England were mistaken in thinking that the rejection of the papal supremacy, and the substitution of a parliamentary for a papal process of legitimating the law of succession, were of minor consequence. There were great consequences, but they were not intended by any of the participants: certainly not by Henry VIII and I do not think even by Cromwell. Dr Elton thinks Cromwell's eight years of office controlled the developments of the next century, as though that momentous era was merely a coda to a bureaucratic symphony composed by Thomas Cromwell, with occasional noises off supplied by Henry VIII. What I think Henry and Cromwell did was to offer an opportunity to the much more radical and penetrating revolutionaries associated with Calvin, at the same time as the stresses and strains inherent in the English social structure of their day were increasing. We may agree with Dr Elton that Cromwell was a sincere Protestant with a genuine interest in reform, just as we may doubt that the King's first minister would have cared for what the Calvinists did to France or Scotland in the name of reform. In the matter of structural change, which most would now agree is at the bottom of some of the most important developments of 'Cromwell's century', Cromwell can have understood it as little as Henry VIII.

In his final chapter, the best, I think, in the book, Dr Elton looks anew at the trial of Thomas More and Cromwell's part in it. He seeks, successfully, to acquit Cromwell of malice and cruelty towards More and in the process opposes the two men's related but utterly opposed principles. It is well to remember that the casualty rate amongst Henry's ministers was only slightly less than that amongst his wives: Cromwell can have had no illusions as to the dangers of his own position and yet, in this instance, we must agree with Dr Elton he behaved well. This More is not the plaster saint beloved of the English middle-class: he is a lawyer-politician, an ambitious one, who took the top job within his reach when it was offered to him. He was probably right, though certainly foolish, to accept the chancellorship. It was this that sent him to his death. He resigned and took a posture of silence when he could no longer speak anything but treason. But because of who he was and what he did—great ministers resigned rather less frequently over questions of principle in the sixteenth century than they do today—his refusal to speak made his position, and his total disagreement with the King, clear. Dr Elton brings out the power and dangers of this silence: this is why More was tried, and also why the government, working within the limits of a body of law that did not recognize dumb insolence as an offence, found it so difficult to condemn him. In the event More defended himself as a man of principle and a clever lawyer, and Dr Elton is very good on just how skilful More's defence was. He also points out that More was not at all concerned with a right of the individual conscience in the abstract, but a right to recognize, a duty for himself—and by implications one incumbent upon all including the King—'to accept a vision granted to the great body of Christians'. This More was a lawyer on the make, who found himself facing a real question of law and principle. He did not evade this question but fought for it and his survival with courage, cunning, and a kind of skill, that makes for a politics at once serious and decent. In contemporary terms More would I think have got on with the Kennedys a deal better than with Jo Grimond or Roy Jenkins.

ERIC JOHN

MYSTICS AND MILITANTS, by Adam Curle. *Tavistock Publications*. London, 1972. 121 pp. £2.00.

Adam Curle is a Professor of Education at Harvard, an educational psychologist, author of several earlier books and a part-time conciliator in a number of significant international disputes in recent years. He has held academic appointments in England, America and several countries of the third world and has also spent time at the Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research in London. His book was written during the last-mentioned period, and is a sequel to an earlier work, entitled *Making Peace*. The latter is briefly summarized at the beginning of *Mystics and Militants*, and this is useful for readers like myself who have not come across the earlier book and need to know something of the background against which the present thesis is presented. Professor Curle defines peace, or rather peaceful relationships (peace for him seems to be a quality of a relationship rather than a state of things in its own right) as the absence of conflict; conflict itself being any situation in which A's advantage is B's disadvantage. This definition is useful, since it

implies that a situation of e.g. slavery, even when the slave as well as his master is content with his lot, is nevertheless unpeaceful. It also means that the relation of the rich countries to the third world—a relationship that Curle calls an 'exploitative network'—is unpeaceful, too, even when violence is absent from it. It follows from this that making peace is a matter, first of generating awareness by the 'slaves' and the 'masters' of their respective positions; secondly, of confronting the 'masters' with the 'slave's' demand for justice; and thirdly, of undertaking conciliation and bargaining, which are processes between parties, who now recognize that they are on a par with each other, for coming to terms with this new relationship.

The present book is a study of the role of personal *identity* and *awareness* in the business of making peace. The parties in an unpeaceful relationship will each begin with a certain conception of their own *identity*, and a certain degree, and kind, of *awareness* both of themselves and of others. Since making peace involves changing each of these elements in order to create conditions for a permanent absence of conflict, it is important to understand what kinds of awareness and identity prevail in any situation and what possibilities there may be of creative change. For this reason a chapter of the book is devoted to identity, another to awareness, and the rest to studying their 'configurations' by means of analytical discussion and case-studies.

Reduced to its simplest terms, the thesis is that peaceful relationships are possible only by a *raising of the level* of awareness among the people concerned, and by the *substitution* of 'awareness-identity' for 'belonging-identity'. In the course of pursuing this thesis many useful and interesting observations are made, and I have no general quarrel with these. But I do feel some dissatisfaction with the definitions of 'awareness' and 'identity' on which the thesis is based.

Awareness, Curle says, is essentially self-awareness. Self-awareness varies both in degree (some people are much less aware of who they are, and what they are doing, than others) and in kind: some people are 'naturally' self-aware (gifted with the capacity to be objective about themselves), others can cultivate self-awareness by psychotherapy, T-groups, etc., others again achieve 'supraliminal' awareness through mystical or religious enlightenment. Nevertheless, it is a safe generalization that the more self-aware people are, and the higher the kind of awareness they have, the better will be their chance of making peaceful relationships. My reservations about this thesis arise from the undue emphasis on the effect our degree and kind of self-awareness has upon our awareness of things and persons outside us. Too little is made of the opposite fact, i.e. the effects of people and environment upon our capacity for self-awareness. To put the point in concrete terms of one unpeaceful situation—Northern Ireland—Curle would seem to emphasize the need for both sides to become more aware of the true sources and nature of their own attitudes (this is fair enough) but to underplay the need to change the environment which largely determines and preserves these attitudes and gives them a function that seems, from within the situation, inescapable.

On the matter of identity, a similar individualistic emphasis seems to operate. The primary need, according to Curle, is to get away from the kind of identity or self-awareness that results simply from 'belonging'—including belonging to a particular race, tribe, club, church, etc. But 'belonging identity' also involves 'belongings': that is, such identity often results from possessing, and thus being defined by, material or measurable things. We become what we own, as well as what we belong to. Such relatively primitive and self-blinding kinds of self-identity need to be replaced, if we are to have peace, with a sense of identity based upon 'awareness'. According to Curle this would come once we have jettisoned our attachments to 'belongings' and the need to 'belong'. Awareness-identity is hard to define positively, but it is the kind of identity recommended by all the great ethical and religious teachers, and can be recognized in particular individuals when we see it. But is 'belonging' quite so limiting as Curle suggests? Are we not radically social beings for whom things and institutions are necessary scaffoldings for the building of personality? How far can we jettison them without falling into the mire of angelism? (itself a rich source of conflict and unpeace).

I have no space to pursue these questions and criticisms. Unfortunately, neither does Professor Curle, whose intelligent and humane book is too short to deal adequately with the very obvious difficulties his thesis raises.

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