

PARTISANSHIP AND PROTEST

The Politics of Workfare Distribution in Argentina

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Abstract: The Argentine workfare program known as the “Trabajar” program shared many characteristics with other targeted social welfare programs implemented in Latin America in the 1990s, including being subject to accusations that program funds were misused for political gain. This paper tests existing hypotheses concerning the political manipulation of public spending using data from two phases of the program and a measure of fund allocation that improves on that employed in previous analyses of the program. It finds that partisan criteria most often cited in the literature affected distribution under one administration only. It further demonstrates that political protest had a differential impact on the distribution of program funds across time and suggests some reasons for this.

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon known as “pork barrel” politics, or, as Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1133) refer to it, the “tactical redistribution” of government funds for political or electoral gain, has long been a topic of interest for citizens and academics alike. In both the developed and developing world, much of the work of government, from funding road construction to setting tax rates, creates opportunities for politicians to create a benefit for, or place a burden on, a particular, identifiable part of the population.

Whether, when, and how politicians take advantage of these opportunities is a matter of great interest to social scientists. This paper

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contributes to our knowledge regarding the tactical redistribution of public funds for political gain through a statistical analysis of the distribution of funds across provinces for an important workfare program in Argentina, the “Trabajar” program. In addition, this article notes that partisanship is not the only salient political characteristic that politicians may evaluate when distributing funds; it therefore examines the influence of social protest on the distribution of those funds. Using a measure of deviation from ideal fund allocation that improves on that used in past scholarship, statistical analysis indicates that social protest was a significant determinant of distribution in some periods of the program but not in others. This suggests some hypotheses about conditions that affect the strategies politicians use to respond to protest, such as the fiscal cost of satisfying protestor demands as well as a leader’s personal popularity. In addition, the analysis offers support for the importance of partisanship during one presidential administration only. This signals that there may be a relationship between party structure and patterns of spending, in that parties without deep roots in society are more likely to resort to geographically based partisan targeting.

The theoretical literature on pork barrel politics has focused on identifying the groups of constituents to whom a rational, reelection-seeking politician or political party is most likely to redistribute funds. Cox and McCubbins (1986) identify three types of constituents who politicians may target in their redistributive efforts—core supporters, swing voters, and the opposition.² The authors posit that risk-averse politicians are likely to focus their redistributive efforts on core constituents, as “investments” in these constituents are more likely to yield electoral results than investments in other groups. For the purposes of this paper, I refer to this as the “ally” hypothesis. In contrast, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987; 1993) predict that redistribution will target voters who are most easily swayed from their initial partisan predilections—in other words, “swing” voters.³ For the remainder of this paper, I refer to this as the “swing” hypothesis. In later work, Dixit and Londregan (1995; 1996) accommodate both the ally and swing hypotheses in a model that takes into account the ease with which a party can make transfers to different

2. For a more thorough review of the theoretical literature on targeted redistribution, see Schady (2000) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002).

3. The models proposed by the authors discussed in this section assume that individuals make their vote choices based on their underlying noneconomic preferences for each of two parties, combined with specific economic incentives promised by each party. Thus, an individual will vote for a party if promised transfers exceed any difference between the underlying attachment to the two parties. A swing voter can be thought of an individual for whom the difference in underlying attachments to the two parties is quite small.

groups of constituents.⁴ If a party is equally effective at making transfers to all groups of voters, a scenario the authors expect will hold where “policies are administered by an impersonal civil service bureaucracy,” Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1144) predict that politicians will direct funds to swing voters. However, if a party is more effective at accurately making transfers to its core supporters, the model predicts these supporters will benefit the most from targeted spending. In addition, Dixit and Londregan predict that politicians will target low-income groups, whose relatively high marginal utility of income makes them more responsive to targeted spending.⁵

In Latin America, the hypotheses outlined above regarding the use of pork barrel politics have been tested through analyses of targeted social welfare programs. Targeted social welfare programs emerged relatively recently in Latin America and are designed “to sustain or enhance the welfare of poor or vulnerable groups at a time of economic transition” and crisis (Graham 1994, 2). The potential benefits of these programs are clear: in a context where fiscal austerity prevents governments from expanding social spending, safety nets may allow governments to protect their most vulnerable citizens without placing too great a financial burden on the state. Though the benefits provided by targeted programs vary widely from education subsidies to public works projects, programs across countries throughout Latin America nonetheless share a number of characteristics. These programs are usually temporary and thus strongly associated with the administrations that carry them out. In addition, they tend to be highly public, have multiple stated goals, and distribute government funds across discrete subnational units. Together, these characteristics make these programs ideal vehicles for the distribution of government funds to achieve political, not solely social welfare, aims.

Empirical studies of targeted social welfare programs in the region provide evidence of the manipulation of these programs for political gain. A number of scholars have demonstrated that funds for the region’s largest and most studied program, Mexico’s National Solidarity Program, or PRONASOL, were directed to subnational units according to a political logic.⁶ Empirical work on a Peruvian targeted social welfare

4. Note that all these authors theoretically examine promises of future redistribution during the course of a political campaign. Empirical work, however, has used these theories to examine actual distribution of funds. For a justification of this decision see Schady (2000, footnote 12).

5. Of course, as Cox and McCubbins (1986) point out, voter turnout tends to be lower among the poor, which may have a countervailing effect. In Argentina, voting is obligatory, so this is unlikely to affect the analysis undertaken here.

6. See Molinar and Weldon (1994), Magaloni, Estévez, and Diaz-Cayeros (2000), and Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2003), for analysis of the role of partisanship on distribution of PRONASOL funds across states and municipalities in Mexico.

program, FONCODES, also finds some evidence for both the ally and swing hypotheses discussed above. Roberts and Arce (1998) argue that Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori used FONCODES to reestablish his support among poor voters who had abandoned him between his 1990 election and 1993 constitutional referendum. Schady (2000) shows that, as in Mexico, poverty, as well as partisan considerations, can explain the distribution of FONCODES funding across subnational units.⁷

Outside of Latin America, Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find that Swedish municipalities with more swing voters were more likely to receive grants to encourage environmentally sustainable development. Examining public fund distribution in the United States, Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa (2004) find that states governed by the president's copartisans receive more funds, which supports the ally hypothesis.

In addition to the partisan variables that have received extensive attention, some authors examining social welfare programs in the developing world expect that politicians with control over targeted social fund distribution are likely to face pressure to direct funds towards the "politically vocal" rather than the "truly needy" (Graham 2000, 74; Tendler 2000, 96). As Graham (1994, 8) points out, the economically most marginalized sectors of the population tend also to be politically marginalized. Even in demand driven programs, the poorest citizens may be unable to organize to articulate their demands. Stated program goals of helping the most needy may therefore be at odds with politicians' incentives to satisfy politically organized sectors. The difficulties entailed in measuring the "politically vocal" perhaps explains the scarcity of studies that examine it.

An important exception to this lack of focus on the politically vocal is Lodola (2005), who also tests the influence of protest on the distribution of funding for the Trabajar program. He finds that partisanship affected fund allocation during Carlos Menem's administration while protest did not, whereas the opposite held true under Fernando De la Rúa's administration that followed. Using an improved operationalization of funding and allowing for independent variables to have different effects within the same presidential administration through interaction terms, this article reaches different conclusions. It finds that protest, not partisanship, had an important impact on fund distribution during the Menem administration, and that protest shaped distribution during the second year of De la Rúa's tenure, while it had no measurable effect on distribution during his first year in office.⁸ Possible explanations for the

7. Both Schady (2000) and Magaloni, Estévez, and Diaz-Cayeros (2000) find that the timing of fund disbursement was affected by the electoral calendar. Unfortunately, the available data on the Trabajar program does not permit me to test that finding here.

8. Differences in the methods employed by the two papers are discussed in greater detail below.

fact that the politically vocal were at times, but not always, rewarded for their activism are discussed below.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. I offer a brief description of the Trabajar program, noting its importance in Argentina, and review commonly held views of the program's performance. I then discuss variables and statistical techniques before proceeding to the empirical results. Concluding thoughts are offered on the implications of these findings for our understanding of the determinants of politically motivated government redistribution in Argentina and elsewhere.

THE TRABAJAR PROGRAM

This paper focuses on one targeted social program—Argentina's Trabajar program—and analyzes the distribution of funds for that program across Argentina's twenty-three provinces and capital city. Targeted at unemployed poor workers, the Trabajar program funded wage payments to individual beneficiaries in return for their work on small infrastructure projects proposed by local governments and nongovernmental organizations.

Although this paper only examines the Trabajar program, the results have implications beyond this particular social program. Though its budget was relatively small, Trabajar attracted significant public attention.⁹ It covered, at its height, about 300,000 unique beneficiaries—only about 1 percent of the Argentine population, but about 20 percent of the unemployed poor—enough to make it the most important program of its type at the time. The Argentine government's contribution to a World Bank report (2003, 38) on Trabajar notes the program's "high visibility," and Trabajar was often discussed in the media and became a focal point for unemployed protestors. Though the Trabajar program itself has been phased out, it has been replaced by similarly structured programs at both the national and provincial levels.

History of the Trabajar Program

The Trabajar program was first implemented during the second presidential administration of Peronist and Partido Justicialista (PJ) member Carlos Menem (1995–1999). It was eventually carried out over a period of six years under two different presidential administrations. Argentina's deteriorating economic situation in the mid-1990s provided the

9. At its highest level of funding, in the second phase of the program, a total of \$1.2 billion was spent on Trabajar, including World Bank loans and national and local government spending. In contrast, in 1997 alone Argentina spent \$24.4 billion on social spending (excluding pensions, health, and unemployment) (Ravallion 2002, Data Appendix).

impetus for the program. The late 1994 Tequila Crisis sent Argentina into a recession; in May 1996 the unemployment rate was 17 percent overall and 40 percent among the poorest 10 percent of the population (World Bank 2000, 4). In response to increases in unemployment and poverty, the Menem administration created the targeted workfare program known as Trabajar. I refer to this first phase of the program, which was implemented beginning in mid-1996, as Trabajar 1, or T1.¹⁰

With the completion of T1 in mid-1997, a \$200 million loan from the World Bank helped expand the program in its second iteration, known as Trabajar 2, or T2, which continued through mid-1998 (World Bank 2000, 7). A subsequent World Bank loan of \$284 million funded the third iteration of the project, known as Trabajar 3 (T3), which was in place during the final year of the Menem administration and through the administration of Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) party member Fernando De la Rúa, which ended in late 2001 (World Bank 2000, 2).¹¹ The program expanded and then contracted over the course of the three iterations, with annual wage payments to beneficiaries averaging \$77 million under T1, rising to \$160 million under T2, and then falling to \$98 million under T3 (Ravallion 2002, 106).

Structure

Each of the three incarnations of the Trabajar program was similarly organized, with T2 and T3 almost identical in structure and administered under more detailed and formal rules than T1. All three were targeted towards the unemployed poor, with the goals of both alleviating household poverty and improving infrastructure in poor communities.

The program's basic structure combined local project proposal with national and provincial project selection and fund disbursement. Available funds were first distributed from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS) to the provinces. During T2 and T3, the MTSS explicitly calculated the number of individuals falling within the target population (unemployed poor) in each province. Funds were then supposed to be distributed in accordance with these calculations, with provinces having greater numbers of unemployed poor residents receiving more funds.¹²

10. A number of smaller workfare programs had been in place in Argentina previously. The program was created December 29, 1995 through Resolution 576/1995.

11. Elected in October 1999 for a four year term, Fernando De la Rúa was forced to resign in the face of popular protests in December 2001. The Trabajar program was phased out in early 2002 by the subsequent presidential administration, which created a more extensive targeted social welfare program in its place, the *Jefes/Jefas de Hogar* program.

12. According to Resolución 240/1997, which established T2, funds were to be distributed to the provinces in part in accordance with the number of unemployed poor and in part in accordance with increases in registration of workers as part of a national

Within each province, nongovernmental organizations, municipalities, and the provincial government itself all proposed small infrastructure projects, ranging from road construction to sewage improvement. The Trabajar program paid only for the wages of the unskilled laborers who worked on these projects; sponsoring organizations were responsible for costs of materials and skilled labor.¹³ The majority of projects were sponsored by municipalities—67 percent under T2 and 62 percent under T3 (World Bank 2000, 23; 2003, 37). NGOs and provincial governments also sponsored a substantial proportion of projects—19 percent and 13 percent during T2 and 22 percent and 10 percent under T3, respectively (World Bank 2000, 23; 2003, 37). Individual beneficiaries received a monthly stipend of between \$100 and \$200.¹⁴ This amount was intended to be sufficiently low so as not to draw people from the labor force; the remuneration was nonetheless a substantial benefit in a country where most unemployed workers are not eligible for unemployment insurance.¹⁵

The Role of Protest and Poverty

Given the Trabajar program's importance in Argentina, it is not surprising that journalistic reports about it abound. These accounts often emphasize the manipulation of program funds in the distribution to provinces, organized protestors, and individual recipients.

According to newspaper reports, groups of protesting unemployed workers (*piqueteros*) often demanded Trabajar slots in exchange for lifting roadblocks or suspending their protests. Although protest rates varied widely across provinces, where protests took place, the course of events was fairly predictable, with newspapers reporting on standoffs and threats (and sometimes the use) of violence before governors (sometimes in conjunction with national government officials and sometimes alone) explicitly promised slots in the Trabajar program to protestors and the protest ended.

A roadblock in the city of Tartagal in the province of Salta in mid-1997 illustrates one course such an event might take. On May 7, 1997,

program to decrease the number of workers employed "off the books." However, ex-post evaluations suggest that the number of unemployed poor was the sole criterion used (World Bank 2000, 6). Regulations for T3 made the number of unemployed poor the sole criterion for distribution.

13. In an attempt to improve the program's impact on poor communities under T3, limited funds were made available for paying for materials in particularly poor areas (World Bank 2003, 3–4).

14. Throughout the period under study, one Argentine peso equals one U.S. dollar.

15. According to one estimate, Argentina's unemployment insurance covers only approximately 15 percent of the officially unemployed (Mazza 2000).

about 4000 residents of two cities blocked a nearby national highway in protest of high unemployment and loss of jobs that resulted from the privatization of the national oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF).¹⁶ The protestors demanded 5000 jobs and investment in infrastructure as a condition for lifting their roadblock. Over the next week, protracted negotiations took place between the protestors and representatives of the state's Peronist governor, with the mediation of a local Catholic bishop. Along with reports from Salta, Argentine newspapers reported on the national government's frequent allusion to the possibility that the national guard would be sent in to forcibly remove protestors if they did not disperse. After protestors rejected repeated compromise offers, the governor of Salta met protestor demands, promising 5000 new temporary jobs, including 1000 from the Trabajar program. Though exact circumstances varied from protest to protest, this fairly typical sequence of events points to the potential influence of protest on program fund disbursement within and between provinces.

Partisanship, as well as protest, appeared in the press as a possible criterion for manipulation of program funds. During the Menem administration, opposition members of Congress accused the president of using the program as a political tool, citing registries of participants that listed fake names and nonexistent addresses (*La Nación* 1998). During the subsequent De la Rúa administration, opposition Peronist governors accused the executive branch of favoring provinces governed by its own Radical party in the distribution of funds—the same accusation, as one article points out, made by Radical governors against the Peronist Menem administration (*Clarín* 2000).

In contrast, a separate literature largely written by World Bank officials emphasized the Trabajar program's success in reaching the poor. For example, in a survey of a sample of program participants Jalan and Ravallion (2003) found that 75.7 percent of T2 participants had household incomes that placed them in the lowest 20 percent nationally.¹⁷ By this measure, then, the Trabajar programs (or at least T2) were much more pro-poor than most Argentine social welfare programs.¹⁸

However, political manipulation of funds and pro-poor targeting are not mutually exclusive. This is especially true because the Trabajar

16. For greater detail on this incident, see Pastrana (1997) and D'Eramo (1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d).

17. Other papers that emphasize the equitable distribution of Trabajar funds include Ravallion (2000; 2002).

18. Even among funding for social services, traditionally more pro-poor than social insurance, for example, only about 49 percent of funds are directed to individuals in the lowest two deciles of household income (Ravallion 2002, 98, from World Bank 1999 and Gasparini 1999).

program's funding allowed it to reach only a portion of its targeted population. According to the World Bank (2000, 5), phase two of the Trabajar program (T2), with slightly under 300,000 unique beneficiaries, reached about 20 percent of the unemployed poor. Given the large numbers of unemployed poor who did not participate, it is of course possible that the program both reached its targeted population and that political considerations influenced who among the targeted population benefited. The next part of this article explores whether, in addition to benefiting the poor, the Trabajar program was directed towards certain provinces according to a political logic.

EXPLAINING DISTRIBUTION TO THE PROVINCES

Dahlberg and Johansson mention a number of conditions that make a central government program that distributes funds to subnational governments an ideal test of theories of partisan redistribution. Included among these is that the strategic use of funds can be separated empirically from equity and efficiency goals (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002, 27).¹⁹

The data from the Trabajar program meet this criterion uniquely well. Dahlberg and Johansson correctly highlight the difficulty of controlling for equity and efficiency goals of redistributive programs and use data from an environmental program with no such goals. Even when programs do not have equity and efficiency goals it is still difficult to include variables in a statistical model that will accurately capture a program's "ideal" distribution. In the case of the Trabajar program, equity goals were paramount. Nonetheless, accounting for these goals is a straightforward task: government officials explicitly calculated each province's share of the country's total unemployed poor in both T2 and T3.²⁰ These calculations, combined with the program's budget, make it easy to assess whether there were any deviations from the equitable

19. The other criteria they mention—that the central government alone decides on the distribution of funds, that funds are distributed in close proximity to an election, and that voters are aware of the program's existence in their district—were also met by the Trabajar program. Program funds were distributed across provinces by the executive branch. Data analyzed here come from the periods mid-1997 to mid-1998 (in the case of T2) and 2000 and 2001 (for T3). Presidential and congressional elections were held in October 1999, and congressional elections were held again in October 2001, and it is therefore reasonable to assume funds were distributed with an eye to pending elections. I discuss Menem's electoral motivations in more detail below. As mentioned above, the Trabajar program was highly visible and was often the focus of social protest in demand of more funds.

20. Of course, if political considerations affected these calculations of the number of unemployed poor, this criterion is itself politicized. If this is the case, this will create a bias against finding any effect for the variables of interest.

distribution of funds and to explore the relationship between such deviations and other variables of interest. They also allow us to test Dixit and Londregan's hypothesis that, apart from equity concerns, politicians redistribute more to poor areas because of poor individuals' higher marginal utility of income.²¹

The data used to test hypotheses on fund distribution are from the second and third phases of the program, T2 and T3, only. Although data on the distribution of funds are available during T1, these are not comparable with data from the two latter periods, most importantly because no clear criteria for the distribution of T1 funds were established, making it difficult to measure deviations from these criteria. Additionally, there is no data on social protest, one of the key independent variables of interest, for the time period that corresponds to T1. For these reasons, data from T1 are not analyzed here. T2 was administered from 1997 to 1998, wholly during the presidency of Peronist Carlos Menem, and data from T3 used in this paper are taken from the period of the program carried out under the presidency of Radical Fernando De la Rúa. Both T2 and T3 (in contrast to T1) were administered with World Bank financial and technical support.

Data and Variables

In my analysis of program fund distribution to Argentina's provinces, the dependent variable is the percentage deviation in province *i* from the program's ideal spending per targeted person, or *deviation*, measured separately for T2 and T3. Ideal spending per targeted person is calculated for each period for which I have data by dividing the total amount of funds disbursed in that period (summed over all provinces) by the total number of unemployed poor people in the country.²² Any given province's deviation from that ideal is calculated by subtracting the national ideal spending per targeted person from the actual spending per targeted person in that province, dividing that difference by ideal spending per targeted person, and then multiplying by 100 to get a percentage.

The use of this measure of deviation, rather than a direct measure of spending, is the most important methodological difference between this

21. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) are able to test this hypothesis because the program they test has no equity goals. In contrast, much empirical work on programs with equity goals is unable to distinguish between the effect of poverty on distribution for equity or political purposes. See the discussion in Schady (2000).

22. Data on spending and targeted population from T2 is for the entire period over which it was carried out, from mid-1997 to mid to late 1998 (World Bank 2000, 29–31). For T3, I use two years of data: 2000 and 2001, both from the Argentine Ministry of Economy (2005). Data on the targeted population in T3 is from the World Bank (2003, 34–35).

paper and previous analyses of the Trabajar program that examine political determinants of distribution across provinces. The measure of deviation used here has two key elements: first, pesos spent are divided by the number of unemployed poor people in each province, thus allowing for comparison across provinces whose targeted populations varied widely. Second, the measure of spending per targeted person in each province is scaled by the total budget of the relevant period (ideal spending per targeted). This allows for simple comparisons across years, as well. Thus, using deviation as the dependent variable quickly gives the observer an accurate sense of which provinces benefit and lose from the distribution of funds over time.

Even more important to the analysis, scaling the dependent variable by the size of the targeted population makes theoretical sense in the context of the model. We expect our independent variables, such as partisanship and protest, to have linear effects on pesos spent per targeted person, rather than on the total number of pesos spent. So, for example, the statistical analysis supports the swing hypothesis under De la Rúa: as the margin of victory or defeat in the presidential contest increases in a given province, funding is expected to decrease, and, conversely, provinces that have close elections are expected to receive more funds. Tierra del Fuego, with a targeted population of 1,900, Formosa, with 35,000 unemployed poor, and Buenos Aires province, with over 400,000 residents targeted by the Trabajar program, had the three closest elections in 1999, all with margins of difference less than 2 percent. If a president were to reward these provinces, we would not expect him to reward them all equally, but rather in accordance with the size of their targeted populations. Using deviation as the dependent variable will allow us to detect that relationship in an OLS framework. In contrast, using the total peso amount as the dependent variable, even when including population as a control variable, constrains us to estimate that a one-unit change in any independent variable for two otherwise equal provinces is associated with a fixed peso change in spending, regardless of whether the number of unemployed poor people in those two otherwise equal provinces is very large or very small. It thus does not capture the interactive nature of the relationship between independent variables of interest and the size of the targeted population.²³

As mentioned above, program regulations stated that funds would be distributed in accordance with a province's targeted population. In a

23. The different measures of the dependent variable here and in Lodola (2005) explain the papers' different findings with respect to protest in T2. Differences in findings on the role of protest in T3 between Lodola (2005) and this article are also due to the fact that I test for differences in the role of independent variables over time using interaction effects within T3, while Lodola does not.




Figure 1 T2 Deviation

program administered according to its objective criterion alone, the dependent variable, deviation from ideal spending per targeted individual, should be at or near zero for all provinces in each period, with each province receiving the same amount of funds per targeted individual.²⁴ Even a cursory glance at the data indicates that this is not the case.

A histogram in figure 1 shows, in T2 for example, that the percentage deviation from the ideal spending per targeted population varied widely.²⁵ The differences are substantively significant. The ideal spending per unemployed poor person over the course of T2 was \$268. The province of Corrientes received about 39 percent more than that—about \$367 per person, or \$99 “extra” per person over the whole period. With a little over

24. Due to variation in total funds devoted to the program over time, spending per targeted population is not expected to be constant across years.

25. A histogram of deviation from ideal spending per targeted person in T3 shows a similar pattern, though with a greater number of provinces receiving less than the ideal spending. The two provinces with the largest populations—Capital Federal and the province of Buenos Aires—are the only provinces that received less than their “fair” share during T2. Together these provinces contained almost one-third of the entire country’s unemployed poor, and so undercompensating these two provinces created sufficient slack to allow for the overcompensation of all the others—though, as the histogram shows, the degree of overcompensation varied widely. In T3, a larger number of provinces received less than their fair share of funds.

48,000 unemployed poor people in the province, if this level of compensation was constant over time, this means that Corrientes received an additional almost \$4,800,000 over the course of T2, enough to employ about 8,000 people for three months each at a salary of \$200 a month.

The main independent variables of interest are partisan variables and measures of the politically vocal. Most authors posit that politicians use targeted distribution to groups identifiable by their partisan identity (or lack thereof, in the case of swing voters) in a bid to win votes in subsequent elections. As mentioned in the introduction, the Trabajar program's highly public nature and strong association with the national government made it a prime candidate for distribution in this manner.

During the implementation of T2, Menem was serving the second of two constitutionally permitted consecutive terms in office, which raises some questions about the applicability of the vote-seeking logic to fund distribution during this time period. In spite of the ban on immediate reelection, there are a number of reasons to believe that Menem was still seeking votes in the general electorate. Menem and his supporters publicly mounted a bid for his "re-reelection" on legal grounds, and that bid was still very viable until Menem's hand was forced by rival Eduardo Duhalde's call for a referendum on it in the latter's stronghold of Buenos Aires province.²⁶ Though this led to Menem's July 1998 announcement that he would not seek immediate reelection, Menem and his collaborators insisted he was simply looking forward to the 2003 presidential election, and in fact he did run for president again in 2003.

A national executive might identify allied or swing constituencies in two ways: vote share in elections or using the partisan identity of governors. In most studies of fund distribution, different groups of potential beneficiaries are operationalized using the vote share received by the president or ruling parliamentary coalition in the previous national elections (Schady 2000; Molinar and Weldon 1994; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002). The share of core supporters is assumed to be increasing in the share of votes the president received in that province in the previous elections.²⁷ *Presidential share* is a variable that equals the share of votes

26. Menem's supporters argued that his 1995–1999 term in office should count as his first term as president, because it was his first term under the new constitution adopted in 1994 (Helmke 2005). See also Levitsky (2003, 176) on Menem's efforts to avoid the appearance of becoming a lame duck.

27. According to Schady (2000, 290), citing Deacon and Shapiro (1975), "it can be shown that the probability a randomly selected voter in province d voted for a party j is equivalent to the share of the vote for party j in that province." Argentina's president is elected in one nation-wide district, and so an ideal reelection strategy might have entailed targeting funds to units smaller than provinces, such as cities or even neighborhoods. The structure of a program like Trabajar, in which funds were formally allocated to provinces, makes lower-level targeting more difficult and encourages targeting of provinces, even where provincial boundaries per se are not important for reelection.

the sitting president received in the previous presidential election and, if the ally hypothesis holds, is expected to have a positive coefficient.²⁸ In a two-party system, swing voters can be operationalized by taking the absolute value of the difference in the vote share received by the two candidates; in a province where this value is smaller, there are assumed to be more swing voters. Argentina is not strictly a two-party system. For the purpose of determining swing voters, I either treat the third-party candidate as part of a "bloc" with one of the two major party candidates (1995), or disregard the third party candidate because of the small share of votes received (1999).²⁹ The variable, *margin of difference*, increases as the difference in vote shares between the two blocs increases and so is a measure of "nonmarginality." It is expected to have a negative coefficient if, following the swing hypothesis, politicians direct fewer funds to constituencies that are either sure supporters or sure opponents.

I also operationalize a president's allied and swing constituents using the partisan identity of governors.³⁰ *Ally dummy* is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 when the governor of province *i* is of the same party as the president in a given period (PJ in T2 and UCR/FREPASO in T3).³¹ If the ally hypothesis explained above is correct, this should be positive. *Swing dummy* is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when the governor of province *i* is not a member or in a

28. Carlos Menem, elected in 1995, was president during T2 and oversaw the first year of T3; Fernando De la Rúa, elected in 1999, was president during the stage of T3 for which I have data. Where applicable, I have summed the share of votes cast for all relevant parties with the same presidential candidate at the top of their slate.

29. In the 1995 election, Menem faced a candidate from the UCR as well as from the newly formed Frente País Solidario, or FREPASO. By 1997, these latter two parties had formed an electoral alliance, the Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia, y la Educación (Alianza). For the purposes of identifying swing voters, I sum the vote share received by the candidates from each of these parties and treat them as an opposition "bloc." In 1999, third-party candidate Domingo Cavallo received on average less than 10 percent of the votes across provinces. A former Minister of the Economy under both Menem and De la Rúa, Cavallo is not easily categorized as a member of either major party "bloc." To determine the share of swing voters in this election, I simply took the difference between the share of votes received by the two major party candidates.

30. Some authors, including Gibson and Calvo (2000), emphasize that Argentine presidents use government funds in bids to win governor support for key agreements or legislation. A number of characteristics of the Trabajar program made it less likely to be used to gain the support of governors in this way, including the fact that most projects bypassed the provincial government and were implemented by municipalities and NGOs at the local level. Also, unlike discretionary transfers, Trabajar program funds could not be absorbed into provincial budgets to be employed at a governor's discretion. I thank a reviewer for bringing my attention to the need to address this point.

31. President De la Rúa was a member of the century old Radical Party (UCR), which joined a leftist coalition, FREPASO, in an electoral coalition for the 1997 congressional and 1999 presidential elections.

formal alliance with either of the two main parties, the Peronist or the Radical party, in a given period. If the swing hypothesis is correct, this should be positive. During De la Rúa's presidency, the province of Neuquén was the sole province with a provincial party governor not allied with a national party, and this variable is excluded.

Partisan identity of governors is admittedly a rough measure of the location of allied or swing constituencies, especially because intra-party rivalries between the president and governors are sometimes intense in Argentina. Nonetheless, in the period examined in this paper the main partisan cleavage in the country continued to be Radical (Alianza) vs. PJ.³²

There is scant data on political protest in Argentina at the provincial level. I rely on the most widely used measure available, a report that counts the number of roadblocks in each province from 1997 to January 31, 2003 (Nueva Mayoría 2003). Roadblocks became the protest mechanism of choice in Argentina during this period, so the number of roadblocks is a very good proxy for overall levels of protest. A single roadblock in a province with a relatively small population can be expected to create an image of greater overall conflict in that province than a single roadblock in a province with a relatively large population. For that reason, I weight the number of protests by population. The variable, (the natural log of) *protest per capita*, takes on the value of the average number of yearly roadblocks per 100,000 residents carried out in each province using data from 1997 and 1998 for T2, and from 2000 and 2001 for these two years of data from T3.³³ As provinces with higher levels of social conflict are expected to receive more funds, the expected sign of the coefficient is positive.

I also include a number of control variables that may affect the distribution of funds. Dixit and Londregan posit that it is easier to "buy" support in poorer areas, with their higher marginal utility of income. For that reason I include the most widely used measure of poverty in Argentina, the share of a province's population with *necesidades básicas insatisfechas*, or unsatisfied basic needs. The variable *poverty* takes on the percentage of a province with unsatisfied basic needs according to the 1991 census and is expected to have a positive coefficient. Because the size of the targeted

32. Due to the intensity of intra-party rivalry under Menem and his frequent alliances with provincial party governors, two alternative measures of allied governors were tested in the empirical analysis of distribution during T2: in the first, the provinces governed by two of Menem's harshest critics, Néstor Kirchner of Santa Cruz and Eduardo Duhalde of Buenos Aires, were not coded as allied governors, and in the second, all provincial party governors were coded as allies. The results reported in the paper are unchanged in either case.

33. Where 0 roadblocks took place, I replace the value of this variable with the natural log of .01. Findings are robust to alternative measures of protest discussed in the section below.

population (unemployed poor) is incorporated into the measurement of the dependent variable, the inclusion of this variable can be treated as a test of Dixit and Londregan's hypothesis, rather than as a measure of the redistributive nature of the program. Like other work, I control for urbanization (*urban*), which, following existing theories, is expected to have a positive effect on funds received.³⁴ Finally, in light of evidence that larger provinces in Argentina receive fewer funds from the federal government than their smaller counterparts, I control for (the natural log of) population (*population*) (Calvo and Murillo 2004).

Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for the dependent variable (*deviation*) along with the independent variables of interest for each stage of the program and each one's expected effect on the dependent variable.³⁵ Demographic variables are taken from the 1991 census and are therefore constant across the two periods.

In the empirical analysis of funding in T3, data from 2000 and 2001 are pooled, leading to the inclusion of an dummy variable for 2001 and interaction terms when necessary as explained below. In each case, these take the form of the 2001 indicator variable multiplied by the relevant variable of substantive interest.

RESULTS: FUND DISTRIBUTION ACROSS PROVINCES

Two separate analyses are conducted, examining distribution during T2 and T3, respectively. All of the regressions presented here were run with OLS and Strata-calculated robust standard errors. The model that presents results from T3 pools data from 2000 and 2001 and began as a fully interacted model, with an indicator variable for 2001 interacted with all other independent variables. In the interest of parsimony, I then tested down, taking care to exclude interaction terms only when warranted, as detailed in Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005). I always kept the interaction term if the interaction term itself reached conventional levels of statistical significance. In addition, even if the interaction term was not itself significant, I did not necessarily omit that term from the more parsimonious model. Rather, I calculated the coefficient and standard error for the "total" effect when the indicator variable was present to determine if the interaction term could be dropped.³⁶

34. See citations in Schady (2000, 301).

35. Recall that there are 24 observations from T2 (1 for each province), and 48 observations from T3 (1 per province from 2000 and 2001.)

36. In the case of a dichotomous dummy variable, this is a straightforward task. The effect of any variable when the dummy variable equals 1 (in this case, during 2001) is simply the sum of the coefficients from the "baseline" and interacted terms. The standard error for that total effect is calculated using the variance-covariance matrix from

Table 1 Summary Statistics, T2

Variable	Mean	(Std. Dev.)	Min.	Max.	Exp. Dir.
Deviation from ideal (%)	37.74	(50.32)	-61.02	181.71	N/A
Ally dummy	0.58	(0.5)	0	1	+
Presidential vote share	52.74	(7.51)	41.71	76.10	+
Swing dummy	0.17	(0.38)	0	1	+
Margin of difference	12.07	(12.13)	0.79	53.28	-
Protest per capita (ln)	-1.85	(1.76)	-4.61	1.6	+
Poverty	24.66	(8.99)	8.09	39.46	+
Percent urban	79.92	(10.23)	60.69	100	+
Population (ln)	13.39	(1.11)	11.1	16.34	-

Table 2 Summary Statistics, T3

Variable	Mean	(Std. Dev.)	Min.	Max.	Exp. Dir.
Deviation from ideal (%)	6.46	(37.19)	-73.18	129.77	N/A
Ally dummy	0.38	(0.49)	0	1	+
Presidential vote share	49.39	(6.24)	32.31	58.36	+
Margin of difference	14.59	(10.95)	1.15	31.68	-
Protest per capita (ln)	.75	(1.4)	-4.61	3.29	+
Poverty	24.66	(8.99)	8.09	39.46	+
Percent urban	79.92	(10.23)	60.69	100	+
Population (ln)	13.39	(1.11)	11.1	16.34	-

Table 3 shows the results of 2 regressions: the first tests the partisan and protest hypotheses on data from the Menem administration's implementation of T2, and the second tests these same hypotheses on data from T3 and the De la Rúa administration. As detailed above, interaction terms do not by themselves tell us either the size or standard error of the effect of a variable of interest when the indicator variable equals one (in this case, during 2001). For the second model these are presented, along with the coefficients of relevant variables in 2000 for purposes of comparison, in table 4.

I focus first on interpreting the results from the analysis of fund distribution during T2, from the first column of table 3, which does not support either of the partisan hypotheses developed in the literature.

the regression results. Where β_1 is the coefficient on the baseline variable, and β_3 is the coefficient on the interaction term, the standard error of the effect of the variable of substantive interest when the dummy variable equals 1 is given by:

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X}} = \sqrt{\text{var}(\hat{\beta}_1) + \text{var}(\hat{\beta}_3) + 2 \text{cov}(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_3)}$$

Table 3 Distribution of Funds across Provinces, T2 & T3

	Deviation T2 (1)	Deviation T3 (2)
Presidential vote share	1.18 (1.99)	1.13 (.76)
Pres. vote share * 2001 dummy	.	.
Ally dummy	12.85 (13.86)	-12.06 (10.81)
Ally * 2001 dummy	.	.
Margin of difference	-1.02 (1.18)	-1.23** (.45)
Margin of difference *2001 dummy	.	.
Swing dummy	-2.66 (20.15)	.
Protest per capita (ln)	15.00*** (5.75)	-5.99 (3.89)
Protest per capita *2001 dummy	.	25.83*** (8.42)
Population (ln)	-33.55*** (8.56)	-25.02*** (3.73)
Population * 2001 dummy	.	22.05*** (4.91)
Poverty	-1.99* (1.10)	-.06 (.84)
Poverty * 2001 dummy	.	.
Percent urban	-2.09 (1.59)	2.13*** (.72)
Urban *2001 dummy	.	-1.62* (.83)
2001 dummy	.	-211.44*** (79.33)
Obs.	24	48
R ²	.7	.64

*, **, *** indicates significance at the .1, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

Though the ally indicator variable and both vote share variables are in the expected direction, none are statistically significant, and the swing dummy is negative, the opposite of the expected direction.

In contrast, the results demonstrate that protest has a statistically and substantively important effect on funding. Recall that the variable "protest per capita" is actually measured as the log of the number of protests

per 100,000 people.³⁷ In T2, the variable has a mean of -1.85, corresponding to about .16 protests per 100,000 residents. Holding all else equal, a 1-unit increase in the (log of the) number of protests per 100,000 residents is expected to increase the deviation from the ideal distribution of funds by about 15 percentage points. The province of Mendoza is illustrative. With .07 protests per 100,000 people, its level of protest was below the median level during T2, and it received 6.52 percent more funds than we would expect using the objective criterion alone. If, holding all else equal, it had experienced instead .4 protests per 100,000 residents (about a 1 standard deviation increase), the expected deviation from the established criterion would be above 50 percent. Mendoza's size means this would have translated into over an additional \$7 million received during the period.

In the analysis of distribution during T3 from the second column of table 3, tests of the fully interacted model showed that the effect of both variables used to operationalize the ally hypothesis—presidential vote share and a dummy for allied governors—were indistinguishable from 0 in 2000 and 2001, and so these interaction terms were omitted from the model presented here. The model does not support the ally hypothesis; the coefficient on vote share is positive, but not significant, while the coefficient on the ally indicator variable is negative, not in the expected direction.

In contrast, the model does support the swing voter hypothesis. As table 3 shows, during T3, a 1 percentage point increase in President De la Rúa's margin of victory or defeat in a given province was expected to lead to an about 1.25 percentage point decrease in the deviation of funds that province was expected to receive. The mean margin of difference in the 1999 presidential election was 14.59 percent, with a standard deviation of 10.95. A province in which the race was a dead heat (*margin of difference=0*) would expect to receive a deviation from ideal funding per targeted population 13.69 percentage points greater than an otherwise identical province that clearly favored De la Rúa or his main rival, Duhalde (with a margin of difference of 10.95, for example).

The effect of political protest on deviation varies across the two years within T3, as table 4 demonstrates.³⁸ In 2000, the coefficient on protest is negative (the opposite of the expected direction) and not significant. In 2001, however, much as during T2, increases in protest per capita are correlated with significant increases in deviation from ideal fund

37. The findings here are robust to measuring protest using either the raw number of protests or protest per capita, as well. In addition, results are unchanged if we exclude the city of Buenos Aires (Federal Capital) from the analysis due to the concern that some of the protests that occurred in the capital may have been carried out by protestors calling for compensation to other provinces.

38. As with the results of T2 discussed above, results are robust to different ways of measuring protest and to the exclusion of the Federal Capital.

Table 4 Effect of Different Variables on Deviation during T3: 2000, 2001

	(2000)	(2001)
Protest per capita (ln)	-5.99 (3.89)	19.84** (7.97)
Population (ln)	-25.02*** (3.73)	-2.96 (3.4)
Percent urban	2.13*** (.72)	.5 (.79)

*, **, *** indicates significance at the .1, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

distribution. A 1-unit increase in the natural log of protest per capita, or about an additional 2.17 protests per 100,000 population, is associated with an almost 20 percentage point increase in a province's deviation from the funding an otherwise similar province would have received.³⁹ Possible explanations for the changing relationship between protest and spending over time are discussed below.

Of the other variables included in the model, population has the expected (negative) coefficient in 1999 and 2000, though the coefficient on population is not significant in 2001.⁴⁰ In none of the periods does the coefficient suggest that poverty has the positive effect on distribution that Dixit and Londregan expect in light of the poor's higher marginal utility of income. In T2, provinces with higher rates of poverty actually received smaller deviations from their ideal funding, whereas in T3 (both 2000 and 2001) there is no significant relationship between provincial poverty rates and funding, once the targeted population is accounted for (recall that the expected spending per unemployed poor person is already accounted for in the way the dependent variable is measured). Finally, more urban provinces were rewarded in 2000, while urbanization had no significant effect on funding during either T2 or 2001.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The use of deviation from ideal funding as the dependent variable in this analysis, combined with the inclusion of interaction terms to allow the relationship between protest and deviation to vary over time, improves our understanding of the relationship between protest and fund

39. General rates of protest in 2001 were much higher than in earlier years; whereas 1997 and 1998 saw a total of 191 roadblocks combined, there were almost 1,400 such protests in 2001 alone.

40. The province of Buenos Aires, which was significantly undercompensated in both T2 and during 2000, actually received 15 percent more spending per targeted person in 2001 than its "ideal" allocation. The results for population are the same, however, even if we exclude Buenos Aires from the calculations of deviations from spending ideal and from the models themselves.

distribution in the Trabajar program.⁴¹ Although the existing literature has emphasized the importance of partisan considerations in fund redistribution, perhaps the most striking empirical result is the changing effect of protest on fund disbursement over time.

The finding that protest at times had an important impact on fund distribution, and at other times had no discernable effect at all, is surprising. Why would the politically vocal be rewarded at some times, but not at others? We might believe that the Menem government, whose PJ party received significant support from poor communities, would be more responsive to the demands of unemployed protestors. However, newspaper reports from the time show that Menem acceded to protestors' requests quite reluctantly, and rarely without a fight.⁴² Furthermore, piquetero groups were not part of the PJ's traditional labor constituency, and protest organizers often competed with more traditional Peronist party organizational structures at the neighborhood level (Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 90–92).

It is more likely that changes in national administration responses to protestors over time reflect the different circumstances the administrations faced. Roadblocks as a form of public protest in Argentina were just beginning in 1996–1997, coinciding with the beginning of the T2 program. Not knowing how widespread such protests were to become, Menem may have believed that targeting funds towards conflictive areas would mollify protestors and decrease the incidence of such protests, which would have been especially important to Menem in light of his low levels of personal popularity at this time.⁴³ Furthermore, the fact that roadblocks remained relatively isolated incidents during most of his time in office meant that responding to protest was not overly costly. In contrast, by the end of Menem's time in office and De la Rúa's initial months in office, roadblocks had become much more general and the potential cost of responding to protest with greater funding would have risen significantly.⁴⁴

41. Using deviation as a dependent variable and pooling data from 2000 and 2001 without testing for interaction effects would lead to the mistaken conclusion that protest has a significant effect on spending in both years, when, in fact, this is only true for 2001. Data from T2 analyzed here is taken from only one approximately 18-month period of T2, which does not shed light on whether the effect of protest during the Menem administration was subject to changes over time. Nonetheless, additional regression analysis conducted on deviation from ideal funding on a yearly basis from 1997–1999 confirms that protest had a significant impact on distribution throughout the Menem government. I thank Germán Lodola for sharing these data with me.

42. See for example the articles describing the conflict in Salta in footnote 16.

43. By mid-1997, only about 20 percent of Argentines had a positive impression of President Menem (*La Nación* 1997).

44. The total number of protests in the country decreased from 151 in 1997 to 52 in 1998 before increasing again to 252 in 1999, doubling in 2000, and almost tripling from the 2000 level in 2001.

In this context of widespread protest and a huge potential cost of addressing such protest, coming on the heels of a solid victory in the October 1999 elections, De la Rúa's administration made a concerted effort to deal with widespread roadblocks in the first year of his presidency by attempting to "de-nationalize" the crisis and make the provinces share political and fiscal responsibility for roadblocks and social unrest.⁴⁵ This strategy of shifting blame to provincial governments was roundly resisted by the governors and was ultimately unsuccessful.⁴⁶ Svampa and Pereyra identify a massive protest in a suburb of the city of Buenos Aires in November 2000 as a turning point in the De la Rúa government's strategy. This prolonged protest at the capital's doorstep, along with threats of a general strike in sympathy with protestors, forced the national government to take a more active role in negotiations and, as data analysis demonstrates, meet the demands of the politically vocal with funds.⁴⁷ By this point in his presidency, De la Rúa was suffering from low levels of popular approval similar to those Menem experienced in 1997 and 1998, suggesting that the desire to avoid even further decline in his image may affect a president's response to protest.⁴⁸

Returning to the more often examined partisan variables, the ally hypothesis does not explain deviations from the ideal criterion in the distribution of funding for Argentina's Trabajar program under either administration. The swing hypothesis is supported by results from the De la Rúa administration, where provinces with closer elections were rewarded with a greater share of funds, though the same was not true under Menem.

The lack of any support for the ally hypothesis, even in a country where the personalistic setting that Dixit and Londregan posit may be most conducive to it is widespread, is somewhat surprising. In the case of the Trabajar program, there are a number of factors that might explain the different dynamics in the two periods. T2 and T3 were carried out not only under different presidential administrations, but with starkly

45. See for example government reactions to a protest in Salta in May 2000, where a national government representative asserted that the executive branch would not "assume the political cost of all social conflicts that appear in the future, because in many cases the national executive is not the one responsible" (*La Nación* 2000a; Dinatale 2000).

46. In response to the national government rhetoric blaming the provincial government for protests in May 2000, the governor of Salta blamed the national government for the protests in his province (García Sota 2000).

47. World Bank assertions (2003, 13–14) that active governors often intervened on behalf of protestors, especially in late 2001, are confirmed by the statistical analysis. The need to favor more "conflictual" provinces became a formal criterion for program distribution in mid-2000 under the De la Rúa administration (República Argentina 2000).

48. By November 2000 De la Rúa's personal approval had fallen to the single digits, and only about 20 percent of Argentines approved of his administration (*La Nación* 2000b).

different budgets and under presidents from different political parties and with different levels of support among sitting governors. Though both Menem (in 1995) and De la Rúa (in 1999) were elected with nearly 50 percent of the vote, Menem governed with 14 of his copartisans (plus a few sympathetic independent party governors) in power at the provincial level. In contrast, the UCR and its allies under De la Rúa controlled only 9 provinces. The extent of gubernatorial power to mobilize voters in Argentina and the strength of the Peronist machine in penetrating social networks and reaching poor voters in many of the provinces has been well documented (Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2003; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004). While Menem could rely on these preexisting mechanisms to maintain and retain voter support, the UCR had no comparable organizational apparatus. De la Rúa's relatively limited access to similar tools may have prompted an attempt to reach swing voters directly through geographically targeted redistribution. Whether and how politicians redistribute public funds for political gain depends on the relative cost of alternative mechanisms of getting votes. The results presented in this paper suggest that targeting geographic units is more likely when other channels to reach voters are unavailable or very costly.

More broadly, however, the finding that different methods of distribution were present in the two administrations (and, in the case of protest, within a single administration) examined suggests that the common strategy of exploiting data on government distribution for only one government administration or one year at a time is misleading. The results shown here demonstrate that government redistributive strategies change over time, both across and within parties. The goal of empirical tests of hypotheses regarding government redistributive tactics should not be to determine which explanation is "correct," but rather to focus on the conditions under which certain strategies of distribution are more likely than others, such as the effect of access to alternative mechanisms to appeal to voters on the use of geographical targeting, mentioned above.

In sum, this paper contributes to our understanding of government redistributive strategies beyond the Argentine Trabajar program in a number of ways. It introduces a measure of deviation from ideal spending that is easily calculated and is especially valuable when we examine spending over diverse subnational units in a program where total spending changes significantly over time. It demonstrates that the use of partisan targeting of subnational units may vary across administrations. In Argentina partisan targeting was used by the president of the party (UCR) with comparatively more shallow roots in society, while partisanship did not affect distribution by the president of the party (PJ) that more deeply penetrated society. This suggests that further research should examine whether geographic targeting is used more by parties with restricted access to voters through other means. It also shows empirically that partisanship should

not be treated as the only variable of interest in attempts to explain redistributive tactics; social protest has an important effect on redistribution, albeit one that changes over time, reflecting changes in both objective circumstances and political strategies.

Finally, to the extent funds are manipulated for political purposes, are the welfare goals of programs like Trabajar actually being undermined? Ironically, in programs that are not intended to reach the entire universe of possible beneficiaries, targeting partisan groups or the politically vocal may easily coexist with successful pro-poor targeting. Nonetheless, *who* among the poor benefit and *where* remain important questions for citizens who rightfully question whether their governments are following the rules the governments themselves have set.

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