

Ethics and Politics

Norberto Bobbio

Increasingly frequent discussions in our country over the last few years on the question of morals have roused the old theme of the relation between morals and politics.¹ Although it is an old theme, it is nevertheless a theme that remains new, which explains why no moral question, regardless of the field in which it has been raised, has ever found a definitive answer. While the issue of the relation between politics and morals is the best known, due to the length of the debate, the authority of the authors who took part, the variety of the arguments put forth and the importance of the subject, it is not that different from the issue of the relation between morals and all other human activity; thus the fact that we can readily speak of the ethics of economic relations or, as often the case over the last few years, of market ethics, or sexual ethics, medical ethics, the ethics of sports and still others. In all these diverse spheres of human activity, the same problem always arises: the distinction between what is morally licit and what is morally illicit.

The relation between ethics and politics is a more serious issue, for historical experience has shown, at least since the conflict pitting Antigone against Creon, and because common sense seems to have tacitly allowed the politician to behave in a way that diverges from common morals, that a morally illicit act could be considered licit in politics, and, in short, that politics obeyed a code of rules, or a normative system, different from and partially incompatible with the code, or the normative system, of moral conduct. When Machiavelli said to Cosimo de Medicis (and seemed to endorse) that the state could not govern with *pater noster* in hand, it is a way of considering and gaining acknowledgment that the politician cannot conduct his own actions in function with the precepts of the dominant morals, which, in

Christian society, coincide with evangelical morals. In our era, Jean-Paul Sartre, in his well-known play *Les mains sales* (Dirty Hands), defended or more so had one of his characters defend the argument that he who becomes involved in political activity must dirty his hands (with mire, but also with blood).

Thus, while the moral question remains in all fields of human behavior, it takes on a particular nature when it enters the political sphere. In all other fields, the moral question consists of asking oneself what conduct would be morally licit, and, conversely, what conduct would be morally illicit, and possibly, for non-rigorous morals, what conduct would be a matter of indifference in economic, sexual, and sports relations, relations between doctor and patient, between teacher and student, and so on. The discussion focuses on the question of knowing which principles and rules must be followed respectively in the activity carried out by entrepreneurs or merchants, lovers or spouses, gamblers or football players, doctors or surgeons, teachers, etc. But generally, the moral question itself is not challenged, i.e. the fact that morals exist, which, in other words, justifies such questioning of the respective conduct. Take for example the field in which a particularly lively debate has been ongoing amongst moralists for years – the field of medical ethics, more particularly bioethics. It centers on the question of the licit or illicit nature of certain acts, but no one has ever thought to refute the problem itself, to wit, in the practice of medicine; problems arise that are considered moral issues by those faced with them, and they unanimously agree to consider the problems as such, even if they do not agree upon the principles or rules that are to be observed or explained. The discussion on market ethics is no different, as we have heard recently in Italy.² It is only when one maintains that the market as such – a perfectly rational mechanism, even though it consists of a spontaneous and non-reflexive rationality – cannot undergo any moral evaluation that the problem can be viewed analogically in the same way the moral problem in politics is traditionally viewed. With one difference, however: even in the most liberal moral evaluations of the market, one could never support its immorality in a deliberate and reasonable way, but at best, its premoral, or amoral, character. Otherwise said, it is not so much an inability to support

its incompatibility with morals, as its foreignness to any moral evaluation. Those who love the market outright have no need to maintain that the market does not govern with *pater noster*. Rather, they would say that it does not govern at all.

Naturally, the problem of the relation between morals and politics has no meaning until one is willing to recognize that morals exist and to accept in principle certain precepts that govern them. To prove the existence of morals and their most basic principles, whether they be negative like *neminem laedere*, or positive like *suum cuique tribuere*, it is not necessary to agree upon their foundations, which is the philosophical theme par excellence that has always divided and continues to divide the schools of philosophy. The relation between ethics and theories of ethics is very complex and we will content ourselves here to say that disagreement on the foundations does not prejudice agreement on the fundamental rules.

It might be useful to point out that when one refers to the relation between morals and politics, one is not referring to individual morals, but social morals – morals that concern the activities of an individual that interfere with the sphere of activity of other individuals, and not to morals that touch on actions relative, for example, to the perfecting of one's own personality, irrespective of the consequences that the pursuit of such an ideal could have for others. Traditional ethics has always made the distinction between duty to others and duty to oneself. In the debate on the issue of political morals, what comes into play exclusively is duty to others.

Is political action subject to moral judgement?

Unlike other fields of human behavior, the problem traditionally placed in the sphere of politics is not so much concerned with morally licit or illicit actions, as with knowing *whether* the issue of the morally licit or illicit nature of political action has any meaning in itself. To use an example more explicit than a lengthy dissertation, there is no moral system that does not contain precepts aimed at prohibiting the use of violence and deceit. The two main categories of offence provided for in our penal codes are violence and deceit. In that famous chapter of *The Prince*, Machiavelli main-

tains that a good politician must truly understand the ways of the lion and the fox. But the lion and the fox represent force and guile.

The most Machiavellian of modern political authors, Vilfredo Pareto, known by Machiavellians through a once popular book, although it came to pass at the same time as its author³, calmly maintains that there are two types of politician: for lion Machiavellians, the instinct of enduring aggregates prevails, while for fox Machiavellians, the instinct of combinations prevails. On one famous page where he discusses the theme of "political honesty," Croce, who admired Machiavelli and Marx for their realistic notion of politics, begins his account with a passage that speaks for itself: "Another sign of the common lack of understanding of political issues is the foolish demand for honesty in political life." After having said that it consists of the ideal at the heart of all imbeciles, he explains that "political honesty is nothing more than political skill."⁴ This, we might add, is what Machiavelli calls *virtù*⁵, which, as everyone knows, has nothing to do with the term used in moral treatises, beginning with Aristotle's *The Nicomachean Ethics*.

These examples, and we could provide still more, seem to leave no other choice but to conclude that it is impossible to put the problem of the relation between morals and politics in the same terms as other spheres of human behavior. Admittedly, theories that have upheld the opposite argument – that even politics can yield, or even better, must yield to moral law – do not fall short, but they have never affirmed themselves through very convincing argumentation, and are thus still considered as noble as they are useless.

The theme of justification

Most of the authors who have dealt with this issue were less interested in argumentation, which was condemned for wielding little persuasive power over political morality, thus they did not take into consideration lessons learned from history or the shared experiences from which the teaching of conflict between common morals and political conduct was drawn. Rather, they sought to understand, and as a final step, to justify this divergence. I feel it

necessary to completely reconsider a major part, if not the entire history, of modern political thought striving to find a solution to the moral problem in politics, by interpreting it as a series of attempts to justify the fact, in itself scandalous, that there is an obvious contrast between common morals and political morals. Once they see the problem in that way, political authors do not try to prescribe what politicians ought to do. They abandon the field of precepts and lean toward new territory – understanding the phenomenon. According to the common distinction today between ethics and metaethics, most dissertations on the morality of politics, which are steeped in the political philosophy of the modern State, are essentially metaethical, even if we cannot rule out side effects (not always intentional) on ethics.

It is in full knowledge of the facts that I speak of “justification.” The conduct that needs to be justified is that which is not in accordance with the rules. Compliance with the rules, moral conduct, do not need to be justified. The need for justification arises when an act violates, or seems to violate, the generally accepted social rules, whether they be of a moral, legal, or sartorial order. Obedience does not need to be justified, but rather, if we wish to grant it some sort of moral value, disobedience. One’s presence at a mandatory meeting does not have to be justified, but one’s absence. In general, there is no need to explain a due or normal act, whereas it is necessary to provide justification for an act that errs on the side of excess or failure, if one truly seeks to redeem it. No one asks to account for the act of a mother who throws herself into the river to save her drowning son. But justification is demanded if she does not. One of the greatest theological and metaphysical problems, the problem of theodicy, stems from observing the existence of evil in the world and throughout history. *Candide* did not fret over justifying the existence of the best of all possible worlds: his concern was at best to explain or demonstrate the fact that the world was so and not any other way.

I must say that, faced with such a broad theme, I have imposed a very small task upon myself. I thought it would be of some use to present, by way of introduction, a “chart” of the diverse and antagonistic solutions that were given historically to the problem of the relation between ethics and politics.

It is, of course, an incomplete and imperfect chart, for it is subject to a dual chance of error: in the classification of types of solution, and in the integration of the various solutions within one type or another. The first error is of a conceptual order, the second an historical interpretation. This chart must certainly be revised with the help of ulterior observations, nevertheless, I think that it will provide at least an initial orientation for those who, before heading off into largely unexplored territory, wish to know all the possible routes.

All of the examples are drawn from modern political philosophy, starting from Machiavelli. While it is true that great philosophy was born in Greece, it is with the formation of the modern State that the problem of the relation between ethics and politics became particularly acute, and received for the first time a name it would keep thereafter: the "reason of State."

On what grounds? I shall put forth several reasons, albeit with much precaution. The dualism between ethics and politics is one of the elements of the great contrast between the Church and the State, a dualism that could only arise from the antagonism between, on one hand, an institution whose mission is to educate, to preach, and to commend universal laws of conduct laid down by God, and on the other hand, an earthly institution whose duty is to restore temporal order in the relations amongst human beings. In reality, the contrast between ethics and politics in the modern State, from the very beginning, goes back to the contrast between Christian morals and the praxis of those engaged in political activity. In a pre-Christian State without institutionalized morals, the contrast is less evident. This does not mean that Greek thought was unaware of it: one need only think of the opposition between the unwritten laws demanded by Antigone and those of the tyrant. But, in the Greek world, there is not one set of morals, but various sets. Each philosophical school has its own morals. Insofar as there are several morals to confront the political action, the problem of the relation between morals and politics no longer holds any precise meaning. What spurred the interest of Greek thought was not so much the problem of the relation between ethics and politics, but the question of the relation between good and bad government, which in turn gave rise to the distinction between the king and the tyrant. But that is a distinction within

the political system, which does not concern the distinction between one normative system, that of politics, and another normative system, which would be that of morals. This in return is what would happen in the Christian and post-Christian worlds.

The second reason for this distinction lies in the fact that, especially with the creation of the large territorial States, politics are revealed more and more as a place where the will for power is exhibited, in a theater much larger, and thus also much more visible, than that of the struggles of the cities or conflicts in the feudal society; especially when this will for power is found to be employed for religious confession. It was during the Wars of Religion that the debate on the reason of State escalated. The dramatic nature of the contrast between morals and politics is revealed to its full extent when the morally reprehensible acts (take as a vivid example the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, praised among others by a Machiavellian, Gabriel Naudé) are accomplished in the name of the source itself, original, unique, exclusive, of the worldly moral order, in other words: God.

To this we can add yet a third example. It was not until the sixteenth century that the opposition assumed the role of a practical problem as well, and that we sought to give it an explanation. There again, the canonic text is Machiavelli's *The Prince*, and more particularly chapter XVIII, which begins with these fatal words: "How laudable it is for a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not guile, everyone perceives: nonetheless, in our times one sees by experience that the princes who have done great things are the ones who have taken little account for faith, and who have known to turn men's brains with guile."⁶ The key to it all lies in the terms "great things." As soon as we start to see the question of human actions, not from the point of view of principles, but in the perspective of "great things," namely in function with results, then the moral problem changes aspect altogether – it is radically inversed. The lengthy debate on the reason of State is, throughout the centuries, a commentary on this entrenched and incomparably truthful affirmation: the principles are not what count in political action, but the great things.

To return to our typology, we must, after this first premise, put forth a second. Of all the doctrines on ethics and politics that I have enumerated, none have a predominantly prescriptive value, insofar

as they do not seem to provide an explanation of the contrast, but attempt to give it a practical solution. Others have an essentially analytical value, since they do not try to suggest a way to resolve the problem between ethics and politics, but rather to indicate the reason the opposition exists. In passing, I must add that the fact that the various functions of these theories have not been taken into account has led to great confusion. For example, it makes no sense to refute a prescriptive doctrine that makes realist observations, just as it makes no sense to oppose an analytical theory that offers a better, or even the best, solution to the contradiction.

I have divided into four main groups the theories that examine the problem of the relation between morals and politics, even if they are not always clearly separated by their facts and, more correctly speaking, are congruent with one and other. I have distinguished between monist and dualist theories, and within monist theories between rigid monism and flexible monism, and within dualist theories between apparent dualism and real dualism. I have included in rigid monism those authors for whom there is no contradiction between morals and politics because there is but one normative system, either a moral system, or a political system. In flexible monism, I have placed those authors for whom there is only one normative system, the moral system, but who will allow, under precise circumstances or specific subjects, for dispensations or exceptions that are justifiable by arguments within reason. In apparent dualism, I have placed authors who see morals and politics as two distinct normative systems, not completely independent from one another, but that rest one above the other in hierarchical order. Finally, I have placed in real dualism authors for whom morals and politics represent two diverse normative systems that obey different judgement criteria. I have presented the various theories in order of increasing divergence between the two normative systems.

Rigid monism

There are obviously two versions of rigid monism, whereby *reductio ad unum* is achieved by reducing politics to morals, or conversely, morals to politics.

An example of the first version is the typical sixteenth century idea, or rather ideal, of the Christian principle, which was so well-represented by Erasmus, whose work *The Education of a Christian Prince* in 1515 was thus more or less contemporaneous with Machiavelli's *The Prince*, and its most radical antithesis. The Christian principle of Erasmus is the other side to the face of diabolical power. A few quotes. Erasmus immediately rises and declares, "If you want to show yourself an excellent prince, see that no one outshines you in the qualities befitting your position – I mean wisdom, magnanimity, temperance, integrity."⁷ These exclusively moral virtues have nothing to do with *virtù* in the Machiavellian sense of the word. Or again: "If you want to make trial of yourself with other princes, do not consider yourself superior to them if you take away part of their power or scatter their forces; but only if you have been less corrupt than they, less greedy, less arrogant, less wrathful, less headstrong."⁸ Or again, the prince asks: "What is my cross?" and he answers: "Follow the right, do violence to no one, plunder no one, sell no public office, be corrupted by no bribes."⁹ The prince's satisfaction lies in the just conduct, and not in accomplishing "great things."

I have drawn my second example from Kant. In the appendix to this valuable book entitled *Perpetual Peace*, Kant distinguishes between the political moralist, who he condemns, and the moral politician, who he praises. The moral politician does not submit morals to the demands of politics, but interprets the principles of political prudence in such a way that they coexist with morals: "Although the saying 'Honesty is the best policy' expresses a theory which, alas, is often contradicted in practice, yet the likewise theoretical maxim 'Honesty is better than any policy' is exalted high above every possible objection, is indeed the necessary condition of all politics."¹⁰ For a moral expert, it might be interesting to know that Erasmus and Kant, while starting from moral theories that differed in their foundation of morals, both resorted to supporting their theses with the same argument, which we would call "consequentialist" in ethics today. Contrary to Machiavellians, for whom the failure to observe current moral rules is the very condition for success, these two authors maintain that, in time, success crowns the sovereign who respects the principles of uni-

versal morals. Which boils down to: "Do what is good, because that is your duty, but also because your actions will be rewarded regardless of your intentions." As everyone can see, it is a very common didactic argument, but it is lacking in persuasive power. To put it bluntly, it is a weak argument that has not been confirmed by history or shared experience.

As an example of the second version of monism, i.e. the reduction of morals to politics, I have chosen Hobbes, and there again with all the necessary precaution, especially since certain recent critics have brought to the fore what has been called the confusing clarity of the author of *Leviathan*, which led the reader, captivated and fascinated by the logical force of Hobbesian argumentation, to mistrust any overly unilateral interpretations. It seems, however, that in certain aspects it is difficult to find an author for whom the normative monism is more rigid, and for whom the normative system, to the exclusion of all others, is the political system, i.e. the system of norms that derive from the will of the sovereign, legitimized by social contract. It is possible to adduce numerous arguments: for Hobbes, subjects do not have the right to judge what is just or unjust, for that falls solely under the responsibility of the sovereign, and the very fact of supporting the subject's right to judge what is just or unjust is considered a seditious theory. But the fundamental argument is that Hobbes is one of the only authors, perhaps the only author, who has not made the distinction between the sovereign and the tyrant; and there is no such distinction because there is no way of distinguishing good government from bad government. In fact, in line with the distinction I made between the Church and the State as a determining contradiction for understanding the problem of the reason of State in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, I have noted that Hobbes reduces the Church to the State: the laws of the Church are not laws unless they are accepted, desired and reinforced by the State. By denying the distinction between the Church and the State, by reducing the Church to the State, Hobbes eliminates the very reason for the contradiction itself.

The theory of dispensation

According to the theory of flexible monism, there is only one normative system, the moral system, which has its own foundation in revelation, or in nature, from where the powers of human reason itself will be able to draw the universal laws of conduct. But these laws, precisely for their generality, cannot be applied in every case. There is no moral law that does not provide for exceptions under certain circumstances. The commandment "Thou shalt not kill" disappears in the case of legitimate defense, that is to say in the case where violence, in that particular circumstance, is the sole possible remedy for violence, according to the maxim that has explicitly or tacitly entered into most moral or judicial normative systems: *Vin vi repellere licet*. The commandment "Thou shalt not lie" disappears, for example, in the case where an affiliate of a revolutionary movement is arrested and asked to denounce his own companions. In all judicial systems, it is a confirmed maxim that *lex specialis derogat generali*. This maxim has the same value for morals, including the coded morals of theology treatises used by confessors.

According to the theory I am attempting to present, what seems at first glance a moral violation perpetrated by the holder of political power is nothing other than a dispensation of moral law, accomplished under exceptional circumstances. In other words, what justifies the violation is the exceptional nature of the situation in which the sovereign is found obliged to intervene. Since we are seeking to determine the various modes of justification for the immoral conduct of a politician, the significance here is not in the supposed existence of another normative system, but within the one accepted normative system itself, in which the rule that dispensation prevails under exceptional circumstances is considered valid. If there is one thing that truly characterizes the sovereign's conduct, it is the extraordinarily frequent exceptional situations in which he finds himself compared to the ordinary man: this frequency is due to the fact that he is working within a context of relations with other sovereigns in particular, in which the exception is established as a rule, even though it could be considered contradictory (but it is not contradictory, for this is a question of rule in the sense of regularity, and the regularity of contrary behavior does

not necessarily signify that a given rule is no longer valid). Even though it may seem that the dispensation is always advantageous for the sovereign (and it is this very advantage that moralists have considered with hostility), the opposite case can also present itself, although more rarely: in fact, the dispensation can act as an extensive mode to allow the sovereign to infringe what the morals forbid; but it can also act in a restrictive way by prohibiting the fulfillment of acts permitted for the ordinary man: *noblesse oblige*.

I need say no more on the historical importance of this motive for justification. Reason of State theorists, who flourished in the seventeenth century and to whom we owe the most profound and continuous thought on the theme of the relation between politics and morals, were often jurists, and it seemed natural to them to apply to the problem Machiavelli brought to the order of the day (with a clearly dualist solution, as we shall see) the principle, well-known to jurists, of dispensation under exceptional circumstances in the case of necessity. Thus, they were in the position to safeguard the principle of a single moral code, while at the same time offering sovereigns an argument to justify their acts that violated this one code, therefore enabling them to mask the “diabolical face of power” that Machiavelli had so scandalously revealed. Jean Bodin, Christian author and jurist, begins his great work, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, with an invective against Machiavelli (an invective that was customary for Christian authors), but, when he discusses the difference between the good sovereign and the tyrant, he affirms: “One must not label as evidence of tyranny the executions, banishments, confiscations and other deeds of violence that mark a revolution or restoration in a commonwealth.”¹¹ Change and reestablishment of the regime are precisely those exceptional circumstances – the state of necessity that justifies acts that would be considered immoral in a normal situation.

The theory of special ethics

To illustrate the second motive for justification of the divergence between common morals and political conduct, I will once again use a judicial category: that of *ius singulare*. I am the first to

acknowledge that these analogies between political theories and judicial theories must be upheld carefully; but, due to their lengthy elaboration and constant application to cases of legal casuistry, they offer points to ponder and practical suggestions in neighboring fields, such as moral and political casuistry. Unlike the relation between the exception and the rule, which concerns the special nature of a situation, the "state of necessity," the relation between *ius commune* and *ius singulare* concerns firstly the characteristics of the subjects, that is the *status* of certain subjects who, precisely because of their *status*, enjoy or suffer from a normative regime different than that of the ordinary man. In this case as well, we can speak of dispensation as regards common law, but what distinguishes this type of situation from the one examined in the previous paragraph is not the reference to a type of situation but to a category of subjects; consequently, it does not matter much whether the specificity of the subject diverges, or that the social condition wants the judicial order to which the nobleman is subject to be different from the order to which the *bourgeois* or countryman is subject, or that the activity carried out, to cite a well-known example, allowed the rights of the merchants to develop over the centuries by dispensation of civil law.

It seems to me, that when applied to moral discourse, the category of *ius singulare* serves mainly as an introduction to the chapter on alleged professional ethics. Professional ethics are understood as the set of rules of conduct to which people with a given activity must consider themselves subject, rules that generally differ, to a greater or lesser extent, from the set of norms of common morals. This explains why more stringent obligations are imposed on members of the corporation, or why members are exempt from impracticable obligations, such as the doctor's obligation to tell the truth to a patient with an incurable disease. Nothing prohibits calling professional ethics singular morals in the sense of judicial theory when we speak of singular rights, especially since those who use them willingly refer to a specific name, particularly constraining by its solemnity: deontology.

Do those who practice political activity institute something that could be assimilated to a profession or a corporation? It must be made clear that this is not a matter of taking a stance in the cur-

rent problem of "political professionalism." It is a matter of knowing whether the political activity presents characteristics specific to the point of creating a particular normative regime with the same *raison d'être* as any other professional ethics, which would be reason to agree to the practice of this given activity and its allotted aims: the goal of the politician is the common good, just as the goal of the doctor is good health and the goal of the priest is saving souls. Putting the question in these terms is nothing absurd: thought on political activity was initiated in ancient Greece by the notion that there was a technique, a constructive way of acting (the *poiéin*), and by the comparison of this art with other art forms that require a specific skill to be implemented well. The aim of Plato's dialogue entitled *Politics* is to explain what royal science consists of, that is, the specific knowledge of he who must govern. It is a scholarly comparison between the art of governing and the art of weaving. Moreover, the similarities – so frequent they have become customary – between the art of governing and the art of the navigator have handed down the term "government" and its derivatives, which we generally employ without recalling their original significations, save if they resurface in historical situations and contexts as unexpected as when we learned that Mao was called the "Great Helmsman."

Throughout the secular debate on the reason of State, alongside the justification of the "immorality" of politics deduced from the argument of the state of necessity, developed the argument derived from the nature of the art of politics. This was imposed on whoever exercised morally reprehensible acts, true, but was required by the nature and the aim of this activity. According to this type of argumentation, if there are political ethics that differ from ethical ethics, it is because the politician, like the doctor, the merchant or the priest, cannot practice his profession without obeying a specific code that, as such, does not necessarily correspond to the code of common morals or to the code of the other professions. Political ethics thus become the ethics of politics and, as special ethics, can have their own motives for justification when they serve to approve behavior that can admittedly seem immoral to the common people. But to the philosopher, however, this is seen simply as the individual member necessarily conforming to

the ethics of the group. By making a connection to the passage we cited from Croce, we will see that the notion of the art of politics as a profession among others has not lost any of its enduring vitality. By condemning the common, and in his opinion erroneous, demand of the “imbeciles” who wish politics to be honest, Croce feels free to declare the following: “Although, when it comes to tending to one’s own pain or undergoing a surgical operation, no one asks for an honest person, but everyone asks for and seeks out and obtains doctors and surgeons, honest or dishonest, providing that they are skilled in medicine or surgery [...], in political matters on the other hand, they do not want political people [that is to say, people who know how to practice their skilled profession of politician, N.B.], but honest people, who are also endowed with additional aptitudes.” And he continues: “For it is obvious that the possible faults of someone endowed with skill and political genius, if applied to other spheres of activity, will render them unsuitable for those spheres, but not for politics itself.”¹² I would like to draw attention to this use of “unsuitable” which evokes, by contrast, a political “cleanliness” obviously not that of morals.

The theory of the superiority of politics

I will now move from the notion of an attenuated or correct monism (“morality is one of them, but its validity fades under exceptional circumstances or in specialized spheres of activity”) to the notion of a professed but apparent dualism. I ask for some allowance for this reference insistent upon judicial categories, but in this case I am also aided by a well-known principle of jurisprudence, whereby, when two antinomic norms are located one above the other, or are placed in hierarchical order, it is the superior norm that prevails.

Concerning the problem of the relation between morals and politics, one of the possible solutions is to conceive of morals and politics as two distinct normative systems that are not completely independent of one another, so that they rest one above the other in hierarchical order. Naturally, a solution of this kind can have two versions: of the two normative systems, either the moral is

superior to the political, or the political is superior to the moral. An example characteristic of the first version can be found in Croce's practical philosophy, and of the second in that of Hegel. In Croce's system, economics and ethics are two distinct things, but they are neither opposites nor located on the same level: the first is above the second insofar as it concerns the moment the spirit *surpasses* the lower moment. Politics belong to the sphere of economics and not the sphere of ethics. This is not to say that "surpassing" would also signify superiority in the axiological sense, but in fact, every time Croce examines the Machiavellian problem of the relation between ethics and politics, he seems to admit that the difference between the two moments would be axiologically of a hierarchical order, even if he is not always clear to establish the consequences. Must a political action contrary to morals be condemned? What sense is there to say that the action is licit in its particular sphere if we subsequently admit that there is a normative superior sphere? These questions are very difficult to answer. Croce returns to this theme countless times. I refer here to a passage taken from the volume entitled, specifically, *Etica e politica* (ethics and politics), where he insists upon one point: politics is the domain of usefulness, business, negotiations, struggles, and in those constant wars, of individuals, the nations and States on guard against individuals, the nations and States in the aim to maintain or promote their own existence – only respecting the existence of others inasmuch as it could prove useful to them. Then, following his reasoning, he warns that one must be wary of committing the common error of separating life forms from one another. He urges to push back moralizing simpletons and to consider wrong *a priori* any dissension that believes it must distinguish between politics and morals, since political life either prepares for moral life or is in itself the instrument for a form of moral life. In sum, Croce's dialectic is not a dialectic of opposites, but of distinct entities, one being superior to the other. Morals and politics are interpreted as two distinct things and, as the last part of the passage demonstrates, places politics below and morals above.

While Hegel, on the contrary, admits to the existence of the two systems, he considers the political system hierarchically superior and finds in this superiority an excellent argument to justify the

immoral conduct of the politician. Namely, when the politician conforms to a superior norm, it forces him to abrogate and thus invalidate any norm of the inferior system that is incompatible. To take the same textbook examples, in the normative system of a group of thieves, pirates, "murderers," or – why not? – gypsies, not to mention the mafia, *camorra* and others who are a part of our everyday experience, if there is a norm that considers theft (of things, of course, that do not belong to members of the group) to be licit, it is obvious that the norm of the normative system considered inferior – whether it be the State, the Church, or the morals of those who do not belong to the group – that prohibits theft should be implicitly considered abrogated, since it is incompatible with the system considered superior. In fact, the States could also be, according to the famous words of St. Augustine, "*magna latrocinia*."

Even more so, those who did not see *magnum latrocinium* in the State, but rather "rational in itself for itself," the ultimate moment in the reign of morality, which was, in turn, the ultimate moment of the objective spirit (of practical philosophy in the traditional sense of the word), had to submit the demands of individual morals to the ultimate demands of the State. Hegel's system, profoundly enlightening in its singularity, is a good example of the total reversal of the relation between morals and politics that had found one of its main expressions in Kantian thought. In fact, it serves as a wonderful illustration of a form of justification for the immorality of politics that differs from any of the others we have seen until now: according to Hegel, morals in the traditional sense of the word are not excluded from the system, but considered as an inferior moment in the development of the objective spirit, which found its fulfillment in collective morals or in the reign of *ethicity* (for which the State is the supreme expression).

Hegel admired Machiavelli, whom he had already praised in the work of his youth on the German constitution. In politics, he was a realist who knew what importance to place on the prattling of preachers when hussars strode onto the battlefield with their brilliant sabers. Should the majesty of the State, that "rich inward articulation of ethical life," thus admit defeat to those who oppose the "broth of heart, friendship and inspiration"?¹³

In paragraph 337 of *The Philosophy of Right*, he returns briefly but exhaustively to his doctrine in this regard. The paragraph begins as follows: "At one time the opposition between morals and politics, and the demands that the latter should conform to the former, were much canvassed."¹⁴ But, as Hegel makes us understand, that is a discussion that had its time and has become anachronical, whence at least we begin to understand that the good of the State has a whole other "justification" than the singular good: one *raison d'être* of the State is its concrete existence, and that alone can gain value as a principle of its action, and not an abstract imperative moral that does not take into account the demands and obligations of the historical movement of which the State, and not the singular individual, nor the sum of singular individuals, is the protagonist. From this point of view, it seems fair to say that, for Hegel, individual morals are inferior for what they are worth to the morals of the State, and thus must submit to them when the historical duty of the State obliges.

The end justifies the means

A dualist solution no longer apparent, but real, is one that history has retained as "Machiavellianism," since, rightly or wrongly, it is attributed to the author of *The Prince*. Here, the dualism is based on the distinction between two types of action: finalized actions, having an intrinsic value, and instrumental actions, which have no value save that they serve to pursue an end, which, only in itself, is considered to have an intrinsic value. While the finalized act, deemed good in itself, such as coming to the aid of the suffering – and in general all the traditional "merciful acts" – is judged on its own terms, as long as it is a "selfless" act that seeks no other interest but to fulfil a good action, the instrumental act on the other hand, good for other reasons than the act itself, is judged according to its greater or lesser ability to serve an end.

No moral theory neglects to take this distinction into account. To take a well known example, it corresponds to the Weberian distinction between rational actions that conform to values (*wertrational*) and rational actions that conform to ends (*zweckrational*).

Thus, there is no moral theory that does not take into account the fact that the same action can be judged in two different ways: according to the context in which it is taking place, and according to the intention for which it was accomplished. Helping the poor, an act that is always cited as an example of a good act, becomes an act that is good for other reasons, and should be judged as such if it is accomplished with the aim to draw benefit from it. If the person who performs the act does not gain benefit, we could also say that the act has remained rational in terms of value, but not in terms of aim.

The fundamental core of Machiavellianism is not so much the recognition of the distinction between an act good in itself and an act good for other reasons, but the distinction between morals and politics based on this distinction. In other words, the sphere of politics is the sphere of instrumental actions that, as such, must not be judged for the acts themselves, but according to their greater or lesser ability to serve an end. That is why, in the Machiavellian solution, we speak of the amorality of politics, which should correspond, although the expression is not imposed (because it is not necessary), to the "apoliticity of morals." The amorality of politics is seen in the sense that, within its own complex and as a set of actions regulated by norms and evaluated by a given judgement criterion, politics have nothing to do with morals in their own complex, which are also a set of actions regulated by different norms and evaluated by another judgement criterion. Here is where the clear difference arises between a solution similar to the one being discussed, based on the idea that the separation and independence of politics and morals, which, as such, can without hesitation be called dualist, and the previously examined solutions, in which either there is no separation because politics are constant within the global normative system and given, as it were, special status, or there is no independence, because while the morals and politics are distinguished, they are set in a relationship of reciprocal dependence. The Machiavellian solution, or the solution of amorality in politics, is presented as being based on the following fundamental principle: "The end justifies the means." In contrast, we could define the non-political sphere (the one, we agree, that governs itself with *pater noster*) as the sphere in which

the recourse to the distinction between the end and the means is incongruous, because all political action must be considered in itself for its intrinsic value or non-value, irrespective of the end. In morals as rigorist as Kantian morals, and all morals of duty in general, not only is an end outside of the action considered improper, but it is also impossible, because to be moral, the action needs no other aim than the fulfillment of duty, which is precisely the end intrinsic to the action itself.

Even if the maxim "the end justifies the means" is not found literally in Machiavelli, we often consider the passage in chapter XVIII of *The Prince* an equivalent. When he poses the problem of whether the prince is held to keeping faith (the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* is a universally moral principle, regardless of foundation, religion, rational, utilitarianism, etc.), he responds that princes who have done "great things" have taken little account for it. He is clearly referring to the passage that says what counts in the statesman's conduct is the end, the "great things," and reaching that end renders licit actions – like not keeping faith – reprehensible by means of that other code, the moral code, to which are bound all ordinary mortals. He did not, however, clearly specify what great things consist of. But an initial answer can already be found towards the end of this same chapter, where what is of importance to the prince is to "win and keep the State."¹⁵

An even clearer answer, and more comprehensible as well, appears in a passage of *Discourses* where the theory of separation is presented in detail: "This counsel merits the attention of, and ought to be observed by, every citizen who has to give advice to his country. For when the safety of one's country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious. On the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that alternative should be wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and preserve the freedom of one's country."¹⁶ Nothing new under the sun: through his particularly effective words, Machiavelli simply illustrates the maxim: *Salus rei publicae suprema lex*. His illustration places the only principle that must guide political judgement, which is the "principle of saving the homeland," opposite all other possible criteria for judgement of human action, which are based

respectively on the distinction between the just and the unjust, the kind or the cruel, the glorious or the vile, and which make reference, although according to diverse points of view, to judgement criteria relative to common morals.

The two ethics

One of the theories on the relation between morals and politics brought the thesis of separation to its extreme consequences, and can thus be considered the most dualist; it admits to the existence of two morals based on two different criteria for judging actions, which do not necessarily have values that coincide with the same action, and are thus incompatible and may not be superimposed. A classic example of the theory of two morals is the Weberian theory of the distinction between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility. What truly distinguishes the two are the different criteria they use to judge whether an action is good or bad. The former uses something that is within the action, a principle, a norm, any prescriptive proposition in general with a function to influence in a more or less determining way the completion of an act, while also permitting a positive or negative judgement of a real act according to its conformity or non-conformity to the abstract action of the said norm. The latter, in order to give a positive or negative judgement, makes use of that which comes after, that is to say the result, and it judges positively or negatively according to the success or failure of the proposed result. In everyday language, these two ethics can also be called the ethics of principles and the ethics of results. In the history of moral philosophy they correspond on one side to deontological morals, such as Kantian morals, and on the other side to teleological morals, which are predominant today.

The two morals do not coincide: what is good according to principles is not as far as results are concerned. And vice versa. According to the principle "Thou shalt not kill," the death penalty should be condemned. But according to the result, if we seek to establish that the death penalty has a great power of intimidation, it can be justified (and as a result, abolitionists have endeavored to

show, supported by statistics, that it does not have a great dissuasive impact).

This distinction has transcended throughout the history of moral philosophy, irrespective of the connection that it could have to the distinction between morals and politics. What is important with respect to this distinction, once we maintain that the ethics of politics is exclusively the ethics of responsibility (or of results), is that political action is judged on the basis of success or failure, and that the fact of judging it according to the criterion of faithfulness to the principles comes back to us as proof of abstract moralism, which has little meaning in the affairs of this world. Those who act according to principles are not greatly concerned with the results of their own actions: do what you have to do and come what may. Those who concern themselves exclusively with the results need least respect conformity to principles: do what is necessary so that what you want comes! As we could have read on several occasions in the newspaper, the judge who asks the "repentant" terrorist whether the terrorists had considered the problem that killing is forbidden, represents the ethics of principles. The terrorist who answers that the group had only considered the problem of the success or failure of their undertaking, represents the ethics of results. If the terrorist repents, it is not so much because he feels remorse for having violated moral law, but because, when all is said and done, he realizes that the political action undertaken failed with respect to the expected outcome. In this way, he cannot truly consider himself repentant, but more as someone who is convinced he has failed. He has not acknowledged the fault so much as the error.

It can happen that the set goal is not reached, but it can also happen that we arrive at a result different from the one intended. The person who attempted the assassination of the archduke Ferdinand declared during questioning at the trial: "I had not foreseen war after the assassination. I thought that it would have had an effect on the youth, inciting them to nationalist ideas." And one of his accomplices, who failed to carry it off, declared: "This assassination had unpredictable consequences. If I had foreseen what was going to happen, I would have sat on that bomb to blow myself up."

In these years of renewed interest in Max Weber's work, it is superfluous to insist upon an illustration of this distinction, even if

it is important to note that reducing all politics to the ethics of responsibility is an unwarranted extension of Weberian thought, which is, as regards ethics (and not metaethics), or personal conviction (and not abstract theory), not at all disposed to the reduction. In the action of a great politician, ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility cannot, according to Weber, be separated. The former, considered in itself and taken to its extreme consequences, is a characteristic of the fanatic, a morally loathsome figure. The latter, completely divided from the consideration of principles that inspire great actions, and solely geared to success (remember Machiavelli: "Let the prince think only of keeping his life and his State!"), characterize the figure, no less morally reprehensible, of the cynic.

Is there a relation between the two theories?

Once we have accepted the distinction between morals as ethics of conviction and politics as ethics of responsibility, there is another point that needs to be addressed, by way of conclusion for this examination of "justifications," especially regarding the last-mentioned, which seems the most drastic: all five refer to one another, to the point of being able to consider them – and this the reader has perhaps already realized – as five variations of the same theme. This of course does not exclude the possibility and the usefulness of perceiving them from an analytical and historical point of view, which is the one adopted here. Like a chain descending in the opposite direction from the one we took, the last variation, namely the ethics of responsibility, links up with the preceding one, the Machiavellian doctrine according to which the only thing that counts in the judgement of politics is conformity with the means of attaining the end, irrespective of the consideration of principles. This, in turn, insofar as it considers "saving the homeland" as the ultimate end for political action, for which the judgement of the good or bad in singular actions depends on the extent to which they conform to the ultimate goal, immediately requires the preceding solution, that of Hegel, who, as it was said, was not an admirer of Machiavelli by coincidence. According to Hegel, the State (the "homeland" of the *Discourses* and the *res publica* culled

from traditional political morals) found its reason in its “concrete” nature, which would later become the “reason of State” of the other political authors who were observing and commenting on the birth and development of the modern State. This concrete reason stands as the exclusive principle of the action of the sovereign, and thus the positive or negative judgement that it receives. Upon close examination, the justification based on the specificity of professional ethics, our second variation, also derives from the end being the clearly predominant criterion for evaluation: the characteristic features of the singular profession are in fact the ends common to all members of the group, saving bodies for the doctor, and saving souls for the priest. Beyond these specific professional ends, it is perfectly legitimate to admit to a third type of saving, no less important, the *salus rei publicae* as the end proper to the politician. Finally, the first variation founded on dispensation in the case of necessity – which is, it seems to me, the most common variation since, on the whole, it is the least scandalous and the most acceptable from the stance of common morals – can also be interpreted as a deviation from the straight and virtuous path, due to the fact that the pursuit of such a path in this particular circumstance leads to a different goal than the one sought or to no goal at all.

It would be worth the trouble to test all these motives for justification (and possibly others) by comparing them to a concrete historical case, to one of these borderline cases well-represented by the traditional figure of the tyrant, and in which the difference between the conduct that morals prescribe to common man and the conduct of the political lord is most evident. One of these exemplary cases is the reign of Ivan the Terrible, who, in Russian and Soviet historiography, gave rise to a very intense and passionate debate, which henceforth became secular. I have chosen to cite this example – but I could use others – not only because it represents a truly borderline case, but also because there is a rich and extensive synthesis found in a book recently translated into Italian, which was written by an historian very perceptive to the problem which is close to our hearts.¹⁷ In the defense of the person who was considered the founder of the Russian State, the motives for justifications we have examined until now all appear in a more or less explicit form. Especially the first, the state of necessity, and the last,

the obtained result. But what connects all these *iustae causae* together is the issue of the grandiose nature of the end; these are exactly Machiavelli's "great things." One of the historians discussed, I.I. Smirnov, speaks of the "objective inevitability of the physical extermination of the princely and boyar families."¹⁸ Thus: necessity knows no law. It is an old saying that you cannot force someone to do the impossible. By the same logic, we must then say that you cannot forbid that same person from doing what is necessary. Just as the state of impossibility is incompatible with observing commandments, so the state of necessity is incompatible with observing what is forbidden. The question of the state of necessity is closely related to the question of the result: an action is "objectively necessary" if it is considered to be the only condition possible to reach a desired end that is judged as good. And in fact, the same Smirnov concludes without fail that, notwithstanding the "cruel form" assumed by the struggle for centralization, such is the price of progress and of liberation from the "forces of reaction and stagnation."¹⁹ He is referring to Ivan, but Stalin is the one who immediately jumps to mind. And in fact, Yanov comments: "On the same analogy, a historian who argued that Soviet Russia in the 1930s was indeed saturated with treason, that all the higher personnel of the country were conspiring against the state, and that the enserfment of the peasantry in the course of collectivization and the attachment of the blue- and white-collar workers to their jobs was 'historically necessary' to the survival of the state would be compelled to 'justify morally' total terror and GULAG."²⁰

One final remark. All of these justifications share the fact that they attribute the rules of political conduct to the category of hypothetical norms, either in the form of conditioned norms of the type "If there is A, then there must be B," as is the case for the justification on the basis of the relation between exception and rule, or in the form of technical or pragmatic norms of the type "If you want A, you must do B," where A could be an end that is only possible or an end that is necessary, as in all the other cases. This exclusion of imperative categories from the political sphere corresponds moreover to the common opinion that the conduct of the statesmen is guided by rules of caution, which are understood as rules which do not incite the unconditioned obligation that disregards any consid-

eration for the situation or the end, but which incite only the obligation to observe when this determined condition is proved or when a determined end is reached. To clarify this essential trait of the moral theories of politics, nothing is more useful than the thinking of Kant, to whom we owe the first and most complete development of the distinction between categorical demands and hypothetical demands: "Politics say: 'have the wisdom of snakes'; and morals add (as a restrictive condition) 'without malice, like doves.'"

Critical observations

It must be made very clear that all of these justifications (which are worth what they are worth, but nevertheless must be worth something since they represent such an important part of the political philosophy of the modern State) do not attempt to eliminate the moral questions of politics, but only, taking into account precisely the importance of the question, to specify the terms and define the boundaries. I said the deviation was justified and not the rule. But it is precisely the deviation that needs to be justified, because every time the deviation is not justified, the rule continues to have worth. Notwithstanding all the justifications for political conduct that deviates from the rules of common morals, the tyrant remains the tyrant, and can be defined as the one whose conduct cannot be justified by any of the theories that nevertheless recognize a certain normative autonomy of politics with respect to morals. Although Machiavelli affirms that no consideration of "piety or cruelty" should intervene when saving the homeland is at stake, he nevertheless condemns Agathocles for being a tyrant because his cruelty was "poorly used." Bodin, referred to earlier as a theorist of exception, illustrates in several famous pages the difference between the king and the tyrant.

Let us examine briefly the various theories: 1) It is true for the theory of the state of necessity that the exception proves the rule, precisely as an exception, for if the criteria of the exception still applied there would no longer be any exception and there would be no rule. If the deviation can only be granted when it is justified, it presupposes that there would be non-justifiable, and conse-

quently, intolerable deviations. 2) Political ethics are the ethics of those who conduct political activity, but political activity, in the notion of those who broach the subject on the grounds of professional ethics, is not power as such, but the power to reach an end that is the common good, collective or general interest. It is not government, but good government. One of the traditional criterion constantly taken up again to distinguish good government from bad is precisely the evaluation of whether or not that specific end was reached: good government seeks the common good, bad government seeks personal good. 3) Are politics superior to morals? It is not the case for all politics, but only those that accomplish in one determined historical era the supreme end of attaining the objective spirit, the politics of heroes or of the individual of universal History. 4) The end justifies the means. But who justifies the end? Perhaps the end does not need to be justified in turn? Is every end proposed by a statesman a good end? Should there not be ulterior criteria to help distinguish between a good and bad end? Is there not room to question whether by chance the bad means corrupts the good end? 5) Political ethics are the ethics of results and not principles. But of all results? If we wish to distinguish between results, are we not one again brought back to principles? Can we reduce the good result to immediate success? Is the defeated always in the wrong by the sole fact that he is defeated? But can the defeated today not be the victor tomorrow? *Victrix causa deis placuit / Sed victa Catoni*. Is Cato not a part of history?

The problem of the legitimacy of the end

All of these questions do not provide an answer, but they help to understand which direction to take to find one, and this direction is not the appropriateness of means but of the legitimacy of the end. One problem does not cancel out the other, they are two different problems, and it is advisable to keep them quite distinct. The problem of appropriateness of means occurs when we wish to pass judgement on the effectiveness of government, for it clearly consists of a technical judgement and not a moral one: an effective government is it not, in itself, a good government. The ulterior judgement

does not merely reach an end but moreover asks: what end? Once saving the homeland, or the general interest, or the common good (in contrast to saving government, to particular interests, to personal good) is recognized as the end to the political action, the judgement, not by the appropriateness of the means but by the goodness of the end, is a veritable and authentic moral judgement, even if, for reasons put forth by all justificationalist theories, it is a moral that is different or partly different from the common morals by which the actions of singular individuals are judged. This signifies that, taking into account the specific reasons for the political action, the alleged "reason of State," which conjures up episodes made disastrous through poor usage (done even if, in itself, it indicates only the distinctive traits of political ethics), the political action, like all other free or presumed free human action, does not completely escape the judgement of the licit and illicit, which equals moral judgement, and which should not be confused with the judgement of appropriateness and inappropriateness.

We could also ask the same question in these terms: by admitting that political action has in some way something to do with conquest, the conservation and increase of power, of maximal power of man over man, of unique power in which we recognize, in the end, the right to resort to force (and that is what distinguishes the power of Alexander from the power of the pirate who does not have this right), none of the justificationalist theories illustrated here consider conquest, conservation and increase of power as gains in themselves. No one thinks that the goal of the "immoral" political action is justified because it hardly aims at "great things" or "saving the homeland." Seeking power for power comes to transform a means, which as such must be judged by the face of the end, into an end in itself. Even for those who see an instrumental action in the political action, it is not an instrument for simply any end it pleases the politician to attain. But once the distinction is established between a good and a bad end, a distinction that has never failed to be made by any theory on the relation between morals and politics, it becomes unavoidable to distinguish between good and bad political action, otherwise said, to subject it to moral judgement. Let us take an example. The debate on the moral question often concerns, especially in Italy,

the theme of corruption under many forms, moreover provided for in the penal code under the heading of crimes of private interest in the practice of public service, embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, etc., and especially, in quasi exclusive reference to party members, the issue of *tangenti* (bribes). Only a moment's thought is needed to realize that all forms of political corruption are rendered morally illicit (aside from illicit law) by the perfectly justified presumption that the politician who allows himself to be corrupted lets his private interests override collective interests, his personal good override common good, and saving himself and his family override saving his homeland. By doing so, he has failed in his duty as one devoted to the practice of political activity, and has completed a blameful political action.

In a State of law such as the Italian Republic (in which the state of health has spurred these thoughts of mine), the discussion would be limited if, when dealing with effectiveness and morality, or political morals, as I have tried to do, it did not pass a more specifically judicial judgement on the political action, that is to say a judgement of whether or not it conforms to the fundamental norms of the Constitution, to which is also subject the practice of political action of the higher representatives of the State. Of these different senses of the State of law, I am referring to the one defined as the governing of laws opposed to the government of man, taking the governing of laws in the sense of modern constitutionalism.

The assessment of the greater or lesser conformity of State representatives, or of that integral part of sovereign power known as the parties, to the norms of the Constitution and the principles of the State of law can give rise to this judgement, which we hear of so often in current political debate on constitutional error or anti-democratic practices. This occurs, to take an example, in the case of the abuse of statutory orders, the call for a vote of confidence solely to suppress the opposition and, for those involved in parties, in the practice of *sottogoverno*, which violates one of the founding principles of the State of law: the visibility of power and the ability to control its practice.

Even though the political polemic often does not distinguish between the various judgements and arranges all three under the etiquette of the "moral question," the three types of judgement –

on effectiveness, on legitimacy, and specifically on morals (we could also call this merit), which is the one I have supported exclusively – must be considered distinct for reasons of analytical clarity and allocation of responsibility.

Translated from the French by Mara Bertelsen

Notes

1. This essay by Norberto Bobbio first appeared in Italian in *Elogio della mitezza a altri scritti morali* (Milan, 1994). It was republished under the same title by *Edizioni Pratiche* (Milan, 1998), revised and updated by the author.
2. A. Sen, *Mercato e morale*, "Biblioteca della libertà," pp. 8-27, n. 94 (1986).
3. I am referring here to J. Burnham, *The Machiavellians Defenders of Freedom*, (New York, 1943).
4. B. Croce, "L'onestà politica," in *Etica e politica* (Bari, Laterza 1945), p. 165.
5. This term has been an ongoing problem in English translation: it reflects the various notions of strength, courage, manliness, ingenuity, character, wisdom, virtue, power to do good, etc. (*Trans. note*).
6. N. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Angelo M. Codevilla (London, 1977), p. 65.
7. D. Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. Lester K. Born, (New York, 1973), p. 151.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
10. I. Kant, *Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Essay*, trans. M. Campbell Smith (New York, 1915), Appendix I, p. 162.
11. P. J. Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, trans. M.J. Tooley (Oxford, N.D.), p. 63.
12. B. Croce, p. 166.
13. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (London, 1967), p. 6.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
15. Here is the entire passage: "[...] and in the actions of all men and especially of princes, where there is no judgement to call upon, one looks to the results. Therefore let a prince win and keep the state." (London, 1997), p. 67. (*Trans. note*)
16. N. Machiavelli. *Discourses upon the first ten books of Tite Livius*, trans. Leslie J. Walker, (Middelsex, 1970). t. III-41, p. 515.
17. A. Yanov, *The Origins of Autocracy. Ivan the Terrible in Russian History*, trans. Stephen Dunn (Los Angeles, 1981).
18. A. Yanov, p. 316.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 254.