

The book is essentially a detailed personal success story of a fervently patriotic, anti-Communist, Yugoslav-born citizen who, in devotion to his native country, never wanted to become a naturalized Briton. Still, it was in Great Britain that he obtained his college education (Cambridge), pursued his successful business career in the shipping industry, and served in the British army during World War II, appearing more British than probably most British subjects. Ivanović's success story is many-faceted. The author recounts his participation as a Yugoslav athlete at the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games (where he was not only a hurdler, but a skillful organizer of anti-Nazi behavior while marching before Hitler), as well as his experiences as a spearfishing expert, a world traveler, a philanthropist, and a consul general of Monaco in London.

The essential weakness of the book is that the author is not able to resist the temptation of including in his narrative a myriad of details which, in many cases, do not go beyond the trivia of life, social gossip, or idiosyncratic irrelevance. Thus, for example, a serious section entitled "Communism, Fascism and Nazism" is sandwiched between two sections called "Clothes" and "Coffee," in which a "British" dandy relates his sartorial or beverage preferences about which, I presume, very few readers could really care. Probably half of the book consists of similar small talk, illuminated here and there with amusing anecdotal vignettes. One ends by liking Mr. Ivanović, but fewer details would have made it a better book.

Fortunately, there are strong compensations for the book's weaknesses. Descriptions of the members of his large family, their careers and destinies, are, for the most part, fascinating. Any historian, sociologist, or ethnologist of Yugoslav lands and societies would profit from this autobiography. The second part, "Yugoslavia at War," is even more important and certainly controversial, for not every reader will share the author's opinionated evaluations or sweeping formulations. However, his description of the political and military role of Great Britain in Yugoslav affairs during the last war—especially the role of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE)—is of utmost interest. Stationed in Bari, Italy as a British officer attached to the Political Warfare Executive, the author was well placed to observe and learn many things that do not belong to official versions of war histories, but are essential to history as such. Pages 239–66 are indispensable reading for any investigative student of the Second World War. If Mr. Ivanović had written nothing but these few pages, the experience of reading his book would still be richly rewarding.

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TITO, MIHAILOVIĆ AND THE ALLIES, 1941–1945. By *Walter R. Roberts*.  
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973. xvii, 407 pp. \$15.00.

Walter R. Roberts's *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies, 1941–1945* had its origins with his appointment as counselor for press and cultural affairs in the American embassy in Belgrade in 1960. At that time, he found that there was no satisfactory account of Yugoslavia's role in the Second World War or of the relations of the contending Yugoslav factions with the Allied (or, one might add, enemy) Powers. Undeterred, Roberts began to build up his own picture, and this book, published some thirteen years after his appointment, represents his effort to remedy the gap which he had found. According to the dust jacket, his documentation was derived "in substantial part from research in archives until now unopened, and includes several hitherto highly classified telegrams . . . between Roosevelt and Churchill. He has supplemented these new sources by interviewing or corresponding with hundreds of participants in the drama." Roberts's preface is more modest; he claims that the book "presents verified information from primary sources, much of it unavailable in the published

literature," and lists some forty-three participants with whom he conversed or corresponded.

The substantive questions to which Roberts addresses himself are: Did the Chetniks fight the enemy or collaborate? Was Tito a Soviet agent or a Yugoslav revolutionary? Was Churchill's concern for Yugoslav affairs mainly military or political? Did the Soviet Union deliberately set about to make Yugoslavia into a Soviet satellite? Did Roosevelt's pro-Serb feelings affect U.S. policy? Briefly, he answers that the Chetniks both fought and collaborated, that Tito was more Yugoslav revolutionary than Soviet agent, that Churchill's concern was at first military and only belatedly political, that the Soviet Union saw its chance to nullify Western postwar influence in Yugoslavia and took it, and that Roosevelt's pro-Serb feelings had no effect on U.S. policy because the United States consciously refrained from having a Yugoslav policy. Although Roberts does not verbalize it, the manner of his answer to the last question hints at a belief that the only hope of making a reality of the Churchill-Stalin fifty-fifty formula for Yugoslavia would have been a more positive American attitude.

The source on which Roberts draws most frequently and effectively is the published series of documents, *Foreign Relations of the United States*. The unpublished documents which he quotes—mostly from the F. D. Roosevelt Library and British Foreign Office files—do not, for the most part, materially affect his judgment of the reasons why things went the way they did, though they throw additional light on certain points, particularly intra-American and Anglo-American differences during the latter part of the war. While Roberts was doing his work and since then, other scholars (American, Canadian, British, and Yugoslav) have trawled the German, Italian, British, and American archives more thoroughly or have drawn on the memories of survivors to produce detailed investigations of various aspects of the war in Yugoslavia and of Allied policy making. One major publication of memoirs, Djilas's *Wartime*, has confirmed and supplemented Roberts's account of a controversial episode, the Partisan-German contacts in March 1943. (Roberts does not, as has been suggested, put this episode in the same category as systematic Chetnik collaboration with the enemy, although his distinction between the Chetniks' active collaboration with the Italians and stand-off agreements with the Germans cannot, in view of subsequently published documents, be sustained without qualification.)

These are, however, partial studies—some of them in more than one sense—and, although they correct or supplement Roberts's work in particular, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies* has not been superseded as an overall account of how the Western Allies, uncertain of their priorities and at odds among themselves, lost even the slender chance of influence which they might have gained by a firm and united policy.

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PRINOS KŪM ISTORIATA NA SOTSIALIZMA V BŪLGARIIA. 4th ed. By  
Dimitŭr Blagoev. Sofia: Partizdat, 1976. 558 pp.

To commemorate the one-hundred-twentieth anniversary of the birth of the father of Bulgarian socialism, Dimitŭr Blagoev (1856–1925), the Bulgarian Communist Party released the fourth edition of his *Prinos kŭm istoriata na sotsializma v Bŭlgariia* (*A Contribution to the History of Socialism in Bulgaria*). Blagoev wrote *Prinos* in 1906, when factionalism was still plaguing the Bulgarian Social Democratic Labor Party (BRSDP), which had split into the Narrow Socialist and Broad Socialist parties in 1903. As leader of the Narrow Socialist Party, Blagoev argues against the Broad Socialists throughout the book, justifying his party's claims to be the vanguard of the Bulgarian Socialist movement (the Narrow Party became the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1919). *Prinos*, therefore, is not an objective history of Bulgarian