

With these qualification in mind, the article still argues that there is value in seeking to provide some rough taxonomy of differing forms of contemporary state, their principal defining features and the associated implications for international

⁵⁹ A good overview can be found in Moses Naim, 'The Five Wars of Globalization', *Foreign Policy*, 134 (2003), pp. 28–37.

⁶⁰ Phil Williams, 'Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security', in J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds.), *Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).

security. As such, a four-fold division between *developed*, *globalising*, *praetorian* and *failed* states is proposed. This is by no means a rigid categorisation and individual countries might incorporate features from more than one of these categories. The range between strong developed statehood and failed states is also very much a continuum along which individual states will be located at different points. These divisions between states are 'ideal-types' and help to order rather than fully to describe the actual conditions of contemporary states.

The first category of *developed* states refers to the industrialised countries of the North whose state-formation process resulted in strong national states, a powerful synergy between state and society, and the capacity to benefit substantially from integration into the global economy. These states have eventually come to enjoy the so-called 'democratic peace', where war is no longer a permissible or perhaps even a conceivable policy instrument in their mutual interaction. But, this peace was also constructed, as argued above, on the historical legacy of centuries of intense and increasingly violent interstate conflict. It has also not stopped these countries fighting wars to deal with dissidence, instability and human rights abuses in the South through military or 'humanitarian' interventions.

The second category of *globalising* states represent those Southern states which have, in varying degrees, proved capable of benefiting from the challenges of (positive) globalisation. This capacity has been, in large part, due to the internal strength and national integration of these states and their ability to generate the state-society synergy necessary for broad developmental growth. Key examples of such states include China, the countries of South-East Asia, India, South Africa, and many of the countries in Latin America. In terms of their security conditions, these states can generally be described as moving towards a greater externalisation of security threats, where the perceptions of threats to internal stability are less prominent, though also not absent. Since a number of these states are not democratic, and those that are often have poorly institutionalised democratic regimes, the 'democratic peace' does not generally apply. But, the perceived costs of modern warfare, and the benefits to be gained by economic integration, do help to reduce, though far from eliminate the prospects of such conflicts. In general, these globalising states are in a transitional phase, where security is being increasingly externalised but where their longer-term strategic ambitions are not yet clearly defined. The case of China illustrates this well. While some see China as a rising threat and that 'the future of Asia will resemble Europe's past' with a real prospect of large-scale interstate war, others view China as being increasingly integrated into political and economic structures which undercut the prospects of aggression or war.⁶¹ There is a greater potential, therefore, that these states would consider engaging in larger-scale interstate warfare, particularly if their vital interests were at stake. These states also tend to be highly sensitive about the presumed right of humanitarian intervention and oppose it for fear that it implies a return to imperialist practice and an undermining of the sovereign powers that they have often with great difficulty struggled to defend.

⁶¹ A. L. Friedberg, 'Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?' *Survival*, 42:3 (2000), pp. 147–59. For alternative perspectives, see Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', *Asian Survey*, 37:8 (1996), pp. 758–81.

The third category of *praetorian* states is an inclusive category which incorporates the concepts of the 'rentier' state, the 'mukhabarat' or secret-service state, and the neo-patrimonial or prebendal state. The key security feature of the praetorian state is that there is a much greater concern amongst state elites, the military and the security forces with threats emanating from within than from without the state. The praetorian state tends to be a weak state, with significant ethnic, religious or clan/tribal divisions, where the state and society coexist in a mutual relationship of alienation and disaggregation. The praetorian state's incorporation into the processes of globalisation tend to be of a 'thin' nature, frequently limited to the international export of valuable natural resources. These states are, in their most extreme cases, at war with their own populations, such as in North Korea or Saddam Hussein's Iraq. However, the praetorian regime is not necessarily unstable and can demonstrate considerable durability and longevity. Praetorian leaders can also, at times, export their fears of internal destabilisation by engaging in external aggression, as, for example, Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1981 was driven by fear of the new revolutionary state's appeal to Iraq's majority Shi'a population.

The final category of *failed* states represents those praetorian states which have fragmented and dissolved through a mix of internal and external pressures. In these cases, the weakness of the state has resulted in extensive ethnic, communal or regional fragmentation, where politics is conducted as a violent 'winner takes all' pursuit for material advantage. The linkage to globalisation is primarily of the thin and/or negative nature, where the export of illicit or illegal resources is a key contribution to the political economy of civil war and conflict. The wars which do occur in these failed states tend to fit the description of the 'new' wars, where central power is dissolved and replaced by competing warlords, civilians are the principal casualties, ethnic cleansing and other acts of extreme brutality are evident, and where the conflict is principally intrastate rather than interstate. However, such conflicts emanating from failed states also tend to destabilise neighbouring countries and regions, resulting in a potential spreading of the conflict as regional powers support differing factions. Such conditions can also potentially implicate Northern interests, whether of a strategic or humanitarian nature, which can result in Northern intervention.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this article is to provide a broad historical and sociological framework for understanding the nature of contemporary warfare and to contribute additional insights into the current debates over the 'new wars' and the presumed bifurcation between a Northern 'zone of peace' and a Southern 'zone of instability'. In essence, the argument is that the legacy of imperialism and Northern colonial expansion continues to exert an influence on the nature and form of the Southern state, the insecurities to be found in these states, and the types of wars which are fought in the South. In particular, the sense of artificiality and external imposition of the Southern state, and the conservative international order which protects and sustains the territorial integrity of these states, has led to national security being primarily conceived in terms of internal rather than external threats. As such, the

main challenges to the Southern state tend not to come primarily from other states but from the internal opposition of social groups who seek to gain power through either denying the very legitimacy of the state or the legitimacy of those who act in the name of the state.

The article has also sought to identify the main variations in the ways in which the Southern state has responded to the structural conditions of imperial state formation. Some states are in the process of transcending these conditions, forging strong states with the necessary state-society synergy successfully to integrate into global economic structures. Other states have only succeeded in containing these challenges, relying on indirect rule, clientelistic systems and the resort to repression and coercion to sustain the integrity of the state and the particular regime which controls the institutions of the state. A third category represents those states which have been overwhelmed by these internal pressures and which are consequently in the process of fragmentation and internal collapse. In each of these three variations of the Southern state, the security conditions and the implications for regional and international security are significantly different. It is in this complexity of the evolution of the Southern state, and the continuing legacy of Northern imposition and dominance, which needs to be included in any substantive analysis of the nature of post-Cold War conflict.