

JG and IG have had a significant impact on their views on the use of violence. The JG's early cells that emerged in the 1970s viewed violence as a necessary means to combat regime repression and liberate the Muslim world from Western hegemony. In contrast, the IG's adoption of violence against the regime was a gradual process and related to the changing political environment in Egypt under former president Anwar Sadat. This distinction is crucial, as other studies often fail to differentiate between these two groups when it comes to their use of violence against the regime. Additionally, the level of internal institutionalization is a crucial factor in determining the extent of the use of violence by these groups. The strong internal institutionalization of the IG resulted in a controlled and calculated resort to violence that was in line with the movement's tactical and strategic objectives. On the other hand, the weak internal institutionalization of the Jihadi-Salafists (JG) led to a haphazard and impulsive use of violence that was often counterproductive.

Despite the contribution of Drevon's book to the existing literature on jihadism, there are also a number of limitations that might be worth mentioning. First is the generalizability of the findings of the book and the analytical model beyond the case of Egypt, which the author admits in the conclusion of the book. While the book attempts to apply the DR model to other cases such as al-Qaeda, the results are not consistent with the book's argument on institutionalization. Second, despite its potential utility, the DR model can be criticized for falling into the trap of causality that the author sought to avoid in the first place. This model provides insight into the internal dynamics and trajectories of the IG and JG; however, it still presents a linear view of causality. Ultimately, radicalization and institutionalization are the outcomes of the interactions between jihadi groups and different actors, with the latter being treated as independent variables. Third, the classification of these actors is not fully convincing. For example, some of them can fall into the same category (i.e., the state and security forces). It would have been more convincing if the author explained why he chose to divide them the way he did. Fourth, the book overstretched the history of violence in jihadi movements. It inaccurately conflates the ideas of Islamic revivalism and reformism, as espoused by figures such as Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the late nineteenth century, with the views of Islamist ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb. This is problematic as it ignores the significant ideological distinctions between these groups. Finally, the book inadvertently conflates the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and violence. While the author acknowledges the differences between the Brotherhood and jihadi groups, there are instances in which he erroneously links the Brotherhood to armed groups. This is not accurate and therefore problematic.

Nevertheless, *Institutionalizing Violence* is a comprehensive and important work that provides a deep understanding of the complex history of Salafi jihadism in Egypt.

Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy.

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Over the last ten years, the scholarship on democracy and democratization has been preoccupied with both the durability and the quality of democratic institutions, whether in long-established democratic countries or in recently democratized ones. The failure of transitions to democracy across the Middle East and North Africa—with the potential exception of Tunisia—and democratic backsliding in several countries across four continents has revived studies about the factors that make democracy survive and thrive or fail. In his new book, Mohammad Ali Kadivar makes an excellent contribution to this debate.

Since the early processes of transition in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, studies on democracy and democratization have often emphasized the role of elites in ensuring a successful transition. In particular, several scholars, including Huntington and Di Palma, highlighted how too many demands and too much participation from below on a still fragile political system after the fall of authoritarianism could derail the transition and pave the way for the return of authoritarian rule. The isolation of the moderates within the failing authoritarian regime and the ability of opposition leaders to insulate themselves from the hardliners within the regime and the radicalism of the street, respectively, were believed to be crucial to ensure the success of the transition. More often than not, a formal pact between members of the regime and opponents was deemed necessary to seal the transition and lead to the construction of a genuine democratic system. For example, Hicham Alaoui's recent study on the processes of democratization in Egypt and Tunisia argues that the presence of a pact in Tunisia and its absence in Egypt is what explains the diverging institutional outcomes in the two countries.

In this "elitist" context, as Kadivar labels it, popular mobilization before and after the fall of authoritarianism has been often deemed problematic for—if not outright dangerous—to the survival of democratic structures. Kadivar offers a different perspective, which is in line with recent studies on the role popular mobilization plays in political and social processes across the Middle East and North Africa, as the work of John Chalcraft for instance demonstrates. Rather than linking successful and durable democratization to the strengths of pacts or agreements between elites, he argues that a sustained, long-popular

mobilization prior to the fall of the regime is crucial to make the new democratic institutions strong and durable.

This is due to several factors, but one that emerges as crucial is that sustained mobilization leads to the creation of organizational structures that can unite large swaths of the opposition. Within these organizations, members are “trained” in the game of compromise and democratic procedures and are provided with tangible resources they can employ when negotiating with the regime. The leadership in the opposition is therefore the expression of the popular will and it has both legitimacy and strength. When such an organization does not really exist and where there is no clear leadership, it is very difficult to negotiate with the regime and build durable institutions. The leaderless Arab uprisings are a testament to that. Furthermore, sustained popular mobilization positively influences the quality of the democracy being installed, which is therefore not only durable, but functions well and can withstand potential challenges. When such long-term mobilization does not exist, Kadivar argues, new democracies do not have deep roots and tend to revert back to authoritarianism quite quickly. In this sense, pacts that are simply agreements between the regime and handpicked opposition leaders with little to no organizational support and no history of being immersed in sustained popular mobilizations are destined to fail.

Overall, there is a lot of merit in the perspective Kadivar sets forth and the theoretical insights find a degree of empirical support both in the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 2 and in the detailed narrative of the five case-studies in Chapters 3 and 4. The theoretical framework emphasising the role sustained popular and, crucially, unarmed mobilization during the era of authoritarian rule in increasing the chances of the success, survival, and better quality of democracy builds on the oft-forgotten insight that society—and individuals in society—need to buy in to the construction of a democratic political system. As mentioned, studies of democratization rely overwhelmingly on an elitist view of how democracy can come about and succeed. There is considerable suspicion of popular claims and widespread popular participation because of the intense focus on rules and procedures as the pillars of democracy. This is only partially the case and Kadivar’s insight is that a more substantive attachment to democracy as a system of accountability needs ordinary people to buy into it. The empirical chapters, with their detailed narrative of the transitions in South Africa, Pakistan, Poland, Egypt, and Tunisia, support the theoretical claims and the author is to be commended for the way in which the narrative of these five countries is interwoven with the theoretical expectations. Case selection is compelling because the author analyses important case studies across different parts of the world, with different authoritarian systems in place and with diverse ethnic,

social, cultural, and religious backgrounds. Notably, the cases are from different eras as well.

Although the theoretical and empirical ground upon which the book is built is solid, there remain questions about the relationship Kadivar explores. First, the decision to adopt the minimal definition of democracy can be questioned when it comes to discussing not so much the durability of democratic institutions, but their quality. Popular mobilization in favour of democracy within authoritarian systems is not often concerned with mechanisms and procedures; they are certainly relevant, particularly when it comes to liberal rights, but they are rarely the reason for mobilization. In their analyses of the Arab uprisings, scholars like Gilbert Achar, Adam Hanieh, Andrea Teti, and Angela Joya argue that socio-economic inequalities were at the heart of mobilization. This has significant consequences on the quality of democracy after the fall of the regime. Where such socio-economic demands are met through the construction of a social-democratic welfare state, as in the case of Southern European countries, democracy becomes more durable and “better”, with a higher chance to survive. When such demands are not met, democracy is not equated by the majority of citizens with a better life and therefore it does not command the same legitimacy, allowing for the hollowing out of democratic institutions.

This might be linked to a second point that the book does not really deal with, namely the international dimension of democratization and democracy. Although this might not be a crucial factor, both the durability and the quality of democracy can be affected. For instance, countries that transitioned in Europe, whether through elite pacts of sustained popular mobilization or elite-driven changes (Romania and Bulgaria come to mind), had the incentive of European Union membership, with all its positive financial consequences, to strengthen their democratic institutions. It is very different for countries like Tunisia or Egypt. Furthermore, the time when a country transitions might have an impact too. For countries engaged in more recent processes of democratization, it has been much harder to build strong democratic institutions not because the requirements of globalized neo-liberalism are in stark contrast with the demands coming from society and this renders democracy fragile. The situation then becomes paradoxical in that during popular mobilization under authoritarianism democracy is perceived not necessarily as a set of decision-making mechanisms destined to deliver accountability, but as an instrument for the socio-economic improvement necessary to offset the negative consequences of neo-liberal economic reforms introduced under authoritarianism. When democracy comes, though, neo-liberal reforms continue to be imposed and are the only “offer” the international system can make. This weakens the democratic institutions put in place because they no longer

respond to the demands that had sustained popular mobilization. This fits quite well the case of Tunisia.

Kadivar's book is an excellent and most welcome contribution to the debate on why and how democracies fail or survive. The focus on popular mobilization as a positive factor highlights how the strength and legitimacy of society can and should buttress democratic institutions. However, it should also be emphasized that democracy cannot be reduced to mechanisms, procedures, and liberal rights; a more substantive understanding and practice of it is necessary. In 2010 Tony Judt spoke of rediscovering the spirit, values, and policies of social democracy. Doing so might finally provide democratic mechanisms with the substance they need to be genuinely durable and strong.

Retrofitting Leninism: Participation without Democracy in China. By Dimitar D. Gueorguiev. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 256p. \$99.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.
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Retrofitting Leninism is a big and important book. It brings together numerous modes of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governance under one theoretical framework, explaining how China's authoritarian system works through a mixture of control and inclusion. The book fits into the broader category of works that explain China's authoritarian resilience, a veritable cottage industry within Chinese studies since Andrew Nathan's 2003 article of the same name was published in the *Journal of Democracy*. Dimitar Gueorguiev's ambition is to change that debate in several ways, all of which enhance our collective understanding of China's governance puzzle. This review summarizes these contributions and, at the end, raises a question that remains unanswered.

First and foremost, *Retrofitting Leninism*, as the title suggests, brings Lenin back into our conceptualization of the CCP's Marxist roots. A 2011 volume by Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry focused on Maoist contributions, which tend to emphasize the informal, perhaps even anarchic, ways in which Chinese governance could be adaptive and nimble to changing situations on the ground. Gueorguiev, in contrast, focuses on China's Leninist roots, emphasizing hierarchical organization and its ability to achieve "controlled inclusion" of the masses into CCP governance. Controlled inclusion is the practice of inviting popular participation in policy making while gathering information and public opinion in a limited and controlled way. This prevents social mobilization and horizontal networks between citizens from ever gaining sufficient capacity to oppose the state and to threaten the CCP's monopoly over political power.

Retrofitting Leninism is not looking at a new or under-researched aspect of Chinese governance. Indeed the

field's focus on China's authoritarian innovations has yielded numerous concepts that explore this innovation of participatory authoritarianism, including Jessica Teet's "consultative authoritarianism," Chris Heurlin's "responsive authoritarianism," and Wenfang Tang's "populist authoritarianism," to name just a few. Gueorguiev's novel contribution is to focus on the control aspects and how this control, as a deliberate mode of Leninist practice, can help explain why China's authoritarian resilience can withstand public participation without spinning out of control toward political liberalization. The game changer that may be enabling Leninist governance now to achieve what the Soviets failed at is technology—specifically, the Chinese state's ability to monitor, poll, and interact with its citizens.

Gueorguiev's Leninism is narrowly focused on certain facets of Leninist practices of party–society interaction. *Retrofitting Leninism* shows how the party gains legitimacy and popular support through consultative and deliberative practices that are not democratic but yet are unusual in authoritarian governance because they risk activating mass interest in politics and raising expectations about what the state should deliver to citizens. Some of these practices have been deeply integrated into CCP governance since Mao's experiments in Yanan in the 1930s and 1940s, such as the mass line, the quasi-democratic elections of cadres, and a petitioning system that incorporates elements of both Soviet practice and the imperial institutions of dynastic China. As I discuss later in this review, Gueorguiev's theory does not analyze the internal structure of the regime itself nor how changing modes of centralization and the erosion of democratic centralism (another key component of Leninist practice) under Xi Jinping may make controlled inclusion more difficult to sustain when the CCP itself is less resilient and internally cohesive.

Retrofitting Leninism is an empirically rigorous and theoretically ambitious book. It provides a broad theoretical framework that structures the main argument. Yet each empirical chapter can stand alone as an excellent example of a more tractable research question that individually builds the case for Gueorguiev's overall argument that the CCP has mastered the art of governing with social input without sacrificing its autonomy. Chapters 3–8 each provide a key part of the argument about controlled inclusion and its benefits for the regime's legitimacy, responsiveness, and policy stability. But Gueorguiev does not overstate his claims about controlled inclusion. It is not always deployed, and unpopular or sensitive policies might be pushed through without consultation and with brutality. Instead, Gueorguiev argues that when it *is* used, the regime and governance are better for it.

Chapter 3 examines the use of citizen input and feedback in the state's anticorruption campaign. Launched by Xi Jinping in 2013, the anticorruption campaign has been incredibly popular among citizens in China, who have