The final chapter, and perhaps the most important, deals with the causes and prevention of lameness. This is an excellent and very readable review of the subject but it could possibly be extended since this is the crux of the issue.

This book is probably the best available for farmers at present on cattle foot trimming and lameness. It can be recommended. However, there are some inconsistencies and omissions, eg the first illustration contains a labelling error; no indication is given as to how often feet should be inspected for possible trimming, and the depth of foot baths in the diagram is not mentioned. There is little coverage on safety precautions for operators during restraint and foot trimming. As labour is limited on farms, the safe control and restraint of animals while doing this operation is essential. It is considered that this book helps to fill a gap in the market and one is looking forward to seeing a second edition.

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Animal Welfare and Human Values

Rod Preece and Lorna Chamberlain (1993). 334pp. Wilfrid Laurier University Press: Waterloo. Obtainable from the publishers, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5; distributed in the UK by Biblios Publishers Distribution Services Ltd, Star Road, Partridge Green, Horsham, West Sussex RH13 8LD, UK (ISBN 0 88920 227 3) Price C$34.95; £31.

Sensible books about animal welfare are hard to find. Somewhere between the intellectual sandcastles of animal rights philosophers and the battle-trenches of reactionaries there is a middle ground inhabited by caring, thoughtful people seeking to better the lives of animals in our world – but such people, it seems, rarely write books about animal ethics. Happily, the authors of *Animal Welfare and Human Values* dwell solidly in this middle kingdom, although they make a few regrettable forays beyond its borders.

The book really consists of two parts, one intellectual and one practical. The intellectual chapters provide a thoughtful, scholarly critique of the logic that many academic philosophers have applied to animal ethics, and here the authors attempt to develop a more intuitive ethic based on what they call 'sensibility' towards animals. These chapters make many important contributions. The authors offer numerous criticisms of such widely-read works as Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* and Tom Regan's *The Case for Animal Rights*. They point out that both of these writers root their arguments in the tradition of Western liberal individualism which bases morality not on preservation of orderly communities, nor on shared, caring relationships, but on the notion of equality of rights or equality of consideration of interests. Preece and Chamberlain argue that this type of reductionism, which treats a community only as the sum of its individuals, is a faulty basis for ethics even in individualist Western human society, and an absolute hindrance to dealing with animal issues where conflicting individual, collective, ecological, and other considerations need to be taken into account.

In contrast with individualist ethics and their emphasis on equality, Preece and Chamberlain stress that our intuitions of right and wrong hinge on our sense of community and shared relationships with specific others. The impartiality of egalitarian ethics is always in conflict with the partiality we feel to specific loved ones, and our ethical notions must balance these conflicting values. In place of the impartial and egalitarian notions of Regan and Singer, Preece and Chamberlain advance several principles. One is Gandhi's tenet that those (people or animals) who are most helpless have greatest claim on our protection. A second is the communitarian notion that our duties to others depend on the closeness of our shared relationships. Thus we owe more to our families than to other fellow citizens, more to fellow citizens than to more distant persons and so on. Applying this thinking to animals, the authors argue that our responsibilities to animals vary according to the degree of shared relationships; hence, our responsibilities to our pets are greater than our responsibilities to wildlife. The authors note further that the more similarity we perceive between ourselves and animals, the more we tend to treat animals as members of one of our communities. Preece and Chamberlain credit studies of animal behaviour, especially by the great-ape ethologists, with stirring humankind's sense of kinship with other creatures.

The authors offer numerous other valuable ideas. For example they draw a clear distinction between suffering and pain, and they explore the implications of this distinction for animal welfare decisions. Suffering, they argue, although perhaps correlated with pain, 'involves the reflective faculties of the cerebral cortex', which implies that the capacity for suffering is 'significantly more developed in humans and decreases as mental complexity decreases'. If we accept this view of suffering, then Singer's principle of treating the suffering of one being equally with the like suffering of another would lead us to give preferential consideration to different species depending on their mental complexity. For this and other reasons, the authors consider that 'speciesism' is justified – not the crass speciesism that treats other species as of no moral value, but a reflective speciesism that attaches different moral significance to different species because of their mental and other basic differences. Animals are entitled not to equal moral consideration, but to just treatment which respects their nature.

As a general conclusion the authors propose that current problems of animal ethics cannot be solved by the simple formulae proposed by the philosophers of animal rights and animal liberation, and that our best hope for progress lies not in more tightly-argued philosophy but in a revolution of the heart. They cite Sir Francis Bacon's notion that in so far as our human interests are not threatened, we have a natural propensity to respect the interests of animals. They trace this idea through the 'natural compassion' of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the 'unconscious identity' with animals of Carl Gustav Jung. They see progress in animal welfare as depending on society reawakening its 'sensibility' towards animals (defined as emotion 'refined by reflection in relation to compassion') which has been dulled but not erased since the onset of Western civilization. Thus Preece and Chamberlain are respectful of the moral intuitions of people of refined sensibility, but sceptical of the logical systems devised to justify them. They quote a prominent eighteenth century judge who advised his colleagues to avoid giving reasons for their judgements, 'for your judgement will probably be right but your reasons will certainly be wrong'.

The practical parts of the book provide a descriptive account of the major uses of animals in society, which tries to point the way to improved animal welfare while acknowledging that most of the issues are much more complex than is widely realized. The authors seem genuinely concerned to avoid the distortions and one-sidedness of many widely-read accounts of animal use. Their treatment of zoos, for example, is careful to balance competing arguments. On the one hand the authors point to the common problems of disease, filth, social isolation and inadequate space found in the poorest zoos; they describe the disturbed or apathetic behaviour of animals kept under inappropriate conditions and refer to this as 'animal exploitation at its very worst'. However, Preece and Chamberlain distinguish clearly between this unpleasant bath water and the baby it contains. They point out that while the methods of collecting and displaying animals in the past were often abominable, zoos 'managed to maintain a tenuous relationship between the city dweller and the magnificent world beyond' and thus contributed to society's awareness of animals. They point out the contributions made by zoos to conservation, education and research, and to the efforts of the better zoos to create quality space appropriate to the various animal species. Thus, the authors neither whitewash nor blackball the use of animals in zoos, and they identify various ways in which zoo animal welfare can be improved. The book is at its best in chapters such as this, which acknowledge the complexity of the issues, but still identify practical avenues for improving animal treatment.

Unfortunately, not all parts of the book display the same knowledge and balance. Rather than confining themselves to one or two areas of animal use, Preece and Chamberlain try to cover all of the major topics including agriculture, fur, biomedical research, entertainment, and recreational hunting and fishing. It is too demanding a programme and the authors do not always live up to their own standards. While their treatment of companion animals and biomedical research seems knowledgeable, the chapter on animal agriculture is superficial and misleading. They present (as if factual) statements that would outrage conscientious farmers. They claim, for example, that whereas farm families once treated their animals with at least a modicum of respect, 'modern farming techniques now *require* that no respect at all be given' (their emphasis), and that animal diseases are of 'no great concern' to farmers because of the short lifespan of farm animals. The authors rightly point out that certain measures of animal productivity (such as weight gain) are not adequate assurance of well-being, but make no mention of other productivity measures (low disease incidence, improved survival of young, etc) whose pursuit by farmers is arguably fundamental to well-being. They rightly criticize crowded, barren, indoor environments, but seem too willing to dismiss the protection from cold and disease that well-designed indoor housing can provide. Also, while claiming in the Introduction to eschew 'the language of diatribe and invective', they refer to farm animals being 'tortured in their millions every day' and being raised with 'absolutely no respect, no consideration, no caring'.

Despite such shortcomings, in general Preece and Chamberlain bring to animal ethics a fresh if eccentric scholarship. They refer repeatedly to Thomas Hobbes, Edmund Burke and Sir Francis Bacon in sketching the intellectual history of animal ethics (figures rarely mentioned in most other books on the subject), and the text is well leavened with light, erudite asides on historical or linguistic points. However, their reading in more contemporary animal ethics has some remarkable omissions. They cite Singer, Regan and Michael W Fox

repeatedly; yet they scarcely mention the more subtle thinking of Mary Midgley (*Animals and Why They Matter*), and the more synthetic approach of Bernard Rollin (*Animal Rights and Human Morality*), both of which would be more compatible with Preece and Chamberlain's own views. Occasionally they seem to rely too much on secondary sources; for example, they follow Singer in repeating the erroneous view that Descartes denied that animals have feelings. Their knowledge of biology also falls short at times. For example, they repeat the nonsense that apart from a few rare instances, animals 'attack and kill others only for sustenance, survival and territorial protection'. Evidently they have been spared a reading of modern field studies of such nasty but common behaviour as siblicide, infanticide and fatal competition over sexual partners in the animal realm.

On the surface this is an unpretentious book which perhaps tries to be too sober and reasonable to capture the wide attention enjoyed by Singer, Regan, Fox and other strident writers, but anyone who has read those authors should read Preece and Chamberlain as an antidote. If that were not reason enough, the book is also welcome for its fresh contributions to the intellectual history of animal ethics; for its admirable but not always successful attempt to portray the complexity of contemporary ethical issues surrounding animal use, and for its well-argued position that animal welfare must be approached first and foremost as a matter of the heart.

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The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity
Edited by Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (1993). Fourth Estate: London. 312pp. Paperback. Obtainable from the publishers, 289 Westbourne Grove, London W11 2QA, UK (ISBN 1 85702 126 6) Price £9.99.

This book challenges some of our most fundamental conceptions about society and our place in the animal kingdom. In brief, it consists of thirty-one chapters, many written by eminent scientists, supporting the proposition that the great ape should be included in the 'community of equals' with humans. This is defined as the moral community within which certain moral principles or rights governing relationships within the community are accepted, and are enforceable by law. The authors argue that these rights should include: the right to life, the protection of individual liberty and the prohibition of torture. Laws to protect animals are not new, but if the ideas in this book were to be adopted they would represent a major change in legislation, and in the way in which we think about our relationships to non-human animals.

Although this claims to be an international book, the thrust is peculiarly American in its emphasis on human rights which are clearly derived from the Declaration of Independence. This may indeed be justified as the bulk of great ape research takes place in the USA. Unfortunately, the book suffers from a great deal of repetition, perhaps because it is multi-author. Possibly this was a deliberate ploy by the editors to produce an effect.