

lift your hand . . .” THEY also ordered then: “When you decide to speak, you damned . . . lift your finger . . .” It was truly difficult to place myself in the present reality.

I tried to explain to you, I wanted to explain, but the words did not come. There are no words to explain suffering – the suffering which, passing through the personal level, reaches a social expression in the human being – when the interlocutor has no idea of its profound meaning. I looked at you – I think, with eyes of a wounded animal – and you were smiling kindly and comforting . . . with the very same Bill’s smile, the day we met.

I am ending this apology to you, one week later. Today I went back to the clinic to finish the treatment. You said: “I am afraid I have to give you an injection”. And I answered, anticipating an explanation of my irrational behaviour to come: “I hate them . . . I hate them!” “Yes, I know” – you said softly, and with gentleness and care you went ahead. When you had finished, you whispered reassuringly: “That’s all, my girl, that’s all.”

I am not a girl now . . . years have passed. What made you say that, Sir? – and in the same tone as Bill used to do when he comforted me? Do you know . . . already?

Tragedy and the Soul’s Conquest of Evil

Kenneth Surin

In an interesting and important essay entitled ‘The Soul’s Conquest of Evil’.¹ Professor W. W. Bartley III argues that it is virtually impossible for man to overcome or subdue his own evil will. Bartley claims that it is a *conditio sine qua non* of man’s conquest of evil that he possess self-knowledge, but he is pessimistic about man’s capacity to gain the self-knowledge needed to triumph over his evil will. Bartley quotes with approval the words of C. G. Jung:

The individual who wishes to have an answer to the problem of evil, as it is posed today, has need, first and foremost, of self-knowledge, that is, the utmost possible knowledge of his own wholeness. He must know relentlessly how much good he can do, and what crimes he is capable of, and must beware

of regarding the one as real and the other as illusion. Both are elements within his nature, and both are bound to come to light in him, should he wish – as he ought – to live without self-deception or self-delusion.²

It is Bartley's contention that the search for self-knowledge is a costly and perilous venture, undertaken successfully by only a few exceptional individuals. *Prima facie*, what Bartley and Jung say seems to be not without plausibility; most of us find it hard to be good precisely because we fail to acquire that clarity of vision which is so important if we are to struggle successfully to be moral beings. Nevertheless, Bartley's position cannot be accepted without substantial reservations, and in this essay I propose to examine his position more closely, and attempt to show why I am inclined to reject his arguments.

It is, as we have already noted, an implication of Bartley's position that only a few exceptionally gifted individuals are capable of acting in a truly moral way. For which man, unless he be blessed in some extraordinary fashion, can honestly claim to live without self-deception or self-delusion? A man with the spiritual resources of a Jung *may* be able to live a life that is graced in this way; but such resources do not seem to be at the disposal of most ordinary human beings. Consequently, it would appear that it is not possible, on Bartley's account, for there to be such a person as the virtuous peasant, i.e. a man who is virtuous without needing, or being able, to reflect deeply on the mainsprings of his selfhood. And yet we know, as a simple fact of history, that the peasant can be virtuous – Franz Jägerstätter (to mention just one noteworthy example), who was beheaded by the Nazis in 1943 as an 'enemy of the state' for repeatedly refusing to serve in what he declared to be an 'unjust war', was an Austrian peasant.³ Bartley, one cannot help thinking, is attaching too much importance to self-knowledge when he claims that it is the *sine qua non* of acting morally: complete self-knowledge is virtually impossible to attain, and besides, even if one can achieve it, it does not seem necessary to possess it in order to be virtuous. What Iris Murdoch has to say on the subject of self-knowledge in connection with morality is quite relevant to our argument:

'Self-knowledge', in the sense of a minute understanding of one's own machinery, seems to me, except at a fairly simple level, usually a delusion. A sense of such self-knowledge may of course be induced in analysis for therapeutic reasons, but the 'cure' does not prove the alleged knowledge genuine. Self is as hard to see justly as other things, and when clear vision has been achieved, self is a correspondingly smaller and less interesting object.⁴

My second reservation over Bartley's position is that although self-knowledge may arguably be a necessary condition for the soul's conquest of evil, it is more importantly sometimes a *sufficient* condition for man's conquest *by* the forces of evil. This is exactly what happens in certain forms of tragic experience. Typically, the tragic individual is a man or woman who, after a long and arduous struggle, manages to acquire a measure of self-knowledge, to live (perhaps!) without self-deception or self-delusion, but who then finds himself or herself the victim of a crushing external design which threatens the substance of his or her being.⁵ The Oedipus story, in many ways the paradigm of tragic experience, is about just such a man. Oedipus confidently pursues self-knowledge, but when he achieves it, he finds that it is more than he can bear. The truth that it reveals about his world and his place in it cannot be endured, and so he blinds himself; he refuses to go on looking at what he cannot bear to perceive. A man like Oedipus may now be more able to reckon fully the cost of his own past actions, and of the burdens unthinkingly cast upon him by the actions of kith and kin; he may now have a clearer vision of his purpose in life; but he may still find that life is intolerable — his greater insight into the forces of life that bear down upon him may afflict him all the more with a sense of life's futility and waste. The articulators of tragic experience — the great dramatists and novelists — show us that sometimes self-knowledge can come too late, or be acquired at too great a price, so that the tragic individual, far from being enabled to overcome evil, finds himself more than ever before the powerless victim of arbitrary forces that will destroy any moral advances that he may have made. The tragic individual, despite his greater self-awareness and more highly developed moral consciousness, may find himself so constrained by these forces that he becomes affected by what Jeannette King calls the characteristic "inability of the tragically aware individual to give form and expression to his consciousness in significant action".⁶ All this is very plausible, but it may nevertheless be argued against us that the argument based on the fact of tragic experience is not really relevant — Oedipus, like everybody else, is a creature of his time and culture, in this case the product of an ancient Greek consciousness. However, this argument goes on to say, the 'hermeneutical gap' between this ancient Greek consciousness and our modern consciousness is simply too great to enable us to conceive what it is really like to be an Oedipus, i.e. a tragic protagonist. The tragedy of Oedipus is possible only because the ancient Greeks had a certain conception of heroism, and of how a tragic hero should conduct himself, and this conception is simply not *experientially* available to the man of today. (For this reason some writers, notably

George Steiner, have argued that tragedy is 'dead'.) I do not propose to deal with the substance of this objection – that would take up too much time, and, moreover, it is not within the scope of this essay to deal with the problem of 'hermeneutical gaps' between cultures nor to decide whether tragedy is still an experientially significant art-form. Instead we can bypass this objection by advert-ing to the fact that modern literature provides numerous examples of *modern* individuals who are tragically destroyed even though they have got to know themselves and have grown into moral maturity. The novels of Thomas Hardy, for instance, show us how sometimes the tragic protagonist, having at last acquired a costly self-knowledge, can then destroy himself and others in the very process of attempting to redeem the past. Such tragic individuals may attempt, in perfectly good faith, and with a full consciousness of their motives, to repair the damage of their past actions, and be totally ruined in the process. Acts of atonement and expiation seem, in Hardy's tragic novels, to be utterly futile and insignificant in an apparently indifferent universe. In such a universe it appears, paradoxically, that the individuals who survive are just those persons who appear on the surface to be least equipped to cope with tragic realities. Knowledge, whether of self or others, is no guarantee of happiness or fulfilment or even salvation, as Clym Yeobright, the ill-fated would-be school teacher in Hardy's *The Return of the Native* ruefully acknowledges: "I, who was going to teach people the higher secrets of happiness, did not know how to keep out of that gross misery which the most untaught are wise enough to avoid".⁷ Clym's wife Eustacia dies, along with her illicit lover, Wildeve. Clym survives, he has gained a little in wisdom and humility, but his existence is so poisoned by his tragedy that he longs for death to release him from his suffering. Similarly, in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, Tess, as a result of the isolation and suffering which accompanied her seduction by Alec, slowly loses her self-delusions, and grows into a hard-won maturity. Her final tragedy is that this maturity is unavailing: her quest for a better future which would enable her to surmount her past leads her to the slowly dawning certitude that her future is inextricably bound up with the past she is trying to overcome. She is driven to kill Alec, in the hope that this deed will expiate her past. As Jeannette King correctly remarks, "It is a kind of suicide, aligning her with all the great tragic heroines prepared to die to save or avenge their honour".⁸ Tess's courage, resilience and self-awareness *cannot* prevail over her tragic predicament, and she is finally overwhelmed by what can only be regarded, artistically, as a modality of Fate. The tragic irony is that Tess would probably have survived if she had acquiesced in her fate instead of making a courageous but ultim-

ately futile attempt to come to terms with it.

The thrust of the argument that we have been developing is not really diametrically opposed to Bartley's position – his claim that self-knowledge is a *necessary* condition of man's conquest of evil, and our contention that self-knowledge, in certain forms of tragic experience, is a *sufficient* condition of man's conquest *by* evil, do not really contradict each other: they would do so only if Bartley claimed that self-knowledge is a sufficient condition of man's conquest of evil, and this of course he does not do. If anything, the literary examples on which our argument is based effectively reinforce Bartley's pessimistic conclusion that the conquest of evil is an almost impossibly difficult undertaking. But there is an important difference between our respective positions. For Bartley, the difficulty in overcoming evil resides essentially in the sheer *psychological* complexity of the business of knowing ourselves:

We can neither *act* morally nor evaluate with much competence the actions of other persons without an extraordinarily deep knowledge of ourselves and our surroundings. Without such deep understanding we discriminate only in the clumsiest way between good and bad consequence or between good and bad intention. An important reason for this is that we are much at the mercy of our projections – that is, in the psychological sense, those interior states which we impose on the external world in the course of interpreting it.⁹

Again, it seems difficult to disagree with what Bartley says in this passage. However, as we see it, the conquest of evil is difficult not only because we can at best only hope to be partly successful in the onerous task of getting to know ourselves, but also because the very possession of this obviously valuable self-knowledge can be instrumental in bringing about a man's downfall, as tragic experience indicates. As we have noted, it is perhaps a paradox of tragic experience that disaster invariably bypasses the less self-aware individual, and that it is precisely the person with the greater insight into himself (and others) who tends to be the most afflicted: it is the man who plumbs the depths of himself who often finds himself engaging with a reality that can somehow reduce him to mute incomprehension. He may have gained some knowledge of himself, but life for him still remains

. . . that mysterious arrangement of merciless logic for a futile purpose. The most you can hope from it is some knowledge of yourself – that comes too late – a crop of inextinguishable regrets.¹⁰

Let us attempt now to see how it is that self-knowledge can be instrumental in bringing disaster upon the tragically aware individual.

Conrad depicts this aspect of tragic experience with a deep understanding of the mainsprings of human character. If we follow the various insights to be gained from his novels, we may arrive at the following viewpoint. The tragically aware person may find himself, often very reluctantly, brought up against the finality of the several facets of his own character (the tragic personage invariably having a complex personality) and the character of other persons; indeed, the finality of the external world. Perceiving this finality – a sometimes fatal perception – can lead to action or the failure to act in a crucial situation, and it is the resultant action or failure to act which is instrumental in bringing about the tragic individual's downfall. The individual who is less self-aware, for this very reason rarely engages with the finality of persons and events: his disengagement from the finality of the things of life diminishes his capacity for tragic experience. We may fail to engage with this finality for many reasons: lack of awareness (Bartley's reason); a certain rigidity of character; ill-health; moral laziness; fear, etc. and Conrad is right when he perceives that it is man's drawing back from this finality of things and persons which "prevents so many heroisms and so many crimes".¹¹ The person whose self-knowledge puts him in a position to engage with the finality of things and persons is more likely to be the perpetrator of "so many heroisms and so many crimes". Bartley is correct in saying that the acquisition of self-knowledge is an arduous undertaking, but he seems to overlook the fact that having embarked on this undertaking, and having gained some insight into himself, the self-aware individual who seeks to conquer his evil will is now, perhaps more than ever before, at the mercy of those tragic forces which could destroy his life. There is a crucial sense in which, *pace* Bartley, the individual's task of overcoming the evil in his soul only begins *after* he has engaged with the elements of finality in both himself and in the external world. Self-knowledge, as the articulators of tragic experience point out, is often a merely preparatory stage in an undertaking which reveals its truly difficult nature only when the tragic individual has been brought to an awareness of himself and of his surroundings which enable him to appreciate what is happening, or going to happen to him. This is perhaps the reason why artistic representations of tragic experience sometimes depict the blinding of the tragic protagonist: he cannot bear to see any more of what his self-knowledge has revealed to him. Thus Oedipus puts his eyes out when he perceives the true nature of his relationship to his dead wife, and Clym Yeobright suffers from failing eyesight at the end of *The Return of the Native*. Of course the tragic victim's refusal to continue to look on the realities revealed by his self-knowledge is always a refusal that is laden with ambiguities,

and we cannot therefore expect an absolutely compelling reason (or set of reasons) for the tragic protagonist's repudiation of his unbearable self-knowledge. Nevertheless, the tragic individual's rejection of this self-awareness suggests that self-awareness cannot by itself lead to salvation: how can it, when as a result of gaining this self-knowledge, he is now brought face to face with a reality that will drive him inexorably towards his destruction? The tragic hero or victim (or hero-as-victim) is enabled to see because of his self-knowledge, yes, but what he perceives is – his self-destruction. Thus it is one of the terrible ironies of Sophocles's play that Oedipus, gains his costly self-knowledge in order that the prophecy of Teiresias – "He that came seeing, blind shall he go" – may be fulfilled. Oedipus, like Tess, struggles towards a moral and spiritual maturity, but the self-knowledge he gains so constrains him (as it does Tess) that his self-blinding becomes for him (as her murder of Alec does Tess) a final act of freedom, an almost despairing assertion of the tragic individual's ability to act in the face of the paralyzing external design which threatens to overwhelm him (or her). Such acts are intended to impose a last vestige of coherence on what, for the tragic individual, is in danger of becoming an irretrievably futile and senseless life. It is sometimes easy for the onlooker to be mistaken about the 'inner logic' of the apparently senseless acts that occur in the denouement of tragic events – we tend to think that these events have somehow unhinged the mind of the tragic individual, and that such seemingly pointless and often excessively violent deeds are committed 'while the balance of *X*'s mind has been disturbed' (to mention the standard legal formula that is used in such cases). There are doubtless a great many cases where the tragic individual's mind is unhinged by his experiences, but it may be that some such apparently senseless acts are meant, by some tortuous and involuted logic, to render coherent a life that seems condemned to be futile and meaningless. (If anything, such apparently senseless acts are committed by the tragic individual with the somewhat paradoxical intention of restoring or *retaining* his balance of mind.) The intentionality for such apparently senseless acts is supplied by the tragic individual's life *as a whole*, and not by the feeling of remorse or regret for *particular* baneful actions done in the past – tragic individuals usually regret not so much their hurtful actions in the past, but the fact that they have even been born. They regret the sheer 'facticity' of their lives (to use a notion of Heidegger's). For the tragic personage the very fact of life itself is his sin, and it follows, therefore, that death is the only appropriate end for the tragic hero – only death can be the expiation of his sin. If our arguments are correct, Bartley (it would seem) has been a little too simplistic

founders on the fact of tragedy. That his position founders on the fact of tragedy is perhaps indicative of a deeper weakness in Bartley's conception of morality. This brings me to my third reservation concerning Bartley's position. A great deal of what follows is speculation, because Bartley does not provide a fully developed theory of morality in his writings on the subject.

The fact that Bartley is prepared to attach so much importance to the possession of self-knowledge (as the *sine qua non* of being virtuous or acting rightly) suggests (though it does not entail) that he understands morality as involving, primarily, the making of decisions and the moral assessment of the intentions and actions of others. Morality, understood in this way, is a sort of decision-procedure, which becomes the possession of the man with self-knowledge (who can perhaps be likened to the scientist with the biggest and best computer who is thereby able to know things that other less fortunate scientists cannot know). This conception of morality is somewhat naive — there are no plausible grounds for believing that there is any kind of decision-procedure which the self-aware individual possesses, and which will enable him to work out, in any given situation, what he should do or what appraisals he should make. In morality there are no magical formulae, and if the magician happens to be a good man, virtue can never be one of his arts. The universe is a morally complex, even 'untidy', place: moral dilemmas, perplexities and predicaments are not uncommon. A man needs more, much more, than self-knowledge if he is to thread his way through such a universe. Any theory of morality which acknowledges that evil manifests itself *in concreto* in the acts of human beings will seek to come to terms with the radical contingency and the particularity of human evil. Self-knowledge may (and in most cases it probably will) be an asset to the moral agent, but then it may not. It all depends on the reality which confronts the moral agent. This is not an argument in favour of moral relativism; it only betokens an austere realist conception of morality (which we shall outline shortly).

I have already implied that the only conception of morality which is adequate to the fact of tragedy is an austere realist theory. A realist conception of moral judgment will hold that in his understanding of the connection between self-knowledge and the soul's conquest of evil: he seems to overlook the tragic dimension of human experience, which indicates that self-knowledge, far from enabling the tragic protagonist to master his evil will, is often the very instrument of his downfall. The tragic personage is destroyed because he is *already* in possession of an unbearable self-awareness, and not because he cannot acquire the self-knowledge that is needed for the soul's conquest of evil. Bartley's position

such judgments are descriptive and assertorial, so that they involve claims that can be regarded as, and *known* to be, true or false. Moral judgments are factually cognitive, and changes in values are accompanied by changes in *factual* appreciation; it follows from this that a moral judgment and its negation are incompatible — they cannot both be true. In short, the truth of a moral judgment is determined by the extra-linguistic, mind-independent reality which we call the real world. However, because the recognitional capacities of finite beings are correspondingly limited, there can be moral truths which we do not recognise for what they are — viz the (moral) truth. Hence, when a person undergoes *metanoia*, repents, experiences a moral or spiritual conversion, he comes to perceive a truth that hitherto he had failed to recognise. In a complex and morally untidy universe it is possible for a man's recognitional capacities to be overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of the moral universe. This is precisely what happens in a tragic experience — the tragic personage, for all his moral and spiritual maturity, can be destroyed by an external design supplied by this universe. Action, particularly moral action, in such a complex universe is always fraught with ambiguity and the possibility of failure — the moral individual is a finite being who is trying to grapple, in ways which exceed his unaided practical capacities, with a recalcitrant world. There is more to the world than the finite being can accommodate: man and the world are not entirely suited; we live an act in a world that we have not created (as Heidegger points out).¹² This theory of moral realism is, in effect, a much abbreviated secular restatement of the doctrine of original sin. For if man and his world are not entirely reciprocally suited, and if moral failure can be said to arise from this fundamental discrepancy between man and his world, then there is a sense in which evil (moral failure) *pre-exists* the deeds of evil men. Bartley is right to be pessimistic about the soul's ability to conquer evil. But he is wrong in thinking that this inability stems from man's failure to know himself — a man can know himself and still be destroyed, he can know himself and there can nevertheless be *more* evil (albeit a tragic evil) in the world. Bartley cannot accommodate the fact of tragic evil because his position is essentially Pelagian — this is evident from the following passage in which Bartley briefly describes the sort of person who is to be accounted virtuous (on the basis of his conception of morality):

[The] Cambridge and Bloomsbury Group . . . were preoccupied with the development of the interior life at the same time that they were able to deal shrewdly with the outer world. . . . They were capable of enormous evil, and — knowing it — did considerable good. . . . Yet perhaps the self-conquest that at

least a few of them attained – and which some weaker men mistook for weakness – lay in the kindness and gentleness of which they were capable, that which one finds perhaps best expressed in the novels of Forster.¹³

The good sort of man, then, is the Bloomsbury man, the virtuous man as portrayed in the novels of E. M. Forster. I do not wish to deny that there were good men and women in the Bloomsbury group, nor do I wish to quarrel with Forster's portrayal of the good man in his novels. I am more inclined to the view that the members of the Bloomsbury group were neither very good nor very bad: they occupied a privileged position in society, and this afforded them the money and the leisure needed to cultivate a certain style of life which was neither terribly good nor terribly evil. In general the members of this group believed in the perfectibility of man, they had no sense of 'original sin' – how could they, when they often referred to themselves as 'pagans'? We cannot censure them for being 'pagans', but it is impossible to avoid thinking that their way of life, their profoundest moral convictions, were never really put to the test: G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, for example, seemed never to have a sense of the 'moral schism' that runs through the universe; the profound moral anguish that afflicted their Cambridge colleague Wittgenstein was totally alien to them. I am not claiming that a feeling of *angst* is essential if we are to have genuine moral convictions (this would be patently absurd); rather, my contention is that our moral convictions must always be accompanied by the realisation that evil has an intractably tragic quality, a quality which makes the good man only a 'poor sort of good man'. Thus Wittgenstein seemed to possess this moral poverty, but not Russell and Moore. I am inclined to think that they lacked moral poverty because they had an essentially simplistic conception of moral virtue: Moore, for example, believed that there are only *two* questions with which ethics should be legitimately concerned, namely, 'Has it (i.e. the ethical object) intrinsic value?' and 'Is it a means to the best possible?'¹⁴ But what things possess intrinsic value? Moore's answer, which must seem extraordinarily quaint to a society that has endured Auschwitz and Hiroshima, is:

By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects.¹⁵

It would be fatuous to assert that *all* the members of the Bloomsbury group were as naive as Moore (Keynes, for instance, was more worldly-wise), but we cannot ignore the fact that Moore's *Principia Ethica* (and *ipso facto* the morality of the Bloomsbury


group) has been bypassed by the real world – after Auschwitz our moral consciences do not easily permit us to discern ‘intrinsic value’ in pleasant conversation and in the contemplation of beautiful things. And yet Bartley enjoins us to regard the members of the Bloomsbury group as the exemplars of the soul’s conquest of evil; theirs is the example we should follow!

I have argued that a radically different conception of the nature of human evil is needed before we can account for the fact of tragic evil. The soul *cannot* conquer tragic evil. On the contrary, tragedy is often responsible for the soul’s conquest by evil. The soul cannot conquer tragic evil because tragic evil (and very likely all the more intractable forms of evil as well) pre-exists man’s evil. This evil pre-exists man’s (evil) deeds because man lives and acts in a world that he has not created. For the person who is both a moral realist and a theist the final implication of this argument is obvious: if such evil is to be overcome, it can only be overcome by the creator of the world. Bartley, then is right to be pessimistic about man’s ability to overcome his own evil will. But if my arguments are correct, he is right for the wrong reasons.^{1 6}

- 1 In G. N. A. Vesey (ed) *Talk of God* London, Macmillan, 1969. pp 86-99.
- 2 Quoted in Vesey (ed) *op. cit.* p 98. The original is to be found in C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* London, Collins, 1967. p 362. Bartley expounds his position more fully in his *Morality and Religion* London, Macmillan, 1971, especially pp 49-65.
- 3 On Jägerstatter see the fully documented biography by the American sociologist Gordon Zahn, *In Solitary Witness* New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964.
- 4 *The Sovereignty of Good* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. pp 67-8. A deprecation of the alleged value of self-knowledge is to be found in Coleridge’s poem ‘Self-Knowledge’ in *The Golden Book of S. T. Coleridge* London, J. M. Dent, 1906, p 274:

What has thou, Man, that can be known?
 Dark fluxion, all unfixable by thought,
 A phantom dim of past and future wrought,
 Vain sister of the worm – life, death, soul, clod –
 Ignore thyself, and strive to know thy God!
- 5 Anyone familiar with the writings of Donald MacKinnon on the relation between ethics and tragedy will probably perceive how indebted I am to him. See especially his *The Problem of Metaphysics* Cambridge, University Press, 1974, chaps. 11 and 12; and ‘Ethics and Tragedy’, in his collection of essays *Explorations in Theology* London, SCM Press, 1979, pp 182-195.
- 6 *Tragedy in the Victorian Novel* Cambridge, University Press, 1979, p 107.
- 7 *The Return of the Native* London, Macmillan, 1964, p 371.
- 8 *Op. cit.* p 115. I am indebted to King’s book for several critical insights. I have also benefited from reading R. P. Draper (ed) *Thomas Hardy (The Tragic Novels): A Selection of Critical Essays* London, Macmillan, 1975.
- 9 *Morality and Religion*, p 62.
- 10 Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness* Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, p 100.
- 11 *Almayer’s Folly* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p 123.

- 12 In referring to the work of Heidegger I am mindful of Edward Schillebeeckx's warning that theologians who use Heidegger's work inevitably dissociate the philosopher's thought from his distinctively philosophical sphere of questioning, so that we have what Heidegger himself has called a 'Christian misuse' of his philosophy. See Schillebeeckx, *God the Future of Man* London, Sheed & Ward, 1969, pp 46-7. Schillebeeckx's warning does not really apply to us since we are not formulating a specifically theological argument.
- 13 *Morality and Religion*, p 66.
- 14 *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge, University Press, 1959, p 224.
- 15 *Op. cit.* p 188. Keynes said of the last chapter of *Principia Ethica* that "The New Testament is a handbook for politicians compared with the unworldliness of Moore's chapter on the Ideal". See his *Two Memoirs* London, Hart-Davis, 1949, p 94.
- 16 In constructing this concluding argument I am indebted to several works. My skeletal outline of the moral realist position is borrowed from the more substantial treatment in Mark Platts, 'Moral Reality and the End of Desire', in Platts (ed) *Reference, Truth and Reality* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, pp 69-82; David Wiggins, 'Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 62, 1976, pp 331-78; and *The Sovereignty of Good*. On the pre-existence of evil I am indebted to Paul Ricoeur, "Original Sin: A Study in Meaning", in *The Conflict of Interpretations* Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1974, pp 269-86. An understanding of the atonement which accords with this theory of moral realism is to be found in my forthcoming 'Atonement and Christology', *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 1982.

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