

Previous explanations of the demise of STV in the United States suggested that it did “too good of a job” of representing racial minorities and leftists. Santucci provides another perspective: STV without parties did not work without slating organizations that attempted to take on the role of parties. Reform coalitions turned into governing coalitions via slating organizations. Even with slating groups recruiting and promoting candidates, the reform’s corrosive effects on parties made for unstable coalitions. Lacking effective coordination, voter error rates were high, candidate quality was low, and coalitions on STV councils shifted rapidly. Slating groups proved unstable, and councils depended on “pork” and logrolling to hold things together. Despite “good government” slates that scholars portrayed as conservative and pro-business, Santucci demonstrates that government spending was higher under STV than plurality elections. An alternate reading could see higher local spending under STV reflecting pro-business candidates channeling spending into Harvey Molotch-like “growth machine” infrastructure investments. Santucci makes a persuasive argument that it instead reflected personal vote-seeking of candidates pursuing the “bailiwick” strategy associated with STV in Ireland.

Santucci argues that twentieth-century STV was used in the United States to “defy an overarching party system” and that slating groups—comprising candidates from various dispersed groups and interests—“did not track the wider party system” (p. 121). Moreover, these slates did not manage to effectively limit the number of candidates they nominated and suffered from voter dealignment and transfer leakage away from candidates on the slate. A resulting “legislative limbo” occurred during which no coalition secured regular control of government. This encouraged counter-reform coalitions to take aim at STV, which was then abandoned in every city by 1961, except for Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The demise of STV in the United States then was not due to it being “too successful” in representing race/ethnic minorities and leftists but due to its intentionally neutering of political parties. Nonpartisan STV hid candidate party labels, came with small councils that could not facilitate multiparty politics, and produced unstable and inefficient coalitions in local legislatures.

Santucci concludes with an examination of prospects for electoral reform in the contemporary era. This treatment raises one question not fully addressed: Why did the majority-preferential systems now in vogue with contemporary reformers “disappear from the map” (p. 177) in the early twentieth century? He notes that political scientists “do not yet know why” but offers some clues that raise questions about prospects for single-winner AV in the United States (aka single-winner RCV). One lesson from this book may be that US STV of the twentieth century and RCV/AV of the twenty-first century have never figured out how to accommodate parties, let alone multiparty politics.

Single-winner AV persists today and “works” in Australia because it works *with* parties: parties control nominations, voter preference rankings are mandatory, parties issue “how to vote cards” to coordinate supporters’ preference transfers, and parties of similar ilk who are coalition partners make agreements not to compete against each other in districts. As such, RCV/AV can complement a multiparty system.

Many contemporary US electoral reformers have advocated single-winner RCV, more recently in state-level races where justifications for these reforms (the de facto non-partisan “Top 4” in Alaska and a similar “Top 5” proposal pending in Nevada) echo some of the motivations of earlier anti-party reformers. Party control of nominations is seen as a problem, with preferential voting without party control of nominations said to lead to “good” outcomes, such as “moderation.” Santucci notes that in a previous era, STV could be effectively marketed as “anticorruption” (read “anti-party”). It seems that we are witnessing this again as reformers herald the supposed virtues of AV in Alaska as eliminating party control of nominations, blurring party lines, and electing “moderate” Republicans (Murkowski) and Democrats (Pelota), regardless of what party organizations might prefer. Santucci’s work challenges us to consider how a contemporary state legislature or the US Congress might function—or not—if such anti-party systems were adopted universally. The answer here seems to be badly, if parties are not better facilitated.

This book should be appreciated for the methodological rigor and detail used to support its claims and conclusions. Some of this is visible reading the main text—spatial maps of voting in STV cities illustrate legislative limbo, ecological inferences estimate support for charter amendments by partisanship, polynomial regression and fixed-effects models estimate spending, and comparative case studies are illuminating. The book includes advertisements for the slating groups that will be invaluable to those teaching this subject. Some of the most engaging bits are about fieldwork and are hidden in the footnotes: for example, about the author finding handwritten minutes of reform group meetings; interviewing surviving family members of elites involved in reform efforts; and going on a car ride with a midcentury party regular who recounted memories of anti-Semitism in coalitions as they made their way to a municipal archive. This is comparative politics of electoral systems reform at its best.

The Trump Effect: Disruption and Its Consequences in U.S. Politics and Government. Edited by Steven E. Schier and Todd E. Eberly. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2022.

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The presidency of Donald J. Trump constitutes a scholarly enterprise that is far from settled, given his combination of

potential criminal indictments and front-runner status in the upcoming GOP primaries. The dominant theme of *The Trump Effect* is the disruption presented by Trump's presidency to the public, institutions, and policy. Each chapter evaluates a piece of the disruptive presidency and its lasting consequences.

The book has three parts. The first three chapters detail the disruptive consequences of Trump's presidency for the public, parties, and the media. Chapter 1, by Todd Eberly, discusses Trump's defeat of Hillary Clinton in 2016 with a populist appeal made primarily to those who did not trust government, producing surprise victories in states like Michigan and Wisconsin. However, Trump's disruption of this group of the electorate did not last. Joe Biden, a demonstrably more likable candidate than either candidate in 2016, carried this group by more than 40 points in 2020. In chapter 2, David Hopkins examines Trump's disruptions to both major parties and the lasting consequences for each. He argues that Trump served as an accelerant to already occurring partisan changes. Non-college-educated whites carried Trump to surprising victories in the Upper Midwest, but they were already leaning Republican, a process that Trump's focus on culture wars sped up. Meanwhile, Trump's focus on cultural issues increased the broadening of representation among Democrats in Congress, electing more women and people of color while appealing more to urban and suburban voters. Essentially, Trump again served as an accelerant to the two parties' already diverging paths, fueling the sharpening of contrasts between red and blue areas. Chapter 3, written by Diana Owen, evaluates Trump's disruptive relationship with the media, again finding evidence that Trump served to accelerate existing patterns. Trump's around-the-clock Twitter activity produced insults, policy positions, and changes in executive branch personnel, accelerating the media use of "churnalism": consistent coverage of an omnipresent source. The media coverage of Trump, which focused mainly on his personality, returned quickly back to normal when it focused on Joe Biden's policy positions.

The second section of the book deals with Trump's disruptions of institutions. Kathryn Pearson explores Trump's accomplishments with Congress. As Pearson notes, Donald Trump signed an expected number of bills into law during the 115th Congress, exploiting unified government for major priorities such as tax cuts, deregulation, and judicial nominations. However, Pearson demonstrates that Trump was loath to get directly involved in the details of legislation, instead deferring to leaders in Congress to accomplish broader agenda goals. Further, Trump failed to accomplish major agenda items such as a repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act and constructing the promised border wall. Importantly, Trump served as an accelerant to polarization in

congressional politics, coupling overwhelming support among congressional Republicans with a lack of support among Democrats. The continued presence of Trumpism in the GOP may make reversing this trend difficult.

In chapter 5, Karen M. Hult examines Trump's disruption of the executive branch. Trump's management style demanded loyalty and produced extraordinary turnover. His fractured relationship with the establishment in the GOP made it difficult to tap experts for key positions. For Hult, Trump's tendency to eschew political appointments and stability in key positions, as well as his unilateral accomplishments focused on deregulation through executive action, could easily be undone by his successor. However, Hult argues that Trump's disruptive executive branch management, particularly the mishandling of COVID-19, did reinforce the importance of expertise within this branch. Additionally, Trump's actions toward civil servants represented career threats that would continue to loom depending on future election results. The reinforced need for expertise was juxtaposed against taking threatening actions against career civil servants, either of which could have long-lasting and disruptive implications.

In chapter 6, Nancy Maveety examines Trump's judicial agenda. Here, Maveety illustrates Trump's likely most long-lasting legacy: the disruption of federal judicial ideology. He appointed an astounding 234 federal justices, including 3 to the Supreme Court. Trump, in consultation with the Federalist Society, published a list of potential Supreme Court Justices during his campaign. Thanks in large part to Mitch McConnell's Senate leadership during both the Obama and Trump presidencies, Trump was given the opportunity to fill many open seats. Appointing a large swath of ideological and young justices with life terms will likely produce a lasting disruption to the federal judiciary.

The third part of the book focuses on Trump's policy legacy. In chapter 7, Andrew Busch explores Trump's domestic policy. Political victories for conservatives include tax cuts, reductions in illegal immigration, and a list of executive actions aimed at deregulation, with only the latter being easily rolled back by President Biden. However, Trump also took policy positions unorthodox to Republicans, including criminal justice reform and a general lack of concern for the federal budget, which had extraordinary consequences for the national debt. Trump's ability to disrupt conservative principles beyond his presidency depends on Republicans' continued adherence to Trumpism, which could have positive implications for the GOP's courting of the African American vote and negative implications for reducing the national debt.

Finally, Steven Schier provides an analysis of Trump's disruptive foreign policy. He details how Trump's America First approach led to several disruptive foreign policy issues throughout his term. From promising a border wall that Mexico would pay for, eschewing long-held alliances

and international agreements, and normalizing relations with adversaries, Trump's approach to foreign policy was among the most disruptive aspects of his presidency. Schier argues that early evidence from the Biden administration demonstrates an effort to restore normalcy in foreign policy, which has been met with a cool reception based on the threat of electoral results leading to further disruption. The potential is there for a lasting disruption of foreign policy due to its dependence on electoral results.

In summary, this book includes variegated perspectives from qualified scholars who break Trump's disruptive presidency and its consequences into manageable pieces. It is accessible to students and would make a strong addition to courses on the presidency generally or on Trump's presidency, in particular. It is also a strong addition to the shelves of scholars of American politics, as we continue to evaluate this unorthodox presidency. As this book shows, many of Trump's accomplishments came through executive actions, which can be undone over time with future executive action. However, Trump's presidency produced successes for his fellow partisans. His tax cuts have not been fully scaled back, and his judicial appointments have the potential to reshape the federal judiciary for decades. As such, this book contributes invaluable insights regarding Trump's political disruption and lack thereof. The extent to which Trump accelerated dangerous processes, including the polarization of parties in Congress and the electorate based on culture wars, is expertly detailed in this book and makes a tremendous yet troubling contribution to the field of American politics.

Constructing Basic Liberties: A Defense of Substantive Due Process. By James E. Fleming. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022. 280p. \$95.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper.

Limits of Constraint: The Originalist Jurisprudence of Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. By James B. Staab. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2022. 464p. \$44.95 cloth.
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As James Fleming notes in *Constructing Basic Liberties: A Defense of Substantive Due Process*, “Our system is not a majoritarian representative democracy but a constitutional democracy in which basic liberties related to personal self-government prevent majorities from dictating how people make certain important decisions fundamentally affecting their destiny, identity, or way of life” (p. 128). The US Constitution creates not a democracy but a liberal democracy: majorities rule—but not over everything. The fundamental question this distinction raises, of course, is where and how we properly draw that line, for the rights of individuals and the powers of government turn on

often-implicit theoretical considerations as to how we are to read and interpret the Constitution and the laws that follow from it.

Both Fleming's book and James Staab's *Limits of Constraint: The Originalist Jurisprudence of Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas* are works of constitutional theory that fall into the camp of those critical of the originalist theory of constitutional interpretation, but they take differing approaches. Drawing on the distinction that Herbert Croly (who does not appear in the index) made in *The Promise of American Life* (1909) between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian traditions in American political thought, Staab argues that Justice Hugo Black should be categorized as Jeffersonian, Justice Antonin Scalia should be seen as Hamiltonian, and Justice Clarence Thomas is “an interesting blend of libertarianism and natural law” (p. 128). This is a densely packed 453-page book, 145 pages of which are endnotes, bibliography, and indexes.

Staab provides sketches of various doctrinal positions taken by Justices Black, Scalia, and Thomas, but the main problem is that these are sketches rather than extended accounts: they offer more breadth than depth. These sketches are interesting, but the reader easily loses sight of the author's overarching argument, which is that Black, Scalia, and Thomas all are or claim to be originalists but nevertheless often end up with conflicting doctrinal positions. In other words, originalism obviously does not function as a consistent interpretive constraint. Making that case requires something more than pointing out those conflicting positions and, in effect, saying, “See?” Readers may be left wondering what this material tells us about US constitutional interpretation in general.

In Staab's account of Scalia's opinions and views of individual rights, for example, one struggles to find any mention, let alone explanation, of why these opinions and views are Hamiltonian or even originalist. We get sketches of doctrinal differences but little help in connecting them to the originalism question and to the broader question of constraint that seems to frame the book. Staab argues at the outset that all three justices are originalists, but he does not really connect that claim in any depth to the doctrinal differences he sketches among them. One can accept his claim that “if these three devout originalists reached contrary results in numerous areas of constitutional law (and sometimes quite dramatically so), then originalism's ‘restraint’ value does not hold up in practice” (p. 3), but I would have liked to know more about how originalists themselves try to explain why originalist judges often reach conflicting doctrinal positions. Staab does not explore this. Reviewers cannot fairly criticize an author for not writing the book they might have preferred, but they can fairly criticize an author for not writing the book the author says he or she has written. What book did Staab want to write—one simply comparing the views of Black, Scalia, and Thomas across various doctrinal areas, which I suggest