

CATHOLICISM AND SOCIETY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRAZIL*

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During the 1960s, social scientists optimistically predicated a significant role for Roman Catholicism in the promotion of social reform throughout Latin America. But political developments during the 1970s, notably in Chile and Brazil, implicitly challenged that view and the theoretical foundations on which it rested. Not surprisingly, one recent and knowledgeable reassessment of the Church's role contends that Catholicism—for reasons that went unaccentuated in earlier scholarship—is both institutionally and ideologically incapable of legitimating and implementing reforms basic to a new egalitarian order.¹

As a contribution to the debate now taking shape, this essay explores—through an analysis of the Brazilian experience over the course of a critical half-century (ca. 1916–64)—the determinants and constraints attendant upon Catholicism's inherence in a modern Latin American society. It develops in three consecutive stages: The first summarizes briefly several principal tenets of the literature on the Roman Catholic Church as an agent of social change in Latin America;² the second reconstructs the history of the Brazilian Catholic Church since World War I; the last assesses whether the history of the Church in one country substantiates or not the social science projections about Latin American Catholicism's capacity to promote social reform.

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I

Three significant tenets of the literature are most pertinent to the historical analysis that follows.

In the now widely acclaimed 1971 classic, *Catholicism, Social Control, and Modernization in Latin America*, the late Ivan Vallier readily acknowledged that the Church was by no means an "independent, advanced front" for social change. Nonetheless, under "specialized religious strategies," he argued, the Church might not only release resources for building a new secular order but could also "actually facilitate social change." By the "Church," Vallier carefully delineated the entire range of Catholicism's complex structures. To "religious elites" rather than followers he attributed the capacity to influence both Catholicism's own course and the wider social order. Ultimately, to the episcopal hierarchy and its power to legitimate ideologies conducive to change, Vallier assigned the chief and critical task of endorsing new directions over the middle run.³

Thomas Sanders, in his comprehensive survey of the Church in Latin America, also shared Vallier's distinction between elites and followers.⁴ But for Sanders, the elites who alter the social teachings and practises of the Church are "innovating elites." Primarily laymen and priests—occasionally a bishop is in their ranks—innovating elites are Catholics conversant in doctrine that they apply to and in their daily lives; moreover, because these "innovators" are involved in social action that lacks the security of official church approval, they are and appear as radicals in conflict with the Church's current teachings.

How do innovators change the Church's views? Sanders stresses the dynamic religious community in which members exchange motivations and critical outlooks; in time, a new consensus emerges that major Church spokesmen then articulate for all the faithful. Sanders is clear, however, that the new consensus may not receive official sanction for decades. But his frequent reference to the Chilean and Brazilian experiences of the 1960s implies that his view of the innovators' capacity to influence the Church's major spokesmen was essentially optimistic.

Lastly, there is the 1969 Rand Corporation analysis that focussed, more pointedly than either of the other two studies, on emerging impediments to the Church's capacity to promote social change. Commissioned by the State Department after the Second Conference of Latin American Bishops had taken place at Medellín, Colombia (1968), Rand experts concluded that the Latin American Church was not at all as "revolutionary" as the conference declarations suggested. Behind the conference pronouncements, there lay diverse opinions among churchmen over the meaning of "revolution," a myriad of complex institutional

conflicts, and evidence of organizational fragmentation. Such factors, according to Rand, hardly allowed Catholicism to follow much of any revolutionary course.

What then did Medellín signify? According to Rand,⁵ the

CELAM conclusions suggest that a major interest of the bishops was to find a formula that would offer some hope of reconciling [the] conflicting views of revolution and social change with each other and with the institutional survival of the Church. The essence of this formula as it emerged at Medellín seems to be independence from partisan politics. Since any government is inevitably open to criticism for failing to meet the existential needs of the poor, the Church should not be identified with governments.

What this amounted to, Rand scholars argued, was a call by the bishops to extricate the Church ("*de facto* separation") from formal and informal alliances with governments. To implement this policy, the hierarchy would invest itself with a modern-day "prophetic mission"; by it, the Church would become the conscience of every state and the accomplice of none, the denunciator of vested interest and the defender of justice for all. Rand scholars were quick to point out the "attractiveness" of the prophetic mission: "It enables Catholics to surmount the divisive impact of partisan political participation, while linking religious values to the general need for progressive social change." Thus, the Rand analysis implied, the "gift of prophecy," theoretically bestowable upon any believer, had been transformed into a prophetic mission assignable chiefly to the Catholic hierarchy, besieged at the time by its then current problems and future strategies relevant to the "institutional survival of the Church."⁶

II

In order to compare this composite sociological image of Catholicism and social change with the concrete historical reality of the Church in a single nation, I have selected Brazil as a case study. What follows is based on my own work in progress and, in part, on several excellent recent monographs. Those by Márcio Moreira Alves, Thomas Bruneau, Emmanuel deKadt, and Margaret Todaro are especially rich in historical data and interpretations, and greatly facilitated my reconstruction of Brazilian Catholic history since World War I.⁷ Moreover, their remarkable and independently reached consensus about Catholicism's unrivaled place in Brazilian society provides a suitable introduction to the ensuing discussion.

The most striking consensus pertains to the long-prevailing social convention by which Catholicism inheres in Brazilian society *as if* it were the official religion of the state, nation, and ruling elites. Except for the early decades of the Old Republic (1889–1930), whose proclamation ul-

timately led to the separation of church and state after almost four centuries of union, the Brazilian political establishment—regardless of professed ideology—has fully acquiesced in this convention. By extension, the state has uninterruptedly granted the Roman Catholic Church a wide range of privileges (especially in educational and social matters) that no other institution, religious or otherwise, enjoys.

This *modus vivendi*—that Bruneau aptly characterized as the “neo-Christendom” model—remains in force today. Moreover, despite frequently severe strains and tensions between Church and state, it is unlikely to be altered. No significant sector of Brazilian society advocates an end to Catholicism’s privileges. Nor is any event, comparable to the republican proclamation or its consequentially disruptive change in the Church’s status, foreseeable in the immediate future. These observations would be pointless were it not for the other striking consensus that the Church’s history could, indeed, have been different. There was, historians contend, an opportunity for Catholicism to build the Church along other, more autonomous lines. Even today, some observers suggest that opportunity knocks again. It is therefore doubly useful to reexamine the half-century of Brazil’s history and the three discrete periods into which the Church’s development seems to fit.

The first period encompasses the latter half of the Old Republic (from about the time of World War I to the Revolution of 1930). During this time, Brazilian Catholicism set about preparing to restore, to whatever degree possible, the union of Church and state.

Disestablished by the Republic of 1889, the Church found herself, for the next two and a half decades, incapable of acting satisfactorily upon the religious and institutional freedom guaranteed her by the Constitution of 1891 and for which, paradoxically, she had unsuccessfully fought in the 1870s. For reasons historians have yet to explain fully, she appears to have turned a deaf ear to one of her most enlightened thinkers and his plan to evangelize Brazil “from the bottom up.” Father Júlio Maria, himself a convert, insisted that the nation was “decatholicized” and that the clergy was in large measure responsible. In his view the priests should preach the gospel to peasant and worker and stop mollicoddling the rich and well-born. But his call to implement Leo XIII’s *Rerum Novarum*, a document clearly intended for industrializing Europe, simply had no applicability to rural Brazil—as deKadt aptly notes. There, caste-bound dependence of the *morador* upon *patrão* had but recently replaced that of slave upon master. If, indeed, social structures are an essential condition for “democratizing” the gospel, then Todaro’s insistence on the viability of Júlio Maria’s grass-roots pastoral alternative for the Brazilian Church seven decades ago may be overstated.⁸

Not so her recognition of “the political and organizational talents of the exceptional prelate,” Sebastião Leme da Silveira Cintra (1882–1942), the architect and builder of Brazil’s “neo-Christendom” Catholicism. As Archbishop of Olinda, Leme spelled out his rationale for reestablishment in a 1916 pastoral letter. Therein, he invoked the uncritical, almost mythic interpretation of the Catholic nation, so widespread in ecclesiastical and secular circles even today: Brazil, by tradition, history, and the faith of her people, was Catholic. But the Republic had nefariously brought a minority of unbelievers to power and made the great majority of the faithful voiceless in the affairs of the nation. To reverse this, it was necessary to mobilize a crusade of Catholic militants, to reeducate the nation in Catholic teachings, and ultimately secure for the Church the legal recognition of her rightful place. In contradistinction to the views of Padre Júlio Maria, Leme’s blueprint called for “re-Catholicizing” Brazil “from the top down”—in a word, a return to a privileged past, minus the impedimenta of the Empire.⁹

But the 1920s were not the past, even for Brazil. In reality, Leme both symbolized and understood the new era well. Son of a school teacher, his nomination as auxiliary bishop of Rio de Janeiro in that critical year of 1922 just as much marks the emergence of the Brazilian middle class as a political contender as do the *Semana da Arte Moderna*, the *tenente* revolt, and the foundation of the Brazilian Communist Party. Likewise, his elevation as Cardinal in 1930 both ends the predominance of the landed aristocracy within the ecclesiastical hierarchy and inaugurates the effective mobilization of the middle-class laity as a political force specifically on the Church’s behalf. Leme also symbolized and promoted the rapid “romanization” of Brazilian Catholicism. A graduate of the *Colégio Pio Latino Americano* in Rome, he indefatigably worked to make the standards of Universal (European) Catholicism operative within the Brazilian Church and among its clergy and laity.

On the ideological level, “romanization” reinforced Leme’s mythic interpretation of the Catholic nation and his commitment to reestablish the Church. True, wherever the liberal republican state had to come to power, the Holy See sought to secure constitutional freedoms and encouraged national hierarchies to make the most of them to promote the Church’s ends. But Rome clearly preferred an established Church, or as second best, a concordat between a secular state (regardless of its ideology) and the Holy See. From the time of Pius X (1903), concordats between the Papacy and the anticlerical Italian state came into force. That separation as a policy was clearly undesirable is ultimately attested to by the Concordat of 1929 between Pius XI’s Vatican City and Mussolini’s Italy.

On the ecclesiastical level, the alliance with Rome saw the number of dioceses and seminaries expand more than five-fold between 1900 and 1940, and it directly promoted vocations to the priesthood, although insufficiently: By 1946, nearly a third of Brazil's clergy was foreign. No wonder Roger Bastide branded "romanization" a process of denationalization of the Brazilian Church. In the same vein, contemporary observers decry the Brazilian Church's profound dependency on foreign resources.¹⁰

In regard to the laity, "romanization" eventually meant the creation of Catholic Action. But prior to 1930, Leme concentrated on fashioning a Catholic intelligentsia from the ranks of the upper middle class capable of countering the anticlericalism, atheism, and religious indifference of the republican elites. The Centro Dom Vital—the association of Catholic intellectuals that Leme established in Rio de Janeiro in 1922—met that need. Its early palladin, Jackson de Figueiredo, articulated a distinctly "negative" Catholic ideology—to invoke deKadt's assessment—that found inspiration chiefly in the Christian fascism of Action Française. It was, however, very much in harmony with the Brazilian government's increasingly strident calls for order during the 1920s.¹¹

It is especially Leme's response to those calls for order that reveals him as one of the most formidable political actors in recent Brazilian history, and his policies for reestablishment as a historic political undertaking. Bruneau pointedly chronicles the reciprocal overtures between a more self-confident Church and the now chronically threatened state during the administrations of Epitácio Pessoa and Arthur Bernardes. In those exchanges, both parties pledged themselves to "maintain order" and "promote *national* progress" against the emergent popular forces that frankly detested and openly threatened the old order. The refusal of the Bernardes government to consecrate this historic rapprochement with the Church, by endorsing a 1925 constitutional amendment "to give official recognition to the Catholic religion as the faith of the people," as Leme desired, may have contributed further to the Old Republic's instability and to the prelate's shrewd decision to wait on more propitious times.¹²

Moreover, success in defining Church objectives over and against the state's required Leme to galvanize the hitherto dispersed and autonomous episcopal hierarchs into a single, centralized ecclesiastical bureaucracy under his sole control. By the late 1920s, the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro was well on its way to becoming the national center of Church power. Only by the early 1930s would it finally eclipse in importance the Bahian see's canonical primacy. In truth, the historic, century-long shift of Brazil's political, economic, and institutional forces—out of the Northeast and into the center-south—could only then be called completed.

It is the era of Getúlio Vargas—from his revolutionary sally onto the national scene in October 1930 to his deposition by the armed forces fifteen years later—that neatly binds the next epoch of Brazilian Catholicism. Shortly after the opening of this period, the Church at last achieved not legal recognition, but a significant measure of quasi-official acknowledgment. By the end of the period, her new-won privileges had induced widespread institutional complacency or inadequacy in the face of the issues and tasks of postwar Brazil. This paradox notwithstanding, the decade and a half under review registers a wide variety of political experimentation whose implications are only now becoming clear.

In reviewing the stages leading up to the Church's limited "re-establishment" under Vargas, it is necessary to bear in mind that the final outcome owed much to both the "unique" historical conjuncture of the 1930s as well as to Leme's consummate political skill in acting upon that moment. The Revolution of October was in full swing when Leme, disembarking from Rome with red hat in hand, was hailed on Rio's docks by "Greeks and Trojans" alike. In that grave moment, the warring factions transformed the nation's second Cardinal into their only hope to avoid civil war. True, Leme's cautious negotiations with the generals of the new republic and the soon-to-be vanquished elders of the old, his intimate role in persuading President Washington Luís to step down peacefully, and his fearlessness in ordering the chancery doors opened wide so that he could bless the roaming bands of armed civilian revolutionaries, have all been related before with sympathy.¹³ But the meaning of these events ought to remain elusive no longer: It was the profound political vacuum generated by the Revolution of 1930 that transfigured the Church into a social force absolutely indispensable to the political process. Consequently, on the new order's "genetic" debility—from 1930 until 1937—the Church's future ultimately turned.

But throughout 1931, it was unclear just how weak the Vargas regime really was, and that uncertainty dictated Leme's next move. It was a master stroke—the mass mobilization of the clergy and faithful, first in May under the invocation of Our Lady of Aparecida, the Patroness of Brazil, then again in October under that of Christ the Redeemer, whose statue atop the Corcovado was inaugurated on Columbus Day. On that day, customarily celebrated throughout Latin America to commemorate the establishment of Iberian heritage in the New World, the inauguration under the aegis of the region's only Cardinal was instantaneously endowed with continent-wide transcendence.

Few who have dealt at length with these events adequately penetrated their political significance, so clear to Leme's official biographer: "The mass mobilization of Catholics in the capital of the Republic, at such

a critical moment, amounted to a demonstration of moral force before the civilian authorities [who were] *still vacillating between diverse factions*.¹⁴ Aparecida, whom the Pope had only a year before proclaimed National Patroness, does not rank with Lourdes or Fatima in political force. But neither did Leme publicly invoke her protection in outright opposition to republicanism as had the bishops of France and Portugal; rather, with restraint, he put the still feeble "New Republic" on notice that the Church would exercise its influence "in the name of the immense Catholic majority of the Nation."¹⁵

Corcovado, in turn, was the occasion for Leme, surrounded by fifty archbishops, bishops, and milling throngs, to "set the price" for the Church's support. In an address that most authoritarian regimes would have certainly censured as "subversive," Leme boldly admonished: "Either the state . . . will recognize the God of the people or the people will not recognize the state." This liturgy clearly was not at all apolitical, as Getúlio Vargas readily understood and later implicitly acknowledged.¹⁶

After Corcovado, it was simply a matter of time before Vargas recognized the "God of the people." The bargain for which Leme had labored so long was written into the Constitution of 1934. That document is prefaced with the phrase, "putting our confidence in God." Although this lacked the fullness of an explicit consecration of the nation to the Catholic faith—as Leme wanted—and although separation of Church and state was constitutionally maintained, the following three concessions would go far towards achieving in practice the union of nation and faith: First, religious marriage was fully recognized by civil law and divorce was prohibited; second, religious education was allowed in public schools during school hours; third, the state was permitted to finance the Church's schools, seminaries, even hospitals, and any other related activities and institutions legally designated as "in the collective interest."¹⁷

From a sociological standpoint, the concessions were tantamount to the perpetual maintenance of Catholicism as a total religious system. They embraced, respectively, the ideological definition of society's primary unit, the family; a permanent mechanism for the socialization of new members and a permanent base for recruitment of new cadres, the school system; and last, the guaranteed allocation of scarce national resources to, technically speaking, an economically nonproductive sector of Brazilian society. Some of the consequences of these privileges, not immediately visible in the halcyon days of the New Republic, will be reviewed elsewhere.

Understandably, the package deal was not easily come by. Between the challenge at Corcovado and the new constitution of 1934, Leme had to play out in public a political drama whose conclusion he could not entirely

determine. To that end, he set in motion, on a nation-wide basis, one or more of the myriad organizations of the Catholic laity that for a decade he had been structuring and adjusting solely within the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro. LEC, the Liga Eleitoral Católica (the Catholic Electoral League) was established in 1932 to mobilize the Catholic electorate and endorse only those candidates (to the Constitutional Assembly of 1933 and the National Congress of 1934) sympathetic to the hierarchy's minimal program (originally drawn up and circulated in pamphlet form in April 1931 and later submitted formally by the hierarchy to Vargas that memorable October). LEC continued its electoral work into the 1940s and 1950s, but by then its vitality was on the wane.

Brazilian Catholic Action (*Ação Católica Brasileira*—ACB), the successor to various and sundry similarly titled structures, came into existence in 1935 and within two years superceded all other lay movements. The ACB, modelled closely on its Italian-Church counterpart, was defined by the Popes themselves as “an organization of laymen participating in the hierarchical apostolate of the Church, outside of any political affiliation in order to establish the universal reign of Jesus Christ.” (ACB would have to await the early 1960s before bearing fruit—to some, bitter). The last organization is the *Círculos Operários*, or Workers' Circles. Organized in 1932, a year after the promulgation of Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno*, it was not until the establishment of the *Estado Novo* that it became national and momentarily flourished.

The details of these structures and their history, and those of other Church organizations dealing with education, social work, family life, liturgy, and spirituality, are found in most of the sources already cited.¹⁸ It is more important here to spell out the features that these institutions shared as well as their significance for the sociological transformation of the Brazilian Church in this era.

The prototypes of almost all these associations were first fashioned in Western Europe. They aimed at recruiting and mobilizing the Catholic laity who, when seen from another more critical optic, were one and the same with the middle and upper strata of the newly industrializing nations. This bid of the episcopal hierarchies for lay support, in Italy at the turn of the century and in Brazil shortly after World War I, implicitly recognized the willingness and necessity of Catholicism to challenge the bourgeois state on the terms that it, rather than the Church, now dictated. In effect, the electoral systems of the era, no matter how restrictive the franchise, had once and for all numerically neutralized the Church's aristocratic, landowning allies; succeeded indefinitely in excluding the emergent working class from power; and, above all, endowed the growing middle stratum with a measure of political leverage.

Consequently, the Catholic laity *qua* citizenry now possessed in the vote a singly important instrument to influence the decisions of state; it became the fulcrum on which many of the Church's privileges—ultimately accorded by the state and public purse—now turned. It is in this context, then, that Catholic Action—and to a lesser extent its short-lived and still unstudied precursor in Brazil, the Catholic Congresses—must be seen as the historic mode by which Catholicism reinserted itself at a given moment into those modern societies whose organizational axes were variants of democracy and capitalism, and whose sociological axes pitted the middle stratum against aristocrats and workers.¹⁹

Understandably then, the true mission of the laity—the Catholic sector of that middle stratum—was to serve the institution of the Church. To that end, it can be said that the hierarchy “invented” the “lay apostolate,” essentially a theological justification for lay political action that contended that the nonordained shared in a “priesthood in the world.” But, unlike the autonomous participation of the believer within Congregationalism, the Catholic layman remained subject to the episcopacy. To the degree the layman imbibed the distinctive mystique of Catholic Action—modelled, as Alves noted, on its significantly authoritarian Italian counterpart—his “clericalization” and obedience to the hierarchy were ensured.

Inside these organizations a model of episcopal “interventionism” took firm root: Leaders were chosen from above, decisions were made with little respect to the democratic process, structures were coterminous with the Church's territorial jurisdictions (that often paralleled the configurations of the state's power), while clergymen appointed directly by their bishops presided as “advisors” at every level of lay activity. Indeed, the world of Catholic Action almost anywhere in the world in this era reflected the elitist, hierarchical, and corporatist nature of the Church (often isolated in spirit and more often in practice from the very course of modern times) that Catholic Action had sought to direct into a victory for Christ—and for His Church.²⁰

Examining the Brazilian structures under Leme from yet another perspective, it is obvious that the concept of *lobby* rather than *political party* best describes the *modus operandi* of LEC, ACB, and other Church-related organizations. Widely cited as the reason for this tactical choice was Leme's steadfast refusal to recreate a Brazilian Catholic party so as not to divide the “faithful.” But the Cardinal himself was more explicit, indeed more “political.” With a Catholic party, he pondered on one occasion, “we would lose the *certain support* of many, we would lose the *probable support* of others, and what would we gain . . . just what?”²¹ It might be said that Leme's reasoning reflected an acute awareness of

sharp regional differences within Brazil that even today put into question the efficacy of supposedly *national* political party structures. Perhaps Leme had also contemplated the divisiveness certain to derive from the personality clashes so typical of Brazilian clientele politics.

But Leme's maxim to post allies in every camp, to favor the modus operandi of lobby over party, has, in my opinion, a dual origin. The more removed is the experience of the Holy See—to whom Leme was extraordinarily devoted and obedient in a political sense—with the evolving Italian State. LEC of 1932 bears a strong resemblance to Pius X's 1905 creation of the papacy-controlled *Unione Elettorale Cattolica*. Similarly, Brazilian Catholic Action of 1935 may have been implanted for the same reason Pius XI chose *Azione Cattolica* over the incipient Christian Democratic Party of Don Luigi Sturzo, then called the *Partito Popolare Italiano*: Namely, the hierarchy could better control an entity under its own jurisdiction than one under that of civilians (whose social platform in Sturzo's case was already too progressive to suit the papacy). Moreover, in the face of fascism's extraordinary rise to power in Italy, the Holy See seems to have reasoned that political parties would be more easily crushed than church-related structures, while in the long run the perennial threat of Bolshevism and the stark specter of Nazism made Il Duce's doctrines and terms somehow more tolerable.²² (Unfortunately, the preceding analysis of the relationship of Catholic organizations to social class, to the transnational structure of Catholicism, and to the international situation of the interwar decades, can go no further for the moment, since few current studies even raise these fundamental issues that, in my opinion, merit further study.)

There is, moreover, a second and more proximate origin to Leme's "lobbyism." Brazilian political uncertainties and a chronically challenged presidency were the hallmark of Vargas's early years: The defiance of the Church in 1931, the São Paulo revolt in 1932, the Constitutional Assembly in 1933, the depression in 1934, the "Bolshevik" putsch in 1935—must not be forgotten. Thus, Leme's order of priorities seems to have been first to exact privileges for the Church in exchange for her endorsement of the regime, then to cover his bets with *all* the political parties (none of which was yet especially strong), and finally to reserve public judgment on Brazil's own fascist movement, *Ação Integralista Brasileira* (AIB). After all, until Vargas finally suppressed the last vestiges of AIB in 1938, the Integralist movement—with the successes of its counterparts in Western Europe—appeared a serious contender for power and, not surprisingly, the endorsement of the Church.

What ties did Brazilian Catholicism have at the grass roots to indigenous fascism? Bruneau points to the sympathy Catholics reserved for

Integralism's affirmation of such Catholic values as "God, Fatherland, and Family" and its virulent opposition to Communism. Todaro offers extensive evidence of direct Catholic participation within AIB's ranks; her roster of prominent militants includes clergymen and laymen alike. Yet, as Héglio Trindade underscores in his path-breaking study of Integralism, the relations between Catholicism and Brazilian fascism were "extremely complex" and thus require genuinely meticulous examination. So too, the formative role of Integralism on some notable contemporary Brazilian leaders.

While the relationship between fascism and Catholicism—so critical in Mussolini's Italy and the Third Reich—was short-circuited in Brazil by Vargas's 1937 coup and repression of the Integralists in 1938, the experience of the *Estado Novo* between 1937 and 1945 occasions interesting speculation about the Church's ties to an endemically authoritarian regime. In the present state of research, only the roughest sketch is possible: Once the Integralist movement went to its defeat, the Church staunchly supported the *Estado Novo* and retained her earlier prerogatives (as well as acquired new ones), even though the Constitution of 1937 made no mention of them whatsoever. It has been suggested that the personal friendship between Vargas and Leme proved to be the real basis of institutional reconciliation; but this appears overdrawn.

In contrast, there is greater substance to the opinion that during the *Estado Novo*, Church and state drew closer due to a shared odium towards Communism. Vargas's summary repression of the Communist Party in 1935 was later matched by his encouragement of Church activism within the trade union arena. There, the Ministry of Labor and the *Círculos Operários* pledged vigilance against communist infiltration and enjoyed uncommon monopoly over workers' mobilization. In the long run, however, Catholic efforts in this only sector of society, where modern Church structures penetrated decidedly beyond the middle strata, proved unsuccessful. Despite the *Círculos'* unprecedented growth and prosperity under Vargas, the latter's fall from power in 1945 spelled meteoric decline for Catholic trade unionism, from which one observer believes it is unlikely ever to recover.²³

On this note, two final observations are in order. First, the abrupt collapse of the *Círculos* was symptomatic of an overall decline in the vitality of other Catholic institutions, such as LEC and Catholic Action. Had Vargas's benefactions to the Church robbed her militants of their crusading fervor? Had the Church's growing dependence on state finances contributed in the long run to the atrophy of lay movements? Whatever the cause, most lay structures established in the combative years between 1922 and 1935 had grown markedly less dynamic by 1945.

Second, only the Catholic educational enterprise seemed to escape the afflictions that befell the institutions reviewed above. The wealthy and would-be wealthy enthusiastically supported the Church-related secondary schools, while in the public sector—thanks to Vargas—the Church made the most of new constitutional provisions, granting her access to the classroom to carry on religious instruction and proselytization. The wisdom of allocating her own scarce manpower and finances for the benefit of the few had not yet come into question. Indeed, only after the Allied victory in Europe had irreversibly set in motion a return to democracy in Brazil, was it possible to begin to assess the balance of the Leme episcopacy.

The two decades at midcentury, from 1945 to approximately 1964, encompass the third and last period of this historical review. If the first Vargas era, that we have just examined, is best summed up in Brazilian Church history as “the triumph of Catholicism’s *de facto* reestablishment,” then the period now under consideration might well be characterized as “the Church’s struggle to maintain the *de facto* union in an era of global change.”

Global change, in the sense Bruneau employs it, applies to a wide variety of transformations that occurred rapidly and dramatically within Brazilian society after 1945: The definitive transition towards an industrial order, the irreversible primacy of urban over rural life and politics, and the proliferation of universities and political parties, as well as of scientific and ideological values that put in question the *raison d’être* of “archaic Brazil.” For Octávio Ianni, one of the most critical alterations of the period is the emergence of a complex class structure, the ensuing challenge by the working and middle strata of the nation’s traditional political elites, and the latter’s recourse to authoritarian, military, and international resources to retain power. Bruneau’s qualifications of this process as a “socio-political threat of the modern world to the Church and its influence” makes greater sense, however, within Ianni’s larger perception. For Ianni, the period marks “the crisis of Brazilian society”: Flowing from it and situated within it, there is the crisis of Brazilian Catholicism.²⁴

Admittedly the canvas is large and sights must be set selectively. Moreover, my reading of the period suggests that Brazilian Catholicism underwent not one, but two crises during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The first was the erosion of Brazilian Catholicism’s religious monopoly; the second was the decade-long collapse (between 1942 and 1952) of church leadership in terms of both personnel and organizations. The erosion of Catholicism’s religious monopoly signifies here the loss of both cadres and membership. In this century, this attrition has accelerated

dramatically, especially since the 1940s, and efforts to halt it have been unsuccessful. In turn, the Church's coercive powers, derivative in part from its spiritual monopoly, have been further shriven.

It might be argued that strong challenges from the modern state (under Pombal, Feijó, Pedro II, and the founders of the Old Republic) contributed to the current situation, but it must be remembered that the Catholic "monopoly" was weakly implanted from the dawn of colonial rule. Furthermore, the long-term consequences of policies and class relations that the Church adopted or condoned as a coagent of Portuguese conquest and colonialism visibly endured well after Brazil became independent. Below, I examine that legacy in regard to the three critical dimensions of erosion, namely: The priesthood, lay religiosity, and alternative credos.

The Priesthood

The key to Catholicism's existence is the priesthood. It opens out upon a myriad of powerful institutional roles, such as cultic leader, symbol of Church power and influence, bureaucratic agent, intermediary between clients and authority, ideologue, proselytizer, to name the most essential. The maintenance of the priesthood is critical to the hierarchical survival of the Church itself; vocations is the term applied to the recruitment and replenishment of priests.

Historically, the priesthood in Brazil was never especially strong. Ever since Europe's expansion, the classic policy of Catholicism towards non-Western colonial peoples remained, until recently, one of systematic opposition to forming a native clergy. Racial differences, reinforced by the division of labor (in Brazil's case, slavery), reasonably account for the exclusion policy's survival long after colonies became independent. In Brazil, moreover, educational facilities under the Empire were few and personnel inadequate, while the steady trickle of European missionaries proved numerically sufficient for an agrarian order.

Under the Old Republic, the number of seminaries doubled; but, thanks to the highly regarded teaching reputation of the presiding, almost entirely European-staffed congregations such as the Lazarists, Capuchins, and Benedictines (and the government's neglect of public education), seminaries for would-be priests were tantamount to secular academies for upwardly mobile *bacharéis*. Some evidence also exists that, at the turn of the century, European seminary prefects may not have thought their Brazilian candidates for the priesthood sufficiently worthy of ordination.

In more recent times, class as a factor in vocations has been more widely recognized and understood. Thus, it comes as no surprise that

most Brazilian priests had usually hailed from rural and urban upper middle-class families where parents could afford the tuition and living expenses of seminary education (that, in effect, has never been gratis). Yet, as long as the social status of the priesthood remained high, it competed reasonably well with other possible occupations open to the same social strata.

The advance of industrial society in Brazil (and of "postindustrial" society in Western Europe and America) is quickly altering this picture. Increasingly, public education at low cost is more readily available, while new career alternatives make the priesthood less attractive. Reportedly, the number of candidates in Brazil is in sharp, perilous decline and the priesthood remains appealing primarily to rural men from large families, who today comprise more than 50 percent of the Brazilian clergy.

In the past decade, thanks to church-sponsored research, it has become easier to translate the priestly dilemma into statistics. Today there are, for Brazil's 100 million inhabitants, about 12,500 priests, nearly half of whom are foreigners (in 1946, only a third were foreigners). A typical Brazilian priest's parish is about eight times larger than an American's or West German's, and twelve times larger than a Spaniard's. The current manpower shortage of twenty thousand clerics can be filled neither by the eighty-six ordinations per annum nor by the importation of foreign priests whose numbers are also declining. Meanwhile, the only statistic on the increase is the average age of the average priest. This endangered species, in Ivan Illich's words, is the "Vanishing Clergyman"; and the endangered institution, the priest-centric Catholic Church.²⁵

Was this particular legacy of colonialism visible sooner? The answer to this question reveals much about the changing ties of Brazilian Catholicism to the Universal Church during the last century. It was in that context that the first serious effort to cope with the priest problem arose. At the initiative of Latin American hierarchies, the Holy See consented to establishing a seminary in Rome for the training of the region's clergy. Founded in 1858, the Colégio Pio Latino Americano stood as testimony to the quest for equality of Latin America's young, postindependence churches with the ancient seats of European Christendom. At the same time, the Pio Latino, as it was called, provided the only outstanding priestly education for a continent still very much inadequately served in this respect. But the most important achievement seems to have been entirely inadvertent: By the early twentieth century, the Pio Latino had become a major source of cadres from which Rome selected many of the region's hierarchs, including cardinals, among them the Archbishop of Olinda and Recife, Dom Sebastião Cardinal Leme. If, then, a certain commonality pervaded the Brazilian episcopal enterprise, or too great a

conformity to Universal Church policy, the Pio Latino, rather than “Brazilian national character,” might be judged the decisive factor.

After the 1930s, it appears Brazilian hierarchs were more often recruited from the ranks of the graduates of the Colégio Pio Brasileiro, a Roman offshoot of its brother institution founded by Dom Leme in 1929. Seminarians chosen to study in the Pio Brasileiro knew that they were headed for a career within the Church’s highest levels of leadership. In this sense, Rome eclipsed the century-long function of the seminaries of Marianna (Minas Gerais) and Itú (São Paulo). In another sense, an understanding of the current leadership of the Brazilian Church is impossible unless the regional and ideological divisions present in the Pio Brasileiro during the 1940s and 1950s are kept in mind.

In recent times, the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) has played a similarly important role in training the Latin American church’s priest-social scientists. As a consequence, if *developmentalism* tended to characterize the Brazilian hierarchy’s view of society throughout the 1960s, the lessons of Louvain as well as Brazilian reality must have been proportionately operative.

Allowing for their utterly different finality, one of the important institutional analogues is the network of United States military training schools. As Alfred Stepan shows in his illuminating study of the military in politics, “about one-third of the Brazilian army line generals on active duty in January of 1964 had received some U.S. schooling.” The role of external forces and bureaucracies upon national institutions is one of the most significant analytic relationships for the study of the Catholic Church.²⁶

The second effort to cope with the priest problem came about the turn of the century in relationship to the massive immigration of Italians and Germans to Brazil. In the countryside, landowners badly exploited their new laborers, while the government feared that aliens in the capital cities were anarcho-syndicalists, “reds,” and agitators. Simultaneously, in Northern Italy and Germany, for reasons too complex to discuss here, the Church harvested unparalleled numbers of vocations—even new orders such as the Salesian and Scalabrini Fathers were founded—that specifically came to the spiritual aid of their benighted and beleaguered emigrant countrymen.

Consequently, the influx of foreign clergy to Brazil at that moment corresponded less to the needs of the far more neglected native worker and peasant than to the dual demands of pacification of and ministrations to conationals. In time, the immigrant Church of the Italians and Germans would be integrated into an existing Brazilian structure. As vocations grew, the descendants of immigrants readily began to occupy an

unusually high percentage of top ecclesiastical posts. Within the Church, "fazer América" became a reality, while the upwardly mobile experience of countless immigrants' sons was taken as an article of middle class faith. Indeed, if an analysis were made of Brazilian Catholicism's ethnic and class origins, it would most probably reveal the recent European immigrant past to be the primary strength of the Brazilian Church today.

The third and major effort began in the 1940s. American "padres," excluded from the Asian "mission fields" by World War II, took advantage of the Good Neighbor Policy to size up Latin America. Each trip southward reflected the region's increasing integration into the U.S. sphere of influence. Each new inspection underscored the growing proprietary interests America's minority Catholics were taking in Latin American Catholic life, and their unconcealed fear that Protestant conationals were not only winning converts en masse but also formulating the official inter-American policy of the U.S. government.

Moreover, when American priests "took in" the historical faith of Latin America from their typically practical, democratic, American perspective, their self-assurance was severely tested. What they saw was a rigidly class-structured Church composed of a privileged, uncommitted laity and a mass of impoverished, superstitious "demi-men." Neither, they believed, could resist the onslaught of rival ideologies. What they perceived, according to one experienced Jesuit, was "disaster written in the skies."²⁷

For the padres, the most imminent menaces were "U.S.-financed Protestant proselytism" and "Soviet-inspired labor union agitation." New structures had to be built to put a halt to those threats; but "at the bottom of all [the region's problems was] . . . the problem of vocations."²⁸ Their solutions to the latter ranged from training Mexican seminarians en masse in Texas to launching a "call for forty thousand" missionaries to descend immediately upon Latin America to shore up Peter's sinking barque.

There was no lunacy in the American proposal, only the reflection of a changing world order. By 1946, nearly 40 percent of American Catholic missionary priests and over 50 percent of the male and female religious in Latin America were already strategically situated in the three most active Protestant missions: Puerto Rico, Brazil, and Cuba. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, additional personnel became available as first China and then Europe's former colonies in Africa and Asia either prohibited or restricted the Western missionary effort. Thus, in 1960, Fr. John Considine, the very same Maryknoll missionary who had issued the "call for forty thousand" fifteen years earlier, embarked on the most massive inter-American Catholic effort in history. At the request of Pope John XXIII, Considine took command of a nation-wide effort to mobilize and dispatch within a

decade some twenty thousand North American missionaries to Latin America.²⁹


From that point on, American Catholicism—enriched by the prosperity of the 1950s and buoyantly confident after the presidential victory of John Kennedy—played an increasingly important role. Along with West German Catholicism, it became a major source of Vatican financing of the Latin American Church, a mainstay of welfare programs of the Latin American episcopacy, and a chief educator of the children of the elite. By 1966, however, barely seventeen hundred Americans—and this figure includes nuns and brothers as well as priests—had responded to Pope John's appeal. As the idea of a "Catholic crisis" took root immediately after Vatican Council II, and as American (and European) vocations began to diminish, the last hope of resolving the "priest-problem south of the border" had come full circle to crashing despair.³⁰

Lay Religiosity

Lay religiosity refers to the spiritual life of the layman or the client of the priest and his Church. The Lay Apostolate, a form of spirituality specific to the middle strata to which we referred earlier, was the proper domain of select militants rather than the ordinary parishioner. For the latter, religiosity or spirituality was developed almost exclusively through a wide variety of official rituals and popular devotions, the most essential of which have always been the obligatory observance of the Sabbath sacrifice and the frequent reception of Holy Communion. So central are these rites to Catholic spirituality that modern pastoral sociologists have fashioned them into the decisive measurements of the "practicing Catholic."³¹

On these measurements, Catholicism in Brazil is dramatically different from the official census' portrayal of nearly all Brazilians as Catholics. Participation at Sunday mass in the great cities thick with priests, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, hovers between 3 and 8 percent of the Catholic population. In these cities the ratio of priests to parishioners is one to seventeen thousand; in the rural areas the ratio is considerably lower. For example, in a satellite town outside Brasilia, there are only two churches to 66,000 inhabitants, over 90 percent of whom are considered Catholics by the census. If Sunday mass attendance is a valid measurement, then there are at best some three to eight million Catholics in Brazil and not the touted ninety-three.

But what of the time-honored "faith of the people," or what anthropologists more aptly identify as folk Catholicism (from which I specifically *exclude* pronouncedly African syncretic variants, to be discussed below)? The highly orthodox but popular religious syndrome associated



with Northeasterners' devotion to Padre Cícero offers, in my opinion, a model of folk Catholicism whose essence is ambiguity to the clerical authority of the Church. This ambiguity is not derived from the enlightenment- and laboring class-roots of modern European anticlericalism, but rather from the perception of the rural priest by rural workers as the synthesis of civil-religious authority, who is simultaneously oppressor and liberator of the exploited.

Joaseiro also testifies to the clarity of vision and understanding of Church authorities regarding the inherent potential of exploited men to both rebellion and docility. In the case of Joaseiro, the ecclesiastical authorities systematically worked from the late 1890s until less than a decade ago to contain and condemn the "miracle-worker's" devotees. Naturally enough they did so in the name of orthodoxy, but also in full awareness of the Church's time-honored mission to preserve order and prevent violence among the labor force of the rural Northeast.

Folk Catholicism—which infuses unlettered men now with "superstition," resignation, now with unparalleled courage—therefore is not simply the sum product of the reputed inadequacy of priestly ministrations over centuries. Rather it reflects the functional imperatives of social class. True, the Church has, until recently, obstinately denied the reality of social class and class tensions in the name of the Pauline principle of the universal applicability of the gospel to all men and of the harmony that ought govern them.³² But it is undeniable that the Church's own institutional viability within the Brazilian rural environment continues to reside in large measure in the dependence of the lower-class folk Catholics upon their middle-class clerical patrons, mirroring the essential patron-client system of rural Brazil.³³

Within the Northeast, there is *apparently* little attrition in the clientele control exercised by the Church over the millions of folk Catholics. But, wherever economic transformation occurs, folk Catholics not only abandon the Church but also embrace a variety of other credos. While the Northeast remains economically sluggish, the Center-South continues feverishly industrializing from the Atlantic Ocean to the banks of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers. Industry's voracious need for manpower has generated the transplantation en masse of the Northeast's labor force southward. In the new environment, they are clients no more, they are free at last—to embrace new beliefs.

Alternative Credos: Pentecostalism and Marxism

As the American padres noted in 1945, "Protestantism is increasing everywhere throughout Latin America" and nowhere faster than in Bra-

zil. But it was not the so-called "Judas dollars" of American Protestants, nor their "soup lines," nor their superior educational institutions that won converts to the "Reform," but rather a series of complicated socio-economic forces so persuasively illuminated by the studies of Emilio Willems.

Willems points out that middle-class Protestantism of the "main line," U.S. mission-sponsored denominations is not at all growing. Instead it is Pentecostalism, autonomous communities in which believers directly experience "God in them." No longer institutionally or financially tied to missionaries, Brazilian Pentecostal congregations enjoy the fullness of independence and an astonishingly accelerating rate of growth. Willems observes astutely that

the assumption that the diffusion of Protestantism has been roughly parallel to the processes of industrialization and urbanization, and that the largest concentrations of proselytically minded Protestants [i.e., Pentecostals] are found in areas where these processes have been most intensive, is supported by figures concerning the growth of the industrial labor force and its distribution within Brazil.³⁴

But in addition to the urbanization-industrialization factor, two others also seem to explain Pentecostalism's success. The more obvious is that the original "folk Catholic" religion of the migrant doubtlessly facilitates his readiness to accept the new faith's Christ-centered message. The less obvious is the role of contradiction in conversion. Pentecostalism presents itself as a root contradiction of Catholicism: Where the latter is priest-centric, the former is lay-centered; celibate and marital; hierarchical and communitarian; gradated and egalitarian. From this, it appears that individual conversion approximates the experiential enactment of a very important pedagogical principle articulated by Paulo Freire: Contradiction is the praxis of liberation.³⁵ Even more interesting is that among illiterate, impoverished migrants from the Northeast, this process occurs "spontaneously," unaided (and unimpeded) by bosses, bureaucrats, or intellectuals.

One last inquiry is in order: Does the Pentecostal praxis of liberation lead to political action, and if so, what kind? The answer is conditional. In pre-1964 Brazil, Pentecostals seemed to be taking an increasing part in the big-time, middle-of-the-road, urban politics of the day. Certain leaders rounded up the vote for a "favorite son" in exchange for the politician's favors, a perfectly reasonable pattern for a "conversion experience" religion whose involuntary function is the "reintegration" of the convert within a new work environment. (The pattern, incidentally, is comparable to what the late Thomas O'Dea found to prevail in New York's "store-front" Pentecostal churches, among rural Puerto Rican farmhands who came to

work in the city's factories and service industries.) Whether the "conversion experience" could lead to labor militancy or class-oriented politics remains to be seen. Conditions more fluid than those generally prevailing in the Brazilian industrial sector today would need to obtain. In sum, the political direction of Brazilian Pentecostalism more strongly resembles that of the British working class in the mid-nineteenth century than that of the continental European working class from 1850 on. Whether in Brazil the former will serve as an initial stage to the latter in a uniquely continuous process, only time will tell.

Pentecostalism, which accounts for about 75 percent of Brazil's approximately eight million Protestants, also shares other vital statistics with fast-growing syncretic religious groupings, like Umbanda and other Afro-Brazilian cults, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to note that Umbanda services are on the upswing in almost all Brazil's major urban centers and may now be frequented by as many as 30 percent of all Brazilians. To the dismay of the Roman Catholic clergy, practitioners of these syncretic liturgies continue to identify themselves as Catholics.³⁶

More noteworthy is that the future growth of these alternative credos seems assured over the long run by two powerful institutional commitments: The Brazilian state's constitutional obligations to enforce religious toleration, and the Holy See's postconciliar pledge to advance the cause of ecumenism. The former is part of the nation's republican heritage and the sine qua non of the cultural pluralism inherent in the modern industrial order of the West. The latter is the product of the peace finally established among the diverse Christian churches of Western European origin in the aftermath both of postwar decolonization of the Third World and of the pronounced secularization of Western Europe since the economic boom of the late 1950s.

Applied to Latin America, the doctrine of ecumenism, enunciated by Vatican II, called a totally unexpected halt to theretofore active Catholic opposition to Protestant missionary activity. Consequently, ecumenism denies legitimacy both to Leme's "myth of the Catholic nation" and to the unchallenged convention derived from that myth by which the Catholic hierarchy speaks "on behalf of the nation." Evidence begins to suggest that on a typical Sunday morning in São Paulo, there are more Pentacostals at prayer than there are Catholics at mass, that there are as many Pentacostals in Brazil as there are practising Roman Catholics. Ecumenism signals the further erosion of Catholicism's religious monopoly.

Marxism, in its socialist and communist variants, may be considered another source of erosion. Since the turn of the century, the Roman pontiffs repeatedly declared the "atheist" doctrine anathema. By the end of World

War I, it ranked with the secular world and the liberal state as Christendom's greatest nemeses. It seemed satanic that, to its fulfillment, countless millions willingly committed their lives and their treasures. Historically, Marxism in Brazil emerged among immigrant European workers and later among middle-class Brazilian intellectuals. For decades, adherents kept to themselves with little real impact on the society. With the creation of the Brazilian Communist party in 1921, the doctrine and the dream became institutionalized; but its new visibility met with hostility from the state.³⁷

Vargas's repression of the Communist party in 1935 paradoxically aided its perennial leader, Luís Carlos Prestes, and his fellow party candidates to win resounding mandates in the 1945 elections. Ironically, their victory brought upon them the banishment from legality the following year. Then, as Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia in 1948, forces opposing Marxism everywhere gathered strength: Under the leadership of the U.S., and with the support of the Roman Catholic Church, the crusade against communism—also called the Cold War—was launched.

In Brazil, clandestinity cloaked the party in a mantle of heroism and popularity even if its membership was never excessively numerous. Its leaders and cadres were extremely dedicated and, despite their theoretical subservience to Moscow, were in their aspirations extremely nationalistic. They were only somewhat successful in organizing the Brazilian industrial worker, whose quiescence was partly owed to and maintained by the superior resources and strategies of the Partido Trabalhista do Brasil and the paternalistic policies of the Ministry of Labor. It was among intellectuals, especially university students, that not only the party but also the entire corpus of Marxist doctrines began to take root.

In this regard, the crucible of middle class youth activities was the Brazilian National Union of Students (União Nacional de Estudantes—UNE). During the late 1940s, it championed the opposition to Vargas and in the 1950s proved the advance theatre of the growing rift between liberals and Marxists throughout Brazil. It is a poignant testimony to the Church's loss of influence over middle-class youth, to remember that in 1950, about 75 percent of Brazil's high school graduates had studied in private Catholic schools.³⁸ Even these educational privileges, remnants of the Estado Nôvo's favoritism, the entrenched Church had apparently turned against itself.

The priesthood, lay religiosity, and the growth of alternative creeds constituted the internal religious crisis for Catholicism at the end of the Vargas era. As its dimensions gradually dawned upon the hierarchy, the second and equally multifaceted crisis became self-evident: There were neither leaders nor structures capable of maintaining and even expanding the Church's monopoly over Brazil's religious life.

The collapse of leadership was concrete enough. Dom Jaime de Barros Câmara, a noted professor of Church history and a man of uncommon humility, inadequately filled the vacancy opened by Leme's death in 1942. Neither in native intellect nor in political instinct did he measure up to his admittedly extraordinary predecessor. In ideological outlook, he was radically more conservative (which, paradoxically, did not prevent him from naming notably progressive junior clerics as auxiliary bishops of the archdiocese). It was as the Cardinal Archbishop of the nation's political capital that his leadership left most to be desired. In time, even the powerful movement that Leme had set in motion to centralize the hierarchy under the command of Rio's ordinary broke down; ecclesiastical power, as was customary, flowed back again to individual dioceses and their occupants.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, this shift indeed gave rise to much experimentation and the emergence of several talented bishops. Dom Eugenio Sales's efforts among Northeastern peasants received international attention and later became the springboard for the Brazilian church's mobilization of rural workers. The stature of a Dom Vicente Scherer of Porto Alegre or a Dom Carlos Vasconcellos Mota of São Paulo went far in affirming the Church's vitality and presence around the nation. But no amount of "good press" could conceal the profound decentralization of Brazilian Catholicism at the very moment when the nation's political system was steadily taking the path of marked centralization.

Contemporary to the collapse of leadership was that of lay structures originating, to some extent, well before Dom Leme expired. On his deathbed he is reported to have wept inconsolably over the near total demise into which Brazilian Catholic Action had fallen. The *Círculos Operários* all but vanished upon the overthrow of its benefactor, Getúlio Vargas. Only the LEC continued to mobilize the Catholic vote, but its activities were forever on an ad hoc basis and thoroughly subordinated to the control of Dom Jaime.

The Centro Dom Vital, Brazilian Catholicism's chief intellectual center until the establishment of the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro in 1941, was no more promising. True, Jackson de Figueiredo's brilliant successor, Alceu Amoroso Lima (also known under the pen name, Tristão de Athayde), had veered definitively away from fascism after 1937 to embrace and advocate the democratic centrism of Jacques Maritain's *humanisme integrale*. True, Alceu also possessed far greater openness to a world in flux than did many of his contemporaries. Undoubtedly too, he was the obvious choice to lead a new intellectual movement. But deKadt's judgment rings true: The Centro Dom Vital "never actually became the

focus from which a specific ideology spread, never became the pivot of a social movement *engagé* in society. Its links with the diocese of Rio, since 1943 directed by Cardinal D. Jaime Câmara, a very conservative prelate, made that impossible."³⁹

It now appears that two distinct efforts were undertaken to shore up this crisis in men and structures. Both took place about 1947, a year after the new constitution perfunctorily reconfirmed the privileges earlier accorded by Vargas, even though the exuberant spirit of postwar democracy intimated that the new Brazil would likely suffer the Church less willingly than had the *Estado Novo*. Neither effort enjoyed overwhelming support from any sector of the hierarchy; both effused a spirit of spontaneity. Indeed, each effort was a clear response to the vacuity of Dom Jaime's tenure.

The first of the two efforts, that ultimately failed, appeared destined to win the greater popular support. Under the ideological guidance of the Maritain-convert, Alceu Amoroso Lima (who in 1946 had, with Eduardo Frei, launched the continental Christian Democratic Movement for Latin America), a party bearing that name was established in Brazil in 1948.⁴⁰ From the beginning, it was linked intimately to the clergy, but with those elements that were less wed to the political bosses at the local and state levels. In fact, a Recife priest, Msgr. Arruda Câmara (no relation to Dom Jaime), presided over the fledgling phalanx during those first years.

Although the selection of Arruda, a Northeasterner, was intended to portray the party as a truly national entity (that, incidentally, no pre-1964 party had ever become in fact), the leaders came increasingly from the Center-South, especially São Paulo, where national party headquarters was resituated in 1958 and where a strong electoral base had been solidified by 1960.

Indeed, the Christian Democratic Party of Brazil (*Partido Democrata Cristão*—PDC) like its counterparts in Chile and Venezuela, swiftly marshalled many younger urban Catholics who were discontent with conservative *coronelismo*, enchanted by Maritain's vision of progress, Catholicism, and democracy, and comforted by the resounding successes and friendly overtures of Europe's foundress-parties in Italy, Germany, and France. At its best (the year was 1962), the PDC commanded 5.7 percent of the country's congressional vote, hardly impressive per se but enough to rank it the fourth strongest party in the country. Why then did it fail to become the new instrumentality by which the Church would weather the future?

Several factors stand forth: The antipathy of many bishops, the reluctance of the hierarchy to cross Leme's ghost and create a confessional "Catholic Party" (which the PDC denied it was), the need to avoid

ideological divisions among Catholics, and, lastly, the quintessential decentralization or localism of the Brazilian political system. The exact proportion of each factor remains to be determined. For the moment, it is not farfetched to suggest that the PDC's relative failure stands inversely to the extraordinary success of the alternative effort.

The initiator of the latter was the current Archbishop of Recife and Olinda, Dom Helder Câmara.⁴¹ In 1947, Câmara (no relation to either Dom Jaime or Msgr. Arruda) assumed the national chaplaincy of Brazilian Catholic Action; in 1950, he became an auxiliary bishop of Rio de Janeiro. Prior to these appointments, he had put his hand to youth work, the labor movement, and journalism in his home state of Ceará, where as a one-time advocate of Integralismo he was not above controversy. It was in the nation's capital, however, that he revealed himself to be an exceptional leader, uncommonly capable of inspiring others to extraordinary endeavors; a pacifist and champion of the poor, his ideas soon found resonance beyond Brazil's borders.

The measure of any man is difficult to take in life, but he stands with Getúlio Vargas as a consummate political leader; in comparison to Cardinals Arcverde and Leme, compleat hierarchs, he ranks among Brazil's greatest religious leaders in the last hundred years. Of course his own career was not at all at issue in 1947 when he and the *mineiro* lawyer and Catholic Action associate, Vieira Coelho, spoke for the first time about building a totally new ark by which the Church might sail the seas of modern times.⁴²

The blueprint was drawn up on the slate of the Church's weaknesses in the hopes of rewriting its future. To that end, the as yet unnamed structure that Helder formally proposed in 1950 to Msgr. Carlo Chiari, the papal nuncio, was designed to meet three "administrative" tasks: Rework the lines of communication between the country's bishops; help them overcome individual inadequacies in administering their dioceses; and provide a minimum of unity to the daily administration and undertakings of the Church. Msgr. Giovanni Batista Montini, the nuncio's aide and the future Pope Paul VI, promised to create the "bishops' conference." A year later, Helder went again to Rome, but only in 1952 did the Holy See deign that the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (Conferência Nacional de Bispos Brasileiros—CNBB) see the light of day.⁴³

The surface simplicity of the conference's scope ought not becloud the unparalleled significance of the Vatican decision. Nowhere in canon law (compiled in 1908) and Roman practice had there been any precedent for creating a *permanent* structure of the likes of the CNBB and its secretariat. Moreover, in no country of Latin America had the Vatican chosen, until then, to play such a direct role in the internal affairs of a "national"

Church and of an autonomous and independent nation (the only other recent case is Cuba under Fidel Castro). Undoubtedly, the erosion of Catholicism's religious monopoly in the "largest" Catholic country of the world appears to have been central to this momentous policy decision.

Within two years of the CNBB's creation, the Holy See dispatched one of its most astute diplomats to Brazil, Dom Armando Lombardi. For over a decade (1954-64) the new nuncio's role was so fundamental to the policies, orientations and sustained unity of both the CNBB and of its secretariat, over which Helder himself took charge—and so essential to the arguments I shall develop later—that I quote *in extenso* the following authoritative assessment of Lombardi drawn up by Bruneau from extensive interviews with bishops, clergy, and laymen throughout Brazil:⁴⁴

While most of my informants on the relationships between Rome and the Brazilian Church were critical of the Roman Curia, the Secretariat of State and the "Roman way" of the Universal Church, they were all very much impressed by Dom Armando. They noted that he was intelligent, active, aware of the problems and responsibilities of a Church in a developing country such as Brazil, and saw as his role the renovation of the Brazilian Church. His channel of renovation was the CNBB. The nuncio met weekly with Dom Helder and worked out strategies for change; he attended the majority of CNBB meetings at which advanced social statements were formulated (for example, Campina Grande in 1956, Natal in 1959 and São Paulo in 1960) and publicly supported this orientation; Dom Armando was involved in the nomination as bishops of a large number of obviously progressive young men who have since become the leaders of the post-1964 active sector. The nuncio also defended the "excesses" of the ACB to critical bishops, and in several meetings made clear his support for the organization. In general, he supported the CNBB as an institution as well as the individuals who constituted the group, attended its meetings and made use of its organ, the *Comunicado Mensal*, for his communiques. It is impossible to determine whether in this support of the CNBB and its orientation Dom Armando was simply representing the three popes (Pius XII, John XXIII and Paul VI), or if he acted with some degree of independence. It was probably more the former than the latter.

Prescinding from the personality of Lombardi, and focusing primarily on his prestigious office as emissary of the Holy Father, it is possible to draw a first conclusion: From the date of Dom Armando's arrival in Brazil in 1954 (and not the date of the conference's establishment, 1952), the CNBB became the most authoritative spokesman of the Brazilian Catholic Church. As a corollary, the CNBB, and not Archbishop Dom Jaime Cardinal de Barros Câmara, was thereby transformed into the true successor to Cardinal Leme, while the CNBB's General Secretary, Dom Helder Câmara, now emerged as the *de facto* leader of the Brazilian Church.

The creation of such an elaborate mechanism as the CNBB may seem disproportionate to the task of transferring power from one bishop to another. But inasmuch as canon law did not, as a rule, provide for firing,

demotions, or “lateral” promotions, the mechanism of the CNBB permitted the Cardinal to “reign but not rule.” Politically, moreover, it was essential that Dom Jaime retain some measure of power and leadership, since he spoke for a powerful conservative constituency within the Brazilian Catholic Church. The last and final virtue of the CNBB, as Alves notes, is that in time its secretariat centralized—in a “professional” way, for which Leme simply lacked the technology—“a semimonopoly over communications between the Church and the civil power and between the Church and foreign forces.”⁴⁵

Drawing once again on the Bruneau vignette, a second and far more speculative conclusion is nonetheless in order: The institution of the CNBB sustained and exacerbated a fundamental division prevailing within the Brazilian hierarchy. Needless to say, divisions are not only proper to large, complex bureaucracies, they also frequently lie at the root of apparently unanimous institutional policies toward the larger society. The Church is no exception to the rule, even though its internal processes and factions have yet to receive the sustained systematic attention as that found in Stepan’s revealing study of the Brazilian military. In fact, most studies of the Brazilian Church have tended to focus almost exclusively on Catholic progressives.

What indeed can be said of the Conservative hierarchs? The scant but enlightening analyses by Alves and by Thomas Niehaus and Brady Tyson call attention to two areas of controversy.⁴⁶ The first is over the chronology of left-right cleavage within the Brazilian episcopacy; the second is over the nature of the cleavage. Both are germane to the CNBB’s history.

When did the cleavage begin? An observant French resident, Charles Antoine, stresses the prerevolutionary years of 1963 and 1964 when conflicts (including street brawls) erupted between ideologically opposed Catholic youth organizations and precipitated the episcopacy into taking sides. Most other analysts insist the cleavage dates from 1960. That year, a small nucleus of conservative bishops dissented from the CNBB’s official support of the government’s espoused program of basic reforms, of which agrarian reform—and presumably the Church’s ties to the peasantry and landowners—stirred the greatest controversy. That same year, a group of conservative Catholic lay allies of the episcopal dissenters established a movement known as the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (*Tradição, Família e Propriedade*—TFP).⁴⁷

The truth of the matter is that the dissenting bishops of 1960, Dom Antônio de Castro Mayer of Campos and Dom Geraldo Proença Sigaud of Diamantina, and the lay founder of TFP, Professor Plínio Corrêa de

Oliveira, had previously joined forces as Catholic Action militants in the late 1930s. In 1943, the three denounced Brazilian Catholic Action (ACB) for “modernism” (i.e., the doctrines of Jacques Maritain) and in 1951, founded and collaborated in the conservative Catholic weekly, *O Catolicismo*.⁴⁸ If the cleavage did originate in the late 1930s, then two further questions merit asking. Might the episcopal differences of the 1960s have begun as political differences of the 1930s, especially in regard to Integralism? Might those earlier dissensions also account for the later hostility of some hierarchs towards Helder Câmara who had abandoned the ranks of Integralism and then, as national chaplain of ACB, espoused the views of Maritain? Satisfactory answers must await future research.

Yet, inconclusive as this dispute over chronology remains, the consensus about the nature of the episcopal cleavage—the other area of controversy—is more apparent than real. Ideology, as the above discussion suggests, lay doubtlessly at the heart of the CNBB’s divisions. Most of the literature, moreover, emphasizes how progressives and conservatives shared little common ground on the major issues from basic reforms to the nature of the Church, society, and the state. But this appeal to ideology alone is an insufficient explanation of the sustained, exacerbated rift within the CNBB that I speculated above to be the second of the two consequences of Dom Armando’s intimate association with the CNBB.

Let me offer here an additional, complementary, hypothesis: The concentration of bureaucratic power, scarce resources, and accessibility to the highest levels of Vatican policy within the secretariat of the CNBB tended to reinforce and intensify the preexisting cleavage within the Brazilian hierarchy and ultimately marginalize the conservatives into their intransigent leadership of the Catholic Right during and after the “Revolution” of 1964. Precisely how did this occur?

First, Dom Lombardi does not at all resemble a neutral bystander; his strong endorsement of the “institution” of the CNBB was tantamount to a partisan defense of the progressive faction that administered the secretariat. Isn’t this the real significance of Bruneau’s portrait of the nuncio, now as champion of the secretariat, now as advocate of its policies, now as apologist for its “excesses” before “critical (i.e., politically conservative) bishops”? Second, such partisanship—confirmed in still another portrait by Alves, in which the intense and intimate collaboration between Dom Helder and Dom Armando became a matter of public record⁴⁹—made bridging differences a lost cause. To the degree that necessary and desirable distinctions between Rome and Rio were obliterated, the nuncio’s critical function as an impartial observer and court of penultimate appeal atrophied.

In one instance, Bruneau would have us believe that the unanimity

and absence of compromise with which CNBB handled its affairs were the genuine results of some long-term sociological processes (“institutionalization” and “ideological coherence”). But in another instance, Bruneau—like Alves—makes no bones about it: The policies, programs, and pronouncements pursued by the CNBB in the name of the entire Brazilian hierarchy had originated exclusively with the nuncio, the secretariat, and the latter’s eight or ten allies.⁵⁰

How did the Catholic Right respond to this involuntary marginalization? More research is required on this score, but the metaphor of conservative bishops returning to distant pastures to tend their flocks is irresistible and, in one sense, accurate. Independently of the CNBB’s alleged progressivism, the 1950s were a time of intense public piety and devotionism at the parish and diocesan levels. There, old-fashioned associations of the devout participated en masse in Eucharistic Congresses and actively promoted such national campaigns as the anti-communist pilgrimages of the statue of Our Lady of Fatima and the family-centered Rosary Crusade of American Catholicism’s alternative to the Rev. Billy Graham, Father Patrick Peyton.⁵¹

The political reflex of liturgy—evident also in Leme’s day—is not yet at issue here. But it is of considerable interest that in 1960, as tensions and frustrations within Brazilian Catholicism and society began to surface, Professor Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira went off to organize—in direct defiance of Dom Armando—an otherwise “miniscule and fanatical” movement of the Catholic Right that for half a decade appeared barely to prick the surface of Brazilian political life. In contrast, the CNBB furrowed deeply into the politics of the day.

However much the Catholic Right branded the CNBB as “radical,” and however much Brazilian Catholicism’s progressive apologists sustained a similar view for reasons of their own, one fact is undeniable: CNBB’s policies and objectives during the period 1954–64 were developed for the most part in close ideological harmony with the goals of the Brazilian state, regardless of the individuals momentarily holding power. Moreover, the increasingly nationalistic component of Brazilian politics (that has been especially evident since the second Vargas era, 1950–54) in no way undermined the essential anticommunist policy pursued by every Brazilian administration since 1930. In the 1950s, anticommunism was part and parcel of the Cold War and the theoretical mainstay of the defense of “Western Civilization and Christendom.” In the course of African and Asian decolonization during the 1960s, not even the supposed “third world” accent of Brazilian foreign policy (around 1960–64) impeded the implementation of an anticommunist policy on the domestic front—critics of this view then and now notwithstanding.

Indeed, as Skidmore's history implies, third-worldism in foreign policy (that kept nationalists at home in tow) and anticommunism in domestic policy (that, however much *less* publicized in Brazil, helped keep the U.S. as an interested suitor) was a viable formula for the new era of Fidel and Kennedy.⁵² Every Brazilian administration worked to prevent a Sierra Maestra along the banks of the São Francisco River, while no administration could refuse to fill their coffers with coppers of the Alliance for Progress. In Brazil's case, the enormous dependence on the United States that three decades of industrialization had wrought made cordial relations essential. There can be no doubt at all that the journeys to Washington of three successive presidents (Juscelino Kubitschek, Jânio Quadros, and João Goulart), were not merely symbolic, while, clearly, the anticommunist campaign at home was also the coin to pay the piper.

And what of the Church's ideological stance? Let it be clear that American liberals of the Truman generation and *not* the Church invented the Cold War, just as ECLA* invented "developmentalism" and *not* the Latin American Bishop's Conference (CELAM) that, convening in Mar del Plata in 1966, endorsed it as a panacea. But the Brazilian Church indeed latched on to each of these positions in the very sequence in which they gained currency in Brazil. Moreover, the Church rode the coattails of the very governments that promoted these and other policies in the CNBB era. Such, it appears to me, is the meaning of the following assessment by Alves: With one possible exception, he remarks, "the pronouncements of the Catholic hierarchy on social problems are concomitant *with or after* the projects and pronouncements of the government."⁵³

What then were the projects and pronouncements of the Church? For our purposes, only the barest outline of CNBB activities and intentions is necessary to carry to a close the few arguments remaining to this historical sketch. Perhaps the most important CNBB activity was not properly a project at all. It was the permanent preoccupation of Rome with the state of the Brazilian Catholic Church, "the largest in the world." The solutions adopted here were both time-honored and innovative and embraced a variety of strategies; but, after almost two decades, they failed to produce results—the number of priests remains inadequate to the task.

Under Dom Armando Lombardi, the key strategy was to expand the episcopacy rapidly. Between 1950 and 1964, the number of ecclesiastical jurisdictions increased from 116 to 178, well above a 50 percent growth rate. Moreover, to his direct intervention are attributable 48 new bishoprics, 11 archbishoprics, and 16 prelatures. According to Bruneau,

*ECLA is the acronym of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America, whose economists in the 1950s and 1960s promoted "developmentalism" as a variant of capitalist economic growth.

the nuncio was also *directly* involved in the nomination of 109 possible candidates to 116 dioceses, and 24 to the 31 archbishoprics.⁵⁴

Unfortunately, the meaning of these statistics is not always clear. Bruneau and Alves would have us believe Lombardi appointed a *flock of progressives*, while Antoine surmises that this is very far from the truth. Furthermore, there is no study of the episcopacy's social origins comparable to the penetrating analysis of Brazil's military officers by Stepan. Alves comes closest by assembling existing data, but unfortunately the original studies were wanting.⁵⁵ What then can be said?

The following comments are not overly hazardous. First, the rapid expansion of executive positions of any organization is not necessarily a guarantee of competent leadership. That is especially true in organizations like the Church where recruitment at the sacerdotal level had shown previous long-term declines. Second, dissident behavior among an institution's members is more likely to emanate from the rank and file than executive officers. In the case of the army and the Church, it is the rare commander or bishop who, having reached advanced age and high rank, would choose nonconformity. Third, 60 percent of the Brazilian hierarchy in the mid-1960s was composed of natives of the most advanced industrial states of the union, although most probably from its rural areas (from which, as we have already seen, about 60 percent of the priests hail). Fourth, bishops of rural origin are probably more inclined to reconfirm the prevailing authority structures of rural society than to challenge them. Finally, there is one fact that all these studies imply: During Lombardi's tenure, no conservative was elevated to the mitre. If this be true, it is a poignant example of the CNBB's marginalization of the Catholic Right.

As to the priesthood, the problem, as described earlier, was at the root of Lombardi's basic policy: The massive mobilization of European and North American clergy to become "missionaries" in Brazil. Between 1946 and 1964, foreign clergy went from a third to almost half of Brazil's total. However, those efforts, coordinated by the Vatican with the American hierarchy, failed for the most part. In contrast, the Italian hierarchy responded with enthusiasm: Today, about 25 percent of Brazil's foreign priests are Italians (who, until 1974, seemed the Catholics least affected by the ideological innovations and contestation of the previous decade).

The massive importation of foreign clergy, among them North Americans, raised more questions than it resolved. In this period, foreigners came to work at the bishops' request in a wide range of positions that, by comparison to the high responsibilities assumed by missionaries just a century before, engendered much less prestige. Culture shock, inadequate preparation, language handicaps, nationalism—these and other impediments to effective work (to say nothing of the higher costs of

maintenance and an annual furlough) gave rise to countless training institutes for clergy "en route." But, by 1967, Ivan Illich, who for a decade had conducted in Cuernavaca, Mexico, the most important training program within the Church, refused to continue "shoring up a sinking ship."⁵⁶

Efforts to transfer technical skills to native Brazilian clergymen were first undertaken in earnest during this period. CERIS—Centro de Estatísticas Religiosas e Investigações Sociais, the research arm of the Brazilian episcopacy—owes its existence to that policy, administered by the Catholic University of Louvain. However, there is no study of the role of Brazilian clerical "technocrats" and the possible consequence of their scholarly and financial ties with foreign foundations, hierarchies, etc., that is comparable to the provocative Mutchler analysis of Chile and Colombia.⁵⁷

Finally, such issues as priests' councils, election of bishops by priests instead of appointment by the Vatican and hierarchy, and above all, priestly celibacy, whose urgent solution the "Affaire Danielou" so poignantly underscores, were not quite yet central to the debates of the pre-1964 period. Vatican Council II was about to conclude, while the milestone meeting of Latin American bishops in Medellín was four years away.

The societal programs of the CNBB developed within three target areas of critical importance to the Church's mission: Student, worker, and peasant milieus. Not surprisingly, the programs in question corresponded to the overriding concerns of the Brazilian state at the particular moments in which they were established. Alves's remark that the Church took a position "*with or after*" the government is worth recalling.

Did the endorsement of that policy originate in Rome? Or, did it first emerge in Brazil out of the concrete experience of the 1950s before becoming official Vatican policy in and around 1961? One important document, in which the Vatican endorses the intimate cooperation of the Brazilian Catholic Church with the Brazilian state, is Pope John XXIII's dramatic appeal in the post-Cuban days of 1961: "That the Bishops should demonstrate to the governments and all those responsible the urgency of structural reforms and improvement for the underdeveloped masses; that the hierarchy and the Church, in a subsidiary fashion, should cooperate in this improvement and participate actively in it."⁵⁸ Unequivocal is the Pope's commitment to the reformist governments of the era. At the time, many analysts advocated "reformism" or "developmentalism" as viable alternatives to the unjust rewards of an authoritarian socialist state and to the unequal rewards of an unbridled capitalist economy; within Latin

America, this choice was posed as between the Cuban model that had just emerged under Fidel Castro, and the Dominican Republic model, for which the continent had become justly infamous. A new alternative had to be found and the Church was to be its midwife.

While the societal model, to which Pope John commended faithful and governments alike, was both nebulous and untried, his implicit commitment of national hierarchies to the policies of the reformist state clearly exacted a price: Subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity holds that the state should not interfere in social endeavors competently executable by private institutions; moreover, private institutions engaged in performing some social "good" are entitled to a "share of the monies of the state." Chile's Christian Democrats, who at this time saw themselves as the exemplary Latin American alternative to communism and capitalism, totalitarianism and individualism, did much to define subsidiarity in the concrete. Peasant unions, trade unions, schools, and other enterprises in which the Church was actively engaged would qualify for the modern-day "benefices in reverse."⁵⁹

Development, then, was the program to which Catholicism was committed, while in fending off socialism and capitalism, the Church bid for a share in the fruits of society's labors. Under the "myth of the Catholic nation," that the Brazilian state conveniently sustained, pluralists (Catholics among them) and other critics found it nearly impossible to challenge the privileges that—in the name of subsidiarity—the state willingly accorded the Church.

It was in the student milieu—one of the CNBB's target areas—that the Church came under severest criticism and where, throughout the 1950s, its own influence was extremely weak. The strengthening of a Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro (Pontifícia Universidade Católica—PUC) after the war had contributed to this situation, since it isolated the Catholic student body from the state universities where public debate was intense. PUC's greatest significance to the debates of the era came from its learned Jesuit rector, Father Fernando Bastos Ávila, S.J. In the early 1960s, he elaborated for Brazil a middle-of-the-road doctrine of society to which the Church could give support, not unlike the "revolution in liberty" found in the pages of the Chilean Jesuit weekly *Mensaje* a half-decade earlier.⁶⁰

Not the Catholic University, but the Catholic student movement, known as JUC (Juventude Universitária Católica) was the center of Catholic student thought and action. It was established in 1950 as a specialized branch of Catholic Action. Two years before, a counterpart structure for young workers known as JOC (Juventude Operária Católica) had already

come into being. Their full history cannot be told here, but their struggle for socialism and freedom can.⁶¹

Most writers refer to JUC and JOC as symbols of a turning point in Brazilian Catholic life and of increased ties with radical French Catholic thought. Neither can be denied. The Italian Corporativist model of Catholic Action established under Leme had finally given way to the Franco-Belgian "class" model. But it is unnecessary to exaggerate. Those new structures were as equally subordinate to the hierarchy as were the old. Moreover, the *assistentes*, the priest-advisors, exercised a pervasive influence, to the point where JUC's principal orientations were for a long period the work of the clerics: Almerly Bezerra, Thomas Cardonnel, Romeu Dale, Mateus Rocha, Henrique Vaz. No doubt, the doctrines were provocative, humane, and liberating—as time would partially confirm—but the idea that post-1950 Catholic Action was "democratic" is patently false. Furthermore, up until 1958, JUC was considered, in deKadt's words, "a movement which discussed . . . well-prepared and well-sounding texts, which, however, meant very little indeed to the concrete life of the movement." He adds, JUC was "ineffective," "unable to influence anyone but [its own] leaders," and given to "excessively abstract theoretical discussions and orientation."⁶²

JUC obviously mirrored its middle and upper middle-class origins just as JOC, that for a variety of reasons tended to be less clerical, reflected the moderate labor militance of its "white collar" cadres. Both organizations were essentially discussion groups, albeit with a significant capacity to facilitate human contacts around the vast nation and abroad, one of the important functions of the youth movement of this period. It is also a fact that the ties of JUC and JOC to the hierarchy, at least via the *assistentes*, were inseverable for an entire decade.

The foregoing observations are not intended to detract from the profound transformation that JUC (and later, JOC) underwent—in spite of the hierarchy—at the outset of the 1960s and to which the recent thesis of the Brazilian sociologist, José Oscar Beozzo, is a useful guide.⁶³ That transformation—whose annunciation came at the Tenth Annual Congress in 1960 and whose testament is the now celebrated document, *O Ideal Histórico*—embraced three tasks: The redefinition of the modern world in more secular terms; a commitment, inspired by the gospels, to change the world; and finally, the conviction that direct political action was the only efficacious means to that end.

At the outset, this metamorphosis met with the enthusiastic support of JUC's advisors. In fact, one of them, Fr. Almerly Bezerra, had drafted and proposed the *Ideal Histórico*. Even the hierarchy managed

momentarily to temper its fears over *JUCistas'* imminent secularization (*laicização*) as JUC electoral victories over Marxist student candidates established a "Catholic influence" among youthful intellectuals at Brazil's universities as at no other time in Brazil's modern history.

Indeed, JUC's politicization went forward relentlessly and dialectically. Eventually, not conflict but collaboration with Marxists and, soon after, JUC's repudiation of "developmentalism" in favor of "socialism and the 'Brazilian Revolution'" brought the organization into inevitable conflict with the hierarchy. Ecclesiastical documents between 1961 and 1963 reveal the episcopacy's alarm over and opposition to JUC's growing autonomy from episcopal authority, its systematic questioning of the inadequacy of the Church's corpus of "social doctrines and teachings" and, finally, its presumption to speak on political matters in the name of Christianity and Catholicism. Thus, by 1961, the standing debate over lobby or political party was now joined to redefining the nature of the Church itself (an issue that was to gain ground only in the 1970s).

deKadt's account of this era correctly implies that JUC's challenge to the hierarchy was nothing less than a struggle for freedom from the impedimenta of a "neo-Christendom" church, a declaration of the layman's right to act upon the world in ways that he, as Christian and citizen, judged fit and necessary, and an outright embrace of socialist ideals.

This is not to insist that JUC and JOC had a monopoly on the truth. Nor had MEB (the Movimento de Educação de Base), whose history deKadt records in full and whose heroic effort to educate and politicize Brazil's teeming illiterate masses in the name of the Brazilian hierarchy must be ranked in this century as one of the great historic undertakings of the Catholic laity anywhere in the world. Indeed, despite the magnanimity and generosity of countless young men and women whom posterity must content itself to salute simply as "the rank and file," the essential MEB strategy of sending forth middle-class activists to liberate working-class peasants had as serious limitations as did JUC's collaboration with its Marxist counterparts. Yet, to free men was, for them, to live out the Christian gospel.

For its part, the hierarchy was consistent in its interests. As deKadt noted, the CNBB "met the challenge from JUC head on." It dismantled JUC and soon thereafter JOC and MEB, too. Within less than a decade, the three core experiences of Catholic innovation came to a bitter end. The fallout was horrendous: The Catholic youth of the 1960s—was it the last generation of the generous to remain loyal to the gospels?—simply abandoned the Church. As a consequence, never before has the Brazilian hierarchy stood so isolated as today in redefining the "Church's" relationship to society.

What then of the Northeast—another CNBB target area—and a veritable political cauldron in which Church, state and a myriad of other interests bid to mobilize and lead the peasantry during the late 1950s and early 1960s? It was in this region that the Church and a succession of governments closely and continuously collaborated, and where Church and government had most to lose. Unlike the youthful experimentation of MEB, the Church reached out to the Northeastern masses through more traditional means and thus, by and large, maintained her cordial ties with rural landowners and politicians.

For one, the leaders of the Church's Rural Syndicates for peasants were not students but almost always priests, and thus more directly subject to the discipline of the hierarchy. For another, they were indelibly marked by a rigid anticommunism that had set them to work in the first place. One sharp observer felt that the priests, far from being "communists," as certain landlords had charged, were from the outset "counterrevolutionaries" seeking to "divert the rural labor movement from the radical goals set by [the radical founder of the Peasant Leagues] Francisco Julião and others." Another observer, sympathetic to the Church, concedes that Julião's "competitive example of the Peasant Leagues was *certainly* important in determining the church's policies."⁶⁴

On the whole, it is evident that the Church's presence in the rural milieu continues to have greater impact than in the student and worker field, or, at least, greater durability. That may be the consequence of the close ties that have prevailed between Church and state since the 1950s when the then nuncio, Msgr. Chiarli, first convened a meeting of priests and government officials to deal with rural "misery." Another reason may simply be that the rural-based priest continues to project the ambiguous image of boss, bureaucrat, and intellectual in which folk Catholics hold him and from which his own—and by extension, the Church's—power derives (as unquestionably demonstrated in a recent, unpublished work by Rowan Ireland, an Australian sociologist).⁶⁵

Exactly what the Northeast meant to the Church and the Brazilian state in the halcyon days of the government's development agency SUDENE (Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste), Julião's Peasant Leagues, and the Church-sponsored Rural Syndicates will require some unrelenting historians to decipher. For the American lawyer and journalist, Joseph Page, whose account of the region in this period is the most perceptive available in any language, the Northeast came to mean "The Revolution that Never Was," a revolution that the Church clearly helped deter.⁶⁶

One last question is really in order. How can such an account of the Brazilian Church purposefully exclude any mention of Vatican Council II

and the “Revolution” of 1964? Indeed, while both are significant and “continuing” events, their effects were barely measurable in 1964, the date on which this essay comes to a close. However, it seems to me that neither event really altered the Brazilian Church’s course, but rather reinforced and accelerated it along the diverse directions in which it had already begun to move.

For example, the “Revolution” of 1964 did not create the Catholic Right but rather galvanized into action its vast human resources apparently neglected in toto by the CNBB. Unfortunately, my sources are mute about how the Catholic Right organized and how it used its organizational force to alter the CNBB and Brazilian Catholicism in the post-1964 period. Yet organize it did, through the Catholic school system, the parish chapters of St. Vincent de Paul, women’s organizations, Marian Congregations, and the whole panoply of movements that some observers in the early 1960s were absolutely convinced had already been consigned to a museum. Instead, they paraded in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in defense of the “Revolution” of 1964 and ever since have continued to exert influence in excess of their numbers.

On the other hand, Vatican Council II sanctioned a new sense of the Church that few could readily discern in the heat of Church politics and the rhetoric and expectations of the late 1950s and early 1960s, but which some clearly felt was coming. Medellín called this new Church the “People of God”—Saint Augustine most likely meant that when he spoke of the City of God—and a host of Third World bishops invoked it poetically as “Abrahamic communities.”

Its shape has not entirely jelled; JUC today would inevitably make freedom from ecclesiastical domination an essential condition of the new communion; and the MEB might now choose to become somewhat more Pentecostal, i.e., egalitarian and less paternalistic, in its insistence on liberation. Nor would advocacy of a socialist order be out of place. But, the essential quality of this “People of God” alternative, at least to some observers, is its aspiration to divest itself of power while simultaneously retaining its universal, institutional cohesiveness, a task until now nigh on sociologically impossible.

At best, what Vatican Council II and the “Revolution” of 1964 *may* have jointly wrought was the emergence of a *third reality* within Brazilian Catholicism, a still-emerging *Pastoral Church* that evidently comprises a significant majority of the Church’s bishops and priests. Although its lay component is not entirely discernible, it is this group that fell heir to the CNBB during the last days of Vatican II, and that is, with great difficulty, trying to reconcile its concern for the poor and its defense of human rights with the situation in which it finds itself today.⁶⁷ The very existence of this

Pastoral Church would have been surprising to anyone making predictions in the early 1960s, so inclined are most people to see exactly what they want rather than what is.

An analysis of the role of this Pastoral Church in Brazil is beyond the historical limits of this essay. But because it is not an isolated case in Latin America, as its Chilean counterpart has demonstrated since early 1974, its development merits close attention.

III

The final task is at hand: How does the Church's role in one country compare with the composite sociological projection of social scientists?

Rightly, Vallier's cautious view of the hierarchy as ultimate legitimator of social change needs to be very much qualified. In the Brazilian case, the hierarchy from Dom Leme to the CNBB most assiduously promoted the Church's own interests, that in turn had been defined less by distant societal alterations than by the more immediate crisis of the erosion of Catholicism's religious monopoly. Had Brazilian Catholicism been an expanding force, like Pentacostalism, would the policies of the bishops have been different? In another vein of comparative inquiry, how applicable are Vallier's hypotheses about Catholicism and social change to noncapitalist societies such as present-day Cuba or Chile under Allende?

Although Sanders's view of innovation in the Church readily acknowledged the possibility of differences between "innovators" and major spokesmen of the Church, it did not stress adequately instances of irreconcilable opposition of views. The case histories of JUC, JOC, and MEB suggest to me that when innovation by youthful elites threatened the authority of the hierarchy, the bishops took action to counter and eliminate the innovators.

The Brazilian case study also suggests that future views of innovation must now give consideration to the powerful role of external ecclesiastical forces on national hierarchies and situations. In the past, only Latin American Protestantism was conceived as a set of values and structures subsisting in a state of dependency on external sources. Perhaps the entire history of contemporary Catholicism in Latin America should now be rewritten from this transnational perspective.

Finally, what of the Rand contention that the Church in Latin America would seek to extricate itself from alliances with parties and governments in order to avoid internal ruptures? The emergence of the Pastoral Church in Brazil after 1964—admittedly beyond the chronology of this study—and in Chile after 1973, may very well reflect an internal compromise between opposing ecclesial factions. But it may equally regis-

ter the consequences of a military strategy that totally discounted the power of the Church and even violently oppressed her cadres whenever it was deemed necessary or convenient. Nor does the uncertainty over which side initiated the current stand-off policy exclude, per se, the possibility that under the growing economic crisis of the mid-1970s, Church and state could effect a rapprochement.

The Brazilian case suggests still another line of inquiry, one that insists on evaluating "extrication" within a larger political frame of reference. For example, if the Church "extricates" itself from "politics" under an authoritarian regime, could that not be mistaken for support of the dictatorship? Or, if it did so under a socialist regime, would that act signify opposition? The cases of Batista's Cuba and Allende's Chile both come to mind.

Rather than pose further questions, it seems appropriate to end by stating the one possibly significant and hardly startling—but worth remembering—conclusion that can be drawn from this historical and sociological exploration: For a half-century, the Brazilian Church succeeded in coalescing with a wide variety of political forces—now cooperatively, now in opposition, but always in defense of her institutional interests.

NOTES

1. The most total disavowal of the Church as an agent of social reform is found in the article by the exiled Chilean Jesuit and founder of the Christians for Socialism movement, Gonzalo Arroyo, "Nota sobre la Iglesia y los cristianos de izquierda a la hora del putsch en Chile," *Latin American Perspectives* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1975), issue 4, pp. 89–99. Rowan Ireland, "The Catholic Church and Social Change in Brazil: An Evaluation," *Brazil in the Sixties*, ed. by Riordan Roett (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), pp. 345–71, concludes that while some churchmen—and presumably social scientists, too—are now free from illusions of the early 1960s, others—including some of the most important bishops—openly prefer security to change (pp. 368–69). Frederick C. Turner, *Catholicism and Political Development in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971) underscores many of the constraints upon Catholicism's political role in Latin America despite his overall characterization of the Church as a "cautiously progressive" force.
2. Useful surveys of this literature are: Gerhard Drekonja, "Religion and Social Change in Latin America," *LARR* 6, no. 1 (Spring 1971): 53–72; Thomas C. Bruneau, "Power and Influence: Analysis of the Church in Latin America and the Case of Brazil," *LARR* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1973): 25–51; and the excellent study by Brian H. Smith, S.J., "Religion and Social Change: Classical Theories and New Formulations in the Context of Recent Developments in Latin America," *LARR* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 3–34.
3. Ivan Vallier, *Catholicism, Social Control, and Modernization in Latin America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 76–77; 114–19; 158–59; and "Religious Elites: Differentiation and Developments in Roman Catholicism," *Elites in Latin America*, ed. by S. M. Lipset and A. Solari (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 190–232, see esp. pp. 190–91.
4. Thomas Sanders, "The Church in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* 48, no. 2 (January 1970): 285–99.

5. Luigi Einaudi, M. Fleet, R. Maulin, and A. Stepan, "The Changing Catholic Church" in *Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future*, ed. by L. Einaudi (New York: Crane Russack & Co., 1974), pp. 75–96; esp. p. 91.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 91–92.
7. Márcio Moreira Alves, "L'Église et le politique au Brésil," (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1973), mimeo; subsequently published under the same title in Paris by Les Editions du Cerf in 1974 (however, all references here are to the original 1973 thesis). Thomas C. Bruneau, *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974); a Portuguese version was published the same year in São Paulo by Edições Loyola; all references are to the original English edition. Emmanuel deKadt, *Catholic Radicals in Brazil* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Margaret Patrice Todaro, "Pastors, Prophets, and Politicians: A Study of the Brazilian Catholic Church, 1916–1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1971). Subsequently, under the married name of Margaret Todaro Williams, chapters of the above were published as articles in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* and the *Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs*, August 1974. All citations are from the original dissertation unless otherwise specified.
8. deKadt, pp. 54–55; Todaro, p. 28; Bruneau, p. 36, n. 70 and p. 74.
9. Bruneau, p. 36; Todaro, pp. 28–32.
10. "Romanization" is discussed in the classic article of Roger Bastide, "Religion and the Church in Brazil," in *Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent*, eds., T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant (New York: Dryden Press, 1951), pp. 334–55. David Mutchler, *The Church as a Political Factor in Latin America: With Particular Reference to Colombia and Chile* (New York: Praeger, 1971) discusses dependence of the Church in the two countries cited in the title. The only account I know of regarding Brazil is the still unpublished study by the Australian sociologist, Rowan Ireland, "Catholic Clergy in the Northeast: An Elite for Modernization?" (1974).
11. deKadt, p. 56; Todaro, pp. 63–143 and, on the social origins of members of the Centro Dom Vital, pp. 252–54.
12. Bruneau, pp. 38–39.
13. Irmã Maria Regina do Santo Rosario, O.C.D. (Laurita Pessôa Raja Gabaglia), *O Cardeal Leme*, Coleção Documentos Brasileiros 113 (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editôra, 1962), esp. pp. 216–26.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 228. Italics mine.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
16. Leme's speech is quoted in full in Todaro. Bruneau cites Oswaldo Aranha's remark: "When we arrived from the south [Rio Grande do Sul] we tended to the Left! But after we saw the popular religious movements, in honor of Our Lady of Aparecida and of Christ the Redeemer, we understood we could not go against the sentiments of the people!", p. 40. Originally cited in Regina do Santo Rosario, p. 289.
17. Pe. Geraldo Fernandes, C.M.F., "A Religião nas Constituições Republicanas do Brasil," *Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira* 8, no. 4 (Dezembro 1948): 830–57.
18. Bruneau, pp. 41–45; Todaro, *passim.*; Howard J. Wiarda, *The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement* (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Labor Relations Research Center, 1969), p. 15; and *Reivindicações Católicas* (Rio de Janeiro: Edição do Centro Dom Vital, 1932).
19. Gianfranco Poggi, *Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 239.
20. Alves, p. 43.
21. Regina do Santo Rosario, p. 310; Bruneau, p. 46.
22. Poggi, pp. 18–24.
23. Bruneau, p. 29; Wiarda, pp. 14–15; Todaro Williams, "Integralism and the Brazilian Catholic Church," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 54, no. 3 (August 1974). See the impressive study of Héglio Trindade, *Integralismo (o fascismo brasileiro na década de 30)*, (DIFEL-URGS: São Paulo, 1974). *Corpo e Alma* 40, p. 155, n. 16.

24. Octavio Ianni, *Crisis in Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). See Bruneau. The quotation in the text is from the title of chap. 7. Other dimensions of global change are: Political democratization, decolonization, the cold war, polycentrism in the socialist camp, realignment of corporative structures such as the armed forces, and organized religion of the churches.
25. See Bruneau, *passim*, for statistics, esp. pp. 242–47. Ivan Illich, “The Vanishing Clergyman,” in *Celebration of Awareness* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 69–94. In 1971 Turner contended the “vocation crisis” had been exaggerated and that in the case of Brazil vocations had kept apace reasonably even though population had exploded, pp. 182–92, esp. p. 188. In 1974, my clerical informants in Brazil suggested the sharp drop in European vocations, whose missionaries account for half the total of Brazil’s clergy, was seriously affecting the country while Brazilian vocations were not holding their own. Since 1970, the focus has shifted from expanding clerical ranks to creating autonomous, lay-directed grass-roots ecclesial communities. See A. Gregory, org., *Comunidades Eclesiais de Base: Utopia ou Realidade* and M. Baraglia, *Evolução das Comunidades Eclesiais de Base*, both edited by Vozes (Petropolis: 1973 and 1974, respectively).
26. Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Military Civilian Relations in Brazil* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 131. Observations on the Brazilian College are those of several seminarians who studied there in the 1950s. See the pioneering institutional comparison by Alexander W. Wilde, “Understanding Corporate Institutions in Politics: The Military and the Church in Latin America” (Paper prepared for the Workshop in Latin American Studies, Yale University, 6 October 1973).
27. Peter Master Dunne, S.J., *A Padre Views South America* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945). On the role and background of the Italian clergy in Brazil, see *La Società italiana di fronte alle prime migrazioni di massa* (Numero speciale), *Studi Emigrazione* 5: 11–12 (Febb.-Giugno 1968), (Centro Studi Emigrazione, Roma, Morcelliana, Brescia), entire volume.
28. John J. Considine, *Call for Forty Thousand* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946); see chap. 3, “The State of the Faith.”
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 305–306. Also see William J. Coelman, M.M., *Latin American Catholicism: A Self-Evaluation* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Maryknoll Press, 1958), World Horizons Report No. 23, pp. 46–55.
30. See Illich and Mutchler. On Caritas, see Bruneau, p. 69 n. 4.
31. Thales de Azevedo’s writings take up the debate about whether the indices of “practising Catholic” developed by the French school of pastoral sociology are really applicable to Brazil. See his *Catolicismo no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio de Educação e Cultura, 1955). The concept of the layman as a “client” is developed in the recent unpublished study by the São Paulo sociologist Douglas Teixeira Monteiro, “Sertão e Civilização: Compassos e Descompassos” (dezembro 1974).
32. Alves, p. 46; Ralph Della Cava, *Miracle at Joazeiro* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), *passim*.
33. deKadt, pp. 9–33; Teixeira Monteiro, *passim*; and Shepard Forman, “Disunity and Discontent: A Study of Peasant Political Movements in Brazil,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 3, no. 1 (May 1971): 3–24. An important discussion of “religiosity,” slightly at variance with the sense in which it is herein employed, is found in Thales de Azevedo, “Catolicismo no Brasil?,” *Vozes. Revista de Cultura* 63, no. 2 (fevereiro 1969): 117–24, esp. pp. 120, and 124, n. 11. Also see Pedro A. R. de Oliveira, “Religiosidade Popular na America Latina,” *Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira* 32, no. 126 (junho 1972): 354–64.
34. Emilio Willems, *The Followers of the New Faith* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969). On Protestantism in general, see Waldo A. César, *Para Uma Sociologia do Protestantismo Brasileiro* (Petropolis: Vozes, 1973). Trilhas, no. 2. On Pentecostalism, see Francisco Cartaxo Rolim, O.P., “Expansão protestante em Nova Iguauçu,” and “Pentecostalismo,” both in *Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira* 33, no. 131 (setembro 1973): 660–75, and 33, no. 132 (dezembro 1973): 950–64, respectively.

35. Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, translated by Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969). The operativeness of the contradiction "Catholic-Pentacostal" appears with considerable certitude at the level of worship: Catholic cults all but eliminate Christ, a "distant" figure outranked by the Virgin, the saints, and such popular "miracle-workers" as Padre Cicero; in absolutely stark contrast, Pentacostalism exclusively affirms Christ to the exclusion of the Virgin, saints, and miracle-workers. On this score, see J. C. Maraschin, "A Imagen do Christo nas Camadas Populares," and João Dias de Araújo, "Imagens de Jesus Christo na Literatura de Cordel," both in *Vozes: Revista de Cultura* 68, no. 7 (setembro 1974): 33–39 and 41–48, respectively. For another dimension of this dialectic, viz. urban-rural, that ought to be seen as the dramatic, spatial transformation that makes a radical "conversion" jump possible, see the excellent article by Waldo A. César, "Urbanização e Religiosidade Popular: Um Estudo da Doutrina Pentecostal na Sociedade Urbana," *Vozes: Revista de Cultura* 68, no. 7 (setembro 1974): 19–28.
36. Bruneau, pp. 62–63.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 61, 66, 69; and Alves, pp. 56–58; See Ronald Chilcote, *The Brazilian Communist Party, Conflict and Integration 1922–1972* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) and Robert Levine, *The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934–1938* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
38. Ulisse Alessio Floridi, *Radicalismo Cattolico Brasileiro* (Roma: Instituto Editoriale del Mediterraneo, 1968), pp. 178–83; Bruneau, p. 65.
39. Bruneau, pp. 46–47, 101; Wiarda, pp. 14–21, deKadt, p. 58. For a thorough account of Dom Eugenio Sales's Movimento da Natal, see Candido Procópio Ferreira de Camargo, *Igreja e Desenvolvimento* (São Paulo: Edições CEBRAP, 1971), pp. 65–77.
40. Data on PDC culled from Bruneau, pp. 100–102 and Alceu Amoroso Lima, *Memórias Improvisadas (Diálogos com Medeiros, Lima)*, (Petropolis: Vozes, 1973), pp. 308–309.
41. A useful but aesopian and at times frankly bad biography is José De Broucker, *Dom Helder Câmara—The Violence of the Peacemaker*, translated by Herma Brifficault (New York: Orbis Books, 1969); Patrick J. Leonard, C.S.Sp., "Bibliography of Helder Câmara," *LARR* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 147–66.
42. Interview of Cecília Monteiro, Dom Helder's long-time private secretary, in *Jornal do Brazil* 14 (October 1972), cited in Alves, p. 80.
43. Alves, p. 80.
44. Bruneau, p. 117.
45. Alves, p. 85; his lengthy analysis of CNBB and of the CRB—the Council of Religious of Brazil, founded in 1954—is the finest account anywhere, pp. 85–95.
46. Márcio Moreira Alves, "L'Extreme Droite Catholique et La Politique Brasilienne" (Paper for "Minicolloque" on Les Organisations Religieuses entant que Forces Politiques de Substitution, Centre d'Étude des Relations Internationales, Paris, 20 September 1972), mimeo; and Thomas Niehaus and Brady Tyson, "The Catholic Right in Contemporary Brazil: The Case of the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP)" (Paper presented at the Southwest Council on Latin American Studies, Waco, Texas, 22 February 1974), mimeo.
47. Charles Antoine, *Church and Power in Brazil* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973); Niehaus and Tyson, p. 6.
48. Alves, "L'Extreme Droite Catholique," p. 7.
49. Alves, pp. 100–101.
50. Bruneau, pp. 112–14; Alves, pp. 80–82.
51. There are almost no studies of Catholic practises and structures of the "pious fifties." Some references are contained in Hélio Damante, "Cem Anos de Religião no Brasil," *O Estado de São Paulo* 30 VIII (1974), Suplemento do Centenário, no. 35.
52. On the Cold War, see the fascinating account by Julian K. Prescott, *A History of the Modern Age* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 3–78; Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 199.
53. Alves, as cited in Bruneau, p. 115, italics mine.

54. Bruneau, p. 117.
55. Alves relies on Pe. Godefredo Deelen's "O Episcopado Brasileiro," *Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira* 27 (junho 1967): 310–32.
56. Ivan Illich, "The Seamy Side of Charity," *America* (January 1967).
57. Mutchler; R. Ireland's study, cited in n. 10, notes disparities between Northeastern and Center-South dioceses in regard to reliance on outside funds, pp. 25–26; Bruneau suggests that one reason Dom José Gonçalves was elected secretary general of the CNBB was because "he knew German, which was important because the German bishops through Adveniat and Miserior were to finance the CNBB for the next five years," pp. 124, 141, and 141, n. 9.
58. Bruneau, p. 119.
59. The Chilean views on subsidiarity are quoted in the original in Mutchler, p. 379. For a general discussion of the principle, see Jean-Yves Calvez, *Igreja e Sociedade Econômica: O Ensino Social dos Papas Leão XIII a Pio XII (1878–1958)*, tradução de Agostinho Veloso (Porto: Tavares Martins, 1960), *passim*.
60. Fr. Fernando Bastos de Ávila, S.J., *Neo-Capitalismo, Socialismo, e Solidarismo* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Agir Editôra, 1963).
61. In addition to published materials by deKadt, and Candido Mendes, *Memento dos Vivos: A Esquerda Católica no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 1966), see José Oscar Beozzo, "Les Mouvements des Universitaires Catholiques au Brésil: Aperçu historique et essai d'interprétation" (Thesis in Sociology, Université Catholique de Louvain, Février 1968), mimeo; and José Luiz Sigríst, "Fenomenologia da Consciência Universitária Cristã no Brasil" (Tese doutoral, Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras de Rio Claro, 1973), mimeo.
62. deKadt, pp. 60–61, *passim*.
63. Beozzo, pp. 126–27.
64. Joseph Page, *The Revolution That Never Was* (New York: Grossman, 1972), pp. 152–53; and Cândido Procópio Camargo, *O Movimento de Natal* (Bruxelles: Centre de Documentation sur L'Action des Églises dans le Monde, 1968), p. 141, italics mine.
65. Ireland, "Catholic Clergy," pp. 8, 27–28.
66. Page.
67. Ralph Della Cava, "Brazil: The Struggle for Human Rights," *Commonweal* 102, 20 (19 December 1975): 623–26.